Greel v. Martel, No. 4:2008cv04474 - Document 22 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Stephen W. Greel Signed by Judge Claudia Wilken on July 23, 2010. (cwlc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/23/2010)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Greel v. Martel Doc. 22 1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 STEPHEN W. GREEL, 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 No. 08-04474 CW Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS v. MICHAEL MARTEL, Warden, 12 Respondent. / 13 14 INTRODUCTION 15 16 Petitioner Stephen W. Greel is a state prisoner incarcerated 17 at Mule Creek State Prison. On September 24, 2008, he filed his 18 original pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 19 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a conviction and sentence imposed by the 20 Contra Costa County Superior Court. 21 was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for kidnapping 22 to commit rape, and that the introduction of certain evidence 23 inflamed the passions of the jury, thus depriving him of his 24 constitutional right to a fair trial. 25 filed a motion for appointment of counsel, which the Court granted 26 on February 26, 2009. 27 answer. 28 traverse. Petitioner claims that there On the same day, Petitioner On July 21, 2009, Respondent filed an Petitioner, represented by counsel, timely filed a Having considered all of the papers filed by the Dockets.Justia.com 1 parties, the Court DENIES the petition. 2 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND United States District Court For the Northern District of California 3 On April 29, 2004, the district attorney filed an information 4 charging Petitioner with attempted murder (Count One; Cal. Penal 5 Code, §§ 187, 664);1 kidnapping to commit rape (Count Two; 6 § 209(b)), assault with a firearm (Count Three; § 245(a)(2)); 7 assault to commit rape (Count Four; § 220); and assault with a stun 8 gun (Count Five; § 244.5(b)). 9 sentencing enhancements for inflicting great bodily injury within 10 the meaning of section 12022.7 as to Counts One and Three, and for 11 personal discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury within 12 the meaning of section 12022.53(d), as to Counts One, Two, and 13 Four. 14 The information also alleged On August 2, 2005, a jury found Petitioner guilty on all 15 counts. 16 true, except for the firearm discharge as to Count Four, assault 17 with intent to rape. 18 The jury also found the alleged sentencing enhancements On March 2, 2005, the trial court denied probation and imposed 19 an aggregate sentence of thirty-four years and eight months to 20 life.2 21 court of appeal, in an unpublished opinion, reversed Petitioner’s 22 conviction for assault with a stun gun for insufficiency of Petitioner timely appealed his convictions. The California 23 1 24 All further statutory references are to the California Penal Code, unless otherwise noted. 25 2 26 27 28 Both the parties contend the sentence was forty-one years to life, but the California court of appeal found the sentencing documents to support a thirty-four year and eight month sentence. Resp’s Ex. 2, at 4 fn. 3. 2 1 evidence, but otherwise affirmed the judgment. 2 People v. Greel, No. A111307 (Cal. App. April 25, 2007). 3 Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme 4 Court, which was summarily denied on July 11, 2007. 5 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 6 The factual background of Petitioner’s conviction is 7 summarized based on the court of appeal opinion, unless otherwise 8 stated. 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California Resp’s Ex. 2; On April 26, 2004, Petitioner, nineteen years old at the time, 10 picked up a woman who was hitchhiking. 11 vehicle, Petitioner grabbed a stun gun and attempted to 12 incapacitate the woman with it. 13 the woman escaped from the car by jumping through the passenger- 14 side window, because the inside passenger-side door handle was 15 broken. 16 per hour, and had just crossed a bridge. 17 injuries jumping from the car, but was able to stand up and run. 18 As the woman ran away, Petitioner shot eight rounds from a .22 19 caliber handgun at her from a distance of approximately twenty 20 feet. 21 Petitioner tried to throw the gun off the bridge, the barrel broke 22 off in his hand and fell to the ground, and the remainder of the 23 gun landed on a sand bar below. 24 When she tried to exit the The stun gun had no effect, and At the time, the vehicle was moving at about five miles The woman sustained minor One bullet hit the woman, causing serious injury. As Petitioner then fled the scene. Later that day, after consulting with his mother, Petitioner 25 turned himself in at the Garberville sheriff’s office. 26 5, 1 Reporter’s Transcript (RT) at 157. 27 Petitioner’s car revealed a stun gun behind the passenger seat, and 28 3 Resp’s Ex. A consensual search of 1 a passenger-side door with no handle. 2 Petitioner waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 3 (1966). 4 to interview him, that he had picked up a hitchhiker, attempted to 5 use a stun gun on her, and shot her when she tried to escape. 6 Resp’s Ex. 5, 1 RT at 250, 254-255. 7 rape the woman but then he wavered after speaking with her about 8 her family. 9 gotten away because he probably would have raped her and maybe United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 Resp’s Ex. 5, 2 RT at 277. He told Detective Dennis Young, who arrived at the station Petitioner said he planned to Pet’r’s Ex. A, at 20-21. would have even killed her. He said he was glad she had Pet’r’s Ex. A, at 31. At trial, two types of evidence were introduced over 12 Petitioner’s objections. 13 stories, recovered from Petitioner’s bedroom and apparently 14 downloaded from the internet and printed out, were introduced to 15 demonstrate Petitioner’s intent to rape and kill the woman. 16 first story described the rape and murder of an eight-year-old 17 girl, and the second a son’s rape of his mother. 18 made reference to the stories at least five times in his closing 19 argument to the jurors, and urged them to examine the stories for 20 themselves. 21 First, copies of two pornographic The The prosecutor Resp’s Ex. 5, 2 RT at 431-432, 440, 446, 473-474. The second type of evidence introduced over Petitioner’s 22 objection was testimony from a sheriff’s sergeant. 23 sergeant testified that, when Petitioner was fifteen years old, she 24 investigated a complaint that he had molested his five-year-old 25 niece. 26 oral copulation, fondling, and masturbation in front of the child. 27 Petitioner also admitted to having molested his niece in his 28 The sheriff’s At that time, Petitioner admitted to engaging in sodomy, 4 1 statement to Detective Young, which was played for the jury. 2 Resp’s Ex. 5, 2 RT at 318. 3 In his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor conceded 4 that Count Five, assault with a stun gun (§ 244.5(b)), was 5 unsupported by the evidence because it could not be shown that the 6 stun gun was capable of incapacitating a person, a required element 7 of the offense. 8 prosecutor urged the jury to convict instead on the lesser included 9 offense of assault (§ 240). Resp’s Ex. 5, RT at 430. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 Accordingly, the Resp’s Ex. 5, RT at 479. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 13 (AEDPA), a federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with 14 respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state 15 court unless the state court's adjudication of the claims: 16 "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 17 unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 18 determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 19 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 20 determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 21 the state court proceeding.” 22 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may 23 grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite 24 to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if 25 the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court 26 has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." 27 Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). 28 5 William v. "Under the 'unreasonable 1 application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if 2 the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle 3 from the [Supreme] Court's decision but unreasonably applies that 4 principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." 5 only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 6 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings of the Supreme Court as of the 7 time of the relevant state court decision. 8 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 Id. at 413. The Id. at 412. If the state court considered only state law, the federal court must ask whether state law, as explained by the state court, 10 is "contrary to" clearly established governing federal law. 11 Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230 12 state court, relying on state law, correctly identified the 13 governing federal legal rules, the federal court must ask whether 14 the state court applied them unreasonably to the facts. Id. at 15 1232. 16 (9th Cir. 2001). If the If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted 17 only if the error had a "'substantial and injurious effect or 18 influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" 19 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001)(quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 20 619, 638 (1993)). 21 Penry v. Johnson, In determining whether the state court's decision is contrary 22 to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 23 federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest 24 state court to address the merits of a petitioner's claim in a 25 reasoned decision. 26 Cir. 2000). 27 opinion is the California court of appeal. 28 Lajoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Here, the highest state court to issue a reasoned 6 1 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 2 II. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Kidnapping with Intent to Rape Petitioner asserts that there is insufficient evidence to 3 support his conviction for kidnapping with intent to rape in 4 violation of section 209(b) because his forced movement of the 5 victim was merely incidental, and that his conviction thereby 6 violates his due process rights under the federal Constitution. 7 The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against 8 conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every 9 fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 10 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 11 alleges that the evidence in support of his conviction cannot be 12 fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a rational trier of 13 fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt therefore states a 14 constitutional claim, which, if proven, entitles him to federal 15 habeas relief. 16 (1979). 17 18 A state prisoner who See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321-324 The kidnapping with intent to commit rape statute, section 209(b), provides: 19 20 21 22 23 24 (1) Any person who kidnaps or carries away any individual to commit robbery, rape, spousal rape, oral copulation, sodomy, or any violation of Section 254.1, 288, or 289, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole. (2) This subdivision shall only apply if the movement of the victim is beyond that merely incidental to the commission of, and increases the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in, the intended underlying offense. 25 In determining whether a forced movement was merely incidental, the 26 jury must consider such factors as “whether the movement decreases 27 the likelihood of detection, increases the danger inherent in a 28 7 1 victim’s foreseeable attempts to escape, or enhances the attacker’s 2 opportunity to commit additional crimes.” 3 Cal. 4th 1141, 1152 (2006). 4 In reviewing claims of insufficient evidence, California 5 courts use the Jackson standard. 6 252, 260-262 (1995); People v. Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d 557, 578 (1980). 7 United States District Court For the Northern District of California People v. Dominguez, 39 See People v. Cuevas, 12 Cal. 4th In the California court of appeal, Petitioner argued that no 8 rational trier of fact could have found him guilty of kidnapping 9 with intent to rape because he moved the victim only a short 10 distance, several hundred feet across a bridge, before she escaped 11 from the car. 12 incidental to the intended rape, and did not either decrease the 13 risk of detection or increase the risk of harm to the victim. 14 court rejected this argument. 15 Petitioner could have raped his victim at any time; movement across 16 the bridge was not required, and thus a reasonable jury could have 17 concluded that the forced movement, while brief, was undertaken for 18 a non-incidental purpose. 19 Therefore, he argued that the movement was merely Resp’s Ex 2 at 8-9. The It noted that Id. at 7. Furthermore, the court acknowledged that there was no evidence 20 that there was a lesser risk of detection at the far end of the 21 bridge, where the forced movement ended, but noted that 22 “transporting a victim by car ‘[gives] rise to dangers, not 23 inherent in [an underlying crime], that an auto accident might 24 occur or that the victim might attempt to escape from the moving 25 car or be pushed therefrom . . .” 26 14 Cal. 3d 122, 132 (1975)). 27 did attempt to escape in this case, jumping from the moving 28 Id. at 8 (quoting In Re Earley, The court explained that the victim 8 1 vehicle. 2 reasoned that even at only five miles an hour, she could have 3 easily been seriously injured. 4 injured did not alter the fact that the forced movement created the 5 risk that she might have been. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 6 Id. Although her injuries were slight, the court Id. That she was not seriously Id. Petitioner counters that jumping from a vehicle moving at five 7 miles an hour is no more dangerous than jumping from a stationary 8 location, and therefore that no reasonable person could convict him 9 of kidnapping with intent to rape based on his forced movement of 10 the victim. 11 not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court 12 precedent. 13 forced movement of the victim, while not far in distance, was not 14 merely incidental because it substantially increased the risk of 15 injury to the victim. 16 unwarranted. 17 III. 18 The court of appeal’s rejection of this argument is A reasonable jury could have found that Petitioner’s Accordingly, habeas relief on this claim is Admission of Prejudicial Evidence Petitioner asserts that the introduction of pornographic 19 stories in his possession, and evidence of his prior sexual 20 misconduct, was so prejudicial as to render his trial fundamentally 21 unfair in violation of his federal due process rights. 22 The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas 23 review unless a specific constitutional guarantee is violated or 24 the error is of such magnitude that the result is a denial of the 25 fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. 26 Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999). 27 “has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or 28 9 Henry v. The Supreme Court 1 overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation 2 sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ.” 3 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that trial court’s 4 admission of irrelevant pornographic materials was “fundamentally 5 unfair” under Ninth Circuit precedent but not contrary to, or an 6 unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law). United States District Court For the Northern District of California 7 Holley v. Yarborough, Failure to comply with state rules of evidence is neither a 8 necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting federal habeas relief 9 on due process grounds. Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031; Jammal v. Van de 10 Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). 11 in federal habeas review is whether the admission of evidence was 12 arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial 13 fundamentally unfair. 14 Cir. 1995). 15 jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due 16 process. The due process inquiry Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Only if there are no permissible inferences that the Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. 17 A. 18 Petitioner asserts that the trial court improperly weighed the Pornographic Stories 19 probative value and prejudicial effect of the violent pornographic 20 stories in Petitioner’s possession that it admitted into evidence 21 to show intent to kill and rape the victim. 22 The court of appeal held that the stories were properly 23 admitted, because they were relevant and the likely prejudicial 24 effect of their admission was “not great.” 25 The court noted that, although the stories themselves were shocking 26 and disturbing, there was “no contention that the defendant was the 27 author of the stories and was responsible for their content,” and 28 10 Resp’s Ex. 2, at 11. 1 thus the jury was unlikely to be unduly prejudiced by viewing them. 2 Id. 3 of the stories was not an abuse of discretion. 4 noted that, even if the stories were improperly admitted, the error 5 would have been harmless, given the extensive evidence of 6 Petitioner’s guilt: he confessed to the crime to both his mother 7 and the police, his account matched that of the victim, and 8 physical evidence recovered from the scene was consistent with 9 Petitioner’s confession. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 On that basis, the court held that the trial court’s admission Id. The court also Id. Because there is no clear Supreme Court precedent holding that 11 admission of prejudicial and irrelevant evidence can be an 12 appropriate basis for habeas relief, Petitioner would not be 13 entitled to habeas relief on this ground even if he could show that 14 admission of the stories unfairly biased the jury against him. 15 Holley v. Yarborough,568 F.3d 1091 at 1101 (holding that even 16 though admission of irrelevant prejudicial evidence was grounds for 17 reversal of petitioner’s conviction under Ninth Circuit case law, 18 the lack of clear Supreme Court precedent meant that habeas relief 19 was inappropriate on that ground). See 20 Furthermore, even under the Ninth Circuit’s Jammal standard, 21 the state court was not unreasonable in finding that admission of 22 the stories did not render Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. 23 The evidence was introduced for the purpose of corroborating 24 Petitioner’s self-admitted fantasies about killing and raping a 25 woman and to show his intent to act on those fantasies. 26 Pet’r’s Ex. A, 20-21, 31. 27 little probative value because of Petitioner’s own admissions to 28 See Although the evidence arguably had 11 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 the same effect, it was offered to counter the defense’s suggestion 2 at trial that Petitioner’s admissions had been bravado on the part 3 of a person with low self-esteem, and that there was no sexual 4 element to the crimes committed. 5 The jury could have permissibly inferred from this evidence that 6 Petitioner’s admissions were not simply bravado and that his 7 interest in raping and killing a woman was real. 8 was not unreasonable in finding that, because there was a 9 legitimate inference the jury could have drawn from the evidence, 10 its introduction did not result in a fundamentally unfair trial. 11 See Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. 12 determination was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of 13 Supreme Court precedent, and Petitioner is not entitled to habeas 14 relief on this ground. Resp’s Ex 5, 1 RT 129, 2 RT 459. The state court Therefore, the court of appeal’s 15 B. 16 Petitioner argues that introduction of evidence that he had 17 molested his five year old niece four years prior to the charged 18 conduct was also so prejudicial as to render his trial 19 fundamentally unfair. 20 Evidence of Petitioner’s Past Sexual Misconduct In general, character evidence, including specific instances 21 of past conduct, is inadmissible under California law when 22 introduced to show a criminal defendant acted in conformity with 23 his or her character. 24 prosecutions for sexual crimes, however, California Evidence Code 25 section 1108 removes this prohibition in regard to evidence of 26 other sex offenses committed by the defendant. 27 § 1108. 28 See Cal. Evid. Code. § 1101. In the case of Cal. Evid. Code. Accordingly, admission of this sort of evidence is limited 12 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 only by California Evidence Code section 352's balancing test, 2 which weighs probative value against prejudicial effect. 3 Evid. Code. § 352; see People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903, 916 4 (1999) (holding that, in the case of evidence of prior sexual 5 conduct, in deciding whether to admit the evidence the trial court 6 must weigh such factors as the nature, relevance, degree of 7 certainty and remoteness of the offense, the likelihood of 8 confusing or distracting the jury, the likely prejudicial effect, 9 and the possibility of less prejudicial alternatives). Cal. 10 The court of appeal held that the introduction of evidence of 11 Petitioner’s past sexual misconduct presented “a close call” under 12 California Evidence Code section 352, but it did not find the 13 admission an abuse of discretion. 14 also held that, even if the evidence was improperly admitted, any 15 error was harmless, given the strength of the case against 16 Petitioner. 17 Resp’s Ex. 2, at 13. The court Id. As mentioned above, the lack of clear Supreme Court precedent 18 on this issue forecloses relief to Petitioner even if the admission 19 did render his trial fundamentally unfair under Ninth Circuit 20 precedent. 21 See Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415, 22 evidence of prior sexual misconduct is explicitly recognized as 23 admissible in sex offense cases, subject to considerations of 24 prejudice and probative value. United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 25 1018, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2001). Admission of such evidence in 26 federal court is subject to the balancing test of Federal Rule of 27 Evidence 403, but the rule recognizes that there is legitimate 28 13 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 probative value to be balanced against prejudicial effect. 2 The court of appeal was not unreasonable in finding that the 3 probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, 4 and that any error was harmless because the case against Petitioner 5 was strong. 6 presented by the prosecution, including the matching confession, 7 testimony of the victim and physical evidence, ensured that the 8 evidence of sexual misconduct had no “substantial and injurious 9 effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Even if the court did err, the strong evidence See 10 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638. 11 rejection of Petitioner’s arguments was not contrary to or an 12 unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority, and he is not 13 entitled to habeas relief on this ground. 14 15 The California court of appeal’s CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas 16 corpus is DENIED. 17 appealability for this case should Petitioner wish to pursue an 18 appeal. 19 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (requiring district court to rule on 20 certificate of appealability in same order that denies petition). 21 A certificate of appealability should be granted "only if the 22 applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 23 constitutional right." 24 appealability must indicate which issue or issues satisfy the 25 showing required by § 2253(c)(2). 26 Court finds that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing of the 27 denial of a constitutional right on his claims based on the 28 The Court will issue a certificate of See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 14 The certificate of 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). The 1 admission of prejudicial evidence. 2 showing sufficient to justify a certificate of appealability on his 3 claim based on the insufficiency of the evidence supporting his 4 kidnapping conviction. 5 judgment, terminate all pending motions, and close the file. Petitioner has not made a The Clerk of the Court shall enter 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 9 Dated: July 23, 2010 CLAUDIA WILKEN United States District Judge United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
