Berman v. Freedom Financial Network, LLC et al, No. 4:2018cv01060 - Document 266 (N.D. Cal. 2020)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION by Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers denying 224 Motion to Compel. (fs, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/1/2020)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Berman v. Freedom Financial Network, LLC et al Doc. 266 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 DANIEL BERMAN, Plaintiff, United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 vs. CASE NO. 18-cv-01060-YGR ORDER DENYING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION Re: Dkt. No. 224 13 14 FREEDOM FINANCIAL NETWORK, LLC, ET AL., Defendants. 15 In this action, plaintiffs Daniel Berman, Stephanie Hernandez, and Erica Russell on behalf 16 of himself and a putative class, allege violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 17 (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. section 227 et seq. by means of autodialed text messages and prerecorded 18 voice calls as part of a telemarketing campaign by Lead Science, LLC (also known as “Drips”) 19 and Fluent, Inc. (“Fluent”) promoting the services of Freedom Financial Network, LLC and 20 Freedom Debt Relief, LLC (collectively “Freedom”). Fluent obtained leads for the text message 21 campaign via its consumer-facing websites which offer users the possibility of rewards, discounts, 22 product samples or entry into sweepstakes, which collect the users’ data for use in Fluent’s clients’ 23 marketing campaigns. The instant motion seeks to compel arbitration of the claims asserted by 24 plaintiffs Stephanie Hernandez and Erica Russell. (Dkt. No. 224.) 25 Having carefully considered the papers submitted, the admissible evidence, and the 26 pleadings in this action, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the motion to 27 compel arbitration. 28 Dockets.Justia.com United States District Court Northern District of California 1 The Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) requires a district court to stay judicial 2 proceedings and compel arbitration of claims covered by a written and enforceable arbitration 3 agreement. 9 U.S.C. § 3. A party may bring a motion in the district court to compel arbitration. 4 9 U.S.C. § 4. The FAA reflects “both a ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration’ and the 5 ‘fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.’” AT&T Mobility LLC v. 6 Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011); Mortensen v. Bresnan Commuc’ns, LLC, 722 F.3d 1151, 7 1157 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The [FAA] . . . has been interpreted to embody “‘a liberal federal policy 8 favoring arbitration.’”). The FAA broadly provides that an arbitration clause in a contract 9 involving a commercial transaction “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. 10 Once a court is satisfied the parties agreed to arbitrate, it must promptly compel arbitration. 9 11 U.S.C. § 4. 12 In ruling on the motion, the Court’s role is typically limited to determining whether: (i) 13 an agreement exists between the parties to arbitrate; (ii) the claims at issue fall within the scope 14 of the agreement; and (iii) the agreement is valid and enforceable. Lifescan, Inc. v. Premier 15 Diabetic Servs., Inc., 363 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004). The party seeking to compel 16 arbitration bears the burden to establish these conditions. “[I]f there is a genuine dispute of 17 material fact as to any of these queries, a [d]istrict [c]ourt should apply a ‘standard similar to the 18 summary judgment standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.’” Ackerberg v. Citicorp USA, Inc., 898 F. 19 Supp. 2d 1172, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Concat LP v. Unilever, PLC, 350 F.Supp.2d 20 796, 804 (N.D. Cal. 2004)); see also Starke v. SquareTrade, Inc., No. 17-2474-CV, 2019 WL 21 149628, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 10, 2019) (same). “If the parties contest the existence of an 22 arbitration agreement, the presumption in favor of arbitrability does not apply.” Goldman, 23 Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2014). 24 The Ninth Circuit in Nguyen described contracts formed through internet websites as 25 generally taking on one of two forms: (1) “browsewrap” agreements whereby the website’s 26 terms and conditions of use are provided via a hyperlink at the bottom of a webpage and assent 27 to the terms is assumed by continued use of the website; and (2) “clickwrap” agreements in 28 which users are presented with the terms of the agreement in question and must click on a 2 1 button or box to indicate they agree before proceeding. Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 2 F.3d 1171, 1175–77 (9th Cir. 2014). 3 4 agreement on the page, sometimes near a button the user must click to continue. For instance, in 5 Nguyen the “Terms of Use” hyperlink was near the buttons a user would need to click to complete 6 an online purchase. Id. at 1177. In considering the conspicuousness of the notice there, the Court 7 noted details of the layout of the website in question: 8 9 10 11 United States District Court Northern District of California Often websites present some hybrid of the two, such as putting a link to the terms of the 12 “the ‘Terms of Use’ link appears either directly below the relevant button a user must click on to proceed in the checkout process or just a few inches away” “the content of the webpage is compact enough that a user can view the link without scrolling. . . [or] is close enough to the ‘Proceed with Checkout’ button that a user would have to bring the link within his field of vision in order to complete his order;” and “checkout screens here contained “Terms of Use” hyperlinks in underlined, color-contrasting text.” 13 Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 2014). Despite these elements 14 supporting conspicuousness, the Ninth Circuit nevertheless held that the website was insufficient 15 to bind the consumer because it contained no admonition to “review terms” or otherwise prompt 16 the user to take affirmative action to demonstrate assent to the terms at issue, including the 17 arbitration clause. Id. at 1178-79 (“where a website makes its terms of use available via a 18 conspicuous hyperlink on every page of the website but otherwise provides no notice to users nor 19 prompts them to take any affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the 20 hyperlink to relevant buttons users must click on—without more—is insufficient to give rise to 21 constructive notice.”) Id.; see also Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1033-34 (7th 22 Cir. 2016) (courts enforce contracts accepted by an electronic “click” on a website only if “the 23 layout and language of the site give the user reasonable notice that a click will manifest assent to 24 an agreement.”); Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 63–64 (1st Cir. 2018) (affirming 25 denial of motion to compel arbitration where “[e]ven though the hyperlink did possess some of the 26 characteristics that make a term conspicuous, the presence of other terms on the same screen with 27 a similar or larger size, typeface, and with more noticeable attributes diminished the hyperlink's 28 3 1 2 In essence, “the onus [is] on website owners to put users on notice of the terms to which 3 they wish to bind consumers.” Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1178–79. “Given the breadth of the range of 4 technological savvy of online purchasers, consumers cannot be expected to ferret out hyperlinks to 5 terms and conditions to which they have no reason to suspect they will be bound.” Id. at 1179. 6 United States District Court Northern District of California capability to grab the user's attention.”)1 Here, defendants have failed to meet their burden to establish that plaintiffs Hernandez and 7 Russell entered into an agreement for mandatory arbitration. As a preliminary matter, an 8 evidentiary dispute exists as to whether the webpage screenshots offered by defendants in support 9 of their motion evidenced an agreement with either plaintiff. Defendants based their motion on a 10 declaration of Mitenkumar Bhadania, a computer system engineer for Fluent, submitted January 11 22, 2020. (Dkt. No. 224-1.) Bhadania very generally explains how he “recreated” the set of 12 multiple webpages each plaintiff would have seen when they visited the websites based on a 13 unique visitor ID generated for each session, and “regenerated images” of the webpages.2 The 14 exhibits submitted by Bhadania are the equivalent of blank form contracts, with no clear indication 15 that these plaintiffs agreed to them. (Id. at Exh. 1, 4.) Fluent elected to omit other pages from the 16 multiple page “flow” for these website visits which might have demonstrated that these particular 17 users interacted with these particular pages. (Compare id. with Bhadania Decl. submitted July 31, 18 2020, Dkt. No. 260-4, Exh. 1, 3 [including images of checked boxes, additional identifying 19 information, and a system timestamp image].) Given that plaintiffs each submit declarations 20 disputing seeing elements of these pages, and defendants failed to provide complete information to 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Defendants cite to authorities that are neither binding nor on point here. In Garcia v. Enter. Holdings, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2015), plaintiff alleged privacy violations and the hyperlink to the “Privacy Policy” at issue was in the same text box as the “Okay” button for completing registration through Facebook, putting plaintiff on notice of the Privacy Policy terms. Likewise distinguishable is Silverman v. Move Inc., No. 18-CV-05919BLF, 2019 WL 2579343, at *11 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2019), appeal dismissed, No. 19-16468, 2019 WL 5431367 (9th Cir. Oct. 18, 2019) in which the court found the Nguyen analysis an “ill fit” since the contract there was formed when plaintiff telephoned defendant to sign up for the contract, spoke to an account executive about entering into a contract, thereafter receiving the terms of the contract in an emailed response. 2 Bhadania avers that Hernandez registered through a website called “getsamplesonlinenow.com” and Russell visited a website called “retailproductzone.com.” (Bhadania Decl. ¶¶ 8, 13.) 4 United States District Court Northern District of California 1 authenticate the exhibits, the Court finds that there are material facts in dispute.3 2 Even if there were no dispute that the proffered webpages caused these plaintiffs’ phone 3 numbers to be recorded as leads for Fluent, the webpages do not conspicuously indicate to users 4 that they are agreeing to the Terms and Conditions, including an agreement to mandatory 5 arbitration. The webpages at Exhibits 1 and 3 to the Bhadania declaration do not include a 6 specific affirmative means of indicating consent to the Terms & Conditions or arbitration clause.4 7 (See Appendix A to this Order.) Similar to the website at issue in Nguyen, while there is text 8 including a hyperlink to the terms of the agreement located near a button the user must click to 9 continue, there is no text that notifies users that they will be deemed to have agreed to these terms 10 “nor prompts them to take any affirmative action to demonstrate assent.” Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 11 1179. Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1178-79. There is no tickbox or “I agree” button for the Terms & 12 Conditions. As in Nguyen, the hyperlink to them is only located in proximity to button with which 13 the user must interact to continue. The “This is correct, Continue!” and “Continue” buttons 14 plainly refer to the entry of other information on the page, not assent to the Terms & Conditions. 15 (See Appendix A [“Confirm your ZIP Code Below” and “Complete your shipping information to 16 continue towards your reward”].) Although the user must interact with the page and click a button 17 to continue using it, that click is completely divorced from an expression of assent to the Terms & 18 Conditions or to mandatory arbitration. Further, the phrase “I understand and agree to the Terms 19 & Conditions which includes mandatory arbitration and Privacy Policy” is formatted in black font 20 against a white background which is exceedingly small compared to the larger, more colorful and 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 Plaintiffs object that these recreations differ from those websites’ archives webpages, submitted the declaration of Jodi Nuss Schexnaydre and screenshots of archived pages at or near the time when plaintiffs would have visited them. However, those archived pages are inconclusive on the question here since all parties acknowledge that website users who engage with the survey questions or registration steps see multiple webpages in the “flow” of their interaction with the advertising campaigns, all of which are not replicated in the archive. 4 The Terms & Conditions include a choice-of-law provision stating that New York law controls. (See Bhadania Decl., Exh. 5 at Fluent_004063.) “[W]hether the choice of law provision applies depends on whether the parties agreed to be bound by [the terms of use] in the first place.” Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1175. However, as in Nguyen, “we need not engage in this circular inquiry because both California and New York law dictate the same outcome” on this issue of contract formation. Id. 5 1 high-contrast fonts on the rest of the page, making it difficult to read on a large, high-resolution 2 monitor, much less a mobile device. (Id.) That the very small text providing the hyperlink to the 3 Terms & Conditions also uses the words “which includes mandatory arbitration” does not change 4 the analysis since the website does not prompt affirmative assent to this statement.5 5 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that defendants have failed to meet their burden 6 to establish assent to the mandatory arbitration agreement in their Terms & Conditions as to 7 plaintiffs Hernandez and Russell. The motion to compel arbitration is DENIED on those grounds. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 This terminates Docket No. 224. 10 Dated: September 1, 2020 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 The Court notes that at least one other court has denied a motion to compel arbitration by defendant Fluent, finding that a similarly designed Fluent website (also for retailproductzone.com) did not provide sufficient notice of or assent to the Terms & Conditions, including mandatory arbitration, to create an enforceable agreement. See Anand v. Heath, 19-cv-0016-JJT, 2019 WL 2716213 (N.D. Ill. 2019). 6 United States District Court Northern District of California 1 APPENDIX A 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 United States District Court Northern District of California 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
