Collier v. Hennessy et al, No. 4:2006cv01143 - Document 91 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION; DENYING THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REFERRING CASE PRO SE PRISONER SETTLEMENT PROGRAM. Motions terminated: 80 MOTION to Strike 77 Memorandum in Opposition fi led by H. Castro, E. Staehely, S. Neu, J. Aragon, Jackson, 60 MOTION for Summary Judgment of Defendants CASTRO, STAEHLY, NEU, JACKSON AND ARAGON filed by H. Castro, E. Staehely, S. Neu, J. Aragon, Jackson.. Signed by Judge Claudia Wilken on 5/13/2010. (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/13/2010)
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Collier v. Hennessy et al Doc. 91 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 TREMAYNE COLLIER, 4 5 6 No. C 06-01143 CW (PR) Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION; DENYING THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REFERRING CASE TO PRO SE PRISONER SETTLEMENT PROGRAM v. SHERIFF M. HENNESSEY, et al., 7 Defendants. 8 / United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 10 INTRODUCTION 11 On February 16, 2006, Plaintiff Tremayne Collier, a state 12 prisoner currently incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison, filed 13 this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arising from 14 incidents occurring while he was a pretrial detainee at San 15 Francisco County jail, against Defendants Sheriff Michael 16 Hennessey, Captain Ideta, Deputy H. Castro, Deputy E. Staehly, 17 Deputy S. Neu, Senior Deputy Jackson and Senior Deputy J. Aragon. 18 On September 23, 2008, the Court found that Plaintiff stated a 19 cognizable claim against Defendants Castro, Staehly, Neu, Jackson 20 and Aragon for excessive use of force in violation of Plaintiff's 21 22 due process rights.1 On February 20, 2009, Defendant Castro filed a motion for 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Plaintiff's supervisory liability claims against Defendants Hennessey and Ideta were dismissed with leave to amend. The Court gave Plaintiff until October 23, 2008 to file his amended supervisory liability claims in an amendment to the complaint. He was told that the failure to do so would result in dismissal of his supervisory liability claims without prejudice. On September 4, 2009, due to Plaintiff's failure to amend, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's supervisory liability claims against Defendants Hennessey and Ideta without prejudice. Dockets.Justia.com 1 summary judgment, which the Court denied without prejudice to 2 refiling as a joint motion with the remaining Defendants. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 3 On November 3, 2009, Defendants Castro, Staehly, Neu, Jackson 4 and Aragon filed a joint motion for summary judgment. 5 filed an opposition, and Defendants filed a reply. 6 Defendants took Plaintiff's deposition, and then Defendants filed a 7 motion for leave to file a supplement to their motion for summary 8 judgment. 9 an opposition to Defendants' supplement, and Defendants filed a The Court granted Defendants' motion. Plaintiff Thereafter, Plaintiff filed 10 reply and a motion to strike Plaintiff's opposition to the 11 supplement. 12 Having considered the papers filed by the parties, the Court 13 DENIES Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's opposition to the 14 supplement, and DENIES their motion for summary judgment in its 15 entirety. 16 17 18 19 BACKGROUND The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's declaration in support of his opposition to the motion for summary judgment. On February 28, 2004, Plaintiff returned to his cell and was 20 informed that there had been a physical altercation between two 21 inmates while he was gone. 22 inmates. 23 Jackson informed Plaintiff that he was being transferred to 24 administrative segregation at D-Block. 25 reason for the transfer, but was told he had to go to D-Block 26 immediately. 27 cooperated while his hands were cuffed in the front. 28 then asked Defendant Jackson to search Plaintiff's paperwork in Jail officials began to interview the When it was time for Plaintiff's interview, Defendant Plaintiff was not given a Defendant Jackson handcuffed Plaintiff, and Plaintiff 2 Plaintiff United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 front of Plaintiff so that he could take it with him to D-Block. 2 Defendant Jackson "became upset" and ordered Defendants Neu, Castro 3 and Staehly to take Plaintiff to D-Block and house him in Cell D- 4 16, stating that "he didn't give a fuck" if they had to drag 5 Plaintiff there. (Pl.'s Decl. at 2.) 6 Plaintiff's declaration states that he complied with 7 Defendants' orders and that he did not pose a threat to any of 8 them. 9 under him and that he fell while Defendants Neu and Castro were (Id.) Plaintiff states that his feet were kicked out from 10 still holding on to his arms. 11 According to Plaintiff, once he was tripped, he fell face down, 12 bracing his fall with his elbows. 13 asserts, "When I hit the ground, Neu went down with me and I know 14 Staehely went down with me because Staehely was directly behind 15 me." 16 several officers fall on his back." 17 asserts, "Staehely jumped on my back and there were others that 18 followed, you can feel when people are jumping on your back. 19 exactly, I can't tell you exactly." 20 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Castro, Neu and Jackson were 21 present but failed to intervene when "several officers" fell on his 22 back and prevented him from breathing. 23 (Id. at 147:16-18.)2 (Pl.'s Dep. at 145:23-24.) (Id. at 146:5-9.) Plaintiff While on the ground, Plaintiff "felt (Pl.'s Decl. at 2.) Plaintiff Who (Pl.'s Dep. at 147:19-22.) (Pl.'s Decl. at 2.) Defendant Neu then "applied a 2 finger choke hold to 24 [Plaintiff's] adams apple." 25 Plaintiff, the choke hold "cut off all my breathing. 26 hands that were handcuffed in front of me to come up underneath me (Pl.'s Decl. At 2.) According to As I used my 27 2 28 Staehly is misspelled in the transcript of Plaintiff's December 23, 2009 deposition. 3 1 and grab Neu's hands . . . and pulled it away." (Pl.'s Dep. at 2 148:23-149:40.) 3 "prevent any other attacks." 4 Jackson placed his foot on the left side of Plaintiff's face and 5 Defendant Castro placed his foot on the left side of Plaintiff's 6 wrist inside the handcuff, "causing the cuff to cut into 7 [Plaintiff's] wrist." 8 Defendants do not claim that Plaintiff resisted in any way during 9 the incident. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Plaintiff then lowered his head to the ground to (Id.) (Pl.'s Decl. at 2.) Defendant For purposes of this motion, Plaintiff asserts that sometime during the incident Defendant 11 Aragon and Deputy Kilgariff arrived. 12 Plaintiff then observed Defendant Aragon asking Defendant Jackson 13 questions. 14 and operated by Deputy Kilgariff and then given to Defendant 15 Staehly.3 16 (Pl.'s Dep. at 150:12-13.) Plaintiff also states he saw a video camera being held (Pl.'s Decl. at 3.) Plaintiff claims that he began complaining of breathing 17 problems. 18 Plaintiff's back. 19 had trouble breathing. 20 to the safety cell. 21 continued to complain that he could not breathe and that he needed 22 more oxygen. 23 Plaintiff informed her that he also had chest pains. 24 then given a nitroglycerin tablet. 25 transported Plaintiff to San Francisco General Hospital for Defendant Jackson advised the deputies to "get off" of (Id.) Plaintiff continued complaining that he After several minutes, Plaintiff was moved His clothes were cut off his body. He A nurse arrived to administer the oxygen and Plaintiff was Paramedics arrived and 26 27 28 3 Defendants have submitted a video tape of the incident. However, the video begins after the incident involving Defendants' use of force had already ended. 4 1 treatment. 2 to the jail. 3 video interview of Plaintiff.4 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 4 After Plaintiff was medically cleared, he was returned A few days later, Senior Deputy Robinson conducted a Plaintiff states that he continues to have "ongoing chest 5 pain, complication of breathing, and has to carry nitroglycerin 6 where ever he goes." 7 Plaintiff was examined by medical officials at San Francisco County 8 Jail because of continued pain in his wrist and elbow. 9 Pl.'s Opp'n.) (Pl.'s Compl. at 5.) On September 9, 2004, (Ex. A to 10 On February 16, 2006, Plaintiff filed the present action. 11 DISCUSSION 12 13 I. Legal Standard Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and 14 disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the 15 evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is 16 clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. 17 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); 18 Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 19 1987). 20 Fed. R. Civ. P. The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no 21 material factual dispute. 22 the opposing party's evidence, if it is supported by affidavits or 23 other evidentiary material. Therefore, the court must regard as true Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 24 25 26 27 28 4 Defendants have submitted the video tape and audio tape of Plaintiff's interview by Senior Deputy Robinson. The Court does not rely on Plaintiff's interview because: (a) the bulk of the interview centers on whether Plaintiff resisted or not, which is not at issue in this case, and (b) the rest of the interview contains information that is duplicative of the parties' other filings. 5 1 815 F.2d at 1289. 2 favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 3 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 4 587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 5 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 6 Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment 7 are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the 8 outcome of the case. 9 are material. 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California The court must draw all reasonable inferences in 11 The substantive law will identify which facts Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an 12 issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of 13 production by either of two methods: 14 17 The moving party may produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's case, or, after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of its claim or defense to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 18 Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 19 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000). 15 16 20 If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an 21 absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or 22 defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence 23 of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with 24 evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. 25 at 1106; see also Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 26 (1990); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 27 1991). 28 the non-moving party's case, the burden then shifts to the non- Nissan, 210 F.3d If the moving party shows an absence of evidence to support 6 1 moving party to produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or 2 admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." 3 Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1409. 4 If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an 5 essential element of the non-moving party's claim or defense, it 6 must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. 7 F.3d at 1105. 8 burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific 9 evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Nissan, 210 If the moving party produces such evidence, the Id. If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of 11 production by either method, the non-moving party is under no 12 obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. 13 This is true even though the non-moving party bears the ultimate 14 burden of persuasion at trial. 15 II. 16 Id. Id. at 1107. Discussion Plaintiff sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that 17 Defendants used excessive force with intent to cause harm. 18 Compl. at 6.) 19 rights under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual 20 punishment. 21 Fourteenth Amendment from the use of excessive force that amounts 22 to punishment. 23 Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to come forward with 24 admissible evidence that he suffered any physical injuries as a 25 result of Defendants' actions, and that an allegation of physical 26 injury is required. 27 evidence that their actions were malicious. 28 (Pl.'s Plaintiff alleges Defendants' actions violated his However, pretrial detainees are protected by the Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n. 10 (1989). Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has no A pretrial detainee, who has not yet been convicted of the 7 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 crime for which he has been charged, is entitled to at least the 2 protections afforded convicted prisoners. 3 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). 4 excessive force, the core judicial inquiry is whether the force was 5 applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, 6 or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. 7 McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). 8 balance several factors focusing on the reasonableness of the 9 officers' actions given the circumstances. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 When prison officials stand accused of using Hudson v. This inquiry requires courts to White v. Roper, 901 10 F.2d 1501, 1507 (9th Cir. 1990). 11 for the application of force, (2) the relationship between the need 12 and the amount of force that was used, (3) the extent of the injury 13 inflicted, and (4) whether force was applied in a good faith effort 14 to maintain and restore discipline. 15 These factors are (1) the need Id. Further, law enforcement officers may be held liable if they 16 have an opportunity to intercede but fail to do so when their 17 fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a plaintiff. 18 Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 2000); Motley 19 v. Parks, 383 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). 20 defendant violates a constitutional right that is "analytically the 21 same as the right violated by the person who strikes the blows." 22 United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447 n. 25 (9th Cir. 1994), 23 rev'd on other grounds, 514 U.S. 81 (1996). 24 an officer is not present during a constitutional violation, or if 25 a violation happens so quickly that an officer had no "realistic 26 opportunity" to intercede, then the officer is not liable for 27 failing to intercede. 28 The passive On the other hand, if Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1290. Based on Plaintiff's evidence, a finder of fact could 8 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 reasonably conclude that the actions of Defendants Castro, Staehly, 2 Neu and Jackson above constituted excessive force. 3 argument that Plaintiff must show more severe physical injury is 4 not well taken. 5 injury and force are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the 6 latter that ultimately counts. 7 S. Ct. 1175, 1178-79 (2010). 8 by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force 9 claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without Defendants' The Supreme Court has recently clarified that Wilkins v. Gaddy, __ U.S. __, 130 An inmate who is gratuitously beaten 10 serious injury. 11 dismissed because the force used was de minimis, but not because 12 the injuries suffered were de minimis. 13 absence of some arbitrary quantity of injury requires automatic 14 dismissal of an excessive force claim improperly bypasses Hudson's 15 core inquiry of whether force was applied maliciously and 16 sadistically to cause harm. 17 Therefore, contrary to Defendants' argument, Plaintiff does not 18 have to prove the he suffered from physical injury to prevail on 19 his excessive force claim. 20 Id. In sum, an excessive force claim may be To conclude that the Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. at 1178. Defendants' attempt to analogize the present facts to those in 21 White is unavailing. 22 901 F.2d at 1507).) 23 precedent, purported force resulting in the absence of any physical 24 injury whatsoever fails to rise to the level of a 'malicious and 25 sadistic' use of force by defendants." 26 Circuit based its affirmance of the district court's grant of 27 summary judgment on the reasoning that, although the amount and 28 type of force used was disputed between the parties, the plaintiff (Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 5 (citing White, Defendants state, "Under Ninth Circuit 9 (Id.) In White, the Ninth United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 did not show he requested medical treatment, lost consciousness at 2 any time or suffered any permanent injury. 3 argue that Plaintiff "has not shown that he required or even that 4 he requested medical treatment for the cuts he allegedly suffered 5 on his wrists and thumb areas." 6 Contrary to Defendants' argument, Plaintiff's own assertions -- 7 regarding Defendants' use of force and his resulting injuries -- 8 are admissible evidence. 9 perjury that he received medical treatment for his injuries and 10 that he suffered permanent harm, including "ongoing chest pain, 11 complication of breathing, and has to carry nitroglycerin wherever 12 he goes." 13 evidence of enough physical harm to overcome summary judgment. 14 Id. Here, Defendants (Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 5.) Plaintiff asserts under penalty of (Pl.'s Compl. at 5.) Therefore, Plaintiff has provided As noted above, Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has not 15 shown that the force was used with the requisite malice and sadism. 16 In determining whether force was applied "maliciously and 17 sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm," the Court may 18 look to many factors, including the need for the application of 19 force and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful 20 response. 21 There is no evidence in the present case that Defendants applied 22 force to Plaintiff in a good faith effort to maintain or restore 23 discipline. 24 for the purposes of this motion, Defendants do not allege that 25 Plaintiff resisted during the incident. 26 argue that because Plaintiff came forward with "no evidence that he 27 suffered any physical injuries," he could not prove that force was 28 applied maliciously and sadistically. White, 901 F.2d at 1507; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6. 10 As mentioned above, at least Rather, Defendants again This argument is without 1 merit. 2 Defendants Castro, Staehly, Neu and Jackson applied excessive force 3 against him. 4 wantonly, maliciously and for the express purpose of causing harm. 5 Direct evidence of malice and sadism is not required. 6 these Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the 7 excessive force claim as a matter of law. 8 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 Plaintiff has created genuine issues of fact as to whether From this, a fact-finder could infer that they acted Therefore, There is a dispute over Defendant Aragon's involvement in the incident. Defendants argue that Defendant Aragon did not make 10 physical contact with Plaintiff and therefore could not have caused 11 Plaintiff physical injury. 12 assert that at Plaintiff's December 23, 2010 deposition, he 13 admitted that Defendant Aragon never caused him any injury. 14 point out that when Plaintiff was asked about Defendant Aragon's 15 involvement and whether he caused him any physical injury, 16 Plaintiff said, "no." 17 other points in the deposition, Plaintiff stated that he was not 18 sure of Defendant Aragon's involvement, and that he was not sure of 19 the identity of the officers who jumped on his back as he was face 20 down. 21 finder of fact could reasonably conclude that Defendant Aragon used 22 excessive force. (Defs.' Supplement at 3.) (Pl.'s Dep. at 109:18-21.) (Id. at 106:13-14, 145:15-22.) Defendants They However, at Based on this evidence, a 23 Alternatively, Plaintiff could prevail against Defendant 24 Aragon by showing that he was present and failed to intervene while 25 Plaintiff's constitutional rights were being violated by Defendants 26 Castro, Staehly, Neu and Jackson. 27 1289-90. 28 that the timing of events was so rapid and fluid as to preclude See Cunningham, 229 F.3d at Plaintiff's testimony at his deposition does not suggest 11 1 Defendant Aragon from interceding. 2 (finding liability for failure to intervene where one officer 3 witnesses another striking blows). 4 issue of fact as to whether Defendant Aragon had an opportunity to 5 intervene to prevent the excessive force against Plaintiff by the 6 other Defendants. 7 summary judgment on the excessive force claim as a matter of law. 8 Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is 9 DENIED. United States District Court For the Northern District of California CONCLUSION 11 For the foregoing reasons, 12 1. 14 15 16 Plaintiff has created a genuine Therefore, Defendant Aragon is not entitled to 10 13 See Koon, 34 F.3d at 1447 n.25 Defendants' motion for summary judgment (docket no. 60) is DENIED. 2. Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's opposition to the supplement (docket no. 80) is DENIED. 3. The Northern District of California has established a Pro 17 Se Prisoner Settlement Program. 18 cases may be referred to a magistrate judge for a settlement 19 conference. 20 Plaintiff's excessive force claim has survived summary judgment. 21 Thus, this case is REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Vadas for a 22 settlement conference. 23 Certain prisoner civil rights The Court finds that a referral is in order now that The conference shall take place within one-hundred-twenty 24 (120) days of the date of this Order, or as soon thereafter as is 25 convenient to the magistrate judge's calendar. 26 Vadas shall coordinate a time and date for the conference with all 27 interested parties and/or their representatives and, within ten 28 (10) days after the conclusion of the conference, file with the 12 Magistrate Judge 1 2 The Clerk shall provide a copy of this Order, and copies of 3 documents from the court file that are not accessible 4 electronically, to Magistrate Judge Vadas. 5 4. The Clerk shall send a copy of this Order to Plaintiff. 6 5. The Clerk shall prepare an Order for Pretrial 7 Preparation, setting the case for a pretrial conference and a five- 8 day jury trial. 9 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California Court a report regarding the conference. 11 6. This Order terminates Docket nos. 60 and 80. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: 5/13/2010 CLAUDIA WILKEN United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 1 2 3 TREMAYNE COLLIER, Case Number: CV06-01143 CW 4 Plaintiff, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 5 v. 6 M HENNESSY, SHERIFF et al, 7 Defendant. 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 / I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California. That on May 13, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office. 13 14 17 Tremayne Collier V-60930 Kern Valley State Prison P.O. Box 5102 A6-208 Delano, CA 93216 18 Dated: May 13, 2010 15 16 19 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk By: Nikki Riley, Deputy Clerk 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14
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