Simon v. Maple Beach Ventures LLC et al, No. 4:2021cv01005 - Document 36 (N.D. Cal. 2021)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING in part and DENYING in part 32 Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Signed by Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton. (pjhlc1S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/12/2021)
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MARCY SIMON, Case No. 21-cv-01005-PJH Plaintiff, 8 v. 9 10 MAPLE BEACH VENTURES LLC, et al., Defendants. 11 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS United States District Court Northern District of California Re: Dkt. No. 32 12 13 14 Before the court is plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in 15 connection with confirming the arbitration award. The matter is fully briefed and suitable 16 for decision without oral argument. Accordingly, the hearing set for May 13, 2021, is 17 VACATED. Having read the parties’ papers and carefully considered their arguments 18 and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby rules as 19 follows. 20 I. Background Plaintiff Marcy Simon and defendants Maple Beach Ventures, LLC,1 entered into a 21 22 consulting agreement in 2014. A dispute subsequently arose between the parties. The 23 parties submitted the dispute to arbitration with JAMS in accordance with the terms of the 24 Consulting Agreement. On January 13, 2021, the arbitrator issued the corrected final 25 26 27 28 1 Maple Beach Ventures, LLC (Nevada), is the entity that originally contracted with plaintiff. It shares its managing director with both Maple Beach Ventures One, LLC (Wyoming), and Maple Beach Ventures One, LLC (Delaware), and all three entities are named as defendants. All three entities are collectively referred to as “MBV” or defendants herein. 1 award in plaintiff’s favor, which included an award of fees and expenses incurred in the 2 arbitration proceedings. On January 19, 2021, plaintiff filed a petition in this court to 3 confirm the award and for an entry of judgment. Dkt. 1. Defendants did not oppose the 4 petition to confirm the arbitration award. Dkt. 25. On March 12, 2021, the court granted 5 plaintiff’s petition and entered judgment in her favor. Dkt. 27 & 28. On April 2, 2021, plaintiff filed a proposed amended judgment and this motion for 6 7 attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in confirming the arbitration award in this court. Dkt. 8 31 & 32. On April 16, defendants filed an opposition to the fee request. Dkt. 33. On 9 April 23, plaintiff filed a reply. Dkt. 34. United States District Court Northern District of California 10 II. Discussion 11 In this motion, plaintiff seeks an order (i) awarding $46,986.25 in attorneys’ fees 12 and (ii) awarding $1,661.76 in costs. Plaintiff’s motion for fees and costs is based on a 13 provision of the underlying consulting agreement between the parties. Section 7(h) of the 14 Consulting Agreement provides as follows: 15 If any arbitration, legal action or other proceeding is commenced which is related to this Agreement, the losing party shall pay the prevailing party’s actual attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in the preparation for, conduct of or appeal or enforcement of judgment resulting from the proceeding. The phrase “prevailing party” shall mean the party who is determined in the proceeding to have prevailed or who prevails by dismissal, default or otherwise. 16 17 18 19 20 Dkt. 19-7 at 8. See SCIE LLC v. XL Reinsurance Am., Inc., 397 F. App’x 348, 351 (9th 21 Cir. 2010) (“Under California law, a contract provision that permits the recovery of fees in 22 arbitration is broad enough to include fees in related judicial proceedings.”) (quotation 23 marks omitted). Defendants do not contest this as a basis for an award of fees and 24 costs. Rather, defendants ask the court to reduce plaintiff’s requested fees considerably 25 because they are the result of excessive and unnecessary legal work. The following 26 assessment thus focuses on the reasonableness of both the attorneys’ fees and costs 27 requested. 28 2 A. 2 Reasonable attorneys’ fees are generally based on the traditional “lodestar” 3 calculation set forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). See Fischer v. 4 SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). A reasonable fee is determined by 5 multiplying (1) “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation” by (2) “a 6 reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. 7 United States District Court Northern District of California Attorneys’ Fees 1 Plaintiff’s counsel breaks down time spent in this case into the following 8 categories: (1) preliminary research; (2) drafting and filing the Petition to Confirm; 9 (3) drafting and filing the administrative motion to seal; (4) preparing for and attempting 10 service via the U.S. Marshals; (5) post-filing motion practice and correspondence; and 11 (6) drafting and filing this motion, and related conferences. 12 13 1. Hours Worked The fee-seeking party bears the initial burden to show that the hours expended on 14 the case were reasonable, using time records documenting what tasks were completed. 15 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir.1992). “By 16 and large, the court should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how 17 much time he was required to spend on the case; after all, he won, and might not have, 18 had he been more of a slacker.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 19 (9th Cir. 2008). 20 The court may reduce the hours through its discretion “where documentation of 21 the hours is inadequate; if the case was overstaffed and hours are duplicated; if hours 22 expended are deemed excessive or otherwise unnecessary.” Chalmers v. City of L.A., 23 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986). In addition, courts may reduce hours where records 24 show billing in block format “because block billing makes it more difficult to determine 25 how much time was spent on particular activities.” Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 26 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007). A 10 percent reduction is appropriate where “the fee 27 applicant submits billing records that . . . the district court cannot practicably rely on . . . to 28 determine a reasonable number of hours,” especially considering that “the district court 3 1 could simply cut the number of hours or the lodestar figure by as much as 10% (without 2 explanation).” Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1204 n.4 (9th Cir. 2013) 3 (citing Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112). a. 4 5 6 United States District Court Northern District of California 7 Parties’ Arguments Defendants argue that the fee request should be reduced because the number of hours worked by plaintiff’s counsel was unnecessary. First, defendants contend that plaintiff’s counsel needlessly prepared papers far in 8 excess of those necessary to confirm the arbitration award. Defendants provide the 9 following examples of papers unnecessarily included in plaintiff’s petition: the inclusion of 10 the confidential contract underlying the arbitration action, several agreements ancillary to 11 the Consulting Agreement at issue, pages of factual background regarding the creation of 12 the Consulting Agreement, and a play-by-play of the post-award briefing. Defendants 13 cite to Sayta v. Martin, Case No. 16-cv-03775-LB, 2018 WL 4677456, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. 14 Sept. 26, 2018) for the premise that petitions confirming arbitration awards should take 15 no more than five hours to complete. 16 Second, defendants argue that at least $4,000 of fees sought by plaintiff are 17 attributable to mere impatience. Plaintiff’s counsel asked defense counsel at the 18 beginning of the case whether they would accept service on behalf of MBV, and when 19 defense counsel said they would get back to them, plaintiff’s counsel began researching 20 and preparing for service of the petition through the U.S. Marshals Service. The research 21 and preparation were obviated one week after counsel’s initial communication, with 22 defense counsel accepting service. 23 Third, defendants argue that plaintiff’s fee request should be reduced by 20 24 percent because plaintiff’s counsel bills in quarter hour (.25) increments. In support of 25 this request, they cite Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2007). In that 26 case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s 20 percent across-the-board reduction 27 based on a finding that quarter-hour billing resulted in a request for excessive hours. Id. 28 at 948-49. 4 United States District Court Northern District of California 1 In response to defendants’ assertions that the record was inflated and expanded, 2 plaintiff’s counsel counters that the documents included in the petition were necessary to 3 provide context and additional support for the administrative motion to seal where 4 defense counsel insisted upon maintaining confidentiality. 5 The hours plaintiff’s counsel spent preparing a lengthy record and petition may be 6 viewed as unnecessary by defendants in hindsight, but plaintiff’s counsel was not aware 7 that the petition would be unopposed and found it necessary to file a robust set of papers. 8 Plaintiff argues that the facts of Satya are distinguishable where the petition considered in 9 that case was to confirm a second arbitration award between the same parties, before 10 the same court, and about the same facts required less effort (Id. at *1-2), while this case 11 involves a fresh petition along with a motion to seal. 12 Plaintiff proceeds to distinguish the facts here from Welch, where the billing 13 records at issue revealed several quarter-hour entries for activities that clearly took much 14 less than a quarter or half-hour. Plaintiff’s counsel offers to make their billing records 15 available for inspection by the court in camera. Plaintiff otherwise concedes that, if the 16 court finds the quarter-hour entries result in overbilling, the more appropriate result than 17 an across-the-board reduction of fees by an arbitrary percentage would be to reduce 18 those nine entries of 0.25 hours “from 0.25 to 0.1 (and from 2.25 hours total to 0.9 19 hours).” Dkt 34 at 5. 20 21 b. Analysis Here, plaintiff’s counsel should not be penalized for taking a thorough approach to 22 preparation of their papers, but they should also not be rewarded for the time they spent 23 impatiently preparing for activities that were not ultimately completed. 24 Plaintiff did prepare papers beyond what may have been strictly necessary to 25 confirm the arbitration award as defendants posit, but such papers were not excessive 26 nor superfluous to the court’s consideration of the petition. The contract documents 27 provided relevant information for the court to understand the context of the dispute. And 28 it was reasonable for plaintiff’s counsel to take a “belt and suspenders” approach to the 5 United States District Court Northern District of California 1 petition where they were not certain that it would be unopposed by defendants. The 2 court defers to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment about the inclusion of papers 3 and effort necessary to prevail on the petition. 4 In contrast, it is not reasonable for plaintiff to attempt to collect fees for researching 5 and preparing for service of process through the U.S. Marshals Service. At the beginning 6 of this action, defense counsel responded within 20 minutes to plaintiff’s inquiry regarding 7 acceptance of service to say they would “check and get back” to them. Supp. Burke 8 Decl., Ex. 1 (Dkt. 34-1 at 4). The records offered by plaintiff show that counsel began 9 preparing for service of the petition the next day, proceeding to spend hundreds of dollars 10 on photocopies and Westlaw search fees before defense counsel agreed to accept 11 service within a week. This effort did not contribute in any meaningful way to plaintiff’s 12 success on the merits, and as defendants remark, shows little more than counsel’s 13 impatience. The court therefore excludes from the award the 6.75 total hours spent 14 researching and preparing for service of the petition and administrative motion through 15 the U.S. Marshals Service. 16 Finally, while defendants object to the use of quarter-hour increments in plaintiff’s 17 billing, the court cannot discern whether this method of tracking hours resulted in over- 18 billing because of plaintiff’s counsel’s block billing practice. Plaintiff encourages the court 19 to reduce nine entries of 0.25 hours “from 0.25 to 0.1 (and from 2.25 hours total to 0.9 20 hours),” but there is no way for the court to understand whether this practice is limited 21 only to those nine entries based on these overly general records. Plaintiff’s counsel 22 provides little detail in support of the motion for fees, only providing six general categories 23 of time with the total number of hours spent by each attorney/staff member. This leaves 24 no opportunity for the court to assess how much time was spent on particular activities. 25 The court thus gives a 10 percent “haircut” to plaintiff’s total based on their block billing, 26 although further reduction would be justifiable given the opacity of counsel’s records. 27 Plaintiff’s counsel offers to make their records available for in camera review by the court, 28 but this is simply too late. This offer to supplement time records is clearly insufficient 6 1 where they carry the initial burden to show that the hours expended on the case were 2 reasonable, using time records documenting what tasks were completed. See Hensley, 3 461 U.S. at 434; Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397. 2. 4 A reasonable hourly rate is based on the “experience, skill, and reputation of the 5 United States District Court Northern District of California Hourly Rate 6 attorney requesting fees,” in the context of “the rate prevailing in the community for 7 similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” 8 Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 9 Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008). Generally, the 10 relevant community is the forum where the district court sits. Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979. 11 “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the 12 community, and rate determinations in other cases . . . are satisfactory evidence of the 13 prevailing market rate.” U. Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 14 407 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts also may rely on decisions by other courts awarding similar 15 rates for work in the same geographical area by attorneys with comparable levels of 16 experience. See Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 917 (9th Cir. 2009). In a relatively recent case from this district, a rate of $425/hour was approved for 17 18 work completed on a petition to confirm an arbitration award by counsel with between 17 19 and 19 years of experience. Int’l Petroleum Prod. & Additives Co., Inc. v. Black Gold 20 S.A.R.L., No. 19-CV-03004-YGR, 2020 WL 789567, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2020). 21 Counsel’s declaration in support of the motion for attorney’s fees and costs there 22 provided a relatively bare record to demonstrate the reasonableness of the rates sought. 23 Id. at *4. The court referred to some other Northern District cases resolving fee petitions 24 to show the reasonableness of the fees requested,2 but the court ultimately relied on its 25 26 27 28 2 See, e.g., In re MagSafe Apple Power Adapter Litig., No. 5:09-cv-01911-EJD, 2015 WL 428105, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2015) (“In the Bay Area, reasonable hourly rates for partners range from $560 to $800, for associates from $285 to $510[.]”); Banas v. Volcano Corp., 2014 WL 7051682, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (finding rates ranging from $355 to $1,095 per hour for partners and associates were within the range of prevailing rates). 7 1 own understanding of market rates, the nature of the case, and comparable rates that the 2 court previously approved to determine that the rate of $425/hour was reasonable. Id. at 3 *4. a. 4 United States District Court Northern District of California 5 Parties’ arguments Plaintiff’s counsel seeks the following rate per member of the litigation team: Kerry 6 Garvis Wright, partner, $600/hour; Thomas P. Burke Jr., associate, $550/hour in 2020 7 and $575/hour in 2021; Tania Seanpanah, associate, $450/hour; Allison Gipson, 8 paralegal, $410/hour; Randy Carlos, research librarian, $150/hour. In support of the 9 motion, plaintiff submits the declaration of Thomas P. Burke, associate with the law firm 10 Glaser Weil Fink Howard Avchen & Shapiro LLP. Dkt. 32-1. Mr. Burke’s declaration 11 summarizes (1) counsel’s meet and confer process preceding the present motion (¶¶ 2- 12 4); (2) how the firm maintains time records using software (¶¶ 5-7); and (3) the 13 credentials, years of experience, and billing rates of the firm’s attorneys and staff (¶¶ 8- 14 12). Dkt. 32-1. 15 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s fee request should be reduced because more 16 senior counsel performed what they deems to be more junior tasks. In a footnote, 17 defendants argue that plaintiff fails to carry her burden to establish the “reasonableness” 18 of the hourly rate sought—plaintiff’s counsel provides no admissible evidence that these 19 rates are the prevailing rate for attorneys with comparable skill and experience. 20 Plaintiff defends her litigation strategy and use of attorneys in preparation of the 21 petition. Plaintiff cites cases providing that a “Court should not speculate as to how other 22 firms might have staffed the case or impose its own judgment regarding the best way to 23 operate a law firm but should instead look at the difficulty and skill level of the work 24 performed.” San Francisco Baykeeper v. W. Bay Sanitary Dist., No. C-09-5676 EMC, 25 2011 WL 6012936, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011) (citing Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112). 26 Plaintiff’s counsel cites to a recent bankruptcy case in the Southern District of New York 27 in which defense counsel’s firm bills at rates far exceeding their own. Counsel attaches a 28 copy of the 83-page application from bankruptcy court to show that defense counsel’s 8 1 firm (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meager & Flom, LLP) bills for associates in excess of $1,000 2 per hour while plaintiff’s counsel here asks for a discounted rate of $600 per hour for the 3 work of a partner. Plaintiff’s counsel then cites generally to a recent Central District 4 decision for the premise that the rates they charge in this case are aligned with those 5 charged by comparable firms in Los Angeles. See Vasquez v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 6 No. CV191935PSGPLAX, 2020 WL 6785650, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2020) (“In Los 7 Angeles, partners have an hourly rate ranging from $450 to $955, and associates from 8 $382 to $721.”) (citing the 2018 Real Rate Report: The Industry’s Leading Analysis of 9 Law Firm Rates, Trends, and Practices). Finally, plaintiff asks the court to rely on its own 10 experience and knowledge to recognize that the rates charged here are reasonable. b. United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 Analysis Here, the court resists second-guessing the staffing choices of plaintiff’s counsel. 13 Plaintiff prevailed, and as noted above, the court need not question winning counsel’s 14 professional judgment about the effort or preparation necessary to meet their client’s 15 goals. See Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112. Moreover, the performance of certain tasks by 16 more senior counsel is clearly mitigated where the partner working on the case reduced 17 her hourly rate to $600 per hour, almost matching the $575 per hour billed for the senior 18 associate on the case. Counsels’ staffing choices do not warrant a reduction in the rates 19 they seek. 20 But defendants are correct that plaintiff provides no admissible evidence that these 21 rates are the prevailing rate for attorneys with comparable skill and experience. Plaintiff 22 provides no information in either of counsel’s declarations demonstrating that these are 23 the prevailing rates for comparable counsel, instead unhelpfully directing the court’s 24 attention to fees sought by their opponents in other fora. 25 The single case cited by plaintiff does support the reasonableness of counsel’s 26 rates for the Los Angeles area—$600 per hour falls within the range for partners and both 27 $575 and $450 per hour fall within the range for associates. It is disappointing that 28 counsel could not find a single case from the Northern District, this forum, to cite in 9 1 support of their motion. It is additionally disappointing that counsel could not offer any 2 reference point for reasonable rates for similar work to cite in support of their motion. The court thus finds it necessary to reduce the requested hourly rates for plaintiff’s United States District Court Northern District of California 3 4 counsel. Plaintiff bears the burden to establish by competent evidence each (1) the 5 experience of the attorneys requesting fees, (2) the skill and reputation of the attorneys 6 requesting fees related to the subject matter at hand, and (3) the rates prevailing in the 7 relevant community. Plaintiff touches on the first two points in the first Burke Declaration 8 (Dkt 32-1), but completely fails to establish the third point, one-third of her necessary 9 evidence. The court, in its discretion, accordingly reduces all rates by one-third. The 10 hourly rate for Kerry Garvis Wright, partner with nearly 30 years of experience, is reduced 11 from $600/hour to $400/hour. The hourly rate for Thomas R. Burke, associate with eight 12 years of experience, is reduced from $575/hour to $383.33/hour.3 The hourly rate for 13 Tania Seanpanah, associate with three years of experience, is reduced from $450/hour 14 to $300/hour. The hourly rate for Allison Gipson, paralegal with eight years of 15 experience, is reduced from $410/hour to $273.33/hour. The hourly rate for Randy 16 Carlos, research librarian, is reduced from $150/hour to $100/hour. These rates are still in the ballpark of historical rates in this district and the 17 18 $425/hour approved for similar post-arbitration award work in Int’l Petroleum Prod. & 19 Additives Co., Inc., 2020 WL 789567, by counsel with between 17-19 years of 20 experience. The court reiterates that the rates sought by counsel in this case are 21 reduced at the court’s discretion for a lack of evidentiary showing—the requested rates 22 may prove reasonable in other contexts if properly supported by competent evidence. 3. 23 Lodestar Calculation 24 Based on the conclusions above, rejecting plaintiff’s counsel’s hours spent 25 preparing for service through the U.S. Marshals Service, giving a 10 percent haircut for 26 block-billing, and granting plaintiff’s counsel’s requested rates, the court calculates the 27 28 3 The court addresses all hours billed by Mr. Burke according to this rate, avoiding any discernment of the hours billed at $550/hour versus $575/hour. 10 1 attorneys’ fees to be awarded to plaintiff as follows: 2 3 Timekeeper Total Billed Hours Hourly Rate Total Billed Amt. 4 Kerry Garvis Wright 18 $400 $7,200 5 Thomas R. Burke 50.75 $383.33 $19,454 6 Tania Seanpanah 2 $300 $600 7 Allison Gipson 3 $273.33 $819.99 8 Randy Carlos 0.25 $100 $25 9 Lodestar Total $28,098.99 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 11 B. 12 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), costs (other than attorneys’ Costs 13 fees) should be awarded to a prevailing party unless a statute, rule, or court order 14 provides otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). “Rule 54(d) creates a presumption in favor 15 of awarding costs to prevailing parties, and it is incumbent upon the losing party to 16 demonstrate why the costs should not be awarded.” Stanley v. University of So. Cal., 17 178 F.3d 1069, 1079 (9th Cir.1999). Taxable costs are listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 as 18 follows: 19 20 21 22 23 24 (1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; (6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title. 25 Civil Local Rule 54-3 provides additional standards for interpreting the costs allowed 26 under section 1920. The taxation of costs lies within the trial court’s discretion. Assoc. of 27 Mexican-American Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir.2000). If the 28 district court wishes to depart from the presumption in favor of awarding costs, it must 11 1 “specify reasons” for doing so by explaining “why a case is not ‘ordinary’ and why, in the 2 circumstances, it would be inappropriate or inequitable to award costs.” Id. at 591-93. 3 District courts may consider a variety of factors in determining whether to exercise their 4 discretion to deny costs to the prevailing party. Id. at 592-93. 1. United States District Court Northern District of California 5 Parties’ Arguments 6 Plaintiff seeks to recover a total of $1,661.76 in costs. Counsel acknowledges 7 within the motion that “The majority of the expenses for ‘photocopies’ [$904.80] were 8 incurred preparing copies of the Petition and administrative motion for service by the U.S. 9 Marshals. Petitioner needed to print four complete sets of the petition and administrative 10 motion, including exhibits and in color, for the Marshals Service—one set for each of the 11 named defendants and one for the Marshals’ records.” Dkt. 7. The other costs plaintiff 12 seeks are reimbursement for Westlaw online research, U.S. Marshals fees, shipping 13 fees, and the civil case filing fee. Defendants’ opposition brief does not include any substantive dispute as to 14 15 plaintiff’s costs. 16 2. Analysis Here, defendants do not demonstrate that costs should not be awarded. The 17 18 presumption in favor of awarding costs thus remains unrebutted. Earlier in this order, 19 however, the court eliminated as unreasonable the hours plaintiff’s counsel spent 20 preparing service of the petition and motion to seal through the Marshals Service. On 21 similar grounds, the court eliminates as unreasonable the photocopy costs incurred in 22 preparing service of the petition and motion to seal through the Marshals Service. The 23 expense of $904.80 for unserved photocopies is excluded from the award of plaintiff’s 24 costs.4 The court thus grants plaintiff’s request in part to recover a total of $756.96 in 25 costs. 26 27 28 The photocopy costs represent just the largest portion of plaintiff’s costs related to this service-related misadventure. Other costs, including fees, were incurred in preparing these documents for service by the Marshals Service. However, the court considers elimination of this expense alone in the face of defendants’ failure to object to the costs. 12 4 1 III. Conclusion 2 For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is 3 GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The court awards a total of $28,098.99 in 4 attorneys’ fees for plaintiff’s counsel and $756.96 for plaintiff’s costs. 5 6 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: May 12, 2021 /s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON United States District Judge 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13
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