Guerrero v. County of Alameda, et al, No. 3:2018cv02379 - Document 51 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING IN PART 35 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND by Judge William Alsup. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/28/2018)
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Guerrero v. County of Alameda, et al Doc. 51 1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 GUILLERMO GUERRERO, 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 Plaintiff, No. C 18-02379 WHA v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, ALAMEDA COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, THE SHERIFF OF THE ALAMEDA COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, GREGORY J. AHERN, DEPUTY SHERIFF G. STEVENS; and DOES 1 through 10, Inclusive, ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND Defendants. / 18 19 20 21 22 23 INTRODUCTION In this excessive-force case, plaintiff moves for leave to amend the complaint. For the reasons herein, plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. STATEMENT In August 2017, an airport traffic officer issued plaintiff Guillermo Guerrero a ticket for 24 parking in a ten-minute loading zone while waiting to pick up his wife and son from the 25 Oakland International Airport. After plaintiff complained to the traffic officer that he had not 26 parked for more than ten minutes, the officer called over defendant Alameda County Deputy 27 Sheriff G. Stevens. Deputy Stevens asked plaintiff for a “high-five,” then grabbed and twisted 28 plaintiff’s right arm. As a result, plaintiff needed orthopedic surgery, physical therapy, and occupational therapy (Dkt. No. 36 ¶¶ 10–11). Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 Stevens at the time of the incident. Plaintiff later received correspondence from the Internal 3 Affairs division of the Sheriff’s Department concluding that Deputy Stevens had in fact used 4 excessive force against plaintiff. Moreover, shortly before the incident, Deputy Stevens had 5 been placed on administrative leave for “a previous civil rights incident.” Shortly after plaintiff 6 initiated this lawsuit, Sheriff Ahern met with his subordinate supervisors and directed them to 7 change their training practices because their current policy did not properly train deputies in the 8 use of force. Over the last three years, the County of Alameda and Sheriff Ahern have received 9 over forty-one excessive-force claims (id. ¶¶ 6, 12–15). For the Northern District of California 10 United States District Court Defendants Sheriff Gregory J. Ahern and the County of Alameda employed Deputy In April 2018, plaintiff initiated this action by filing a petition under Section 946.6 of 11 the California Government Code, asking for relief from the statute of limitations governing 12 claims brought under the Government Claims Act. A May 31 order treated the petition as an 13 excessive force claim under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code and directed 14 plaintiff to promptly serve the summons and a new complaint on all defendants. Defendants 15 Sheriff Ahern and the County of Alameda subsequently moved to dismiss the claims against 16 them. An August 1 order granted the motion to dismiss and gave plaintiff the opportunity to 17 seek leave to amend. Plaintiff now moves for leave to amend and submits a proposed amended 18 complaint (Dkt. Nos. 1, 11, 15, 30, 35). This order follows full briefing and oral argument. ANALYSIS 19 20 FRCP 15(a)(2) advises, “The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” 21 In ruling on a motion for leave to amend, courts consider: (1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) 22 prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of amendment, and (5) whether the plaintiff has 23 previously amended their complaint. Futility alone can justify denying leave to amend. Nunes 24 v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 2004). For purposes of assessing futility on this 25 motion, the legal standard is the same as it would be on a motion to dismiss under FRCP 26 12(b)(6). Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants argue 27 that the undersigned should deny leave to amend solely on the ground that plaintiff’s proposed 28 amendments would be futile. 2 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 1 1. STATE-LAW CLAIMS. 2 The August 1 order dismissed plaintiff’s state-law claims for battery, negligence, 3 assault, and violation of Section 52.1 of the California Civil Code against the County and 4 Sheriff Ahern in light of plaintiff’s failure to substantially comply with the California 5 Government Claims Act. Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint asserts these state-law claims 6 against only Deputy Stevens. In opposing leave to amend, defendants erroneously argue that 7 the August 1 order dismissed plaintiff’s state claims against all defendants. Not so. Deputy 8 Stevens had not yet appeared in this action at the time of the August 1 order and had not moved 9 to dismiss the state-law claims asserted against him. While the reasoning contained in the 10 August 1 order may very well apply to the claims asserted against Deputy Stevens, the 11 undersigned declines to dismiss those claims absent a formal motion. In amending his state-law 12 claims so that they are asserted only against Deputy Stevens, plaintiff has conformed the 13 amended complaint to the August 1 dismissal order. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend these 14 claims is GRANTED. 15 2. FEDERAL CLAIMS. 16 To state a claim under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, the complaint 17 must show that a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue and 18 that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the 19 Constitution or laws of the United States. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 632–33 (9th Cir. 20 1988). Although in order to state a claim a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, 21 a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than 22 labels and conclusions and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 23 do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. 24 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S 544 (2007). 25 26 A. Fourth Amendment Claim. The August 1 order dismissed plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim against Sheriff 27 Ahern because the facts alleged failed to demonstrate Sheriff Ahern’s personal involvement in 28 the excessive-force incident. The August 1 order concluded that although the complaint alleged 3 1 that Sheriff Ahern negligently or willfully employed Deputy Stevens, plaintiff had failed to 2 allege a causal link between the purported negligent hiring of Deputy Stevens and the 3 deprivation of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. The proposed amended complaint fails to 4 remedy this shortfall. For the Northern District of California United States District Court 5 As previously explained, supervisor liability under Section 1983 exists when the 6 supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a sufficient 7 causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. 8 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). The requisite causal connection can be 9 established “by setting in motion a series of acts by others, or by knowingly refusing to 10 terminate a series of acts by others, which the supervisor knew or reasonably should have 11 known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Id. at 1207–08 (internal citations 12 quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Here, plaintiff alleges that prior to the August 2017 13 incident Deputy Stevens had been placed on administrative leave and his personnel file 14 reflected a history of civil rights violations. These allegations are insufficient to show that 15 Sheriff Ahern knew of Deputy Stevens’s prior civil rights violations and failed to act. In Henry 16 A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1004 (9th Cir. 2012), our court of appeals held that similarly high- 17 level allegations regarding a supervisor’s oversight responsibilities were insufficient to state a 18 claim under a supervisor-liability theory. And unlike in Starr, where the complaint specifically 19 alleged that the defendant-Sheriff received notice and reports of prior civil-rights incidents, 20 plaintiff fails to allege that Sheriff Ahern personally knew of Deputy Stevens’ prior conduct or 21 that he had any direct responsibility to train or supervise Deputy Stevens. Starr, 652 F.3d at 22 1216. Plaintiff cites no authority in support of his argument that such allegations are sufficient 23 to establish supervisory liability. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend this claim against 24 Sheriff Ahern is accordingly DENIED. 25 26 B. Fourteenth Amendment Claims. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, 27 or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV § 1. The amended 28 complaint asserts three claims for relief for violations of plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment 4 1 rights, which claims generally assert two theories of relief. First, plaintiff alleges that the 2 August 2017 excessive-force incident deprived him of substantive and procedural due process. 3 Second, plaintiff alleges defendants interfered with plaintiff’s right to familial association. This 4 order addresses each theory in turn. (1) 5 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 6 Due Process. The Supreme Court has held that allegations concerning excessive force in the course of 7 making an arrest or other such seizure are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and 8 its “objective reasonableness” standard, not as a violation of due process under the Fourteenth 9 Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Because plaintiff’s proposed 10 eighth and ninth claims for relief under the Fourteenth Amendment are duplicative of his Fourth 11 Amendment claim, leave to amend these claims is DENIED. (2) 12 13 Interference with Familial Association. Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint also asserts a Fourteenth Amendment claim 14 against defendants for interference with plaintiff’s right to familial association. “[T]he interest 15 of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children — is perhaps the oldest of the 16 fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the Supreme Court.]” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 17 1228, 1235–36 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality 18 opinion)). Nevertheless, the proposed amended complaint’s allegations — that plaintiff was 19 “forced to attend numerous medical procedures” as a result of the his injuries and thereby was 20 separated from his wife and child — are insufficient to state a claim for governmental intrusion 21 or interference into plaintiff’s familial relationship. Plaintiff alleges no facts to plausibly 22 suggest that defendants “forced” him to attend medical treatment or that such medical treatment 23 “forced” plaintiff’s separation from his family. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to assert his tenth 24 claim for relief is DENIED. 25 26 C. Eighth Amendment Claim. Plaintiff’s proposed claim under the Eighth Amendment fails because in evaluating 27 excessive-force claims, “the less protective Eighth Amendment standard applies ‘only after the 28 State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal 5 1 prosecutions.’” Graham, 490 U.S. at 398–99 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671, 2 n. 40 (1977)). Accordingly, “[w]here, as here, the excessive force claim arises in the context of 3 an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking 4 the protections of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 394. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to assert this 5 claim is DENIED. 6 D. For the Northern District of California United States District Court 7 “Section 1983 Claim.” Plaintiff’s proposed claim for an unspecified violation of Section 1983 is duplicative of 8 his constitutional claims. Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights but merely 9 provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. Graham v. Connor, 490 10 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989). Plaintiff’s motion for leave to assert his eleventh claim for relief is 11 accordingly DENIED. 12 13 E. Monell Liability. In his seventh claim for relief, plaintiff alleges that the County failed to adequately train 14 its deputies regarding the use of force. “[I]nadequacy of police training may serve as the basis 15 for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the 16 rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 17 378, 388 (1989). The August 1 order found that plaintiff had failed to state a Monell municipal 18 liability claim because the complaint merely stated in a conclusory manner that the County 19 failed to adequately train, supervise, and control their officers in the use of force. Plaintiff fails 20 to remedy this defect. 21 “A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily 22 necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. 23 Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (citation omitted). In his proposed amended complaint, 24 plaintiff alleges that over the past three years, over forty-one excessive-force cases have been 25 instituted against the County. Moreover, plaintiff alleges, following the filing of the instant 26 litigation, Sheriff Ahern held a meeting in which he acknowledged the inadequacy of the Sheriff 27 Department’s excessive force policy and directed subordinate supervisors to change their 28 training practices. Neither allegation demonstrates deliberate indifference with respect to the 6 1 conduct at issue here — the use of force when a subject is cooperating and complying with a 2 deputy’s verbal commands. Many of the prior excessive-force incidents listed in the complaint 3 have nothing to do with the conduct underlying plaintiff’s claims. For example, plaintiff cites 4 civil-rights claims brought against the County for placing individuals in over-crowded jail cells 5 or claims brought by women who gave birth in jail without the assistance of a doctor. 6 Moreover, plaintiff’s allegations regarding changes in policy that occurred nearly a year after 7 the excessive-force incident at issue fails to demonstrate the County’s deliberate indifference in 8 August 2017. Accordingly, because plaintiff has failed to remedy the Monell claim asserted in 9 his proposed seventh claim for relief, plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend this claim is 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 DENIED. Defendants do not oppose, however, plaintiff’s request for leave to amend his sixth 12 claim for relief, which claim alleges that the County’s official policy, pattern, or practice caused 13 the deprivation of plaintiff’s rights. Because defendants do not oppose this claim, plaintiff’s 14 request for leave to amend this claim is GRANTED. 15 16 F. Punitive Damages. Finally, defendants oppose plaintiff’s proposed amendments to the extent the complaint 17 seeks punitive damages against the County. As defendants correctly point out, municipalities 18 are immune from punitive damages under Section 1983. Mitchel v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 527 19 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff does not respond to this authority. Plaintiff’s request for leave to seek 20 punitive damages against the County is accordingly DENIED. CONCLUSION 21 22 For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is GRANTED IN PART 23 AND DENIED IN PART. 24 above but adding nothing more, by OCTOBER 8 AT NOON. 25 Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint, making the changes allowed IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 27 Dated: September 28, 2018. WILLIAM ALSUP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28 7
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