Hermosillo v. Santa Clara County Main Jail et al, No. 5:2008cv00915 - Document 20 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT re 14 . Signed by Judge Jeremy Fogel on 7/15/10. (dlm, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/26/2010)
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Hermosillo v. Santa Clara County Main Jail et al Doc. 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 NOT FOR CITATION 9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 For the Northern District of California United States District Court FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 No. C 08-00915 JF (PR) JOSE H. HERMOSILLO, 13 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Plaintiff, 14 v. 15 16 P. CORSO, Defendant. 17 / (Docket No. 14.) 18 Plaintiff, a former inmate in the Santa Clara County Jail, filed the instant civil rights 19 20 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court ordered service of the complaint upon 21 Defendant Sergeant P. Corso, and dismissed the remaining claims for failing to state a 22 cognizable basis for relief under § 1983. Defendant Corso has filed a motion for summary 23 judgment. (Docket No. 14.) Plaintiff has not filed opposition. For the reasons discussed 24 below, the Court concludes that Defendant Corso is entitled to summary judgment and will 25 GRANT Defendant’s motion. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JF\CR.08\Hermosillo915_msj (moot).wpd 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 DISCUSSION 2 I. Standard of Review 3 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that 4 there is ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact and [that] the moving party is entitled to 5 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A court will grant summary judgment 6 “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 7 element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 8 trial . . . since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving 9 party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 11 under governing law, and a dispute about such a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit 12 such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. 13 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Generally, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of 14 15 the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex 16 Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at 17 trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than 18 for the moving party. But on an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of 19 proof at trial, the moving party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to 20 support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. If the evidence in opposition to the motion 21 is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. 22 See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings and by her 23 24 own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ 25 designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex Corp., 477 26 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted). If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the 27 moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 323. 28 /// Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JF\CR.08\Hermosillo915_msj (moot).wpd 2 1 II. Legal Claims and Analysis 2 The Court found cognizable, when liberally construed, Plaintiff’s claim that 3 Defendant Corso placed him in “protective custody” in retaliation for Plaintiff exercising his 4 First Amendment right to complain about jail officials to Internal Affairs. (Compl. at 3-3A.) 5 Retaliation by a state actor for the exercise of a constitutional right is actionable under § 6 1983, even if the act, when taken for different reasons, would have been proper. See Mt. 7 Healthy City Bd. of Educ. V. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977). Plaintiff seeks only 8 injunctive relief, i.e., to enjoin jail officials from the use of “harassment, threats and 9 intimidation” against inmates such as himself, and that the Court order the County to “take 11 prohibiting such malicious practices.” (Compl. at 4.) For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 the necessary steps ti bring [jail officials] into compliance with the lay by setting new policy 12 A. Mootness 13 The jurisdiction of federal courts depends on the existence of a “case or controversy” 14 under Article III of the Constitution. PUC v. FERC, 100 F.3d 1451, 1458 (9th Cir. 1996). 15 “[A] dispute solely about the meaning of a law, abstracted from any concrete actual or 16 threatened harm, falls outside the scope of the constitutional words ‘Cases’ and 17 ‘Controversies’.” Alvarez v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576, 580 (2009) (citations omitted). 18 Whereas standing is evaluated by the facts that existed when the complaint was filed, 19 mootness inquiries require courts to look to changing circumstances that arise after the 20 complaint is filed. ACLU v. Heller, 471 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 2006). A claim is 21 considered moot if it has lost its character as a present, live controversy, and if no effective 22 relief can be granted due to subsequent developments. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 23 (1968); see, e.g., Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 745-46 (9th Cir. 2003) (constitutional 24 challenge requesting declaratory relief to Oregon’s “Budget Reduction Plan” suspending 25 certain criminal proceedings and appointment of public defenders for indigent defendants in 26 those proceedings is moot where at time of appeal plan has expired and appellate court 27 unable to provide any relief to plaintiffs). A claim also may be considered moot if interim 28 relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JF\CR.08\Hermosillo915_msj (moot).wpd 3 1 violation. See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1274 (9th Cir. 2 1998) (claim for injunctive and declaratory relief for unconstitutional blood and urine tests 3 was not mooted by the cessation of the testing because there were lingering effects of the 4 violations that could be remedied, i.e., a defendant retained the test results and could be 5 ordered to expunge the unconstitutional test results from its records). Where injunctive relief 6 is involved, questions of mootness are determined in light of the present circumstances. See 7 Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 528 (9th Cir. 1996). 8 Defendant Corso moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff’s action 9 for injunctive relief is moot and unenforceable against him as the sole remaining defendant to 11 2009, (see Asban Decl. at 2) (Docket No. 15), and that Plaintiff’s release from jail renders his For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 this action. (Mot. at 1.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has not been in custody since July 2, 12 case moot because no case or controversy presently exists before this Court. (Mot. at 3.) 13 Plaintiff has not filed opposition to meet his burden to designate “specific facts showing that 14 there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. 15 The Court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact with regards to 16 Defendant’s contention that no controversy remains or any requested relief for the Court to 17 provide. Because only injunctive relief is involved, the Court must consider the present 18 circumstances to resolve the question of mootness. See Mitchell, 75 F.3d at 528. It is clear 19 that Plaintiff’s non-custodial status means he is no longer subject to the alleged “malicious 20 conduct” of Santa Clara County Jail officials, and a court order enjoining them from such 21 conduct would have no effect on Plaintiff. Furthermore, when an inmate is released from 22 prison or transferred to another prison and there is no reasonable expectation nor 23 demonstrated probability that he will again be subjected to the prison conditions from which 24 he seeks injunctive relief, the claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed as moot. See 25 Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1995); Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 26 876-77 (9th Cir. 1986); see also PUC v. FERC, 100 F.3d at 1459 (federal court cannot issue 27 declaratory judgment if claim is moot); cf. Sadorski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 28 2006) (affirming dismissal of class claim for injunctive relief because inmate was no longer Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JF\CR.08\Hermosillo915_msj (moot).wpd 4 1 incarcerated pursuant to an unlawfully modified sentence and therefore had no personal stake 2 in the outcome of this litigation) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968)). In sum, 3 Plaintiff’s release from custody has rendered his First Amendment claim against Defendant 4 Corso moot as it is no longer a present and live controversy, and the injunctive relief Plaintiff 5 seeks would no longer be effective. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 95. 6 CONCLUSION 7 8 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant P. Corso’s motion for summary judgment is For the Northern District of California United States District Court 9 GRANTED. (Docket No. 14.) 10 This order terminates Docket No. 14. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 DATED: 7/15/10 JEREMY FOGEL United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JF\CR.08\Hermosillo915_msj (moot).wpd 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA JOSE H. HERMOSILLO, Case Number: CV08-00915 JF Plaintiff, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE v. P. CORSO, Defendant. / I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California. That on 7/26/10 , I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office. Jose Horace Hermosillo 1747 S. King Road San Jose, CA 95122 Dated: 7/26/10 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk
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