Cini et al v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 3:2024cv00288 - Document 21 (N.D. Cal. 2024)
Court Description: ORDER denying 9 Motion to Remand. Signed by Chief Judge Richard Seeborg on March 15, 2024. (rslc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/15/2024)
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Cini et al v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC Doc. 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 PATRICIA JO CINI, et al., Case No. 24-cv-00288-RS Plaintiffs, 11 United States District Court Northern District of California v. ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND 12 13 MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, Defendant. 14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 16 Plaintiffs Patricia Jo Cini and Robert Lawrence Cini (Plaintiffs) initially filed this suit 17 against Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (Defendant) in the Superior Court of California, 18 County of San Mateo, on October 30, 2023. On January 17, 2024, Defendant removed the case to 19 the Northern District of California, asserting both diversity and federal question jurisdiction 20 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 2310. Plaintiffs move to remand back to 21 state court. For the reasons explained below, Plaintiffs’ motion is denied, and removal is proper. 22 Plaintiffs also filed certain evidentiary objections to Defendant’s notice of removal, however the 23 objections represent Plaintiffs’ substantive arguments in the motion to remand. Accordingly, the 24 evidentiary objections are overruled. 25 26 II. BACKGROUND This case is about Plaintiffs’ purchase of a 2020 Mercedes-Benz GLE (the “vehicle”) that 27 was manufactured or distributed by Defendant. The vehicle was covered by an express written 28 warranty. During the warranty period, the vehicle allegedly developed nonconformities to the Dockets.Justia.com 1 warranty including defective seats, abnormal wear, and fit and finish defects. The operative 2 Complaint advances six causes of action against Defendant, asserting violations of the Song- 3 Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“the Song-Beverly Act”), also known as California’s “lemon 4 law,” and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“the Magnuson-Moss Act”). Defendants insist that 5 upon becoming apprised of the amount in controversy at issue in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, it timely 6 filed its removal notice based on both diversity and federal question jurisdiction. United States District Court Northern District of California 7 Plaintiffs’ motion to remand has three bases: first, Defendant’s removal was untimely 8 because it was not filed within 30 days of service; second Defendant’s citizenship allegations are 9 speculative and insufficient; and third, the amount-in-controversy allegations are similarly flawed. 10 III. LEGAL STANDARD 11 A defendant may seek removal of an action based on federal question jurisdiction or 12 diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. There is a presumption against federal 13 jurisdiction and “the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 14 jurisdiction.” Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 15 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). A “notice of removal may 16 be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an 17 amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the 18 case is one which is or has become removable.” Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 19 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013). If the case as stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice 20 of removal may be filed within 30 days after “receipt of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, 21 order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has 22 become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). “These two 30-day periods are not the exclusive 23 periods to remove; provided that neither is triggered, a defendant may remove at any time based 24 on the results of its own investigations.” Anaya v. Mars Petcare U.S., Inc., No. ED CV 21-1603 25 PSG (KKx), 2021 WL 5578724 at *2 (C. D. Cal. Nov. 29. 2021) (citing to Roth v. CHA 26 Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013). “‘The threshold requirement for 27 removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 is a finding that the complaint contains a cause of action that is ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND CASE NO. 24-cv-00288-RS 28 2 1 within the original jurisdiction of the district court.’” Ansley v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 340 2 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Toumajian v. Frailey, 135 F.3d 648, 653 (9th Cir. 1998)). 3 Additionally, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject 4 matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). IV. DISCUSSION United States District Court Northern District of California 5 6 A. Untimeliness 7 Defendant removed the case to federal court 78 days after the Complaint was filed in state 8 court, and Plaintiffs insist this gap renders Defendant’s removal notice untimely under Sections 9 1446(b)(1) and 1446(b)(3). The Ninth Circuit has held that the two 30-day periods in Sections 10 1446(b)(1) and 1446(b)(3) are merely “periods during which a defendant must remove if one of 11 the thirty-day time limits is triggered” and a defendant may “remove outside the two thirty-day 12 periods on the basis of its own information, provided it has not run afoul of either of the thirty-day 13 14 15 16 deadlines.” Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125. Defendant insists that removability was not readily ascertainable from the face of the Complaint, and it removed once it discovered, by its own investigation, that the case was removable. Regardless, Plaintiffs’ procedural objection to Defendant’s notice of removal is waived because their own motion to remand was filed more than 30 days after the notice of removal.1 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“A motion to remand the case on the 17 basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after 18 the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a)”); see also Maniar v. F.D.I.C., 979 F.2d 19 20 21 782, 784–85 (9th Cir. 1992) (“We hold that untimely removal is a procedural defect and not jurisdictional and that § 1447(c) limits a district court’s power to remand a case sua sponte for such a procedural defect.”). 22 B. Diversity Jurisdiction 23 24 In its notice of removal, Defendant asserts complete citizenship diversity with Plaintiffs on the basis that the parties are citizens of different states and the amount-in-controversy exceeds 25 26 27 1 The notice of removal was filed on January 17, 2024, and the motion to remand was filed on February 21, 2024. ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND CASE NO. 24-cv-00288-RS 28 3 1 $75,000. According to Defendant, it is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal 2 place of business in Georgia, and has only one member, the Mercedes-Benz North America 3 Corporation, which is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. See 4 Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n LLC is a 5 citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens”). Defendant also asserts that, 6 based on the signature on the purchase agreement for the vehicle, Plaintiffs are residents of San 7 Mateo County, California. Further, while the Complaint is silent as to damages, Defendant 8 calculates the amount-in-controversy to exceed the $75,000 threshold required for diversity 9 jurisdiction. United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Plaintiffs insist that the notice of removal contains only bare allegations as to the 11 citizenship requirement and potential damages. While Plaintiffs do not challenge any 12 representations about Defendant’s own citizenship, they argue that Defendant’s claims about 13 Plaintiffs’ citizenship and residency are unfounded. However, Defendant based its determination 14 on the purchase agreement for the vehicle, which indicated that Plaintiffs resided in San Mateo 15 County, California. Plaintiffs could have refuted that reasonable conclusion by simply stating their 16 citizenship in their motion to remand but failed to do so. Plaintiffs also failed to file a reply brief 17 addressing this omission. 18 Plaintiffs next argue that Defendant has failed to meet its burden with regard to the 19 amount-in-controversy. For a federal court to have diversity jurisdiction over a case, the parties 20 must not only have different state citizenship, but the amount at issue must exceed $75,000. 28 21 U.S.C. § 1332. A removing defendant need not “prove to a legal certainty that the amount in 22 controversy requirement has been met.” Dart Cherokee Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 23 81, 89 (2014) (citations omitted). “Removal…is proper on the basis of an amount in controversy 24 asserted…if the district court finds, by a preponderance of evidence, that the amount in 25 controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Id. at 89 (citations omitted). In order to 26 determine the jurisdictional amount is in controversy, a court must “consider whether it is ‘facially 27 apparent’ from the complaint.” Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 690. If not, “the court may consider ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND CASE NO. 24-cv-00288-RS 28 4 1 facts in the removal petition.” Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th 2 Cir. 1997). Bare conclusory allegations are insufficient to determine the jurisdictional amount. Id. United States District Court Northern District of California 3 Here, the removal notice contains more than mere “conclusory allegations” to support 4 Defendant’s contention. Since the Complaint was silent on damages, Defendant investigated 5 Plaintiffs’ allegations, the causes of action, and the requested damages. Plaintiffs seeks 6 reimbursement of the entire amount paid for the vehicle, damages, penalties “two times the 7 amount of actual damages,” reasonable attorney’s fees, prejudgment interest, and other relief. The 8 Song-Beverly Act permits restitution in “an amount equal to the actual price paid or payable by 9 the buyer” and certain collateral damages, as well as civil penalties up to twice the amount of 10 actual damages, which is what Plaintiffs are seeking. Defendant represented that the vehicle was 11 purchased for $55,316.00, and Plaintiffs could be awarded up to twice that amount in additional 12 damages, for a total of $165,948 without calculating incidental or consequential damages or 13 attorneys’ fees. Aside from evidentiary objections, Plaintiffs’ motion is bereft of specific 14 arguments casting doubt on Defendant’s calculations other than accusing them of being “bare 15 allegations, without evidentiary foundation, and invit[ing] shear [sic] speculation regarding all the 16 elements of damages.” However, Defendant’s conclusions are based on Plaintiffs’ pleadings and 17 reasonable calculations of possible damages. Accordingly, the amount-in-controversy exceeds the 18 jurisdictional threshold. 19 C. Federal Question Jurisdiction 20 Defendant also removed on federal question grounds. Plaintiffs bring a claim under the 21 Magnuson-Moss Act, a federal statute governing warranties on consumer products. The 22 Magnuson-Moss Act has its own jurisdictional amount-in-controversy requirement, that is, the 23 amount must exceed $50,000 for federal jurisdiction to be exercised. As explained above, 24 Defendants have shown that Plaintiffs may plausibly recover well over that amount if Defendants 25 are found liable. Therefore, removal is proper under federal question jurisdiction as well. 26 D. CONCLUSION 27 For the foregoing reasons, removal was proper. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to remand ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND CASE NO. 24-cv-00288-RS 28 5 1 is denied. 2 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 5 6 7 Dated: March 15, 2024 ______________________________________ Richard Seeborg Chief United States District Judge 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND CASE NO. 24-cv-00288-RS 28 6
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