Braninburg v. Monterey County et al, No. 4:2008cv04562 - Document 38 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 24 , 25 , 26 MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge Claudia Wilken on 2/23/2011. (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/23/2011) *** DISREGARD, SEE CORRECT ORDER DOCKET NO. 40 ***
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Braninburg v. Monterey County et al Doc. 38 1 2 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 7 8 9 TROYCE T. BRANINBURG, ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) ) MONTEREY COUNTY, et al., ) ) ) Defendants. ___________________________ ) United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 No. C 08-4562 CW (PR) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docket nos. 24, 25, 26) INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Troyce T. Braninburg, currently incarcerated at 12 Coalinga State Hospital, brought this pro se civil rights case 13 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging constitutional violations stemming 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 from being housed at the Monterey County Jail (MCJ) as a pending "Sexually Violent Predator." Plaintiff seeks monetary relief. Plaintiff is a pre-operation, transgender individual. In its previous Orders, the Court referred to Plaintiff using male pronouns. Plaintiff refers to herself using female pronouns in her filings; therefore, the Court will do so in this Order. The Court conducted an initial screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Plaintiff asserted that jail officials and medical staff at the MCJ were deliberately indifferent to her medical needs. The following background was taken from the Court's July 1, 2009 Order: According to the allegations in the complaint, between May 1, 2007 and December 10, 2007, Plaintiff was held as a civil detainee at the Monterey County Jail. (Compl. at 3.) During this time, Plaintiff alleges he did not receive HIV/AIDS medications for four months, and he spent "the entire time in a unsanitary cell with little Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 3 or no medical attention." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he "became ill and built up resistance to current . . . meds . . . [and] deteriorated medically-mentally." (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that he filed numerous grievances, which were never addressed or returned. FN. (Compl. at 1.) 4 5 6 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Plaintiff names the "Monterey County District Attorney's Office" and the "Monterey County Jail Staff as correctional and medical staff" as defendants in this case. He seeks monetary damages. FN. Plaintiff contends he has filed administrative appeals (grievances) on this issue which have never been answered. It thus appears he has not exhausted his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). If the allegations that his appeals have not been answered are true, however, it may be that administrative remedies are not "available" within the meaning of the statute. This is an issue better resolved at a later stage of the case. (July 1, 2009 Order at 1-2 (footnote in original).) The Court found that Plaintiff's allegations presented a cognizable deliberate indifference claim. However, the Court determined that she failed to allege facts identifying which individuals violated her constitutional rights. (July 1, 2009 Order at 7.) Plaintiff named "Monterey County Jail Staff"; however, she failed to name any specific defendants. The Court granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint to cure the pleading deficiencies, or to suffer dismissal of the action. On August 4, 2009, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC). She named the following Defendants: Monterey County Sheriff Mike Kanalakis; MCJ Commander Barrera; and MCJ Director of Medical Services Taylor Fithian, M.D. She also named the following as Doe defendants: three MCJ sergeants, twelve MCJ deputies; and MCJ 26 Isolation Unit supervisors and deputies. 27 On January 25, 2010, the Court issued its Order of Service. 28 The Court found that Plaintiff stated a cognizable claim for 2 1 deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs against 2 Defendant Fithian. Plaintiff also stated cognizable supervisory 3 liability claims against Defendants Kanalakis and Barrera as well 4 as cognizable Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against 5 Defendants Kanalakis, Barrera and Fithian. Plaintiff's claims 6 against the Doe defendants were dismissed without prejudice. 7 On June 23, 2010, Defendant Fithian filed his motion for 8 summary judgment. On June 24, 2010, Defendants Kanalakis and 9 Barrera filed their motion for summary judgment. In their motions United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 for summary judgment, Defendants did not raise Plaintiff's failure 11 to exhaust her administrative remedies; therefore, the Court need 12 not consider this issue. 13 In an Order dated July 27, 2010, the Court granted Plaintiff 14 an extension of time to file her oppositions to Defendants' motions 15 for summary judgment. 16 On September 1, 2010, Plaintiff filed her oppositions.1 17 On September 10, 2010 and September 14, 2010, Defendant 18 Fithian and Defendants Kanalakis and Barrera respectively filed 19 their replies to Plaintiff's oppositions. 20 For reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS in part and 21 DENIES in part Defendants' motions for summary judgment. 22 1 In Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant Kanalakis and 23 Barrera's motion for summary judgment, she requests more time to conduct discovery. Plaintiff has already filed her oppositions to 24 Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Defendants state that they were "not aware that Plaintiff conducted any discovery, and 25 Plaintiff has not indicated in her opposition that she has any plans to do 26 specificReply at 2.) so in the future." (Defs. Kanalakis and which Barrera Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to describe documents are sought or how "additional discovery would have 27 revealed specific facts precluding summary judgment." See Tatum v. 28 City and County of S.F., 441 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's request for a continuance for discovery. 3 BACKGROUND 1 2 I. Medical Care 3 Plaintiff was transferred from the California Men's Colony to 4 MCJ in May, 2007. (Def. Fithian Mot. Summ. J., Ex. D-7, California 5 Forensic Medical Group (CFMG) Records.) Plaintiff's medical 6 records describing her prior medical treatment were transferred 7 with her to MCJ. (Id., Ex. D, CFMG Records.) 8 medications with her to MCJ. She also brought An Intake Health Screening and Intake 9 Triage Assessment test found that Plaintiff had Hepatitis C, United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 HIV/AIDS, psychiatric problems and prostate cancer. (Id., Ex. D-1, 11 CFMG Records.) According to her FAC, Plaintiff did not receive medical 12 13 treatment or prescribed medication for over four months. 14 3.) (FAC at She claims that "this deliberate indifference will shorten 15 [her] life expectancy." (Id.) Plaintiff adds that she also 16 suffers from "Hep-C, Neuropathy, cancer, etc." (Id., Attach. 17 "Claim 4 of 4.") 18 Plaintiff claims that the conditions of confinement caused her 19 "to become extremely depressed, and very suicidal." (Id., Attach. 20 "Claim 3 of 4.") She also "experienced extreme physical discomfort 21 22 23 24 and insomnia." (Id.) Plaintiff claims that she lost forty pounds while housed at MCJ, "caused by a combination of lack of food, lack of proper medical treatment, depression, insomnia, and mental exhaustion." (Id.) 25 Plaintiff claims that despite being in solitary confinement, 26 "no mental health care or treatment was provided or offered." 27 28 (Id., Attach. "Relief 1 of 3.") On May 3, 2007, Plaintiff was examined by Susana Fraser, P.A. 4 1 (Def. Fithian Mot. Summ. J., Ex. F-1, CFMG Records.) Plaintiff 2 claims she was taking various medications, which were verbally 3 approved by Dr. Garcia, her previous physician. (Id.) When 4 Plaintiff arrived at MCJ, she did not have any HIV medication. 5 (Id.) Plaintiff's HIV medications had been discontinued by the 6 medical staff at the California Men's Colony because she had to United States District Court For the Northern District of California 7 undergo neck surgery; however, they were supposed to have been 8 prescribed again post-surgery. (Id.) P.A. Fraser told Plaintiff 9 that she would request Plaintiff's medical records relating to HIV 10 medications. (Id.) 11 On May 16, 2007, Defendant Fithian prescribed six medications 12 for Plaintiff's conditions after a Jail Re-Admission Health 13 Appraisal was performed. (Id., Ex. D-9, CFMG Records.) 14 On May 29, 2007, the director of nurses advised MCJ that 15 Plaintiff had not been on any HIV medications since June, 2006. 16 (Id., Ex. F-2, CFMG Records.) P.A. Fraser decided to refer 17 Plaintiff to the Natividad Immunology Division Outpatient (NIDO) 18 clinic for a new evaluation relating to her HIV positive condition. 19 (Id.) 20 On June 20, 2007, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Pauda of the NIDO 21 22 clinic. 23 tests. (Id., Ex. L, CFMG Records.) (Id.) Dr. Pauda ordered laboratory On July 10, 2007, Plaintiff was scheduled for a 24 follow-up appointment with Dr. Pauda and a psychiatrist, Dr. D. 25 Guiroy, at the NIDO clinic. 26 (Id., Ex. J-1 - J-2, CFMG Records.) Plaintiff was seen by the Marriage and Family Therapist on 27 June 22, 2007, who referred Plaintiff to Defendant Fithian. 28 Ex. F-5, CFMG Records.) On June 25, 2007, Defendant Fithian 5 (Id., 1 increased the dosage of Plaintiff's Wellbutrin prescription to 2 treat her depression. (Id.) Plaintiff was otherwise stable. 3 (Id.) 4 On June 27, 2007, Plaintiff's public defender, Erin 5 Wennerholm, Esq., sent a letter expressing concern regarding 6 Plaintiff's medical and psychiatric treatment. 7 Records.) (Id., Ex. J-3, CFMG Ms. Wennerholm discussed Plaintiff's request for an United States District Court For the Northern District of California 8 increased dosage of her Wellbutrin prescription. (Id.) Plaintiff 9 requested an additional bagged lunch or breakfast due to rapid 10 weight loss, and also requested an extra pillow and blanket for 11 comfort to alleviate pain caused by recent back surgery. (Id.) 12 Plaintiff asked for disposable razors because of her sensitive 13 skin. (Id.) Ms. Wennerholm indicated that later on she was 14 informed that Plaintiff's Wellbutrin prescription had in fact been 15 increased to the recommended dosage, and that Plaintiff's medical 16 concerns were being addressed. (Id.) 17 On June 27, 2007, Defendant Fithian ordered Plaintiff an extra 18 sack lunch and blanket. (Id., Ex. J-4 - J-5, CFMG Records.) 19 On July 10, 2007, Defendant Fithian ordered Plaintiff an 20 21 additional sack breakfast. (Id., Ex. J-6, CFMG Records.) That 22 same day, Plaintiff called Dr. Finnberg asking to discontinue her 23 Wellbutrin prescription because of concerns relating to her liver 24 disorder, and Defendant Fithian recommended that Plaintiff's 25 request be granted. 26 (Id., Ex. F-8, CFMG Records.) On August 24, 2007, a MCJ health care provider denied 27 Plaintiff's request for a razor due to Plaintiff's history of 28 suicide threats. (Id., Ex. J-16, CFMG Records.) 6 Plaintiff was 1 also told that she would be given her Neurontin medication three 2 times a day. 3 (Id.) Plaintiff was then seen at the NIDO clinic regarding her 4 sensitive skin problems, lab tests and medications, as well as 5 evaluations by Dr. Pauda, Dr. Guiroy and Dr. Tobber for Hepatitis C 6 treatment. (Id., Ex. J-19 - J-24, CFMG Records.) Plaintiff was 7 then given disposable razors due to her sensitive skin and 8 prescribed various medications. 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 13 (Id.) On September 11, 2007, Defendant Fithian renewed Plaintiff's Wellbutrin prescription. (Id., Ex. F-16, CFMG Records.) On October 3, 2007, Plaintiff again asked to discontinue her (Id., Ex. J-28, CFMG Records.) Wellbutrin prescription. Defendant Fithian ordered that Plaintiff's Wellbutrin prescription be tapered 14 off during the following weeks. (Id.) 15 On October 9, 2007, Defendant Fithian noted that Plaintiff's 16 17 18 19 20 Wellbutrin prescription was being tapered off, as requested, and would soon be entirely discontinued. (Id., Ex. F-18, CFMG Records.) On October 17, 2007, Dr. Guiroy examined Plaintiff and 21 recommended Wellbutrin once again. (Id., Ex. J-29 - J-30, CFMG 22 Records.) Plaintiff was scheduled for a follow-up appointment with 23 Dr. Pauda and Dr. Guiroy. 24 (Id.) On October 18, 2007, the physicians at NIDO clinic examined 25 Plaintiff and recommended that Wellbutrin be prescribed again, to 26 which Plaintiff agreed. (Id., Ex. F-19, CFMG Records.) The next 27 day, Defendant Fithian noted that Plaintiff's Wellbutrin 28 prescription had been restarted. (Id., Ex. F-20, CFMG Records.) 7 1 On November 20, 2007, Plaintiff refused to visit physicians at 2 the NIDO clinic for her follow-up appointment. (Id., Ex. J-35, 3 CFMG Records.) 4 On November 29, 2007, Defendant Fithian noted that Plaintiff's 5 Wellbutrin prescription was reordered. (Id., Ex. F-21, CFMG 6 Records.) United States District Court For the Northern District of California 7 On December 5, 2007, Plaintiff was last seen by medical staff 8 before he was transferred out of MCJ on December 10, 2007. (Id., 9 Exs. E-13 & G-14, CFMG Records.) 10 II. Strip Search and Conditions of Confinement 11 Plaintiff alleges that she was "illegally stripped [sic] 12 search[ed] upon entering MCJ." (FAC, Attach. "Claim 4 of 4.") She 13 adds that, because this strip search was conducted in the presence 14 of inmates, it was "humiliating and degrading." (Id.) Plaintiff 15 argues that she should not have been subjected to a strip search, 16 because it is "designed for criminal process misdemeanants [sic] 17 who might be concealing a weapon or have drugs in their 18 possession." (Id.) 19 Plaintiff alleges that she was held in "solitary confinement" 20 21 for the entire duration of her stay in MCJ, and was "only allowed 22 out of her cell a maximum of 3 hours per week (1 per day, 3x 23 week)." (Id., Attach. "Claim 1 of 4.") Plaintiff claims that her 24 cell was "filthy, infested with vermin, had poor plumbing which 25 often backed up leaving raw sewage." 26 (Id.) Plaintiff claims that she was not given adequate bedding, and 27 was placed in a "cold and dank" cell that caused her to suffer 28 "insomnia brought on by extreme physical discomfort." 8 (Id.) 1 Plaintiff asserts that she was "routinely not given meals, 2 particularly lunch." (Id., Attach. "Claim 2 of 4.") Plaintiff 3 claims she was given a used razor to shave with, which "may well 4 have exposed other persons to Plaintiff's HIV, and exposed 5 Plaintiff to HIV, or other blood borne maladies from other 6 persons." 7 (Id.) Plaintiff claims that she was "routinely placed in mechanical United States District Court For the Northern District of California 8 restraints" during transports. (Id.) Although Plaintiff was kept 9 physically separated from the "criminal process prisoners" and 10 placed in a compartment with a metal mesh grating, she claims that 11 "the criminal process prisoners routinely expectorated and urinated 12 on Plaintiff because of her 'involuntary civil commitment status.'" 13 (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Defendants "made [her] status known to 14 the criminal process prisoners," which "led to Plaintiff being 15 singled out for abusive treatment at the hands of the criminal 16 process prisoners, whom she never should have been transported with 17 in the first place." (Id.) 18 Plaintiff asserts that she had "extremely limited access to 19 telephones, could only place non-confidential monitered [sic] 20 21 calls" and "could not receive calls. Also, visits were severely 22 limited to 2 days of non-contact visits per week." 23 "Claim 3 of 4.") (Id., Attach. Plaintiff argues that "mental health patients in 24 California are entitled to, as a matter of statutory law, 25 reasonable access to telephone to both make and receive 26 confidential calls." 27 (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that she was denied equal 28 protection and due process. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that 9 1 "the conditions of confinement in MCJ and the actions of the 2 Defendants were punitive in nature." (Id.) Plaintiff contends 3 that she was "entitled to more considerate conditions of 4 confinement than those of prisoners whose conditions of confinement 5 are designed to punish." (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that she was 6 denied equal protection in the form of rights codified in the 7 Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act (California Welfare & Institution 8 Code §§ 5000, et seq.) which were created to protect mental health 9 patients in California. (Id., Attach. "Claim 4 of 4.") United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 DISCUSSION I. Legal Standard Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and disputed issues of material fact remain and when, viewing the evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1987). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. F.2d at 1289. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815 The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it is based on 10 1 personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in 2 evidence. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th 3 Cir. 1995). Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment 4 5 are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the 6 outcome of the case. 7 are material. 8 (1986). The substantive law will identify which facts Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof 9 on an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by 11 demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the 12 nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden 13 then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific evidence, 14 through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that 15 the dispute exists." Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 16 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). A complete 17 failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving 18 party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 19 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 20 II. Legal Claims 21 A. 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs and Supervisory Liability Claims Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 11 1 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986). The analysis of a claim of deliberate 2 indifference to serious medical needs involves an examination of 3 two elements: (1) a prisoner's serious medical needs and (2) a 4 deliberately indifferent response by the defendants to those needs. 5 McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. A serious medical need exists if the 6 failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further 7 significant injury or the "wanton infliction of unnecessary pain." 8 Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury 9 that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that 11 significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the 12 existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of 13 indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical 14 treatment. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 15 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)). A prison official is deliberately 16 indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of 17 serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable 18 steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 19 The prison official must not only "be aware of facts from which the 20 inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 21 exists," but he "must also draw the inference." Id. If a prison 22 official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the 23 official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how 24 severe the risk. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 25 (9th Cir. 2002). In order for deliberate indifference to be 26 established, therefore, there must be a purposeful act or failure 27 to act on the part of the defendant and resulting harm. See 28 McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison 12 1 Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). A finding that the 2 defendant's activities resulted in "substantial" harm to the 3 prisoner is not necessary, however. Neither a finding that a 4 defendant's actions are egregious nor that they resulted in 5 significant injury to a prisoner is required to establish a 6 violation of the prisoner's federal constitutional rights. 7 McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060, 1061 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 8 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1992) (rejecting "significant injury" requirement and 9 noting that Constitution is violated "whether or not significant United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 injury is evident")). However, the existence of serious harm tends 11 to support an inmate's deliberate indifference claims. Jett v. 12 Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing McGuckin, 974 13 F.2d at 1060). 14 Once the prerequisites are met, it is up to the factfinder to 15 determine whether deliberate indifference was exhibited by the 16 defendant. Such indifference may appear when prison officials deny, 17 delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may 18 be shown in the way in which prison officials provide medical care. 19 See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062 (delay of seven months in providing 20 medical care during which medical condition was left virtually 21 untreated and plaintiff was forced to endure "unnecessary pain" 22 sufficient to present colorable § 1983 claim). 23 Plaintiff claims that Defendant Fithian failed to provide her 24 with medical treatment for her HIV for up to four months. 25 3.) She also claims that she was never provided or offered mental 26 health treatment. 27 (FAC at (FAC, Attach. "Relief 1 of 3.") That Plaintiff has serious medical needs is not in dispute. 28 However, Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Fithian failed to provide 13 1 any or adequate medical treatment does not support a claim of 2 deliberate indifference. To the contrary, the record shows that 3 Defendant Fithian provided adequate care to Plaintiff. 4 Fithian Mot. Summ. J., CMFG Records.) (Def. Defendant Fithian, as well as 5 outside physicians, examined Plaintiff on multiple occasions and 6 gave her adequate treatment for her medical issues. (Id.) When 7 Plaintiff first entered MCJ and was given a Jail Re-Admission Health 8 Appraisal, Defendant Fithian noted that Plaintiff had Hepatitis C, United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 HIV/AIDS, psychiatric problems and prostate cancer. (Id., Ex. D-1, 10 CMFG Records.) Defendant Fithian prescribed six different 11 medications for Plaintiff's conditions. (Id., Ex. D-9, CMFG 12 Records.) Defendant Fithian increased the dosage of Plaintiff's 13 Wellbutrin prescription to treat her depression. (Id., Ex. F-5, 14 CMFG Records.) Plaintiff's complaints were not ignored by Defendant 15 Fithian, who continued to give her follow-up care according to her 16 medical needs. The record shows that Defendant Fithian ordered 17 Plaintiff an additional sack breakfast and lunch, as well as an 18 extra blanket. (Id., Ex. J-6, CMFG Records.) When Plaintiff 19 requested that her Wellbutrin prescription be discontinued, 20 Defendant Fithian ordered that the medication be tapered off and 21 eventually stopped. (Id., Ex. J-28, CMFG Records.) Defendant 22 23 Fithian renewed Plaintiff's Wellbutrin prescription after Plaintiff 24 underwent lab tests at the NIDO clinic and agreed to take 25 Wellbutrin. (Id., Ex. F-19 - F-20, CMFG Records.) Therefore, the 26 Court finds that Defendant Fithian was not deliberately indifferent 27 because he did not deny or delay treatment of Plaintiff's serious 28 medical needs. Cf. Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 14 1 (9th Cir. 1989) (summary judgment reversed where medical staff and 2 doctor knew of head injury, disregarded evidence of complications to 3 which they had been specifically alerted and, without examination, 4 prescribed contraindicated sedatives). 5 Accordingly, Defendant Fithian is entitled to summary judgment 6 on the deliberate indifference claim as a matter of law. See 7 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 8 Plaintiff sues Defendants Kanalakis and Barrera in their United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 supervisorial capacity. Specifically, Plaintiff claims Defendants 10 Kanalakis and Barrera failed to "adequately train and supervise 11 [their] subordinate deputies who clearly violated Plaintiff's rights 12 of due process and equal protection, and who were deliberately 13 indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs." (FAC, Attach. "Relief 1 14 of 3.") The Court has not found that any of Defendants Kanalakis's 15 and Barrera's subordinates were deliberately indifferent to 16 Plaintiff's medical needs, or violated any of her constitutional 17 rights. 18 Accordingly, Defendants Kanalakis and Barrera are entitled to 19 summary judgment as a matter of law as to this claim as well. See 20 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 21 B. Legal Claims Relating to Conditions of Confinement 22 1. Due Process Claim 23 24 Plaintiff claims that a variety of the conditions of her 25 confinement at MCJ between May, 2007 and December, 2007, violated 26 her constitutional rights as a civil detainee under the SVPA. 27 There is no per se prohibition on housing SVPs in facilities, 28 such as county jails, where criminal detainees or convicts are also 15 1 housed. The Ninth Circuit, in Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th 2 Cir. 2004), declined to hold that SVPs may not, consistent with the 3 Constitution, be held in jail facilities, finding instead that the 4 dispositive question when assessing an SVP's constitutional 5 challenge to his or her conditions of confinement is whether those 6 conditions are punitive. See Jones, 393 F.3d at 932. A restriction 7 is punitive where it is intended to punish, or where it is excessive 8 in relation to its non-punitive purpose, or is employed to achieve United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 objectives that could be accomplished in alternative and less harsh 10 methods. Id. at 933-34. The conditions and duration of confinement 11 must "bear some reasonable relation to legitimate, non-punitive 12 13 14 15 government interests." Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Legitimate, non-punitive government interests include ensuring a detainee's presence at trial, maintaining jail security, and effective 16 management of a detention facility. Jones, 393 F.3d at 932. 17 Further, individuals who have not yet been civilly committed at 18 19 20 21 22 trial under the SVPA are entitled to protections at least as great as those afforded to civilly committed individuals and to individuals accused but not convicted of a crime. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 931-32 (9th Cir. 2009). Foster v. For such 23 individuals, a presumption of punitive conditions arises where the 24 individual is detained under conditions identical to, similar to, or 25 more restrictive than those under which pretrial criminal detainees 26 are held, or where the individual is detained under conditions more 27 restrictive than those he or she would face upon commitment. Id. at 28 934; cf. Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 997 (after trial and civil commitment 16 1 under SVPA, presumption switches, and conditions of confinement are 2 presumed non-punitive unless proven otherwise). The government must 3 be afforded an opportunity to rebut this presumption by showing 4 legitimate, non-punitive interests justifying the conditions of 5 detainees awaiting SVPA proceedings, and by showing that the 6 restrictions imposed on such detainees were not excessive in 7 relation to these interests. 8 See Jones, 393 F.3d at 934-35. During the time period at issue in this case, Plaintiff was United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 housed at MCJ while awaiting adjudication on her civil commitment 10 proceedings, and was housed in conditions similar to those of 11 pretrial criminal detainees. Thus, Defendants are required to rebut 12 the Jones presumption that the conditions of confinement at MCJ were 13 punitive. Defendants have submitted declarations and Plaintiff's 14 jail records as evidence in support of their motions for summary 15 judgment. Plaintiff has not submitted evidence in opposition, 16 although the Court considers her sworn and verified first amended 17 complaint as an opposing affidavit to the extent it is based on 18 personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in 19 evidence. See Schroeder, 55 F.3d at 460 & nn.10-11 (allowing 20 verified complaint to be considered opposing affidavit under Rule 56 21 to the extent it sets forth specific facts admissible into 22 23 evidence). 24 Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated her equal protection 25 and due process rights by subjecting her to conditions of 26 confinement that were punitive in nature. 27 4.") (FAC, Attach. "Claim 3 of Defendants Kanalakis and Barrera argue that they had 28 legitimate, non-punitive interests justifying how they housed 17 1 Plaintiff, and that the restrictions imposed on Plaintiff were not 2 excessive in relation to those interests. 3 Barrera Mot. Summ. J. at 2.) (Defs. Kanalakis and Moreover, Defendant Fithian argues 4 that the decisions pertaining to Plaintiff's housing conditions were 5 "reserved for custodial staff in the day-to-day management of an 6 inmate's living condition." 7 (Def. Fithian Mot. Summ. J. at 14.) Plaintiff claims that she was held in solitary confinement for 8 her entire stay at MCJ. (FAC at 3.) She claims that her complaints United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 about the unsanitary conditions of her cell were ignored, and that 10 she refused less restrictive placement "to protect herself from harm 11 at the hands of other inmates." (Opp'n to Defs. Kanalakis and 12 Barrera Mot. for Summ. J. at 17.) The undisputed evidence 13 demonstrates that Defendants made "several attempts to expand 14 [Plaintiff's] privileges and relax her confinement, given available 15 resources and space." (Hunton Decl. ¶¶ 6-14.) Although she was 16 placed in isolation, Plaintiff was authorized daily access to the 17 day room in addition to three hours of outdoor recreation each week. 18 (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff was housed separately from criminal defendants 19 as a safety precaution, and she also had greater access to staff and 20 medical services as well as less competition for time in the day 21 room. (Id. ¶ 8.) In regards to her claim of inadequate bedding, 22 23 Plaintiff's sheets were changed each week and blankets were changed 24 each quarter. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff was also ordered an extra 25 blanket by Defendant Fithian. 26 - J-5, CMFG Records.) 27 Plaintiff's cell. (Def. Fithian Mot. Summ. J., Ex. J-4 Efforts were made to ensure the sanitation of (Mihu Decl. ¶ 6-7.) For example, cleaning 28 supplies were routinely provided to inmates because they were 18 1 expected to clean their own rooms. (Id.) Moreover, three separate 2 repairs took place, addressing flooding caused by a broken shower 3 and leaking toilet. 4 (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that she was routinely denied meals, 5 particularly lunch. (FAC, Attach. "Claim 2 of 4.") Denial of food 6 service presents a sufficiently serious condition to meet the 7 objective prong of the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference 8 analysis. Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2009) United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 (denial of sixteen meals over twenty-three days was "a sufficiently 10 serious deprivation because food is one of life's basic 11 necessities"). However, the evidence shows that Plaintiff was 12 assigned an extra sack breakfast and lunch. (Def. Fithian Mot. 13 Summ. J., Ex. J-6, CFMG Records.) Moreover, the record shows that 14 Plaintiff refused her breakfast on six occasions, and refused her 15 lunch on one occasion. (Hunton Decl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff was not 16 deprived of any meal. (Id.) 17 Therefore, the Court finds the evidence presented by Defendants 18 sufficient to rebut the presumption that the conditions of 19 confinement to which Plaintiff was subjected in MCJ were punitive. 20 Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden of demonstrating a genuine 21 issue of material fact. The Court finds no merit to Plaintiff's 22 23 conclusory argument that, as a matter of law, Defendants violated 24 her constitutional rights because she suffered conditions of 25 confinement that were intended to punish. 26 Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on 27 Plaintiff's due process claim. 28 19 2. 1 2 Equal Protection Claim Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed to provide her with the 3 protections afforded to persons subject to other civil commitments, 4 such as other mental health patients. 5 4.") (FAC, Attach. "Claim 4 of "The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 6 commands that no State shall deny to any person within its 7 jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, which is essentially 8 a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 10 439 (1985) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 11 Plaintiff asserts that Defendants made her "involuntary 12 commitment status" known to the criminal process prisoners, thus 13 causing her to be singled out and abused. (FAC, Attach. "Claim 2 of 14 4.") Defendants Kanalakis and Barrera argue that each civil 15 detainee is clothed in a white jump suit as an indicator to other 16 inmates and jail officials of his or her status as a civil detainee, 17 and as a safety precaution to identify and separate the civil 18 detainee from other inmates. (Def. Kanalakis and Barrera Mot. Summ. 19 J. at 12.) Defendant Fithian argues that he did not provide any 20 information to prisoners concerning Plaintiff and her involuntary 21 commitment status. (Def. Fithian Mot. Summ. J. at 14.) The LPS Act 22 23 sets forth the rights applicable to persons who have been 24 involuntarily detained in a mental health treatment facility for 25 evaluation or treatment. The Court finds unavailing Plaintiff's 26 argument that she was treated differently from individuals civilly 27 detained pursuant to the LPS Act. The LPS Act by its terms applies 28 only to those who are involuntarily detained in a mental health 20 1 facility for evaluation or treatment, and does not apply to 2 individuals such as Plaintiff, who are involuntarily confined 3 because they are facing civil commitment proceedings under the SVPA. 4 Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on 5 Plaintiff's equal protection claim. 6 7 3. Right to Privacy Claim Plaintiff claims that her right to privacy under the Fourteenth 8 Amendment was violated because she was not allowed sufficient United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 privacy while meeting with visitors and using the telephone. (FAC, 10 Attach. "Claim 3 of 4.") Any right to privacy in a county jail is 11 necessarily diminished by the government's legitimate interest in 12 securing and effectively managing the jail. See Bell v. Wolfish, 13 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). To test the reasonableness of intrusions 14 into privacy in the jail setting, the Court "must consider the scope 15 of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, 16 the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is 17 conducted." Id at 559. Matters such as the introduction of 18 contraband, plans for escape or insubordination, and conflict among 19 inmates or between inmates and staff could be discussed in 20 confidential telephone calls or during confidential visits. 21 Therefore, Defendants' restrictions on these matters are relatively 22 23 routine precautions related to the safety of the staff and inmates 24 and the security of the jail. See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 25 U.S. 576, 588 (1984) (deferring to jail administrators' discretion 26 in determination that contact visits would jeopardize safety of 27 institution). Additionally, Defendants claim Plaintiff refused use 28 21 1 of the day room and access to the telephone fifty-seven percent of 2 the time it was available. 3 (Hunton Decl. ¶ 12.) There is no evidence in the record that the alleged 4 restrictions on Plaintiff's telephone calls and visits were 5 unrelated to the legitimate government interest in the safety of 6 MCJ. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on 7 Plaintiff's right to privacy claim. 8 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 4. Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments Plaintiff claims that she was subjected to a strip search upon 10 arrival at MCJ, in violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 11 rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. (FAC, 12 Attach. "Claim 2-4 of 4.") 13 The Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable 14 searches and seizures extends to SVPs. Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 993. 15 The reasonableness of a particular search or seizure is determined 16 by reference to the detention context and is a fact-intensive 17 inquiry. Id. 18 Here, the search at issue involved a strip search upon arrival 19 at a jail. The Fourth Amendment applies to the invasion of bodily 20 privacy in prisons and jails. Bull v. San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 21 974-75 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). To analyze a claim alleging a 22 23 violation of this privacy right, the court must apply the test set 24 forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), and determine 25 whether a particular invasion of bodily privacy was reasonably 26 related to legitimate penological interests. 27 973. See Bull, 595 F.3d at A strip search that includes a visual body cavity search 28 complies with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment so long as it 22 1 is reasonable. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. In Bell, the Supreme Court 2 evaluated the constitutionality of a blanket policy allowing visual 3 body cavity searches, without regard to individualized suspicion, of 4 all inmates at the county jail, including pretrial detainees, after 5 every contact visit with a person from outside the institution. 6 at 559-60. Id. The Supreme Court upheld the policy because the 7 possibility of smuggling drugs, weapons, and other contraband into 8 the institution presented significant and legitimate security United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 interests. Id. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held that the 10 rights of arrestees placed in custodial housing with the general 11 jail population are not violated by a policy or practice of strip 12 searching each one of them as part of the booking process, provided 13 that the searches are no more intrusive on privacy interests than 14 those upheld in Bell, and the searches are not conducted in an 15 abusive manner. Bull, 595 F.3d at 980-82 (San Francisco's policy 16 requiring strip searches for all arrestees classified for custodial 17 housing in the general population was facially reasonable under the 18 Fourth Amendment, notwithstanding the lack of individualized 19 reasonable suspicion as to the individuals searched). 20 Defendants claim that Plaintiff was not strip searched because 21 there is no record of a search and jail policy requires that such 22 23 searches be recorded and documented. (Defs. Kanalakis and Barrera 24 Mot. Summ. J. at 13.) Moreover, Plaintiff did not grieve the matter 25 and "County Jail rules for strip searches require that the privacy 26 of the inmate or detainee be maintained and that the search be 27 reported." (Id.) However, Plaintiff maintains that the strip 28 search did occur, and "whether it was recorded or not, it is common 23 1 for County Jail to perform strip searches of persons entering the 2 facility from the community or other facilities." 3 Kanalakis and Barrera Mot. Summ. J. at 17.) (Opp'n to Defs. Even if Plaintiff was 4 strip searched, she does not claim that the search was unreasonable 5 or conducted in an abusive manner. She only alleges that she was 6 strip searched upon arriving at MCJ. As mentioned above, the Ninth 7 Circuit has upheld the policy or practice of strip searching inmates 8 as part of the booking process so long as they are reasonable and United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 not conducted in an abusive manner. Bull, 595 F.3d at 980-82. 10 Therefore, there is no evidence that the strip search conducted here 11 violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 12 Plaintiff further alleges that she was placed in mechanical 13 restraints during transports, also in violation of her Fourth and 14 Fourteenth Amendment rights. (FAC, Attach. "Claim 2-4 of 4.") As 15 an SVP, Plaintiff had a right to conditions of confinement that were 16 not punitive, and she also had a substantive liberty interest in 17 freedom from unnecessary bodily restraint. Jones, 393 F.3d at 933; 18 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982). However, the use 19 of mechanical restraints while escorting Plaintiff when she was 20 transported around the jail was reasonably related to Plaintiff's 21 safety. Putting mechanical restraints on Plaintiff would reasonably 22 23 prevent Plaintiff from separating herself from the guards escorting 24 her and thereby endangering herself at the hands of other inmates. 25 Moreover, according to jail officials, it was routine to restrain 26 all detained persons with leg-irons and belly chains when being 27 transported to court. (Pineda Decl. ¶ 5.) Therefore, the use of 28 mechanical restraints while escorting her did not violate her Fourth 24 1 and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 2 Even if Plaintiff had alleged violations of her Fourth and 3 Fourteenth Amendment rights, there is no evidence that Defendants 4 Kanalakis and Barrera, who are being sued in their supervisorial 5 capacity, "participated in or directed the violations, or knew of 6 the violations and failed to act to prevent them." 7 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 8 claim. Taylor v. List, Nor has Plaintiff made such a Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 Fithian, who was one of her physicians, participated in any way in 10 the alleged strip search or in the use of mechanical restraints. 11 Therefore, the Court finds no merit to her conclusory argument that 12 these Defendants violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 13 rights. 14 Accordingly, Defendants Kanalakis, Barrera and Fithian are 15 entitled to summary judgment on her claims relating to the alleged 16 strip search and to the use of mechanical restraints. 17 CONCLUSION 18 For the foregoing reasons, 19 Defendants' motions for summary judgment (docket nos. 24, 25, 20 26) are GRANTED. 21 The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of 22 23 Defendants in accordance with this Order, terminate all pending 24 motions, and close the case. Each party shall bear his own costs. 25 This Order terminates Docket nos. 24, 25 and 26. 26 IT IS SO ORDERED. 27 DATED: 2/23/2011 28 CLAUDIA WILKEN United States District Judge 25 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 1 2 3 TROYCE T. BRAININBURG, Case Number: CV08-04562 CW 4 Plaintiff, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 5 v. 6 7 8 MONTEREY COUNTY et al, Defendant. / 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District 10 Court, Northern District of California. 11 That on February 23, 2011, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said 12 envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office. 13 14 15 Troyce Tabatha Braninburg 754-2 16 Coalinga State Hospital 24511 Jayne Avenue 17 P.O. Box 5003 Coalinga, CA 93210 18 Dated: February 23, 2011 19 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk By: Nikki Riley, Deputy Clerk 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 26
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