Brumble v. Andrew M. Jordan, Inc., No. 3:2023cv01336 - Document 29 (N.D. Cal. 2023)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION 15 , GRANTING MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 13 , DECLINING TO EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER REMAINING CLAIMS 14 AND REMANDING THOSE CLAIMS TO STATE COURT. (rslc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/16/2023)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 KERWYN BRUMBLE, Case No. 23-cv-01336-RS Plaintiff, 11 United States District Court Northern District of California v. 12 13 ANDREW M. JORDAN, INC., Defendant. 14 15 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION, GRANTING MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DECLINING TO EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER REMAINING CLAIMS AND REMANDING THOSE CLAIMS TO STATE COURT 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 19 This is a putative class action asserting wage and hour claims on behalf of non-exempt 20 employees of defendant Andrew M. Jordan, Inc., a construction company that provides a “full 21 array of construction and civil engineering services” in Northern California. Named plaintiff 22 Kerwyn Brumble began working for Jordan in 2019 under the job title “laborer.” Brumble’s 23 complaint, filed originally in Alameda County Superior Court, asserts eight claims for relief: 24 failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime, failure to provide meal breaks, failure to 25 provide rest breaks, failure to provide sick time compensation, wage statement violations, waiting 26 penalties, and unfair competition. 27 28 Jordan removed the action here, contending jurisdiction exists by virtue of the preemptive effect of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (“LMRA”), because 1 Brumble’s employment is subject to a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). Jordan now 2 moves for summary judgment as to the claims for relief it contends are preempted, and to compel 3 arbitration as to the remaining claims, over which it contends the court has supplemental 4 jurisdiction. Brumble, in turn, moves to remand the entire action to state court, arguing the 5 complaint did not support removal jurisdiction. 6 Because the removal was proper, the motion to remand will be denied. The motion for 7 summary judgment as to the preempted claims will also be granted. The remaining state law 8 claims will be remanded to state court, without prejudice to any determination the state court may 9 subsequently make as to whether arbitration of those claims should be compelled. 10 II. DISCUSSION United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 A. Motion to remand 13 Because Brumble’s motion to remand challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of this 14 court, it must be addressed first. Jordan’s notice of removal asserts jurisdiction is proper here 15 based on claims in the complaint that give rise to a federal question. On their face, all of the claims 16 for relief are stated exclusively under California state law. Jordan, however, contends certain of 17 the claims are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. That section provides “[s]uits for violation of 18 contracts between an employer and a labor organization . . . may be brought in any district court 19 of the United States.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 20 “Although § 301 contains no express language of preemption, the Supreme Court has long 21 interpreted the LMRA as authorizing federal courts to create a uniform body of federal common 22 law to adjudicate disputes that arise out of labor contracts.” Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 913 F.3d 23 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2019). Moreover, even though “normally federal preemption is a defense that 24 does not authorize removal to federal court, § 301 has such ‘extraordinary pre-emptive power’ that 25 it ‘converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes 26 of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’” Id. at 1152 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 27 65 (1987). Accordingly, a civil complaint raising claims preempted by § 301 raises a federal 28 CASE NO. 2 23-cv-01336-RS 1 2 The parties agree the question of whether a claim is preempted by § 301 is governed by the 3 standards set out in Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2007). Under 4 Burnside, the first inquiry is whether the claim for relief involves a right conferred upon an 5 employee by virtue of state law, as opposed to a right created by a CBA. “If the right exists solely 6 as a result of the CBA, then the claim is preempted, and our analysis ends there.” Id. at 1059. If, 7 however, the right exists independently of the CBA, the court must proceed to evaluate whether 8 adjudication of the claim will be “substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining 9 agreement.” Id. 10 United States District Court Northern District of California question and can properly be removed to a federal court. Here, Brumble insists his “his meal and rest period and overtime/sick pay violation claims 11 involve state law wage and hour rights that are wholly independent from the CBAs and are instead 12 based on the California Labor Code and applicable Wage Orders, including Wage Order No. 16 13 which governs the construction industry.” He concludes, therefore, that Jordan has not met its 14 burden to show preemption under the “first prong” of the Burnside test. Brumble then devotes the 15 bulk of his briefing to arguing that resolution of the claims will not require any substantive 16 analysis or interpretation of the CBA provisions, such that there is no preemption under the 17 “second prong” of Burnside either. 18 The flaw in Brumble’s argument is that he fails to address the directly applicable holding 19 of Curtis. As explained by the Ninth Circuit in that case, California Labor Code section 510(a)(2), 20 provides that the ordinary statutory provisions governing overtime compensation “do not apply to 21 the payment of overtime compensation to an employee working pursuant to . . . [a]n alternative 22 workweek schedule adopted pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement pursuant to Section 23 514.” Section 514 in turn states that “Sections 510 and 511 do not apply to an employee covered 24 by a valid collective bargaining agreement if the agreement expressly provides for the wages, 25 hours of work, and working conditions of the employees, and if the agreement provides premium 26 wage rates for all overtime hours worked and a regular hourly rate of pay for those employees of 27 not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage.” Cal. Lab. Code § 514. 28 CASE NO. 3 23-cv-01336-RS Accordingly, Curtis, concludes, “[b]y its terms, therefore, the default definition of 1 2 overtime and overtime rates in section 510 does not apply to an employee who is subject to a 3 qualifying CBA.” 913 F.3d at 1153–54. Because of that, as long as the employment is governed 4 by a CBA that satisfies Labor Code section 514, the right to overtime “exists solely as a result of 5 the CBA,” and therefore is preempted under § 301. Id. at 1154.1 6 Jordan has submitted admissible and adequate evidence that Brumble’s employment was 7 governed by a qualifying CBA.2 Accordingly, the claim for unpaid overtime is preempted under 8 the first prong of Burnside and this action was properly removed on that basis. Brumble’s 9 arguments about whether it is necessary to “interpret” the CBA—which go to the second prong of 10 Burnside—are simply not germane. Although unnecessary to give rise to the right to remove, the same basic analysis applies to United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 the claim for meal period violations (CBA gives rise to exemption under Labor Code section 512 13 (e)), the claim for rest period violations (exemption under Labor Code section 227(e) and Wage 14 Order 16), and the claim for sick time pay (exemption under Labor Code section 245.5). Finally, 15 the portion of the unfair competition claim that is based on these underlying alleged violations is 16 likewise preempted and also supports removal. Brumble’s motion to remand must be denied. 17 18 B. Motion for summary judgment 19 Jordan seeks summary judgment in its favor on the overtime, meal period, rest period, and 20 sick time claims, as well as the portion of the unfair competition claim arising from those claims, 21 on grounds that Jordan’s employment was exempt from the state law provisions he contends were 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 Curtis addressed a motion to dismiss. Although a few district court decisions have declined to apply it in the context of motion to remand, the majority of courts have found that to be a distinction without a difference. See Alexander v. Bio-Pac., LLC, 2023 WL 2573866, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2023) (collecting cases). Brumble’s briefing on the motion to remand does not dispute the existence of the CBA or that it satisfies section 514. To the extent his opposition to summary judgment raises such arguments, they are addressed below. 2 28 CASE NO. 4 23-cv-01336-RS 1 violated. As reflected in the discussion in the preceding section, Jordan’s position is sound. Brumble’s opposition to summary judgment is two-fold. First, he argues that Jordan has 2 3 not adequately established that his employment was in fact subject to the CBA Jordan submitted 4 with its motion papers. Jordan, however, laid an adequate foundation for the admissibility of the 5 document, including its authenticity, and provided evidence that Brumble was employed pursuant 6 to its terms. Notably, Brumble offers no declaration or other evidence to the contrary. There is no 7 material dispute of fact that the CBA applies. Second, Brumble contends the CBA does not fully meet the requirements of Wage Order United States District Court Northern District of California 8 9 16 to make his employment exempt from the statutory meal period and rest break rules.3 The 10 issues to which Brumble points, however, do not obviate the effect of the CBA. For example, 11 Brumble complains that the CBA does not expressly require that employees be provided “an 12 adequate supply of potable water, soap, or other suitable cleansing agent and single use towels for 13 handwashing.” Nothing in the statutes or the wage order, however, requires a CBA to contain such 14 a provision to exempt employees from the default meals requirements. Brumble also argues the 15 CBA does not include a “final and binding mechanism” for resolving meal period disputes, but 16 Section 9 of the agreement does just that. Similarly, while Brumble asserts the CBA does not 17 provide for the “working conditions” of employees, the agreement clearly is focused on that very 18 topic and covers it adequately to give rise to the exemptions. 19 Accordingly, Brumble’s employment was not subject to the California statutory 20 requirements that govern overtime, rest period, meal periods, and sick time in the absence of a 21 qualifying CBA. His claims under those statutes fail as a matter of law, and Jordan’s motion for 22 summary judgment must be granted. 23 24 25 26 27 3 Brumble makes no argument that CBA does not meet all of the requirements necessary for exemption as to the overtime and sick time claims. Summary judgment would therefore be warranted on those claims even if there were some issue as to the meal and rest period claims. 28 CASE NO. 5 23-cv-01336-RS 1 C. Remaining claims 2 Jordan does not contend preemption applies to Brumble’s claims for minimum wage 3 violations, wage statement violations, waiting penalties, and or the portion of the unfair 4 competition that rests on those claims. Instead, he moves to compel Brumble to arbitrate those 5 claims pursuant to an arbitration provision of the CBA. Brumble opposes, arguing that Jordan 6 waived the right to compel arbitration by seeking a court adjudication of some of the claims in this 7 action via its summary judgment motion. United States District Court Northern District of California 8 Jordan insists there is no waiver because it sought no relief from the court as to the specific 9 claims for relief that it wishes to arbitrate, other than the motion to compel arbitration. Neither 10 party has pointed to any authority addressing circumstances like these, where a defendant has 11 sought court relief as to only a subset of the arbitrable claims pleaded in a single complaint and 12 arising from the same set of operative facts. 13 Ultimately, however, the question of whether these remaining state law claims are subject 14 to arbitration is more appropriately addressed by the state courts. The very basis on which Jordan 15 argues this court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims is its contention that all 16 of the claims arising from the events alleged in the complaint should be adjudicated together. By 17 seeking summary judgment on the preempted claims and arbitration of the remaining claims, 18 however, Jordan has already precluded that. Additionally, the determination that certain claims are 19 preempted has not required substantive analysis of the underlying facts or remaining claims such 20 that there would be any judicial efficiencies in exercising supplemental jurisdiction were 21 arbitration not ordered. 22 A court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims 23 once it has “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); 24 Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001). Discretion counsels such a result here. 25 26 27 III. CONCLUSION Brumble’s motion to remand this action for lack of jurisdiction is denied. Jordan’s motion 28 CASE NO. 6 23-cv-01336-RS 1 for summary judgment in its favor as to Brumble’s overtime, meal period, rest period, and sick 2 time claims, as well as the portion of the unfair competition claim arising from those claims, is 3 granted. Jordan’s motion to compel arbitration of the remaining claims is denied, without 4 prejudice to its refiling in state court following remand. This action is hereby remanded to the 5 Alameda County Superior Court. 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 Dated: June 16, 2023 ______________________________________ RICHARD SEEBORG Chief United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CASE NO. 7 23-cv-01336-RS
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