Coon v. San Mateo County et al, No. 3:2019cv05203 - Document 25 (N.D. Cal. 2020)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOURTH THROUGH EIGHTH CAUSES OF ACTION WITH LEAVE TO AMEND granting 16 Motion to Dismiss. (Illston, Susan) (Filed on 5/5/2020)
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ZEPHANIAH COON, Plaintiff, 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 Case No. 19-cv-05203-SI v. SAN MATEO COUNTY, et al., Defendants. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOURTH THROUGH EIGHTH CAUSES OF ACTION WITH LEAVE TO AMEND Re: Dkt. No. 16 12 13 Defendants’ motion to dismiss the fourth through eighth causes of action is scheduled for a 14 hearing on May 8, 2020. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court determines that the matter 15 is appropriate for resolution without oral argument, and VACATES the hearing. For the reasons 16 set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion and GRANTS plaintiff leave to amend. The case 17 management conference scheduled for May 8 at 1:30 p.m. remains on calendar. 18 19 BACKGROUND 20 On August 21, 2019, plaintiff Zephaniah Coon filed a complaint alleging eight federal and 21 state law causes of action against defendants County of San Mateo and Blake Lycett, who is 22 alleged to have been at all relevant times a San Mateo County deputy sheriff. 23 The complaint alleges that on August 21, 2018, plaintiff was arrested in Sunnyvale, 24 California and charged with a narcotics violation. Compl. ¶ 15. After he was processed by the 25 arresting officers, plaintiff was transferred to the Maguire Correctional Facility in San Mateo 26 County to await his arraignment. Id. ¶ 16. On August 22, 2018, plaintiff was in the general 27 holding area and “experiencing anxiety about his arrest and legal jeopardy.” Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff 28 approached defendant Lycett and requested to make a phone call. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. After Lycett United States District Court Northern District of California 1 ignored plaintiff’s requests, plaintiff approached a different deputy and asked whether he could 2 use the phone. Id. ¶ 20. Defendant Lycett “without notice or provocation, stalked PLAINTIFF 3 from behind, slamming PLAINTIFF’s unprotected body against the wall, and forced PLAINTIFF 4 from his feet to the ground in a vicious and aggressive manner.” Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff alleges that 5 Deputy Lycett viciously battered him, including punching and kneeing him in the head, torso, ribs 6 and extremities. Id. ¶¶ 2, 22. Lycett and “possible unnamed and currently unknown assailants” 7 picked plaintiff up from the floor, slammed his head into a steel elevator door, and continued 8 attacking plaintiff, leaving him with severe physical and emotional injuries. Id. ¶¶ 3-5. The 9 assault was video recorded. Id. ¶ 6. 10 The complaint alleges three causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and five causes 11 of action under state common law. The complaint alleges that the County is “legally responsible 12 and liable for the incident” and “liable for the actions of its employees,” and that Lycett was an 13 employee of the County and that is he “liable for his personal conduct.” Id. ¶¶ 11-12. As to the 14 state causes of action, the complaint alleges that plaintiff complied with the claims presentment 15 requirement contained in California Government Code § 910 et seq. by filing “a claim with San 16 Mateo County on March 24, 2019 by sending a certified letter to County Counsel (See Exhibit 1).” 17 Id. ¶ 9. Exhibit 1 to the complaint is an unsigned letter from plaintiff’s counsel titled “California 18 Tort Claim Act: Notice of Claim” and addressed to John Beiers, County Counsel, San Mateo 19 County Counsel Office. Id., Ex. 1. 20 21 LEGAL STANDARD 22 To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to 23 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 24 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to 25 “more than a sheer possibility that a Defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 26 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must accept as true all facts 27 alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Usher v. 28 City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, a district court is not required to 2 1 accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 2 unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). 3 As a general rule, courts may not consider materials beyond the pleadings when ruling on a 4 Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). However, “a 5 court may consider ‘material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint’ on a motion to 6 dismiss without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id. 7 DISCUSSION 8 9 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 I. Government Claims Act Both defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s state law claims for failure to comply with the 11 Government Claims Act. Defendants contend that plaintiff’s claims are barred because his 12 government claim was sent to San Mateo County Counsel John Beiers and not to a recipient 13 designated by California Government Code § 915(a), specifically “the clerk, secretary, auditor, or 14 to the governing body” of the local public entity at its principal office. Section 915(a) provides, 15 “A claim . . . shall be presented to a local public entity by either of the following means: (1) 16 Delivering it to the clerk, secretary or auditor thereof. (2) Mailing it to the clerk, secretary, auditor, 17 or to the governing body at its principal office.” 18 Plaintiff does not dispute that his government claim was sent to Mr. Beiers, nor does he 19 contend that Mr. Beiers is a statutorily-designated recipient. Instead, plaintiff argues that the 20 Court should apply the “substantial compliance” doctrine and conclude that plaintiff substantially 21 complied with the statutory requirements for a valid claim even though the claim was technically 22 deficient. Plaintiff argues that “Defendant cannot argue in good faith that it did not have sufficient 23 information to enable it to adequately investigate the claims made by Plaintiff because the facts of 24 the incident had already been investigated by the County: the investigation of the offending officer 25 was handled by a high ranking public official employed by the Defendant, the County brought 26 criminal charges against Defendant Lycett, Defendant Lycett was terminated from his 27 employment, and numerous public statements had been made by the Defendant himself, including 28 the fact that the attack was caught on video.” Opp’n at 9 (Dkt. No. 21). Plaintiff argues that Mr. 3 United States District Court Northern District of California 1 Beiers is the highest ranking civil legal official within the county, and as such, he had the 2 obligation to give notice of the defect to plaintiff’s counsel and/or to forward the claim to the 3 proper persons. Plaintiff also asserts that Mr. Beiers’ office is located at the same address as the 4 statutorily-designated recipients (“though some may be on different floors of the building”), and 5 that “Mr. Beiers likely meets in ‘closed-door’ sessions with the County Board of Supervisors 6 regularly.” Id. Plaintiff also asserts that “Defendant never acknowledges whether actual receipt of 7 the Claim ever occurred pursuant to § 915(e)(1)1 in its Motion.” Id. 8 “Suits for money or damages filed against a public entity are regulated by statutes 9 contained in division 3.6 of the Government Code, commonly referred to as the Government 10 Claims Act.” DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara, 55 Cal. 4th 984, 989 (2012); see also 11 Neal v. Gatlin, 35 Cal. App. 3d 871, 877-78 (1973) (where public employee was acting within 12 employee’s express or implied authority, notwithstanding wrongful nature of the act, complaint 13 based on such act was properly dismissed for failure to allege filing of claim with employing 14 public entity). “[S]ection 905 requires the presentation of ‘all claims for money or damages 15 against local public entities,” subject to exceptions not relevant here. DiCampli, 55 Cal. 4th at 989 16 (quoting section 905). “Claims for personal injury and property damage must be presented within 17 six months after accrual . . . ‘[N]o suit for money or damages may be brought against a public 18 entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim 19 has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon . . . or has been deemed to have 20 been rejected . . . .’” Id. (citing and quoting sections 911.2 and 945.4). “Thus, under these 21 statutes, failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff 22 from filing a lawsuit against that entity.” Id. Presentation of a claim “is therefore an element that 23 a plaintiff is required to prove in order to prevail.” Id. at 990 (emphasis in original). 24 In DiCampli, the California Supreme Court held that the plain language of section 915 25 26 27 28 Section 915(e)(1) provides, “A claim, amendment, or application shall be deemed to have been in compliance with this section even though it is not delivered or mailed as provided in this section if, within the time prescribed for presentation thereof, any of the following apply: (1) it is actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor, or board of the local public entity.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 915(e)(1). 4 1 1 required delivery of the claim to one of the persons designated in the statute, and rejected a 2 statutory interpretation that allowed substantial compliance with the claim delivery requirement. 7 Section 915(a)(1) reflects the Legislature’s intent to precisely identify those who may receive claims on behalf of a local public entity. Section 915(e)(1) reflects the Legislature’s intent that a misdirected claim will satisfy the presentation requirement if the claim is “actually received” by a statutorily designated recipient. Thus, compliance with section 915(e)(1) requires actual receipt of the misdirected claim by one of the designated recipients. If an appropriate public employee or board never receives the claim, an undelivered or misdirected claim fails to comply with the statute. This straightforward construction honors the statutory language and is consistent with the purpose of the claims statutes. 8 Id. at 922. The Court found that “[e]ven if the public entity has actual knowledge of the facts that 9 might support a claim, the claims statutes still must be satisfied,” and that “[a] goal of the 10 Government Claims Act is to eliminate confusion and uncertainty resulting from different claims 11 procedures.” Id. at 990. 3 4 5 United States District Court Northern District of California 6 12 Significantly, the Court rejected the holding of an earlier California Court of Appeal 13 decision, Jamison v. State of California, 31 Cal.App.3d 513, 517 (1973), in which the Court of 14 Appeal held that “Service upon any responsible official of the entity, but not the statutory officer, 15 is sufficient if the party served has the duty to notify the statutory agent.” The California Supreme 16 Court held that “Jamison is unpersuasive because it fails to follow the statutory language 17 specifically identifying who must actually receive a claim. Finding compliance when any agency 18 employee is served exponentially expands the scope of the statute. By placing a duty on a public 19 employee who receives a misdirected claim to forward it to the proper agency, Jamison 20 improperly shifted the responsibility for presenting a claim from the claimant to the public entity.” 21 DiCampli, 55 Cal.4th at 996. 22 The Court concludes that DiCampli forecloses plaintiff’s substantial compliance argument. 23 Plaintiff attempts to distinguish DiCampli by suggesting that its holding is limited to the facts of 24 that case, which involved a notice of intent to sue that was delivered to a hospital’s medical 25 staffing office. The Court disagrees, and finds that DiCampli unequivocally rejected the same 26 substantial compliance argument that plaintiff presents here. See id. at 987 (“We reject this 27 judicial expansion of the statutory requirements and affirm that a claim must satisfy the express 28 delivery provisions of the statute.”). The cases upon which plaintiff relies predate DiCampli 5 United States District Court Northern District of California 1 and/or involve a different statutory scheme. See, e.g., Life v. County of Los Angeles, 227 Cal. 2 App. 3d 894 (1991) (analyzing substantial compliance doctrine pre-DiCampli); Becerra v. 3 Gonzalez, 32 Cal. App. 4th 584 (1995) (examining claims presentation requirement for Foster 4 Family Home and Small Family Home Insurance Fund). 5 Plaintiff also relies on Government Code section 911 to argue that any defect in the claim 6 has been waived. Section 911 provides in relevant part, “Any defense as to the sufficiency of the 7 claim based upon a defect or omission in the claim as presented is waived by failure to give notice 8 of the insufficiency with respect to the defect or omission . . . .” (emphasis added). However, as 9 defendants argue, the waiver argument is dependent on the claim actually being presented. See 10 also id. § 911.3(b) (“Any defense as to the time limit for presenting a claim described in 11 subdivision (a) is waived by failure to give the notice set forth in subdivision (a) within 45 days 12 after the claim is presented . . . .”). Here, plaintiff does not dispute that he did not present his 13 claim to a statutorily-designated recipient, and thus the waiver argument is misplaced. 14 Plaintiff does not seek leave to amend to allege that the claim was actually presented. 15 Further, in light of plaintiff’s concession that the County is immune, see infra, the Court finds 16 leave to amend would be futile. Accordingly, the Court does not address the parties’ additional 17 arguments regarding the untimeliness of the claim and equitable tolling. 18 19 II. Immunity 20 The County also contends that it is immune from liability under the state causes of action 21 pursuant to Cal. Gov’t Code § 844.6. “Government Code section 844.6(a)(2), subject to stated 22 exceptions, provides that a public entity is not liable for ‘[a]n injury to any prisoner.’” Teter v. 23 City of Newport Beach, 30 Cal. 4th 446, 448 (2003); Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 844.6(a)(2), § 845.4, 24 § 845.6. For purposes of section 844.6, a “prisoner” includes a pretrial detainee. Cal. Gov’t Code 25 § 844. 26 In response, plaintiff concedes that his state law claims against the County are barred by 27 immunity. Plaintiff requests leave to amend to remove the County from those causes of action and 28 to allege them only against Lycett and Does 1-10. Opp’n at 15. 6 Defendants’ reply does not 1 specifically address plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint to proceed on the state law claims 2 against Lycett and the Doe defendants. 3 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss the fourth through eighth 4 causes of action against the County WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, and GRANTS plaintiff 5 leave to amend the complaint to allege those causes of action against Lycett and the Doe 6 defendants in their personal capacities. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 820(a) (“Except as otherwise 7 provided by statute (including Section 820.2), a public employee is liable for injury caused by his 8 act or omission to the same extent as a private person.”); Caldwell v. Montoya, 10 Cal. 4th 972, 9 980 (1995). The amended complaint shall be filed by May 12, 2020. 10 CONCLUSION United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss the 13 fourth through eighth causes of action against the County WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, and 14 GRANTS plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to allege those causes of action against Lycett 15 and the Doe defendants in their personal capacities. The amended complaint shall be filed by 16 May 12, 2020. 17 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 20 21 Dated: May 5, 2020 ______________________________________ SUSAN ILLSTON United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7
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