Mitchell v. Pennington et al, No. 3:2021cv06247 - Document 24 (N.D. Cal. 2023)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge William H. Orrick on 03/29/2023. (jmd, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/29/2023)Any non-CM/ECF Participants have been served by First Class Mail to the addresses of record listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Mitchell v. Pennington et al Doc. 24 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 HENRY MOSES MITCHELL, Plaintiff, 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 v. PENNINGTON, et al., Defendants. Case No. 21-cv-06247-WHO (PR) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Dkt. Nos. 14 and 19 12 13 INTRODUCTION 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Plaintiff Henry Moses Mitchell, aka Henry C. Hayes, alleges in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit that prison staff refused to issue him books that he ordered for a divinity class, thereby violating his free exercise of religion rights under the First Amendment. Mitchell has filed a motion for summary judgment, defendants have filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, Mitchell has filed objections to defendants’ motion, and defendants have filed a reply. Summary judgment will be granted in defendants’ favor because the undisputed record shows that Mitchell’s right to free exercise was not substantially burdened by defendants’ conduct. Mitchell could have exchanged four of the books he already had for the four he ordered; defendants merely asked him to do so. Furthermore, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Mitchell’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 27 28 Dockets.Justia.com BACKGROUND 1 Mitchell is a California state prisoner who was housed at Pelican Bay State Prison United States District Court Northern District of California 2 3 when the alleged events giving rise to this suit occurred. The following summary is based 4 on his allegations. He ordered four books for a class (“Foundations of Moral Theology”) 5 that he was taking as part of his Master of Divinity coursework. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) 6 On January 3, 2021, he was called out of his cell to obtain the books from correctional 7 officers Pennington and Pearcey. (Id.) Defendant Pennington “stated that he needed me to 8 provide one-for one exchange books in order to obtain the textbooks that were ordered 9 from Christian Book Distributors.” (Id.) Mitchell told him that he was “excluded from the 10 one-for-one policy due to his written notice from the Receiving and Release Sergeant on 11 October 25, 2020, which stated ‘school books will not count as your 10.’” (Id.) According 12 to Mitchell, Pennington, after seeing this document, “screamed these are ‘Christian’ 13 Books!” (Id.) Mitchell showed him his course syllabus, which listed the books he 14 ordered as required for the course. (Id.) After Pennington said that Mitchell could not take 15 such a course without prison approval, Mitchell showed him a “written notice of the 16 Proctor Agreement signed by Pelican Bay State Prison Educational Department.” (Id.) 17 Pennington then said that he was refusing to issue the books and would leave the matter to 18 Receiving and Release (R & R) to resolve. (Id.) Mitchell alleges that by denying him the 19 books he ordered, Pennington and Pearcey violated his First Amendment right to the free 20 exercise of religion.1 Defendants offer a slightly different version of events. Neither defendant recalls 21 22 interacting with Mitchell on January 3, 2021. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (DMSJ), Dkt. No. 23 19 at 5.) Pennington does recall that on some date he and Pearcey entered the day room to 24 25 26 27 28 In one of his filings, Mitchell describes himself as an “Apostolic, [which is] a NonProtestant faith . . . [and] a branch of Reform Judaism.” (Pl.’s Objections to DMSJ, Dkt. No. 20 at 3.) At his deposition, Mitchell was asked, “Do you adhere to a specific Christian denomination?” (Reply, Mitchell Depo., Dkt. No. 23-1 at 5.) He replied, “I would not say that I adhere to a traditional Christian denomination. My theology is as an originalist. Meaning that what the scripture dictates that’s the doctrine in which I follow. In other words, not so much I’m a Baptist or Methodist; I’m an Episcopalian. That type of thing.” (Id. at 6.) 1 2 1 deliver packages to prisoners, and that he had a book to deliver to Mitchell, but he does not 2 remember anything about the book. (Id.) When he looked at Mitchell’s property card, he 3 noticed that if he gave plaintiff his book, the ten-book limit would have been exceeded. 4 Plaintiff said the book was for an educational course. (Id.) Rather than argue with him, 5 Pennington brought the book to R & R and asked whether Mitchell was enrolled in a 6 course. The R & R officer said that Mitchell was not enrolled in a course. (Id.) 7 Pennington left the book with R & R for return to the vendor. (Id.) United States District Court Northern District of California 8 STANDARD OF REVIEW 9 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits 10 demonstrate that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant 11 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those 12 which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 13 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a 14 reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. 15 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying 16 those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of 17 a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 18 Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must 19 affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the 20 moving party. On an issue for which the opposing party by contrast will have the burden 21 of proof at trial, as is the case here, the moving party need only point out “that there is an 22 absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. 23 Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go 24 beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts 25 showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Court is 26 concerned only with disputes over material facts and “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant 27 or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. It is not the task of the 28 court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. Keenan v. Allan, 91 3 1 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party has the burden of identifying, with 2 reasonable particularity, the evidence that precludes summary judgment. Id. If the 3 nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 4 a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (internal quotations omitted). DISCUSSION 5 “A person asserting a free exercise claim must show that the government action in United States District Court Northern District of California 6 7 question substantially burdens the person’s practice of her religion.” Jones v. Williams, 8 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015.) “A substantial burden . . . place[s] more than an 9 inconvenience on religious exercise; it must have a tendency to coerce individuals into 10 acting contrary to their religious beliefs or exert substantial pressure on an adherent to 11 modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 1011 (9th 12 Cir. 2013) (quoting Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 13 988 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). Prisoners retain the protections afforded by the First Amendment, “including its 14 15 directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of 16 Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citation omitted). But a prisoner’s right to free 17 exercise of religion “is necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration,” Ward v. Walsh, 1 18 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348). “To ensure that courts 19 afford appropriate deference to prison officials,” the Supreme Court has directed that 20 alleged infringements of prisoners’ free exercise rights be “judged under a 21 ‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of 22 fundamental constitutional rights.” O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349. The challenged conduct “is 23 valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. (quoting Turner v. 24 Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). 25 i. 26 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment The parties dispute whether the denial of the books (and thereby perhaps denying 27 him the opportunity to take his class) violated a tenet of his religion. Defendants contend 28 that “[t]here is no First Amendment right for an inmate to take an academic course 4 1 concerning religious topics, or to obtain a religious degree. Denial of the textbooks may 2 have interfered with Mitchell’s Masters of Divinity course, but Mitchell does not claim he 3 was coerced to forego the practice of his Christian religious beliefs.” (DMSJ, Dkt. No. 19 4 at 7.) United States District Court Northern District of California 5 Mitchell contends that “[i]t is ecclesiastical policy of certain religions that one must 6 attain a certain level of religious education or training before one may hold a position 7 within that organization. This is what constitutes the requirement of a degree to practice 8 one[’]s religion.” (Pl.’s Objections to DMSJ, Dkt. No. 20 at 10.) He then goes on to cite a 9 Bible verse which advocates study: “‘Study to show thyself approved unto God, a 10 workman that needeth not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth.’” [Second 11 Epistle of Paul to Timothy, Chapter 2, Verse 15].” (Id. at 11.) 12 Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, I assume without 13 deciding that the denial of the books violated a tenet of Mitchell’s religion. But even on 14 these facts, defendants did not place a burden so substantial that it “must have a tendency 15 to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs or exert substantial 16 pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Ohno, 723 F.3d 17 at 1011. Mitchell had an alternative means of exercising the right to free exercise. He 18 simply could have given up four books from his collection of ten, and obtained the books 19 he ordered. See, e.g., Zajrael v. Harmon, No. 2:07-cv-00158-JMM-JJV, 2010 WL 20 4823232 at *2, *4, *6 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 10, 2010) (inmate challenged confiscation of 21 numerous religious books, arguing that he was a member of numerous Islamic sects and 22 was required to educate himself about each; court ruled that confiscation did not 23 substantially burden religious exercise because 10 to 15 texts, including the Bible and 24 Quran, remained in Plaintiff’s cell, and Plaintiff was permitted to acquire new books 25 provided that he surrendered books in his possession). It is undisputed that the opportunity 26 was open and was offered to him, and nowhere does he contend that giving up four books 27 from his collection would have burdened his exercise of his religion, or made him unable 28 to complete his coursework. Accordingly, defendants’ summary judgment motion is 5 1 GRANTED. 2 ii. 3 Mitchell contends he had a “protected liberty interest” in having the books he 4 ordered. (PMSJ, Dkt. No. 14 at 8.) This liberty interest was “created by regulation for the 5 benefit of incarcerated person[s] seeking education through rehabilitation through 6 education.” (Id.) Therefore, he was “entitled to acquire and possess religious school 7 books.” (Id.) He contends that because the books he ordered were for school coursework, 8 they were exceptions to the ten-book limit and should have been allowed. (Id. at 5.) Mitchell’s contentions are not on point. The claim at issue in this suit is not about a 9 United States District Court Northern District of California Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment 10 liberty interest, but rather one of free exercise of religion. A liberty interest involves 11 different questions of law (see e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)) and was not a 12 claim found cognizable in the complaint. Moreover, even if Mitchell had pursued the free exercise claim in his motion for 13 14 summary judgment, it would not have been successful. As noted above, on the undisputed 15 facts his right to free exercise was not substantially burdened. He could have given up 16 books in his collection to obtain the four he ordered. It is undisputed that the opportunity 17 was open and offered to him, and nowhere does he contend that giving up four books from 18 his collection would have burdened his exercise of his religion, or made him unable to 19 complete his coursework. Mitchell’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 20 iii. 21 Qualified Immunity Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The defense of 22 qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar 23 as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 24 which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 25 (1982). To determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, the court must 26 decide whether the facts alleged show the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right; 27 and, if so, whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful 28 in the situation he confronted. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001); see also 6 1 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (overruling Saucier’s requirement that qualified 2 immunity analysis proceed in a particular sequence). “[I]f no constitutional right would 3 have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further 4 inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 5 Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The undisputed facts show that 6 defendants did not substantially burden Mitchell’s exercise of religion. And it would not 7 be clear to a reasonable officer that he was violating Mitchell’s free exercise rights when 8 Mitchell was offered the opportunity to have the books he wanted, and only had to 9 exchange ones he already possessed to obtain them. CONCLUSION 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff Mitchell’s 12 motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions, 13 enter judgment in favor of defendants, and close the file. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 Dated: March 29, 2023 _________________________ WILLIAM H. ORRICK United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
