Holomaxx Technologies Corporation v. Microsoft Corporation et al, No. 5:2010cv04924 - Document 30 (N.D. Cal. 2011)

Court Description: ORDER GRANTING 19 MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART. Signed by Judge Jeremy Fogel on 3/11/2011. (jflc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/11/2011)

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Holomaxx Technologies Corporation v. Microsoft Corporation et al Doc. 30 1 2 3 ** E-Filed 3-11-2011 ** 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 SAN JOSE DIVISION 11 12 HOLOMAXX TECHNOLOGIES, a Pennsylvania Corporation, 13 Plaintiff, 14 15 16 Case Number CV-10-4924-JF ORDER1 GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART v. [Re: Docket No. 19] MICROSOFT CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, and RETURN PATH, INC., a Delaware Corporation, 17 Defendant . 18 19 20 21 Defendant Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) moves to dismiss the complaint of 22 Plaintiff Holomaxx Technologies (“Holomaxx”) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) for failure 23 to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The complaint asserts the following claims: 24 (1) violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, et seq. (“Wiretap Act”); (2) violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701, et 25 seq. (“Stored Communications Act”); (3) violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030, et seq. (“Computer 26 Fraud and Abuse Act”); (4) intentional interference with contract; (5) intentional interference 27 28 1 This disposition is not designated for publication in the official reports. Case No. CV-10-4924 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART (JFEX2) Dockets.Justia.com 1 with prospective business advantage; (6) violation of California Penal Code §§ 630, et seq. 2 (“wiretapping/eavesdropping”); (7) violation of California Civil Code §§ 43, et seq. 3 (Defamation); (8) false light; and (9) violation of California Business and Professions Code §§ 4 17200, et seq. (“UCL”).2 For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted, with leave 5 to amend in part. 6 I. BACKGROUND 7 Holomaxx describes itself as an “ecommerce business development company” that 8 provides a number of different services, including “contract[ing] with commercial clients to 9 provide a fully-managed email marketing service . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 13). It sends millions of daily 10 marketing emails on its clients’ behalf. (Id. at ¶ 14). It generates these e-mails from subscriber 11 lists provided by its clients. The lists consist of individuals who either have elected voluntarily to 12 receive such correspondence or who have “opted-in” by co-registration. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-15). 13 Typically, it is paid a “fixed amount per email sent” and receives no compensation for e-mails 14 that are unsuccessfully delivered. (Id.). Holomaxx asserts that it is a legitimate, CAN-SPAM 15 Act compliant email service provider. (Id. ¶¶ at 15-16). It alleges that it takes specific 16 safeguards to ensure such compliance, including: (1) producing e-mails with clear and accurate 17 transmission and header information; (2) including “opt out” mechanisms for users electing not 18 to receive future communications; (3) registering its domains and IP addresses with all available 19 feedback loops; (4) originating all e-mails from the same set of servers; and (5) monitoring the 20 compilation techniques employed by its clients. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-18). As a result of these 21 safeguards, Holomaxx maintains a self-reported complaint rate of between 0.1% and 0.3%.3 (Id. 22 at ¶ 19). 23 Microsoft is a global technology company and a major Internet Service Provider (“ISP”). 24 (Compl. ¶ 20). Microsoft provides free e-mail services to millions of Internet users. (Id.). Like 25 2 26 27 28 The complaint originally named Microsoft and Return Path, Inc. as Defendants. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Defendant Return Path, Inc.,on December 15, 2010. (Dkt. No. 18). 3 According to Microsoft’s feedback loop data, the aggregate complaint rate consistently is approximately 0.5%. (Compl. ¶ 19). 2 Case No. CV-10-4924 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART (JFEX2) 1 most companies that offer e-mail service, Microsoft employs various filtering technologies and 2 procedures that identify and reject potentially harmful communications. (Mot. to Dismiss, 1:11- 3 14; Comp. ¶¶ 20-23). Holomaxx claims that Microsoft relies upon several faulty methods to 4 determine whether incoming mail is spam, including an automated spam filter (“SmartScreen”), 5 a technique known as a “dynamic spam trap,”4 and evaluations from “whitelisting” services such 6 as those offered by Return Path, Inc. (Compl. ¶¶ 20-23). Holomaxx alleges that in practice these 7 methods filter and block legitimate e-mail communications. Holomaxx also claims that 8 Microsoft wrongfullly has refused to offer a remedy for these errors. (Id. at ¶¶20-24). 9 In or about November 2009, Microsoft allegedly began “intermittently blocking, 10 rerouting, and ‘throttling’ (i.e. delaying) emails,” sent by Holomaxx from a block of IP addresses 11 referred to as the “.78 addresses.” (Id. at ¶ 31). Microsoft stopped delaying the e-mails for 12 approximately one month after being threatened with legal action, only to begin blocking them 13 again in June 2010. (Id.). Microsoft continues to block the .78 addresses. (Id.). In May 2010, 14 Holomaxx obtained a different block of IP addresses referred to as the “.88 addresses” that 15 became operative in June 2010. (Id. at 32). In July 2010, Microsoft began blocking the .88 16 addresses as well. (Id. at 33). Holomaxx received error messages stating that rejection of its e- 17 mails “may be related to content with spam-like characteristics or IP/domain reputation 18 problems.” (Id. at 34). Microsoft also indicated that it may have blocked Holomaxx’s e-mails 19 “based on the recommendations of [its] SmartScreen filter.” (Id.). Holomaxx alleges that 20 Microsoft continues to interfere with its legitimate communications and that Microsoft’s refusal 21 to remedy the situation has caused loss of revenue and damage to Holomaxx’s reputation and 22 client relationships. (Id. at 36). 23 24 Holomaxx also claims that Microsoft wrongfully accessed the computer on which Holomaxx’s e-mails were stored, scanned the content of the e-mails, and obtained information 25 26 27 28 4 As described by Holomaxx, a “dynamic spam trap” involves monitoring e-mail addresses that an e-mail service provider believes were abandoned by individual users. Based on its monitoring activities an e-mail service provider will determine whether the e-mails being received by those accounts are spam. (Compl. ¶ 21). 3 Case No. CV-10-4924 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART (JFEX2) 1 therefrom without receiving consent from either Holomaxx or the intended recipients. (Id. at ¶ 2 41). Microsoft allegedly used this wrongfully obtained information, together with a “reputation 3 score” provided by Return Path, Inc., to determine that Holomaxx’s e-mails were spam. (Id.). 4 Finally, Holomaxx alleges that Microsoft communicated or implied to Dragon Networks, 5 Holomaxx’s hosting IP data center, that it believed Holomaxx was sending spam. (Id. at ¶¶ 44- 6 46). It is unclear whether Microsoft initiated this communication with Dragon Networks, or 7 whether the communication was made in response to an inquiry by Dragon Networks after 8 Microsoft blocked all messages originating from the data center’s IP addresses. (Id.). As a 9 result, Holomaxx claims that its reputation was and continues to be damaged, and that its profits 10 and its contractual relationships have been affected adversely. (Id. at 46). It seeks declaratory 11 and injunctive relief; statutory, compensatory and punitive damages; and reasonable costs and 12 attorneys’ fees. (Compl. 42:7-50:22). 13 II. MOTION TO DISMISS 14 “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a 15 cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. 16 Centinela Hosp. Center, 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). For purposes of a motion to 17 dismiss, “all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most 18 favorable to the nonmoving party.” Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th 19 Cir. 1996). However, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not 20 need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 21 ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of 22 the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 23 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Leave to amend must be granted unless it is clear that the 24 complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Lucas v. Department of Corrections, 66 25 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). 26 27 28 III. DISCUSSION Microsoft argues that Claims Three, Four, Five, Six, and Nine, all of which are based on Microsoft’s filtering activities, are subject to an affirmative defense pursuant to the 4 Case No. CV-10-4924 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART (JFEX2) 1 Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230. (Mot. to Dismiss, 1:25-2:4). 2 Microsoft also contends that Claims One, Two, Seven, and Eight are insufficiently pled and fail 3 to state a cognizable claim. (Id. at 2:4-15). In opposition, Holomaxx argues that affirmative 4 defenses are not properly considered on a motion to dismiss, (Pl.’s Opp., 3:20-4:3), and that in 5 any case the CDA does not give Microsoft “blanket immunity” or otherwise provide protection 6 for providers that filter legitimate “business content.” (Id. at 4:3-9). Holomaxx also asserts that 7 each of its remaining claims is pled adequately. (Id. at 9:1-25:1). 8 A. Communications Decency Act (Claims Three Through Six) 9 A principal purpose of the CDA is to encourage ISP’s to engage in effective self- 10 regulation of certain content. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that §230 of the statute is 11 “designed at once ‘to promote the free exchange of information and ideas over the internet and to 12 encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive and obscene material.’” Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 13 570 F.3d 1096, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 14 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Zeran v. American Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 15 1997) (finding that an important purpose of the CDA is to “encourage service providers to self- 16 regulate the dissemination of offensive materials over their services.”). Accordingly, §230(c) 17 provides protection for “good samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material. Pursuant 18 to §230(c)(2): 19 No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of-- 20 (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1) 21 22 23 42 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)& (B). An “interactive computer service” means “any information 24 service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple 25 users to a computer server . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). Significantly, “[n]o cause of action may 26 be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with 27 this section.” 42 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). Moreover, §230(c)(2) “allows [an interactive service 28 5 Case No. CV-10-4924 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART (JFEX2) 1 provider] to establish standards of decency without risking liability for doing so.” Goddard v. 2 Google, 2008 WL 5245490, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008) (Fogel, J.) (citing Green v. 3 American Online, 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3rd Cir. 2002)). 4 1. Whether the Court may consider Microsoft’s affirmative defenses 5 Holomaxx argues that defenses pursuant to the CDA “should not even be considered on a 6 Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” (Pl.’s Opp., 3:20). However, both this Court and others have held to the 7 contrary. (Def’s Reply to Pl.’s Opp., 2:5-13) (citing Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F.Supp.2d 8 1193, 1200 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2009)). The assertion of an affirmative defense properly may be 9 considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion where the defense is “apparent from the face of the 10 [c]omplaint.” Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F.Supp.2d 1193, 1200 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (internal 11 citation omitted); see also Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F.Supp2d 622, 630-31 (D.Del 2007) 12 (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based on application of CDA immunity); see also 13 Jones v. Block, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007) (finding “[w]hether a particular ground for opposing a 14 claim may be the basis for dismissal for [a 12(b)(6) motion] depends on whether the allegations 15 in the complaint suffice to establish that ground . . . .”). Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 2008 WL 16 4217837, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 16, 2008), does not hold otherwise. The section of the CDA at 17 issue in that case is not implicated here, and more to the point, the pleadings themselves 18 presented a question of fact as to whether Google was a “content provider” and thus not entitled 19 immunity at all. Id. 20 2. Whether Microsoft’s filtering decisions qualify for CDA immunity 21 To assert an affirmative defense under §230(c)(2)(A), a moving party must qualify as an 22 “interactive computer service,” that voluntarily blocked or filtered material it considers “to be 23 obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,” and 24 did so in “good faith.” 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(2)(A). Holomaxx does not dispute that Microsoft 25 qualifies as an “interactive computer service,” (Compl. ¶ 20), and other district courts have 26 concluded that ISP’s that provide email services properly are characterized as “interactive 27 computer service” providers. See e360 Insight, LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F.Supp.2d 605 (N.D. 28 Ill 2008); Winter v. Basssett, 2003 U.S. Dist. 26904, at *7 n.4 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 22, 2003) (finding 6 Case No. CV-10-4924 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART (JFEX2) 1 that ISP’s properly are considered interactive computer services under the CDA because they 2 “allow internet users to connect to the internet” and they “provide email services.”). 3 However, Holomaxx contends that §230(c)(2)(a) “ was not intended to immunize the 4 blocking of routine business e-mails.” (Pl.’s Opp., 6:1-3), and that the business content of its e- 5 mails is not the type of content that providers might find “objectionable.” (Id. at 6:1-7:17). It 6 points to Goddard v. Google, Inc., 2008 WL 5245490 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008) (discussing 7 National Numismatic Certification, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 2008 WL 2704404 (M.D. Fla. July 8, 8 2008)), in which this Court acknowledged the vagueness of the word “objectionable” and 9 adopted the application of ejusdem generis in National Numismatic to determine the appropriate 10 scope of §230(c)(2). Goddard, 2008 WL at *6. The Court observed that content that a provider 11 subjectively finds “otherwise objectionable” must have some relationship to the categories of 12 content enumerated by Congress. 13 No court has articulated specific, objective criteria to be used in assessing whether a 14 provider’s subjective determination of what is “objectionable” is protected by §230(c)(2). In 15 e360 Insight, LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F.Supp.2d 605, 608 (N.D. Ill. 2008), the court 16 concluded that virtually total deference to provider’s subjective determination is appropriate. 17 Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to address the issue directly, it has expressed concern about 18 giving providers unfettered discretion. See Zango v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1178 19 (9th Cir. 2009) (Fisher, J., concurring) (expressing concern with a rule under which “providers of 20 blocking software [are] given free license to unilaterally block the dissemination of material by 21 content providers under the literal terms of § 230(c)(2)(A).”). Here, however, it is clear from the 22 allegations of the complaint itself that Microsoft reasonably could conclude that Holomaxx’s e- 23 mails were “harassing” and thus “otherwise objectionable.” Holomaxx acknowledges that it 24 sends approximately three million e-mails per day through Microsoft’s servers, and that at least 25 .5% of these either are sent to invalid addresses or result in user opt-out. (Compl. ¶¶ 17-19). On 26 27 28 7 Case No. CV-10-4924 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART (JFEX2) 1 2 an annual basis, this amounts to more than five million invalid or unwanted e-mails.5 Although Holomaxx pleads conclusorily that Microsoft acted in bad faith, the appropriate 3 question is whether Holomaxx has “pled an absence of good faith.” e360 Insight, LLC v. 4 Comcast Corp., 546 F.Supp.2d 605, 609 (N.D. Ill. 2008). Holomaxx claims that Microsoft uses 5 faulty filtering technology and techniques, (Compl. ¶¶ 9-11, 20-24, 28, 30-31, 48-51, 117), that 6 its decisions are motivated by profit derived from blocking both good and bad e-mails, (Id.), and 7 that it refuses to discuss in detail its reasons for filtering Holomaxx’s e-mails or to provide an 8 acceptable remedy that will prevent the e-mails from being filtered in the future. (Id. at ¶ 34). 9 These allegations are insufficient. Holomaxx alleges no facts in support of its conclusory claim 10 that Microsoft’s filtering program is faulty, nor does it identify an objective industry standard that 11 Microsoft fails to meet. While it suggests that Microsoft is “[p]ossibly seeking to cut costs in its 12 service to its free email service” and alleges based on information and belief that Microsoft 13 profits from requiring senders to join “whitelists,” (Compl. ¶¶ 20-22), it offers no factual support 14 for these allegations. Nor does Holomaxx cite any legal authority for its claim that Microsoft has 15 a duty to discuss in detail its reasons for blocking Holomaxx’s communications or to provide a 16 remedy for such blocking. Indeed, imposing such a duty would be inconsistent with the intent of 17 Congress to “remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering 18 technologies.” 47 U.S.C. § 230 (b)(4). 19 3. Conclusion 20 The first element of Microsoft’s affirmative defense under the CDA is not in dispute. 21 While it is conceivable that Holomaxx could raise an issue of fact as to the second and third 22 elements, it must provide significantly greater factual detail in order to do so. Accordingly, 23 Holomaxx’s third, fourth, fifth, and sixth claims predicated on Microsoft’s filtering and blocking 24 activities will be dismissed, with leave to amend. 25 26 27 28 5 Significantly, the number of messages that result in delivery to invalid addresses or in user opt-outs is calculated with the existing filtering technology and techniques in place. Had Microsoft’s filters been inactive, it is reasonable to assume that the number of invalid deliveries and user opt-outs would be far greater than 0.5%. 8 Case No. CV-10-4924 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART (JFEX2) 1 B. Judicial Notice of Microsoft’s Service Agreement 2 Microsoft contends that it is immune from liability under both the Wiretap Act and the 3 Stored Communications Act because its users specifically consent to the alleged wrongful access 4 to their communications. (Mot. to Dismiss, 13:14-14:7; 16:25-17:3). Microsoft asks the Court 5 to take judicial notice of its Hotmail.com service agreement. Holomaxx opposes this request, 6 disputing the authenticity of the document and arguing that it did not reference the service 7 agreement its complaint, that user consent is not a core issue, and that even if it were the service 8 agreement presents factual issues inappropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss. (Pl.’s Opp. 9 to RJN, 1:2-8). Holomaxx is correct that courts ordinarily “may not consider any material 10 beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 11 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled 12 on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002)); 13 see also MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986). However, courts in 14 the Ninth Circuit may consider documents that are not physically attached to the complaint when 15 authenticity of the documents is not questioned and the complaint relies on the documents, (Lee, 16 250 F.3d at 688), 6 and “a court may take judicial notice of ‘matters of public record.’” Id. 17 (quoting Mack v. South Bay Beer Distrib., 789 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)). 18 Microsoft argues that the first exception applies here because the complaint “repeatedly 19 references” the terms of the service agreement and specifically puts the terms at issue. (Def.’s 20 Mot. to Dismiss, pp. 13-14 fn 3). In fact, Holomaxx alleges that Microsoft “[a]ccessed 21 computers on which Holomaxx’s confidential email communications were stored, and that 22 Defendant[] also scanned the contents of those emails and obtained information therefrom, 23 without the consent of either Holomaxx or the intended recipients.” (Compl. ¶ 41) (emphasis 24 added). This single allegation is insufficient to trigger the “incorporation by reference doctrine.” 25 See e.g., In re Facebook PPC Adver. Litig., 2010 WL 5174021, at (N.D. Cal. Dec, 15, 2010) 26 27 28 6 This exception commonly is referred to as the “incorporation by reference doctrine.” See e.g., In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir. 1999). 9 Case No. CV-10-4924 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART (JFEX2) 1 (Fogel, J.) (taking judicial notice of an “exemplary screen shot” of a web page advertisement as 2 well as copies of “click-through” agreements. Significantly, the authenticity of these materials 3 went unchallenged, specific portions were quoted in the complaint, and the contents formed the 4 foundation of the dispute); In Re Finisar Corp. Derivative Litig., 542 F.Supp.2d 980, 990 n.4 5 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that a company’s closing stock price was “crucial” to the plaintiff’s 6 claims in a shareholder derivative action). Nor is the service agreement a “public record.” See 7 Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that public records are those 8 documents obtained from government and administrative agencies); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 9 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). The request for judicial notice will be denied. 10 C. Violation of the Wiretap Act (Claim One) 11 Holomaxx alleges that Microsoft “intentionally intercepted electronic communications 12 sent by Holomaxx, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.,” (Compl. ¶ 59), and “intentionally 13 used and disclosed the contents of such electronic communications sent by Holomaxx, while 14 knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of 15 those communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511.” (Id. at ¶ 60). It claims that Microsoft 16 intercepted e-mails to evaluate the “spam like characteristics” on the e-mails. (Id. at ¶¶ 59-60). 17 However, while the Court must “take all factual allegations in the complaint as true,” (Ashcroft v. 18 Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.1937, 1949(2009)), it is not required to accept a “legal conclusion couched as a 19 factual allegation.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Here, Holomaxx’s 20 allegations are both conclusory and devoid of factual support. Holomaxx does not explain how 21 Microsoft “intercepted” its communications or how Microsoft “used and disclosed” the contents 22 of those communications. Additional factual detail is necessary in order to permit the Court to 23 make a meaningful assessment of the plausibility of the allegations. 24 D. Violation of the Stored Communications Act (Claim Two) 25 Holomaxx also alleges that Microsoft violated the Stored Communications Act, which 26 prohibits a party from “intentionally access[ing] without authorization a facility through which an 27 electronic communication service is provided; or intentionally exceed[ing] an authorization to 28 access that facility; and thereby obtain[ing] . . . or prevent[ing] access to a wire or electronic 10 Case No. CV-10-4924 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART (JFEX2) 1 communication while it is in electronic storage in such system . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). Here 2 again, Holomaxx does no more than provide a “formulaic recitation of a cause of action” and 3 fails to provide the type of factual support necessary to “raise a right to relief above the 4 speculative level.” Bell Atl.v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). It fails to explain what 5 facility or communication were accessed, or by whom, or how the alleged access exceeded a 6 particular authorization. 7 E. Defamation (Claim Seven) 8 To state a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must establish “the intentional publication of a 9 statement of fact that is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or which causes 10 special damage.” Arikat v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 430 F.Supp.2d 1013, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 11 2006) (citing Smith v. Maldonado, 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645 (1999). Publication means 12 “communication to a third person who understands the defamatory meaning of the statement and 13 its application to the person to whom reference is made.” Arikat, 430 F.Supp.2d at 1020. 14 Holomaxx alleges, on information and belief, that Microsoft “informed Dragon Networks in 15 writing” that it had blocked all IP addresses originating from Dragon Networks because “certain 16 of Holomaxx’s .78 addresses had been rejected ‘for policy reasons,’ and were blocked manually 17 ‘or for spamming.’” (Compl. § 45). Holomaxx does not explain how the alleged statement was 18 defamatory or produce a copy of the alleged defamatory correspondence between Microsoft and 19 Dragon Networks. Nor does it explain how the alleged communication amounts to “a statement 20 of fact that is false.” 21 F. False Light (Claim Eight) 22 As Judge Seeborg recently explained, a false light claim may be maintained only by 23 individuals. Kennedy Funding, Inc. v. Chapman, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116038, at *13-14 24 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (Seeborg, J.). False light implicates an invasion of privacy, (Cort v. St. Paul 25 Fire & Marine Ins. Cos., 311 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2002)), which at common law in California 26 is a right reserved exclusively for actual persons. See e.g., Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson, 110 27 Cal.App.3d 868, 878-9 (1980). “As commonly understood, a corporation . . . is not susceptible 28 to the injured ‘feelings’ associated with invasion of privacy torts.” Kennedy Funding, Inc., 2010 11 Case No. CV-10-4924 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART (JFEX2) 1 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *13-14 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Ion Equipment Corp., 110 Cal.App.3d at 2 878). Because this deficiency cannot be cured by amendment, Claim Eight will be dismissed 3 without leave to amend. 4 G. Unfair Competition Law 5 California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq., prohibits acts of unfair 6 competition, including “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, 7 deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. This statute 8 “was intentionally framed in its broad, sweeping language.” Cal-Tech Communications, Inc. v. 9 Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co., 20 Cal.4th 163, 181 (1999). “[A] plaintiff must have 10 suffered an ‘injury in fact’ or ‘lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition’ to 11 have standing to pursue either an individual or a representative claim under California Unfair 12 Competition Law.” Hall v. Time Inc., 158 Cal.App.4th 847, 849 (2008). 13 To state a claim under the “fraudulent” prong of the UCL, a plaintiff must allege that the 14 challenged practice is likely to deceive members of the public. Bardin v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 15 136 Cal.App. 4th 1255, 1274 (2006). To support liability under the “unfair” prong, the conduct 16 must either “offend[ ] an established public policy or [be] immoral, unethical, oppressive, 17 unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers” or be “tethered to specific constitutional, 18 statutory or regulatory provisions.” Id. at 1268. A violation of the “unlawful” prong of the UCL 19 may be established by a variety of unlawful acts, including those practices prohibited by law, 20 whether “civil or criminal, federal, state, [ ] municipal, statutory, regulatory, or court made.” 21 Because as discussed above Holomaxx has yet to state a viable claim for any actionable 22 wrongdoing, the UCL claim in its present form also is subject to dismissal. 23 24 IV. ORDER Good cause therefore appearing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED, WITH LEAVE TO 25 AMEND as to Claims One through Seven and Claim Nine, and WITHOUT LEAVE TO 26 AMEND as to Claim Eight. Any amended complaint shall be filed within (30) days of the date 27 of this order. 28 12 Case No. CV-10-4924 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART (JFEX2) 1 IT IS SO ORDERED 2 3 4 DATED: March 11, 2011 __________________________________ JEREMY FOGEL United States District Judge 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13 Case No. CV-10-4924 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART (JFEX2)

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