Roberts v. Paulson, No. 5:2008cv04771 - Document 84 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER Denying In Part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 63 ; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program by Judge Ronald M. Whyte. (jg, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/15/2011)
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Roberts v. Paulson Doc. 84 1 2 3 4 *E-FILED - 2/15/11* 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TROY ANTHONY ROBERTS, 12 13 14 15 16 ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ) LIEUTENANT PAULSON and OFFICER ) REID, ) ) Defendants. ) ) No. C 08-4771 RMW (PR) ORDER DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; REFERRING TO PRO SE SETTLEMENT PROGRAM 17 Plaintiff filed this pro se amended civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 alleging that San Francisco County Lieutenant Paulson and San Francisco County Deputy Reid 19 violated his right to be free from excessive force. Defendants have moved for summary 20 judgment, arguing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that they are entitled to 21 judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff has filed an opposition, and defendants have filed a reply. 22 After a review of the record, for the reasons stated below, the court DENIES defendants’ 23 motion for summary judgment. 24 BACKGROUND1 25 Plaintiff was arrested in San Francisco on July 31, 2008. (Decl. Gerchow, Ex. C, 26 Plaintiff’s Deposition Transcript (“Tr.”) at 72.) At the time of his arrest, although plaintiff was 27 28 1 The following facts are taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.08\Roberts771msjdeny.wpd Dockets.Justia.com 1 extremely high from cocaine use, he was coherent. (Id. at 87.) Plaintiff had been on a month- 2 long binge of abusing cocaine. (Id. at 73.) By the time he arrived at the jail, he was no longer 3 high, but was very hungry and tired. (Id. at 94.) At some point, plaintiff had breakfast and fell 4 asleep. (Id. at 124.) 5 Plaintiff was awoken by another inmate who let him know that the guards were 6 conducting a walk-through inspection. (Id. at 124-25, 126.) Plaintiff decided that he wasn’t 7 going to get up and instead, fell back asleep. (Id. at 125.) Plaintiff was woken up at least two 8 more times by inmates, and the inmates urged him to assist in preparation of the walk-through. 9 (Id. at 127-28.) Plaintiff told them that was not going to do so, but offered to tell the officers that 10 he could not participate because he was too tired and needed the rest because he had been on a 11 binge. (Id. at 128.) 12 The inmates explained to plaintiff that the “inspection” involved a clean-up process. (Id. 13 at 135.) Plaintiff was unaware of the process because he had never been in that jail before. (Id.) 14 The inspection involved making the bed, folding the towels, helping to clean up the walls and the 15 shower. (Id.) Plaintiff told the inmates that he was not going to do it. (Id.) 16 Plaintiff got up, put on his clothes and shoes, and asked to speak with a deputy. (Id. at 17 134, 136.) Defendant Paulson came to see him. (Id. at 134.) Plaintiff asked to be reclassified so 18 that he could “detox” from the drugs because he could not participate in the inspection. (Id.) 19 Paulson concluded that plaintiff was being uncooperative. (Id. at 137.) Plaintiff told him that it 20 was not that he did not want to cooperate, but that he was merely too tired to comply. (Id.) 21 Paulson told one of the deputies to “cuff” plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff was cuffed and pushed 22 to the ground. (Id.) Defendant Reid kicked plaintiff in the back of his head. (Id. at 137, 169.) 23 Reid ordered other deputies to push plaintiff’s arms up toward the ceiling while his hands were 24 cuffed behind his back, which forced plaintiff to face down toward the ground. (Amended 25 Complaint (“AC”) at 6.) Plaintiff was escorted, walking backwards, to the hallway and into a 26 “rubber” room. (Tr. at 137; AC at 6.) Once in the rubber room, Paulson watched several 27 officers slam him onto a wooden table, and he was kicked again by Reid. (AC at 6.) Because 28 the key to the handcuffs broke when an officer tried to remove them (AC at 7), officers used Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program 2 P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.08\Roberts771msjdeny.wpd 1 bolt-cutters to cut off his handcuffs. (Tr. at 191.) Plaintiff’s flesh on his left wrist was cut in the 2 process and plaintiff could see his bone. (Id.) He was bleeding heavily. (AC at 7.) Plaintiff was 3 re-cuffed and placed in administrative segregation where he was slammed onto his stomach and 4 kneed in the back while both defendants watched. (Id.) Eventually plaintiff was freed, and then 5 kicked in the head a third time by Reid. (Id.) When plaintiff went to medical that same 6 morning, he received gauze, band-aids, an ace bandage, and naproxen. (Tr. at 249.) As a result 7 of this incident, plaintiff states that he suffered injuries to both his wrists, his left shoulder, his 8 upper and lower back, and his right ankle. (Id.) 9 10 DISCUSSION A. 11 Standard of Review Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits demonstrate 12 that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 13 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect 14 the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute 15 as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a 16 verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. 17 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those 18 portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine 19 issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving 20 party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no 21 reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. But on an issue for which the 22 opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, as is the case here, the moving party need 23 only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. 24 at 325. 25 Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the 26 pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a 27 genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The court is only concerned with disputes over 28 material facts and “factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program 3 P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.08\Roberts771msjdeny.wpd 1 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248. It is not the task of the court to scour the record in search 2 of a genuine issue of triable fact. Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The 3 nonmoving party has the burden of identifying, with reasonable particularity, the evidence that 4 precludes summary judgment. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the 5 moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. 6 B. Evidence Considered 7 A district court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary 8 judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). 9 Here, plaintiff has filed motions to include medical records and other documents (docket nos. 70, 10 71, and 74) as evidence in support of an opposition to defendants’ motion for summary 11 judgment. Defendants have moved to strike the attached documents on the grounds that they are 12 unauthenticated and are inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition. 13 Authentication is a condition precedent to admissibility; unauthenticated documents 14 cannot be considered in a motion for summary judgment. Id. In a summary judgment motion, 15 documents authenticated through personal knowledge must be attached to an affidavit that meets 16 the requirements of Rule 56(e) and the affiant must be a person through whom the exhibits could 17 be admitted into evidence. Id. at 773-74. Hearsay evidence also is inadmissible and thus may 18 not be considered on summary judgment. See id. at 778. Accordingly, the court GRANTS 19 defendants’ motion to strike and will not consider the documents filed in docket numbers 70, 71, 20 and 74. 21 C. 22 Plaintiff’s Claim Plaintiff claims that defendants used brutal force against him in an attempt to “make an 23 example” out of him for not participating in the walk-through inspection. The arbitrary and 24 wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth 25 Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). When prison officials stand accused 26 of using excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is 27 whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously 28 and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Id. at 6-7. In determining whether the use Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program 4 P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.08\Roberts771msjdeny.wpd 1 of force was for the purpose of maintaining or restoring discipline, or for the malicious and 2 sadistic purpose of causing harm, a court may evaluate the need for application of force, the 3 relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the extent of any injury inflicted, 4 the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the 5 severity of a forceful response. Id. at 7. In reviewing these factors, courts must accord prison 6 administrators wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of polices and practices to 7 further institutional order and security. Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 917 (9th Cir. 2001). 8 9 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a post-arraignment pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. Graham v. 10 Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979)). 11 The Eighth Amendment excessive force standard for prisoners and the Fourteenth Amendment 12 substantive due process standard for pretrial detainees are analyzed in the same manner. The 13 analysis of whether the actions of defendants constitute a Fourteenth Amendment violation is 14 informed by White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501 (9th Cir. 1990). In White, the Ninth Circuit stated 15 that to show a violation of substantive due process, a plaintiff must show “egregious government 16 conduct in the form of excessive and brutal use of physical force.” Id. at 1507 (citations 17 omitted). The Constitution does not prohibit uses of force that appear unreasonable in hindsight, 18 so long as the officers were acting in good faith and for a legitimate end. Whitley, 75 U.S. at 19 322. In order for an excessive force case to go to the jury, the evidence must go “beyond a mere 20 dispute over the reasonableness of a particular use of force or the existence of arguable superior 21 alternatives” to support “a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.” Id. 22 Here, plaintiff alleges that Paulson ordered officers to cuff plaintiff and Reid kicked him 23 in the head. Plaintiff also alleges that the group of officers verbally abused him and then 24 slammed him onto a wooden table in the rubber room. Plaintiff claims that he suffered injuries 25 to several parts of his body, including his back, wrists, shoulder, and ankle. 26 Paulson and Reid both averred that they do not remember this incident. (Decl. Paulson at 27 2; Decl. Reid at 2.) Moreover, Paulson asserted that transporting an inmate with his head held 28 down, walking backwards, and handcuffed is the “standard handcuffing and transportation Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program 5 P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.08\Roberts771msjdeny.wpd 1 method used by deputies” to “safely move resistive inmates from one location to another.” (Decl. 2 Paulson at 2.) Further, Paulson stated that “when the lock on a pair of handcuffs becomes stuck, 3 the fastest and safest way to remove the handcuffs is by using bolt cutters.” (Id.) Plaintiff does 4 not dispute these statements. 5 Defendants argue that the extent of plaintiff’s injuries as reported in the medical records 6 contradict plaintiff’s allegations of injuries. Specifically, on the date of the incident, plaintiff 7 was seen for medical treatment and the medical notes indicate, “Seen in clinic complaint of wrist 8 wound due to handcuffs.” (Decl. Goldenson, Ex. A.) The notes do not mention any bleeding, 9 much less heavy bleeding, or any other physical injury, as alleged by plaintiff in his amended 10 complaint. (Id.) One week later, plaintiff returned to seek medical treatment and complained 11 that he had pain in his wrist because, when he was arrested, his handcuffs were too tight around 12 his left wrist; the medical notes do not indicate that plaintiff’s complaints resulted from the 13 challenged incident. (Id., Ex. B.) Three weeks after the incident, plaintiff returned to medical to 14 seek a strong pain medication because he claimed that his hands continued to hurt. (Id., Ex. C.) 15 Later on, however, plaintiff admitted to the nurse that he wanted to have vicodin so that he could 16 sleep at night. (Id.) In plaintiff’s submitted documents, a September 10, 2008 medical record 17 states that plaintiff had a recurring left shoulder pain from a dislocation that occurred in 1997. 18 On January 27, 2009, plaintiff’s medical records indicate that he had a lower back probram 19 which began when he had a motor vehicle accident in 1988. A review of the documents 20 submitted by plaintiff contradicts plaintiff’s version of events. There is no evidence of heavy 21 bleeding due to officers’ cutting his flesh to the bone when removing the handcuffs on August 1, 22 2008, and no evidence of any injuries sustained to plaintiff’s left shoulder, upper and lower back, 23 or his right ankle as a result of the August 1 incident. Moreover, in light of the undisputed 24 statement that the handcuffing and transportation methods used are standard to maintain 25 discipline, force was applied in a good-faith effort, rather than maliciously and sadistically to 26 cause harm. Hudson. 503 U.S. at 6-7. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there is an 27 absence of evidence that defendants’ use of force with respect to handcuffing and transporting 28 plaintiff was done with wantonness or an intent to maliciously cause pain. Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program 6 P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.08\Roberts771msjdeny.wpd 1 However, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Reid’s use of force -- 2 namely, his kicking of plaintiff -- was excessive. According to plaintiff, after he was 3 handcuffed, Reid proceeded to kick him at least three separate times. (Tr. at 169-70.) 4 Defendants dispute that this occurred. None of the medical records make mention of any injuries 5 or complaints of injuries caused by kicking. While the extent of the injury may indicate the 6 amount of force applied, a significant injury is not a threshold for stating an excessive force 7 claim. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his 8 ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape 9 without serious injury. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178-79 (2010) (per curiam). 10 Therefore, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there are genuine issues 11 of material fact as to whether Reid, in fact, kicked plaintiff, and if so, whether application of 12 such force was applied in good faith. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is 13 DENIED. 14 D. 15 Referral to Pro Se Prisoner Settlement Program Prior to setting this matter for trial and appointing pro bono counsel to represent plaintiff 16 for that purpose, the court finds good cause to refer this matter to Judge Vadas pursuant to the 17 Pro Se Prisoner Settlement Program for settlement proceedings on the claims set forth above. 18 The proceedings will consist of one or more conferences as determined by Judge Vadas. The 19 conferences shall be conducted with defendants, or the representative for defendants, attending 20 by videoconferencing if they so choose. If these settlement proceedings do not resolve this 21 matter, the court will then set this matter for trial and consider a renewed motion from plaintiff 22 for appointment of counsel. 23 CONCLUSION 24 1. Defendants’ motion to for summary judgment is DENIED. 25 2. The instant case is REFERRED to Judge Vadas pursuant to the Pro Se Prisoner 26 Settlement Program for settlement proceedings on the remaining claims in this action, as 27 described above. The proceedings shall take place within one-hundred twenty (120) days of 28 the filing date of this order, or as soon as practicable. Judge Vadas shall coordinate a time and Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program 7 P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.08\Roberts771msjdeny.wpd 1 date for a settlement conference with all interested parties or their representatives and, within ten 2 (10) days after the conclusion of the settlement proceedings, file with the court a report 3 regarding the prisoner settlement proceedings. If these settlement proceedings to do not resolve 4 this matter, plaintiff can file a renewed motion for appointment of counsel and the court will then 5 set this matter for trial. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 3. The clerk of the court shall mail a copy of the court file, including a copy of this order, to Judge Vadas in Eureka, California. 4. The instant case is STAYED pending the settlement conference proceedings. IT IS SO ORDERED. 2/14/11 DATED: _________________ RONALD M. WHYTE United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program 8 P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.08\Roberts771msjdeny.wpd
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