Sanders v. San Francisco Public Library et al, No. 4:2023cv00211 - Document 41 (N.D. Cal. 2023)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS by Judge Jeffrey S. White granting in part and denying in part 25 Motion to Dismiss. (kkp, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/5/2023)
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Sanders v. San Francisco Public Library et al Doc. 41 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 CHARLOTTE R. SANDERS, Plaintiff, 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 Case No. 23-cv-00211-JSW ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS v. SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC LIBRARY, MICHAEL LAMBERT, and LAWRENCE LINDISCH, Re: Dkt. No. 25 Defendants. Now before the Court is the motion to dismiss Plaintiff Charlotte Sanders (“Sanders)’s complaint filed by the San Francisco Public Library (“Library”) and individuals Michael Lambert and Lawrence P. Lindisch (collectively, “Defendants”). The Court has considered the parties’ 16 papers, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, and HEREBY GRANTS IN PART and 17 DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 18 BACKGROUND 19 Sanders alleges that she worked as librarian at the Library for 19 years, first as a frontline 20 reference librarian and, for the five years prior to her termination, in the Collection Development 21 Office. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 9.) On March 16, 2020, the Library closed its public operation after the 22 Presidential proclamation of a national state of emergency due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (Id. 23 ¶¶ 11, 12.) Sanders was able to shift immediately to work remotely. (Id. ¶ 13.) On June 23, 2021, 24 the City and County of San Francisco (“City”) announced its COVID-19 vaccination policy, 25 which mandated that all City employees report their vaccination status to the City by July 29, 26 2021, and be fully vaccinated no later than 10 weeks after the Federal Food and Drug 27 Administration gave final approval to a vaccine. (Id. ¶ 16.) In September 2021, the City imposed 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 a vaccine mandate, requiring all employees to receive a COVID-19 vaccine unless they qualified 2 for an exemption. (Id. ¶ 22.) On October 1, 2021, Sanders submitted a request for religious exemption from the City’s United States District Court Northern District of California 3 4 mandate. (Id. ¶ 24.) The exemption request detailed Sanders’ “sincerely held religious belief that 5 the use of aborted fetuses, or cells derived therefrom, in the vaccine process is gravely evil and 6 that participating by permitting herself to be injected with those vaccines would compound that 7 moral wrong.” (Id. ¶ 26.) On October 7, 2021, a senior human resources manager for the Library, 8 requested that Sanders submit a “Declaration of Support” from someone who knew of her faith 9 and on October 13, 2021, Sanders submitted the requested declaration. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 28.) Sanders 10 represents that she is a “non-denominational Christian who has been a practicing Christian since 11 childhood and regularly attends church. She underwent an intense spiritual awakening in 2010. 12 After much prayer and contemplation, Ms. Sanders stopped vaccinating that same year.” (Id. ¶ 13 29.) 14 After several conversations about Sanders’ medical history, on October 29, 2021, the 15 Library denied the exemption request because: “(1) an accommodation would pose a direct threat 16 to the health and safety of others and/or Ms. Sanders, (2) an accommodation would prevent Ms. 17 Sanders from performing essential function(s), and (3) an accommodation would result in undue 18 hardship for the City.” (Id. ¶ 40.) In accordance with Skelly v. State Personnel Board, 15 Cal.3d 19 194 (1975 (“Skelly”), the City provided notice that it intended to terminate Sanders’ employment 20 for failure to comply with the vaccine mandate and held a hearing which upheld this decision. (Id. 21 ¶¶ 41-44.) Defendant Lawrence Lindisch acted as the Skelly officer and upheld the City’s decision 22 to terminate Sanders. (Id. ¶ 44.) Defendant Michael Lambert allegedly affirmed Lindisch’s 23 findings and signed a letter dismissing Sanders on November 29, 2021, followed by a final notice 24 of dismissal dated April 4, 2022. (Id. ¶¶ 46, 47.) 25 After exhausting her remedies with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and 26 receiving a right-to-sue letter, Sanders filed this lawsuit 91 days later against the Library, and 27 individuals Lindisch and Lambert. She asserts two claims for violation of the First Amendment’s 28 Free Exercise Clause pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983, one against the Defendants in their 2 1 individual capacities and one in their official capacities. Sanders also asserts a claim for violation 2 of Title VII against the Library. On May 9, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of United States District Court Northern District of California 3 4 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. 5 Defendants contend that (1) Sanders’ claim for violation of Title VII is time-barred because she 6 failed to initiate this lawsuit within 90 days of receiving a right-to sue notice;1 (2) the Library is a 7 constituent department of the City and County of San Francisco and only the City may be sued in 8 a civil action pursuant to San Francisco Charter Article VIII, section 8.102, Article I, section 9 1.101; (3) Sanders’ section 1983 official capacity claim is redundant as to Lindisch and Lambert 10 and should therefore be dismissed;2 (4) Sanders’ claim for violation of the Free Exercise Clause 11 against the Library should be dismissed as governmental entities are not subject to suit in their 12 individual capacities;3 and (5) Sanders’ claim for violation of the Free Exercise Clause against 13 Lindisch and Lambert in their individual capacities should be dismissed based on qualified 14 immunity. The only remaining contentions for the Court to decide are: (1) whether the Library or the 15 16 City is the correct defendant to sue; and (2) whether the claim against the individual Defendants in 17 their individual capacities for violation of Sanders’ Free Exercise rights is subject to dismissal 18 based on qualified immunity. The Court shall address other relevant facts in the remainder of its order. 19 ANALYSIS 20 21 A. Legal Standard on Motion to Dismiss. 22 A motion to dismiss is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where the 23 pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A court’s “inquiry is limited to 24 the allegations in the complaint, which are accepted as true and construed in the light most 25 26 27 28 1 Defendants abandon this contention on the basis that the extra day was a holiday, and therefore the filing of the complaint was within 90 days and therefore timely. 2 Sanders concedes that the official capacity claim against the two individuals is redundant and concedes their dismissal. 3 Sanders again concedes that the Library is not subject to suit in its individual capacity and concedes to dismissal of this claim. 3 1 favorable to the plaintiff.” Lazy Y Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). 2 Even under the liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), “a plaintiff’s 3 obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 4 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell 5 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 6 (1986)). Pursuant to Twombly, a plaintiff must not merely allege conduct that is conceivable but United States District Court Northern District of California 7 8 must instead allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 9 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 10 draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 11 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing the plausibility 12 of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the 13 pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & 14 Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). However, courts do not “accept as true 15 allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 16 inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). If dismissal is appropriate, a court “should grant leave to amend even if no request to 17 18 amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured 19 by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation 20 marks and citation omitted). 21 B. 22 Library is Not the Proper Defendant. Defendants contend that Sanders should have sued the City and not the Library. Although 23 Sanders concedes that the City is the proper defendant as to her constitutional claims pursuant to 24 Section 1983, she argues that the Library is the proper defendant under Title VII. Title VII 25 imposes liability on employers, including governmental entities and agencies, who employ 15 or 26 more employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 27 28 Under the San Francisco Charter, only the City has the power to “appear, sue, and defend in all courts in all matters and proceedings.” (Dkt. No. 25-2, Declaration of Adam Shapiro, Ex. B, 4 1 S.F. Charter Article I, § 1.101.) Further, nothing in the statute and nothing offered by Sanders 2 provides that an unincorporated municipal department, which by Charter lacks the ability to be 3 sued, may be named as a defendant in a Title VII action. The Court recognizes that the Library is 4 an agent of the City, which by its own Charter may be sued and defend may defend all claims 5 remaining. Sanders’ Title VII claim as well as her claim under Section 1983 may be brought 6 against the City, which has conceded that it is amenable to suit. Accordingly, the Court 7 GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Library as the defendant and instead SUBSTITUTES 8 the City in its place. 9 C. United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Qualified Immunity. Defendants argue that the individual defendants Lindisch and Lambert are qualifiedly 11 immune from liability for claims under Section 1983 in their individual capacities because they 12 did not violate a clearly established right. 13 Qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar 14 as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 15 reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). It 16 “balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they 17 exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and 18 liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 19 (2009). To analyze qualified immunity, a court engages in a two-prong inquiry, asking whether a 20 constitutional right has been violated and whether that right was “clearly established.” Pearson v. 21 Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236 (2009). Whether a right is “clearly established” depends on 22 whether the “contours of the right [were] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 23 understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 24 “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether 25 it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 26 confronted.” Id. Courts may choose which prong of this analysis to address first. See Pearson, 27 555 U.S. at 236-39. Examining the second prong first may “expedite the resolution of the case” 28 because the second prong may be decided as a matter of law. Morales v. Fry, 873 F.3d 817, 8225 1 United States District Court Northern District of California 2 23 (9th Cir. 2017). A federal right is “clearly established” when, at the time of the official’s conduct, the law 3 was “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand” that what he or she was 4 doing was unlawful. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 527, 589 (2018) (citations and 5 quotations omitted). For a right to be clearly established, the law must be “settled”—the 6 constitutionality “beyond debate”—with a sufficiently clear foundation in “then-existing 7 precedent.” Id.; Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991). It is not enough that the right in 8 question is “suggested” by precedent existing at the time of the official’s challenged conduct. 9 Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590. Rather, a rule must be dictated by controlling authority or a “robust 10 consensus of cases of persuasive authority.” Id. at 589-90 (citations and quotations omitted). The 11 precedent must be sufficiently clear so that “every reasonable official would interpret it to 12 establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court must 13 therefore ask whether every reasonable official in Defendants’ positions would have known that 14 their specific actions were unconstitutional, given the particular facts that they faced and the 15 “precedent on the books.” Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation and 16 quotation omitted); see Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 309 (2015) (noting that the second-prong 17 inquiry depends “very much on the facts of each case”). 18 The first step in the determination whether a right is clearly established is to define the 19 right in question. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). A plaintiff bears the initial 20 burden of proving that the rights allegedly violated by defendants were clearly established at the 21 time of the alleged misconduct. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984); Houghton v. Smith, 22 965 F.2d 1532, 1534 (9th Cir. 1992). “[T]he proper fact-specific inquiry . . . is not whether the 23 law is settled, but whether, in light of clearly established law and the information available to him, 24 a reasonable person in [the defendant’s] position could have objectively believed his actions to be 25 proper.” Floyd v. Laws, 929 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991). 26 Sanders defines the right at issue as “the particular right of being free from religious 27 discrimination under policies that are not neutral and generally applicable.” (Opp. Br. at 7, citing 28 Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (2021)). Defendants define 6 United States District Court Northern District of California 1 the right in question as “the right to work unvaccinated at a public institution during a pandemic.” 2 (Motion at 11.) The Court finds neither party’s definition of the right at issue to be accurate. 3 Rather, the right at issue is whether, in enforcing the City’s mandate and religious exemption 4 provisions, the individual defendants infringed Sanders’ Free Exercise rights. The question 5 whether the mandate was neutral on its face or whether the individual defendants performed their 6 duties to enforce the mandate in a discriminatory way are still disputed issues. At this procedural 7 posture, the Court cannot determine that the individuals, while performing their duties for the City 8 during an unprecedented health crisis, would have known that their specific actions were 9 unconstitutional. The Court has not made a determination whether enforcement of the City 10 mandate and its specific decision to deny Sanders’ religious exemption request violated her 11 constitutional rights. There is clear case precedent for the finding that “the urgent public health 12 needs of the community can outweigh the rights of an individual to refuse vaccination” during a 13 health crisis. We The Patriots USA v. Hochul, 17 F.4th 266, 294 n.35 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing 14 Jacobsen v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)). However, it is not clear 15 whether in this particular instance the City’s religious exemption provision and enforcement of 16 that provision by these individuals violated the clearly established right to be free from 17 discrimination based on the free exercise of religion. Accordingly, and at this procedural posture, 18 the Court does not find that Defendants met their burden to show that the individual defendants 19 Lindisch and Lambert are qualifiedly immune from liability for claims under Section 1983 in their 20 individual capacities. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 21 individual Defendants in their individual capacities on the basis of qualified immunity as 22 premature. 23 24 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 25 Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court does not find the suit was late-filed. The Court 26 SUBSTITUTES the City in place of the Library as a named defendant. The Section 1983 official 27 capacity claim against Lindisch and Lambert are DISMISSED as redundant. The Section 1983 28 claim as to the Library is DISMISSED as the governmental entity is not subject to suit in its 7 1 individual capacity. Lastly, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claim 2 against Lindisch and Lambert in their individual capacities as it finds the defense of qualified 3 immunity is premature. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: September 5, 2023 7 8 ______________________________________ JEFFREY S. WHITE United States District Judge 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8
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