Freeman v. Indochino Apparel, Inc. et al, No. 4:2019cv04539 - Document 46 (N.D. Cal. 2020)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; SETTING CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE by Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers denying 37 Motion to Dismiss. Amended Pleadings due by 3/25/2020. Case Management Statement due by 3/30/2020. Initial Case Management Conference set for 4/6/2020 02:00 PM in Oakland, Courtroom 1, 4th Floor. (fs, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/11/2020)
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Freeman v. Indochino Apparel, Inc. et al Doc. 46 1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 JEFFREY FREEMAN, 7 Plaintiff, 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 vs. INDOCHINO APPAREL, INC., ET AL., CASE NO. 19-cv-04539-YGR ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; SETTING CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE Re: Dkt. No. 37 Defendants. Defendants Indochino Apparel Inc., Indochino Apparel (US), Inc. (collectively 12 “Indochino”) sell made-to-measure clothing such as suits, tuxedos, blazers, vests and pants. 13 Plaintiff Jeffrey Freeman brings this consumer class action alleging that defendants engaged in a 14 systematic and pervasive false reference pricing scheme by deceptively advertising through their 15 website, in stores, via e-mails and on social media that their clothing was “on sale” and was 16 previously sold at a substantially higher price when, in fact, the clothing was always sold at or 17 near the falsely claimed “sale” price. 18 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, filed December 18, 2019 (Dkt. No. 35, “FAC”), 19 alleges he bought a custom, made-to-measure suit from Indochino on August 4, 2017, in its San 20 Francisco showroom location. Plaintiff claims he viewed the suit’s pricing on Indochino’s 21 website as well as when he visited its showroom. Plaintiff alleges he was injured by Indochino’s 22 use of “reference pricing.” Plaintiff alleges Indochino’s clothing was regularly and repeatedly 23 advertised at substantial discounts to a specified reference price but rarely, if ever, sold at the 24 represented reference price. Plaintiff alleges claims for violations of the California Consumer 25 Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA,” Cal. Civil Code § 1750 et seq.); California False Advertising Law 26 (“FAL,” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 et seq.); and California’s Unfair Competition Law 27 (“UCL,” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.), as well as claims for breach of contract; and 28 unjust enrichment. Dockets.Justia.com Indochino moves to dismiss on several grounds: (1) insufficient pre-suit notice with United States District Court Northern District of California 1 2 respect to Freeman’s CLRA and contract claims; (2) failure to allege plausible claims under the 3 UCL, FAL or CLRA; (3) failure to plead a plausible breach of contract claim; (4) failure to allege 4 a basis for and standing to pursue equitable relief; and (5) failure to allege a basis for punitive 5 damages. The Court, having considered carefully the papers1 and pleadings filed in support of and 6 in opposition to the motion, DENIES the motion to dismiss. 7 I. DISCUSSION 8 A. Pre-Suit Notice 9 Indochino moves to dismiss the CLRA and breach of contract claims on the grounds that 10 plaintiff failed to provide sufficient pre-suit notice as required by California Civil Code section 11 1760 and California Commercial Code section 2607(3)(A). The Court disagrees. 12 Plaintiff sent pre-suit notices to defendants on June 5, 2019, via Federal Express and July 13 9, 2019, by certified and registered mail. Plaintiff did not seek damages in the CLRA claim until 14 the amendment of the complaint in December 2019. The letters informed Indochino of the facts 15 underlying the claims here. Based upon the allegations of the FAC, plaintiff did not learn of the 16 basis for his breach of contact claim until shortly before the first letter was sent. (FAC ¶ 12.) In 17 light thereof, the FAC alleges timely and sufficient notice under these statutes. 18 B. Plausibility of Claims of Deceptive Advertising 19 Indochino next argues that plaintiff’s claims under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA are not 20 plausible because no reasonable consumer likely would be deceived by the pricing practices 21 plaintiff alleges; the references prices were not deceptive; and restitution is not available in this 22 type of case. The Court addresses each argument in turn. 1. 23 Reasonable Consumers Would Not Be Deceived 24 The FAC alleges that Indochino had a practice of advertising their clothing with a “sale” 25 price adjacent to a higher, crossed-out price along with a graphic reading “Sale” or “XX% OFF” 26 27 28 1 Defendants seek judicial notice of plaintiff’s pre-suit demand letters to Indochino, referenced in the FAC, in support of their motion to dismiss. The Court GRANTS the unopposed request for judicial notice. 2 1 (FAC ¶¶ 28-35.) In addition, defendants’ advertising included statements indicating the sale 2 pricing was for a limited time, such as “April Clearance Over 100 Suits for $299 USD (you save 3 $500) [¶] Last Chance on Our Limited Runs.” (Id. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff alleges that the top banner of 4 the homepage for Indochino’s website nearly always included language that a “sale” was in 5 progress and consumers had a limited time to obtain the clothing at the “sale” price, even though 6 the clothing was always sold at the “sale” price. (Id., ¶¶ 35-40.) Further, plaintiff alleges 7 Indochino did not include any language to indicate to consumers that the False Reference Price 8 was a comparison to another “substantially similar” product (such as “compare” or “compare at”), 9 as opposed to the regular, original or former price of that same article of Clothing. (Id., ¶¶ 3, 29- United States District Court Northern District of California 10 33, 42-43.) 11 Claims under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA concerning deceptive advertising are governed by 12 a “reasonable consumer” standard. Under that standard, plaintiffs must plead facts showing that a 13 “significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably 14 in the circumstances, could be misled.” Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., 105 Cal. App. 4th 496, 15 508 (2003); see also Freeman v. Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1995). If the court can 16 determine from the facts alleged that no reasonable consumer would be so deceived, dismissal 17 may be granted. Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 967 (9th Cir. 2016). More particularly here, 18 under California statute, companies may not advertise a “former price of any advertised thing” 19 unless it was “the prevailing market price . . . within three months next immediately preceding the 20 publication of the advertisement.” See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17501. 21 Indochino contends that the alleged pricing practices here differ significantly from 22 reference pricing cases in which the representations were express statements like “original price” 23 or “compare to,” and all reasonable consumers would understand that the struck-through prices 24 were comparisons to former prices of substantially similar items sold by another retailer. 25 Indochino’s argument essentially seeks a ruling that, as a matter of law, no reasonable consumer 26 would their reference prices (i.e. “$799”) as a comparison to the former price of that identical 27 item. Plaintiff alleges in detail, with images from Indochino’s advertising, the struck-through 28 reference prices were coupled with representations of “sale,” “You save $___,” or a percentage 3 1 “off” the reference price, and had no accompanying language indicating that the reference price is 2 one the consumer should “compare to” another item from another retailer. (FAC ¶¶ 28-39.) 3 “[W]hether a business practice is deceptive will usually be a question of fact not appropriate for 4 decision” on a motion to dismiss. Williams v. Gerber Prod. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 5 2008). The Court declines find, as a matter of law, that Indochino’s reference price 6 representations would not mislead a reasonable consumer. 2. 7 United States District Court Northern District of California 8 Basis for Deceptiveness of Reference Prices Indochino further argues that plaintiff has not alleged why the crossed-out reference prices 9 are deceptive, contending that plaintiff must allege more than that the “prevailing market price” 10 was the price at which Indochino regularly sold the clothing items. Plaintiff alleges the clothing 11 items at issue here are all custom, “made-to-measure private label Clothing sold exclusively by” 12 Indochino. (FAC ¶ 48; see also ¶¶ 5, 52, 62, 111.)2 He further alleges that Indochino 13 “manufacture[s] and distribute[s]” the clothing at issue, is “the exclusive source for” it, clothing 14 items are labeled only with the Indochino brand name, “is not sold by any other company and is 15 not sold at any other retail stores or websites, other than those owned and operated by” Indochino. 16 (Id. ¶ 52.) Plaintiff alleges a reasonable consumer would understand the reference prices in 17 Indochino’s advertising refer to a regular, original or former price of Indochino’s clothing, not 18 similar items of clothing sold by a different company under a different label. (FAC at ¶¶ 2-3, 41, 19 51, 53, 89.) Thus, the Court finds that the FAC alleges why the reference prices are deceptive.3 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 Indochino’s attempt to distinguish Spann v. J.C. Penney Corp., 307 F.R.D. 508 (C.D. Cal. 2015) is unavailing. The decision there was at class certification, which explains why the court relied on a significant evidentiary presentation to support plaintiff’s private label argument. Here, at the pleading stage, Freeman’s detailed allegations are sufficient. 3 In contrast to the Branca decision cited by Indochino, plaintiff here has alleged “he was exposed to or relied on . . . other representations by [Indochino], such as other advertisements or marketing, that le[d] him to believe that the [reference] price was a former price at which [Indochino] sold the items.” Branca v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. 14CV2062-MMA JMA, 2015 WL 1841231, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2015). Similar to the amended complaint in Branca, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the reference prices are deceptive. See Branca v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. 14CV2062-MMA (JMA), 2015 WL 10436858, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2015) (“Branca II”) (deceptive advertising alleged where plaintiff alleged the combination of “Compare At” with “% Savings” led him to believe the “Compare At” price was former price of the item, or at least the prevailing market price, but the truth was that the item had never been sold by defendant or any other retailer at that price). 4 3. 1 2 Indochino next argues that Freeman’s UCL and FAL claims should be dismissed because 3 most, if not all, measures of restitution would be unavailable to him because he received some 4 value from the underlying transaction. Arguing that “precedent in this Circuit bars Plaintiff from 5 restitution for his consumer-fraud claims” (Motion, Dkt. No. 37, at 12:13-14), Indochino cites this 6 Court’s decision in Stathakos v. Columbia Sportswear Co., No. 15-CV-04543-YGR, 2017 WL 7 1957063 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2017) and another district court decision in Chowning v. Kohl's Dep't 8 Stores, Inc., No. CV-15-08673-RGK-SPX, 2016 WL 1072129 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2016). 9 United States District Court Northern District of California Availability of Restitution On Consumer Fraud Claim Indochino misrepresents the decisions in Stathakos and Chowning. Both decisions rejected 10 plaintiffs’ particular models for calculating class-wide restitution at the summary judgment stage. 11 Stathakos, 2017 WL 1957063 at *9-13; Chowning, 2016 WL 1072129, at *7-13(C.D. Cal. Mar. 12 15, 2016). Neither decision purports to bar restitution under all circumstances. Trial courts have 13 broad discretion to fashion equitable relief, based upon the parties’ evidentiary showing. In re 14 Tobacco Cases II, 240 Cal. App. 4th 779, 792 (2015) (“difference between the price paid and 15 actual value received is a measure of restitution, not the exclusive measure”); Colgan v. 16 Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 135 Cal. App. 4th 663, 700 (2006), as modified on denial of reh'g 17 (Jan. 31, 2006) (amount of restitution awarded under FAL, CLRA, and UCL “must be supported 18 by substantial evidence”). 19 As stated above, plaintiff’s CLRA, UCL, and FAL claims are sufficiently alleged. 20 Determination of whether plaintiff can offer a viable model for measuring restitution is premature 21 at this point in the litigation. See Stathakos v. Columbia Sportswear Co., No. 15-CV-04543-YGR, 22 2016 WL 1730001, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2016) (denying motion to dismiss on identical 23 grounds). 24 25 The motion to dismiss the CLRA, UCL, and FAL claims on the foregoing grounds is, therefore, DENIED. 26 C. Elements of Breach of Contract Claim 27 Indochino next argues that plaintiff’s breach of contract claim should be dismissed for the 28 further reason that he has failed to plead the necessary factual elements, including the terms of the 5 1 contract, the nature of the breach, and the resulting damage. Indochino contends the allegations do 2 not give fair notice of the basis for the claim, and that plaintiff has not alleged a plausible breach 3 or damages. United States District Court Northern District of California 4 The FAC alleges that plaintiff entered into a contract with defendants when he purchased 5 clothing, subject to the defendants’ terms and conditions, including those in his order 6 confirmation. (FAC ¶ 108.) Freeman alleges that the contracts stated Indochino would provide a 7 product that had a value equal to the reference price and failed to do so, instead providing clothing 8 of a quality “materially less than the value of the Clothing set forth in the contracts.” (FAC ¶¶ 111, 9 114, 115.) Freeman has alleged the required elements of his breach of contract claim. Cf. 10 Munning v. Gap, Inc., No. 16-CV-03804-TEH, 2016 WL 6393550, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2016) 11 (advertised price reductions were material and supported claim for breach of contract based on 12 allegations that plaintiffs did not receive “benefit of the bargain,” i.e., higher-value product at a 13 price reduction) (citing Hinojos v. Kohl's Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013), as amended 14 on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (July 8, 2013)).4 15 Finally, Indochino’s argument that “Plaintiff does not give even an estimated amount or 16 propose any way to calculate these purported damages” (Reply, Dkt. No. 42, at 6:25-26), 17 misunderstands plaintiff’s pleading burden. Such issues are premature and not a valid basis to 18 dismiss the breach of contract claim. The motion to dismiss on these grounds is DENIED. 19 D. Equitable Relief 20 Next, Indochino offers three reasons why Freeman’s claims for equitable relief should be 21 dismissed: (1) failure to allege legal remedies would not be adequate; (2) lack of standing for 22 injunctive relief to address any future harm; and (3) unjust enrichment is not a claim recognized in 23 California law. All three bases are without merit. 24 Plaintiff may allege claims in the alternative at the pleading stage. The equitable remedies 25 26 27 28 4 Further, Indochino’s attempt to distinguish Munning’s contract terms from those alleged here fails. As Indochino acknowledges, the basis for the contract claim in Munning was the allegation that “a full price that was struck through, followed by a percentage discount and the phrase “now $16.99.” Munning, 2016 WL 6393550, at *7. Plaintiff has alleged nearly identical circumstances, and more. (See, e.g., FAC Exh. 1 [order confirmation stating “discount: $450”].) 6 1 afforded by the UCL and CLRA are expressly stated to be in addition to other available remedies 2 at law. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17205; Cal. Civ. Code § 1752, 1780(a). United States District Court Northern District of California 3 With respect to injunctive relief, plaintiff alleges that, regardless of any pricing policy 4 changes implemented by Indochino on present iteration of its website, he cannot be certain that 5 Indochino will not revert to its prior alleged practices in the absence of injunctive relief. (FAC ¶¶ 6 60, 62, 85.) A plaintiff sufficiently alleges standing for prospective injunctive relief based upon a 7 threat of future injury where the complaint alleges he “faces the similar injury of being unable to 8 rely on [defendant’s] representations . . . in deciding whether or not . . . [to] purchase the product 9 in the future.” Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 971–72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 10 139 S. Ct. 640 (2018). Plaintiff has done so here. Indochino is alleged to have misrepresented 11 that it offered custom-made suits at a steep discount when in fact the suits were never sold at the 12 higher reference price. Plaintiff plausibly alleges a continued desire to purchase custom-made 13 clothing from Indochino in the future if it accurately represents the prevailing market value of that 14 clothing. (FAC ¶¶ 58, 59, 60.) Cf. Lepkowski v. CamelBak Prod., LLC, No. 19-CV-04598-YGR, 15 2019 WL 6771785, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2019) (finding lack of a plausible allegation that 16 plaintiff intended to purchase water bottle from defendant in the future where she alleged she 17 would never purchase a water bottle that was not “spillproof”). 18 With regard to unjust enrichment, Ninth Circuit law is well-settled that the claim alleged 19 here is cognizable and not duplicative of other claims for breach of contract or restitution. See 20 Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 762 (9th Cir. 2015) (“quasi-contract” cause of 21 action based on allegations of misleading labeling and resulting unjust enrichment of defendant 22 sufficiently alleged and not duplicative). 23 Thus, Indochino’s motion on these grounds is DENIED. 24 E. 25 Finally, Indochino argues that the Court should dismiss plaintiff’s prayer for punitive 26 damages, even while acknowledging that California Civil Code section 1780(a)(4) expressly 27 permits such damages. Indochino argues the statute does not give plaintiff an entitlement to such 28 damages, but instead plaintiff must offer substantial evidence to support such an award. Punitive Damages 7 California Civil Code section 3294(a) sets the standard for an award of punitive damages United States District Court Northern District of California 1 2 on a state law claim, requiring plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct evinces “oppression, 3 fraud or malice.” Plaintiff alleges fraudulent and misleading conduct. As with other arguments by 4 Indochino, dismissal of plaintiff’s request for punitive damages at this stage is premature and 5 without a substantial basis. The motion on these grounds is DENIED. 6 II. CONCLUSION 7 Indochino’s motion to dismiss is DENIED on all grounds stated. 8 Defendants shall file their answer to the FAC within 14 days of this Order. 9 An initial case management conference is hereby scheduled for April 6, 2020, at 2:00 10 p.m. The parties shall file an updated joint case management statement seven days in advance of 11 the conference. 12 This terminates Docket No. 37. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 Dated: March 11, 2020 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8
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