Porter v. Muniz, No. 3:2014cv05034 - Document 37 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER Granting In Part Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 07/17/2017. (tehlc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/17/2017)
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Porter v. Muniz Doc. 37 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 ANTHONY W. PORTER, Plaintiff, 5 v. 6 7 WILLIAM MUNIZ, Case No. 14-cv-05034-TEH ORDER GRANTING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Defendant. 8 9 Anthony W. Porter (“Porter” or “Petitioner”), a California state prisoner, filed a pro 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 se habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After the Court denied Petitioner’s 12 request for appointment of counsel, it ordered Respondent to show cause why a writ of 13 habeas corpus should not be granted. ECF No. 4. Respondent filed a timely answer, 14 followed by a supplemental brief addressing the merits of the petition. ECF Nos. 10, 19. 15 Petitioner retained counsel and filed a traverse. ECF No. 36. After review of the briefs and 16 the extensive record in this case, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s writ for 17 habeas corpus. The Court holds that Petitioner did not received constitutionally adequate 18 counsel when he entered into a sentencing agreement in 2010 and that the agreement was 19 not entered into knowingly. The rest of Petitioner’s claims lack merit or are procedurally 20 barred. 21 22 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1 On March 26, 2004, Petitioner Anthony Porter was visiting Monterey County to 23 24 attend the funeral of a friend, Albert Johnson. Porter was eighteen years old at the time and 25 26 27 28 1 This background is derived from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, in People v. Porter, No. H029031, 2006 WL 3649273 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2006). Dockets.Justia.com 1 was going to college in San Diego. Albert Johnson had been shot and killed in a drive-by 2 shooting six days prior, and there was evidence that his death was gang-related. Porter attended the funeral and a series of gatherings in Johnson’s honor. The 4 evidence shows that he got progressively more intoxicated as the day went on. Even 5 though his blood alcohol level was never tested after his arrest, a toxicologist testified that 6 it must have been in the range of severe intoxication. Porter testified that he left the last 7 gathering that night after throwing up by a dumpster. He started walking to his 8 grandmother’s house when Travis Williams, who was older than Porter, offered him a ride. 9 Porter claims he did not know Williams prior to the funeral. Williams drove Porter to Fort 10 Ord, where the two men smoked marijuana laced with PCP, and then to Monterey. Porter 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 3 threw up again, felt sick during the ride, and allegedly asked multiple times to be taken to 12 his grandmother’s house. Williams then drove the car past the house of DeShawn Lee, who was a suspect in 13 14 the killing of Albert Johnson and was in jail. Williams made a U-turn and returned to Lee’s 15 house where Kimber Lee-Roman, Latoya Choates, and Adrianne Jenkins were smoking on 16 the porch. Porter testified that Williams told him to “get out and start talking shit” and 17 Porter “did as he said.” Ex. 2, 9 RT 2108. 2 The evidence showed that Williams was driving 18 the car and Porter was sitting on the frame of the passenger’s side window when shots 19 were fired from the car into Lee’s house. The bullets hit the house but missed the women. 20 No one was injured. The jury heard conflicting testimony from prosecution witnesses about whether 21 22 shots were fired from the driver’s side of the car, nearest the porch, or from the passenger 23 side of the car. Lee-Roman and Jenkins testified that they saw an arm coming out on the 24 driver’s side of the car and heard gun shots seconds later. They ran inside for cover. 25 Choates heard shots fired but was not able to identify the source of the gunfire. The only 26 27 28 2 The Court first cites to the exhibit where the document is located. It then indicates the volume number, whether the document is found in the Reporter’s Transcript (“RT) or the Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”), and the appropriate page number within the transcript. 2 1 witness who claimed to have seen the gun was Eugenio Ramos, who was fixing a flat tire 2 on his car about four houses away and around the corner on San Lucas Street. The victims’ 3 house was located on 1246 Sonoma Avenue in Seaside, California. Ramos testified at trial 4 that he looked up from his car when he heard tires squeal and saw the passenger, who was 5 sitting on the frame of an open window with his hands on top of the car, shoot a gun over 6 the top of the vehicle. Ramos called 911 and told dispatcher the following: “white female 7 shoot the gun. he was driving, he’s wearing like a blue sweater.” 3 Ex. 1, Vol. 2, 2 CT 534. 8 At trial, he testified that he had seen “two guys” and that he meant “male” when he told the 9 dispatcher “female.” Ex. 2, Vol. 4, 4 RT 839-840. Officer Jacqueline Maroney testified that at 11:00 pm she heard gunshots and 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 proceeded to pursue the suspect vehicle until it crashed. Both suspects fled and were 12 subsequently apprehended. They were both black men. She identified Porter as the 13 passenger. A handgun was found in the area where another pursuing officer had observed 14 the passenger’s hand come out of the car and make a throwing motion. The gun’s location 15 was consistent with having been thrown out by the passenger, and Porter admitted 16 throwing the gun out of the car. Police retrieved live rounds of ammunition from Williams’ 17 pockets that were similar to the ammunition recovered from the gun. The jury heard 18 testimony that the gun was registered in Richmond, where Williams was from. 19 Detective July Stradan interrogated Porter at 2:10 am after the shooting. She 20 testified that she smelled alcohol but did not notice any slurring of the speech, even though 21 the transcript of the interrogation contains dozens of sections marked as “unintelligible.” 22 Ex. 1, Vol. 2, 2 CT 563. Porter consistently denied firing the shots even as the detective 23 probed and claimed that the police had a video of the shooting. Gunshot residue (“GSR”) samples were taken from the suspects’ hands and their 24 25 clothing following their arrest. Prior to trial, prosecution’s expert Steven Dowell tested the 26 27 28 3 Judge Russell Scott of Monterey County Superior Court noted that in the audio recording of the 911 call, Ramos does not pause between the words “gun” and “he was driving.” Ex. 18, Vol. 4, Ex. K at 713. 3 1 samples taken from the backs of the hands of each suspect and found no gunshot residue 2 on either. The palm samples were not analyzed, nor was the clothing from either suspect. 3 At trial, Porter’s attorney entered into a stipulation that “no gunshot residue was found on 4 either person.” Ex. 2, Vol. 6, 6 RT 1303. Dowell testified that Porter could have been the 5 shooter even though no gunshot residue was found on him. 6 On January 24, 2005, a Monterey County jury found Porter guilty of two counts of attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder (Cal. Penal Code §§ 187(a), 664) 8 (counts one and two), shooting at an inhabited dwelling (Id. § 246) (count three), two 9 counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Id. § 245(b)) (counts four and five), person 10 other than registered owner carrying loaded firearm (Id. § 12031(a)(2)(F)) (count six), and 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 7 shooting from a motor vehicle (Id. § 12034(c)) (count seven). The jury found true a gang 12 enhancement allegation (Id. § 186.22(b)(1)) as to each charged offense, a sentence 13 enhancement allegation for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm (Id. § 14 12022.53(c)) with regard to the attempted murder counts, and a sentencing enhancement 15 allegation for personal use of a firearm (Id. § 12022.5(a)) on the two assault counts. 16 17 18 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On April 22, 2005, Porter moved for a new trial and sought dismissal of the charges 19 pursuant to Penal Code § 1181(6). Judge Wendy C. Duffy of Monterey County Superior 20 Court, who had presided over the trial, denied the motion as to the charged offenses but 21 granted it as to the gang enhancement and premeditation and deliberation allegations. With 22 respect to the deliberation allegations, she stressed the “uncontroverted evidence of the 23 defendant’s extreme intoxication” and stated that the court “cannot find that there was 24 sufficient evidence that [Porter] had the ability to weigh the decision to kill or not kill the 25 people on the porch.” Ex. 2, 14 RT 3309-3310. Regarding the gang enhancements, she 26 noted the evidence that the Albert Johnson may have been a member of the “Krazy Ass 27 Pimps” (“KAP”) and that at the funeral Porter was given a t-shirt made by Johnson’s 28 female friends with Johnson’s photo and the words “Krazy Ass Pimps.” She explained that 4 1 there was evidence KAP was a gang in 1994 but there was no evidence of “any cohesive 2 gang activity after the year 2000.” Id. at 3310. She also stated that Porter may have been 3 friends with identified gang members when he was 14 years old or younger, presumably 4 because of where he grew up, but that there was no evidence that “he was ever involved 5 with any [gang members] in participating in any crime.” Id. at 3313. Lastly, she found no 6 “credible evidence that the shooting would have benefited the gang, the KAP gang.” Id. at 7 3314. 8 9 On May 6, 2005, after ordering a new trial on the gang enhancement and deliberation allegations, Judge Duffy sentenced Porter to 25 years on the remaining counts: the lower term of 5 years for attempted murder and an additional 20 years for the 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 enhancement regarding personal discharge of a firearm (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(c)). 12 On December 28, 2005, co-suspect Travis Williams, who was charged in a separate 13 indictment, pled no contest to one count of attempted murder (Id. §§ 664, 187(a)). He 14 admitted discharging a firearm (Id. § 12022.53(c)) and participating in a gang (Id. 15 § 186.22(b)(1). 16 On July 8, 2006, Porter filed a notice of appeal for the convictions that were not 17 reversed by the trial court. On August 14, 2006, he filed a petition for writ of habeas 18 corpus in the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, alleging two grounds for relief: (1) 19 incompetence of counsel for failure to raise objections to the prosecution gang evidence in 20 an Evidence Code § 492 hearing and at trial; and (2) new evidence discovered of factual 21 innocence, specifically an admission by Williams made to his cellmate Bruce Collins that 22 Williams fired the shots, not Porter. The Court of Appeal ordered the habeas petition to be 23 considered with the appeal. Ex. 4. On December 14, 2006, the Court of Appeal affirmed 24 the convictions in full and summarily denied Porter’s writ petition. People v. Porter, No. 25 H029031, 2006 WL 3649273 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2006). Porter subsequently filed a 26 petition for review from the appeal and a petition for review from the habeas denial in the 27 California Supreme Court, which the high court summarily denied on March 14, 2007. 28 Exs. 9, 10. 5 1 In the meantime, on January 5, 2006, Porter moved for dismissal of the unresolved 2 enhancements alleging a double jeopardy violation pursuant to California Penal Code 3 § 1016(4)(5). Judge Russell D. Scott of Monterey County Superior Court denied his 4 motion. Porter filed a writ of mandate on February 16, 2006 (Ex. 11), and the Court of 5 Appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling that retrial would constitute double jeopardy (Ex. 6 12). On March 18, 2008, while the prosecution’s petition for review was pending in the 7 California Supreme Court, Porter filed a habeas petition in this Court. Pet. in Porter v. 8 Horel, No. 08-1496-TEH. On July 23, 2009, the high court reversed the Court of Appeal 9 and returned the matter to the Monterey County Superior Court for partial retrial. Porter v. Super. Ct. of Monterey Cty., 47 Cal. 4th 125 (2009). On October 29, 2009, this Court 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 dismissed the habeas petition as moot because the enhancements were not reinstated at the 12 time the petition was filed and thus there was no case or controversy. The Court had 13 previously dismissed the free-standing actual innocence claim as not cognizable on federal 14 habeas corpus. Dkt. in Porter v. Horel, No. 08-1496-TEH, ECF No. 6. 15 Monterey County Public Defender James Eager was appointed to represent Porter 16 on the retrial of the deliberation allegations and gang enhancements. After a number of 17 continuances, retrial was set to begin on September 27, 2010. In preparation for retrial, 18 Porter’s counsel received permission to retest the original gunshot residue swabs taken 19 from Porter and Williams after their arrests. On September 7, 2010, forensic expert Celia 20 Hartnett’s laboratory determined that samples from Williams’ hands had particles 21 consistent with gunshot residue on them. Ex. 16, 1 CT 218. On September 9, 2010, 22 unaware that any of the results were available, Porter entered into a resentencing 23 agreement. Ex. 16 at 94-97. He agreed to be resentenced to an additional nine years in state 24 prison on the underlying convictions in exchange for the prosecution’s dismissal of the 25 premeditation and deliberation allegations and gang enhancements. Ex. 17, 2 RT 304-307. 26 Petitioner agreed to serve a total term of thirty-four years and further “give up all rights 27 regarding both state and federal writs and appeals.” Resentencing Agreement; Ex. 16 at 95. 28 6 1 Resentencing was initially set for October 7, 2010, but was continued at the trial court’s 2 request to October 14, 2010. Ex. 16, 1 CT 127. 3 On October 4, 2010, unbeknownst to Porter and his attorney, Harnett’s laboratory 4 found particles consistent with gunshot residue on the cuffs of Williams’ shirt. Ex. 16, 1 5 CT 218. On October 13, 2010, the night before the resentencing hearing, Porter’s attorney 6 learned for the first time that Williams’ hands and clothing were positive for gunshot 7 residue, contradicting the prosecution’s evidence at trial and supporting the version of 8 events that Porter had given all along—that he was not the shooter. Ex. 17, 3 RT 603, 605. 9 On October 14, 2010, Porter’s counsel informed the trial court of the new evidence and asked to have the sentencing hearing continued. On October 18, 2010, Harnett’s laboratory 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 completed the analysis of the samples collected from Porter’s hands and reported that the 12 results were negative. Ex. 16, 1 CT 218. 13 On November 3, 2010, Petitioner moved to withdraw from the resentencing 14 agreement based in part on California Penal Code § 1018. Ex. 16, 1 CT 191. While the 15 motion to withdraw was pending, Porter filed a habeas petition in the same trial court. 16 Porter alleged trial counsel was ineffective for failing to test the GSR evidence and 17 entering into a stipulation that no GSR was present on Williams or Porter, for failing to 18 interview Ramos and confront him with the 911 tape, as well as that counsel at the 19 agreement stage was ineffective and that the agreement was not entered into knowingly 20 and voluntarily. On September 9, 2011, after denying Porter’s motion to withdraw from 21 the agreement, the court resentenced Porter to a term of thirty-four years. Ex. 16, 2 CT 22 378-81. On November 21, 2011, Porter appealed the judgment and imposition of his 23 sentence. The trial court denied Porter’s habeas petition on November 21, 2012 (In re 24 Anthony Porter, No. HC 7331 (Super. Ct. of Monterey Cty., Nov. 21, 2012)), and Porter 25 filed a petition in the Court of Appeal (Exs. 18, 19). 26 On May 22, 2013, the Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment and 27 dismissed his appeal, finding that Porter had waived his appellate rights. People v. Porter, 28 No. H037619, 2013 WL 2284949 (Cal. Ct. App. May 22, 2013). It also summarily denied 7 1 the habeas petition. Ex. 21. On August 28, 2013, the Supreme Court summarily denied his 2 petition for review from the direct appeal and his state habeas corpus petition. Exs. 24, 25. 3 On November 12, 2014, Porter filed the present petition in federal court pro se. ECF No. 1. 4 5 STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “on behalf of a 7 person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 8 custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 9 § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), habeas 10 relief may not be granted “with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 6 State court proceedings” unless the state decision was: (1) “contrary to, or involved an 12 unreasonable application, of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 13 Court of the United States,” or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 14 light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This 15 AEDPA standard is applied to the “state court’s ‘last reasoned decision’ on the claim.” 16 Edwards v. LaMarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (quoting Ylst v. 17 Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)). 18 A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority if “the state court 19 arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the [Supreme] Court on a question of 20 law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of 21 materially undistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A state 22 court decision is an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court authority if “the state 23 court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decision 24 but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. For the 25 federal court to grant habeas relief, the state court’s application of Supreme Court authority 26 must be “objectively unreasonable,” not merely incorrect or erroneous. Riley v. Payne, 352 27 F.3d 1313, 1323 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)). In 28 reviewing the reasonableness of a state court’s decision to which Section 2254(d)(1) 8 1 applies, a district court must rely on the record that was before the state court and presume 2 correct determinations of factual issues made by the state court. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 3 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). 4 5 6 DISCUSSION Porter seeks habeas corpus relief on five grounds: (1) Ineffective assistance of trial 7 counsel, Thomas S. Worthington, for his failure to investigate gunshot residue, to 8 interview Ramos in Spanish and impeach him with a recording of his 911 call, to present 9 evidence that Porter was weak on his left side, and to present evidence of Porter’s alcohol blackouts; (2) Brady violation for the prosecution’s presentation of false evidence 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 regarding gunshot residue found on Williams; (3) Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 12 prohibition against double jeopardy for Porter’s retrial on the deliberation allegations and 13 gang enhancements; (4) Ineffective assistance of counsel at the agreement stage, James 14 Eager, for his failure to inform Porter of available exculpatory evidence before advising 15 Porter to enter into the resentencing agreement; and (5) Due process violation of the Fifth 16 and Fourteenth Amendments for enforcing a resentencing agreement that was not entered 17 into knowingly and voluntarily. 18 Because Porter entered into an agreement with the prosecution on September 9, 19 2010 that included a waiver of his rights to file a federal habeas petition, the Court must 20 first determine whether that waiver is valid. It is undisputed that even after entering into an 21 agreement that waives the right to pursue habeas corpus relief, a prisoner may assert an 22 ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding the advice he received regarding the 23 agreement, as well as a claim challenging the voluntariness of the agreement itself. See 24 Washington v. Lambert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005). 25 The Court therefore begins by reviewing Porter’s claims pertaining to the 2010 26 resentencing agreement. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that Porter has 27 met the demanding burden of demonstrating that the California Court of Appeal was 28 objectively unreasonable in denying Porter’s ineffective assistance of counsel and 9 1 voluntariness claims. Granting habeas relief on Porter’s last two claims invalidates the 2 agreement and the waiver contained therein. As a result, the Court has jurisdiction to 3 review the remainder of Porter’s claims, which the Court denies after a careful review of 4 the record. 4 5 6 I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Agreement Stage Porter claims that public defender James Eager was ineffective for failing to 7 8 investigate, discover, and inform Porter of favorable evidence before persuading him to 9 enter into a resentencing agreement, which increased Porter’s sentence by nine years and 10 resulted in a waiver of his right to appellate and habeas relief. The Sixth Amendment confers a right to reasonably effective assistance of counsel. United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Reversal is required whenever 13 ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) deprives a defendant of a substantive or 14 procedural right guaranteed under the law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 390-93. The Supreme 15 Court has held that a defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel may attack 16 the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he 17 received from counsel was not within the range of competence demanded of criminal 18 defense attorneys. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). The test that the Supreme 19 Court developed for IAC claims challenging plea agreements applies to Porter’s IAC claim 20 because the resentencing agreement he entered into is similar in key respects to a plea 21 agreement. 5 To prevail, a petitioner must show that: (1) counsel’s representation fell below 22 the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases; and (2) there is a 23 “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [petitioner] would not have pleaded 24 guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 58-59. 25 4 26 27 28 Since Petitioner concedes that there is no evidence to support his Brady violation claim, the Court denies the claim without consideration. Traverse at 68 (ECF No. 36). 5 Even though the agreement Porter signed was not a plea agreement in that Porter did not plead guilty to any of the sentencing enhancements, the Court considers it analogous to a plea agreement for the purposes of this analysis, as do the parties. Answer at 8 (ECF No. 10-1). 10 In addition, federal habeas relief is unavailable unless the petitioner demonstrates 1 2 that the state court’s rulings on both the performance and prejudice prongs of his 3 ineffectiveness claim were “contrary to” or “involved unreasonable application of clearly 4 established federal law.” Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 123 (2011). 6 The state court that 5 issued the last reasoned decision on Porter’s IAC claim pertaining to the agreement was 6 the California Court of Appeal in People v. Porter, No. H037619, 2013 WL 2284949 (Cal. 7 Ct. App. May 22, 2013). 7 See Byrd v. Lewis, 566 F.3d 855, 859 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009) 8 (looking to the California Court of Appeal’s decision because it was the last reasoned state 9 court decision). Where, as here, the California Supreme Court denied review of a habeas petition without comment (In re Anthony Porter, No. S211940 (Cal. 2013); Ex. 25), 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 federal courts “look through the unexplained California Supreme Court decision to the last 12 reasoned decision,” in this case the state appellate court’s decision, “as the basis for the 13 state court’s judgment.” Gill v. Ayers, 342 F.3d 911, 917 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal 14 citations omitted). This Court’s review of the Court of Appeal’s holding is “doubly” 15 deferential, because Strickland requires state courts to give deference to choices made by 16 counsel, and AEDPA in turn requires federal courts to defer to the determinations of state 17 courts. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). 18 Even under this demanding standard of review, the Court finds that the state 19 appellate court’s conclusion that Porter’s counsel at the agreement stage provided effective 20 21 6 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Since both the performance and the prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact, claims of ineffective assistance require a thorough review of the record. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698. The state court’s ultimate conclusion is reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), but its underlying factual findings supporting the conclusion are clothed with the deferential protection ordinarily afforded factual findings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d. 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). 7 This Court reviews the Court of Appeal’s opinion in Porter, 2013 WL 2284949, which analyzes the merits of Porter’s IAC and voluntariness claims even though that state appellate opinion adjudicated Porter’s petition for review on direct appeal, not his habeas petition. See id. at *1. Porter challenged the voluntariness of the agreement in both petitions; the Court of Appeal issued a reasoned decision only on appeal, summarily dismissing his habeas petition, presumably for the same reasons that it denied his direct appeal. Denial of Pet. for Writ, No. 039221; Ex. 21. 11 1 representation was an “unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme Court 2 law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 3 4 1. Deficient Performance 5 The state appellate court identified the correct legal principles governing the 6 deficiency prong of the ineffectiveness claim but unreasonably applied those principles to 7 the facts of Porter’s case. The court began by reciting the standard for IAC set forth in 8 Strickland, properly emphasizing reviewing courts’ deference to counsel’s reasonable 9 tactical decisions. See Porter, 2013 WL 2284949, at *8-9. It then stated that “it was a reasonable tactical decision for counsel to recommend that defendant accept a nine-year 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 increase in his determinate prison sentence and avoid the risk of being convicted of the 12 unsettled charges on retrial and receiving […] three life terms with an 85-year minimum 13 sentence.” Id. at *9. But the fact that nine years is less than eighty-five years—without 14 more—does not make counsel’s choice a tactical one. If this were the case, defense 15 attorneys would have no reason to ever conduct investigations in criminal cases. They 16 could simply sit back and wait to receive plea offers from the government, which by their 17 very nature promise defendants less time in prison than those same defendants would 18 receive if convicted at trial. Defense attorneys could then advise their clients to enter into 19 plea agreements regardless of their clients’ protestations of innocence or the strength of the 20 evidence against them. To conclusively label every defense counsel’s recommendation that 21 a client accept a plea deal “a reasonable tactical decision” would be to entirely abrogate 22 some of the most basic protections afforded to criminal defendants under our Constitution. 23 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a failure to conduct a reasonable 24 investigation may satisfy the performance prong of Strickland. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 25 539 U.S. 510, 526-27 (2003). Counsel has a “duty to make reasonable investigations or to 26 make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 27 466 U.S. at 691. This is equally true when considering a plea agreement, as it is when 28 preparing for trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 57-58. To make a decision that is “reasonable,” 12 1 counsel must rely on facts gathered through investigation. See Jennings v. Woodford, 290 2 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A]ttorneys have considerable latitude to make strategic 3 decisions about what investigations to conduct once they have gathered sufficient evidence 4 upon which to base their tactical choices.”) (emphasis in the original). The evidence presented to the Court of Appeal unequivocally points to counsel’s 5 6 failure to conduct a sufficient investigation before advising Porter to enter into a 7 resentencing agreement. Public Defender James Eager (“Eager”) was appointed to 8 represent Porter on two sets of allegations: (1) that the crimes were committed for the 9 benefit of a criminal street gang (Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1)), and (2) that the attempted murders were committed willfully, deliberately and with premeditation (Id. 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 § 664(a)). Even though in a strict statutory sense, a jury had already found that Porter had 12 committed an attempted murder and therefore the only question before the new jury would 13 have been whether he acted willfully and deliberately, strong evidence that Porter did not 14 actually commit the act of shooting would have influenced the new jury’s decision on 15 whether he acted deliberately and with premeditation. See Nolan Decl. In Support of Pet. 16 Before Ct. of Appeal, Ex. 18, Vol. 2 at 77-81 (stressing the importance of the GSR 17 evidence to Porter’s original conviction and the sentencing enhancements). 8 Aware of this 18 fact, Eager requested that samples taken from Porter’s and Williams’ hands and clothing 19 be retested for gunshot residue; he himself stated that “the presence or absence of gunshot 20 residue was relevant to the allegations [on retrial] in that it tend[ed] […] to prove or 21 disprove that [Porter] was in fact the person who carried out the acts” (Ex. 16, 1 CT 273) 22 23 8 24 25 26 27 28 At the original trial, Porter’s attorney argued that because there was no GSR found on Porter, he was not the shooter. See Nolan Decl. ¶ 14. The problem with that theory, according to Nolan, was that the same argument could be made with respect to Williams. Id. The fact that there was no GSR initially found on Williams significantly undermined Porter’s defense. The jury found that Porter personally discharged the firearm and found true the allegation of willfulness and deliberation. Had there been forensic evidence showing that Williams was the shooter, Nolan claims, “there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have found Porter not guilty.” Id. ¶ 17. Such forensic evidence, with its exculpatory potential, was actually available five years later before Porter signed the resentencing agreement. 13 1 and “by default negate the pending premeditation/deliberation and benefit of the gang 2 allegations.” (Ex. 16, 1 CT 215). 3 It is then completely unexplainable why Eager did not wait for the completion of the gunshot residue testing before advising his client to enter into a binding agreement, 5 which added an additional nine years to his already lengthy twenty-five year sentence. 6 Eager was on notice that the retesting would likely produce new evidence because he 7 knew, or should have known, that Celia Harnett, defense expert at Porter’s trial in 2005, 8 testified that the gun used at the shooting had produced considerable GSR and that it was 9 therefore likely that Dowell’s results finding no GSR on both Williams and Porter were 10 flawed. Ex. 17, 7 RT 1815-1821. The newly discovered evidence would in turn bolster 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 4 Porter’s defense; in Eager’s own words, “as a practical matter, the viability of [Porter’s 12 defense] depended entirely on the availability of independent evidence proving it was 13 Williams – and not Porter – that shot out of the vehicle.” Ex. 16, 1 CT 214 (emphasis 14 added). And yet in a pure act of incompetence, Eagar himself foreclosed the possibility of 15 this new evidence demonstrating that his client was not guilty of the allegations on retrial. 16 The Court of Appeal did not hold that Eager had conducted a “reasonable 17 investigation,” as is expected of competent defense attorneys acting as diligent advocates. 18 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. It was clear that Eager had started an investigation but not 19 completed it. The Court instead found that Eager had made a “reasonable decision” that 20 would make the completion of the gunshot residue investigation unnecessary. See Porter, 21 2013 WL 2284949, at *9. The Court speculated that Eager may have advised his client to 22 enter into the resentencing agreement on September 9, 2010 because “there could be no 23 guarantee that the prosecution would keep [the offer] open.” Id. But that analysis “puts the 24 cart before the horse,” to quote the Ninth Circuit in a recent decision. Weeden v. Johnson, 25 854 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal citation omitted). It should have been 26 Eager’s investigation into the gunshot residue evidence that informed his recommendation 27 to Porter, not the other way around. The fact that there was an offer from the government 28 on the table could not have justified a failure to investigate crucial facts in Porter’s case on 14 1 retrial. See id. (“Counsel cannot justify a failure to investigate simply by invoking 2 strategy.”) 9 The Supreme Court has squarely rejected “the attempt to justify [a] limited 3 investigation as reflecting a tactical judgment.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (holding that 4 state court opinion was an unreasonable application of Strickland where state court merely 5 assumed investigation underlying alleged strategic decision was adequate, whereas the 6 evidence demonstrated it was not adequate) (emphasis added); see also Williams v. Taylor, 7 529 U.S. at 396 (failure to uncover mitigating evidence was “not justified by a tactical 8 decision” where counsel “did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough 9 investigation of the defendant’s background”). In this case, there is an additional piece of evidence that demonstrates the objective 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 unreasonableness of the state court’s decision. 10 The Court of Appeal was quick to assume 12 that Eager might have been motivated to leave his investigation unfinished because of the 13 potential expiration of the government’s resentencing offer. Even if that was part of 14 Eager’s calculus, there is still no reasonable explanation for why Eager did not take a 15 moment to check the status of the GSR tests before he advised Porter to forgo an additional 16 nine years of his life. Had he called his own expert on September 9, 2010, he would have 17 learned that Celia Hartnett’s laboratory had already found gunshot residue on samples 18 from Williams’ hands. Ex. 16, 1 CT 218. He would have uncovered evidence that pointed 19 to Porter’s innocence of the charged allegations. Instead, he did not check whether the 20 9 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Circuit precedent does not constitute “clearly established Federal law,” but it does constitute persuasive authority to the extent that it assists district courts to determine whether a particular state court holding is “an unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2003). 10 Porter’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the agreement stage was brought and briefed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Court grants the claim under the standard of Section 2254(d)(1) but also notes that the claim could have been brought under Section 2254(d)(2). A decision that is “based on an reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence” occurs where the state court has failed to weigh and consider probative evidence central to petitioner’s claim. See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the Court of Appeal appears to have ignored the fact that probative GSR evidence, which could exonerate Porter of the allegations on retrial, existed at the time Eager made an uninformed recommendation to his client. The Court of Appeal’s determination that Eager’s decision was a tactical one, therefore, constitutes an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented and made part of the state-court record. 15 1 GSR results were ready until the night before Porter’s sentencing hearing on October 13, 2 2010 and over a month after he had advised him to enter into the resentencing agreement. 3 “The traditional deference owed to strategic judgments of counsel is not justified” where, 4 as here, “there was not an adequate investigation ‘supporting [counsel’s] judgments.” 5 Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 948-49 (9th Cir. 2008). 6 Lastly, Eager himself admitted his actions constituted deficient performance under 7 Strickland. He stated, “Porter has a legitimate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for 8 current defense counsel’s failure to advise him not to sign the agreement and instead ask 9 for a continuance until we could complete the gunshot residue test and definitely determine that it was co-suspect Williams – and not Porter – who fired the shots on the night in 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 question.” Ex. 16, 1 CT 268. Even though, as the state court held, counsel’s proclamation 12 of inadequacy is not determinative, it does hold evidentiary value when so clearly 13 supported by the entirety of the record. Eager himself was unable to point to any strategic 14 decision that could have prevented him from contacting his own expert and inquiring about 15 the results of the testing before he instructed Porter to sign the agreement. 16 17 2. Prejudice 18 To establish prejudice from counsel’s advice to accept a plea offer, petitioner must 19 show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have 20 pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 57-59. 21 Because the Court of Appeal did not address the issue of prejudice, this Court reviews the 22 issue de novo. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 372, 390 (2005) (examining prejudice de 23 novo where state court did not reach the issue); Miles v. Ryan, 713 F.3d 477, 489-90 (9th 24 Cir. 2013) (same). 25 Porter has met the burden of establishing prejudice. He declared under penalty of 26 perjury that had he known that gunshot residue was found on Williams, he “would not 27 have agreed to be resentenced, and instead would have gone to trial.” Ex. 16, 1 CT 205. A 28 decision to reject the plea bargain would have been “rational under the circumstances” 16 1 because, as discussed above, the new GSR evidence was relevant to the allegations on 2 retrial. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010). Judge Wendy C. Duffy, who heard 3 all of the evidence at trial, including evidence that no GSR was found on either Porter or 4 Williams, questioned whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Porter of the gang 5 enhancement and willfulness allegations. Ex. 2, 14 RT 3309-3314. With the new evidence 6 showing GSR on Williams and not Porter, the likelihood that Porter would be found guilty 7 beyond a reasonable doubt at a retrial would have been significantly smaller. Considering 8 that Porter had steadfastly insisted on his innocence, his declaration and the record as a 9 whole establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s misadvice. In conclusion, the Court finds that counsel’s failure to complete the investigation or 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 at least inquire into its status before advising Porter to enter into a resentencing agreement, 12 constitutes deficient performance. The state court unreasonably applied federal law to the 13 facts of this case. Porter suffered prejudice as a result of his counsel’s ineffectiveness. His 14 request for habeas relief on the basis of this claim is GRANTED. In order to “put the 15 defendant back in the position he would have been in if the Sixth Amendment violation 16 never occurred,” the Court hereby VACATES the resentencing agreement and all of its 17 provisions. Johnson v. Uribe, 700 F.3d 413, 425-26 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lafler v. 18 Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (directing 19 district court to grant conditional writ subject to state court vacating defendant’s conviction 20 and granting him a new trial). Porter’s case will be returned to the state superior court for a 21 new trial on the deliberation allegations and the gang enhancement. If the District 22 Attorney’s office is not inclined to prosecute those allegations, it should dismiss them, 23 allowing Porter to serve the remainder of his twenty-five year sentence on the original 24 conviction. 25 26 27 28 II. Voluntariness of the Plea Agreement In addition to challenging the constitutionality of his counsel’s recommendation to enter into a resentencing agreement, Porter challenges the resentencing agreement itself on 17 1 the ground that it was not entered into knowingly and intelligently. Having invalidated the 2 agreement as a product of counsel’s deficient performance, the Court need not rule on the 3 second challenge to the same resentencing agreement. Nonetheless, in the interest of 4 finality and a clear record for review, the Court opts to rule on the merits of Porter’s 5 voluntariness claim. 6 Due process requires that a guilty plea be both knowing and voluntary because it 7 constitutes the waiver of three constitutional rights: the right to a jury trial, the right to 8 confront one's accusers, and the privilege against self-incrimination. See Boykin v. 9 Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969). “Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 12 748 (1970). A habeas petitioner bears the burden of establishing that his guilty plea was 13 not knowing and voluntary. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31-34 (1992). On federal 14 habeas corpus review, as stated above, Petitioner also bears the burden of showing that the 15 state court’s adjudication of his claim resulted in a “decision that was contrary to, or 16 involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law” or in a “decision 17 that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 18 presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 19 Here, the Court of Appeal in People v. Porter, No. H037619, 2013 WL 2284949 20 (Cal. Ct. App. May 22, 2013) issued the last reasoned decision of Porter’s voluntariness 21 claim. The court found that the agreement was entered into knowingly and voluntarily 22 because: (a) the agreement thoroughly described “the rights and opportunities defendant 23 was waiving”; (b) the defendant “showed acute awareness of the costs and benefits to him” 24 of entering into the agreement; and (c) defense counsel assured the court that defendant 25 understood what he was doing. Id. at *6. These findings of fact by the state court are 26 awarded deference and, in this case, are also supported by the record. And yet the crucial 27 piece of evidence that was presented to the Court of Appeal but seemed to be entirely 28 disregarded was that before Porter signed the agreement, he did not know that gunshot 18 1 residue had been found on Williams’ hands and clothing. Nor did he know that the original 2 GSR evidence was flawed because the prosecution’s expert Steven Dowell had performed 3 an incomplete and faulty testing of the GSR samples taken from Williams and Porter. The 4 evidence was available at the time he signed the agreement; the only reason Porter was not 5 privy to it was his counsel’s failure to inquire into the status of the retesting. Eager failed 6 to give his client “the tools he need[ed] to make an intelligent decision.” Turner v. 7 Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 881 (9th Cir. 2002). 8 The Court finds that Porter did not enter into the agreement with “sufficient 9 awareness of the relevant circumstances,” as required by federal constitutional law. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. He did not have the information necessary to assess intelligently "the 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 advantages and disadvantages of a trial as compared with those attending a plea of guilty." 12 Brady, 397 U.S. at 755. As a result, his plea was unintelligent. The Court of Appeal’s 13 decision finding otherwise was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 14 law. Since the agreement as a whole was not entered into knowingly, the waiver of 15 appellate and habeas rights was also not entered into knowingly. See United States v. 16 Portillo–Cano, 192 F.3d 1246, 1250 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) 17 (“waivers of appeal must stand or fall with the agreement of which they are a part”). 18 Finding that the waiver is invalid, the Court proceeds to reach and decide the rest of 19 Porter’s claims. 20 21 III. Double Jeopardy Violation 22 Porter next argues that the federal prohibition against double jeopardy should have 23 barred retrial of the premeditation allegations and gang enhancements. He reasons that in 24 ruling on his motion for a new trial, the original trial judge found that the evidence was 25 legally insufficient to sustain a finding of guilt as to premeditation and deliberation, as well 26 as gang membership. Because Porter sought a writ of mandate after his motion for 27 dismissal on double jeopardy grounds was denied, the issue was brought first to the Court 28 of Appeal and then to the California Supreme Court. The high court rejected Porter’s 19 1 double jeopardy claim in a published opinion, Porter v. Super. Ct. of Monterey Cty., 47 2 Cal. 4th 125 (2009). 3 The California Supreme Court reasonably determined the facts of Porter’s case as 4 they relate to his double jeopardy claim. Porter moved for acquittal under California Penal 5 Code § 1118.1 before his case was submitted to the jury; Judge Wendy C. Duffy of 6 Monterey County Superior Court denied the motion. Id. at 133, n.3. Subsequently, after the 7 jury found him guilty on all counts, he moved for a new trial under California Penal Code 8 § 1181(6). In deciding his motion for a new trial under Section 1181(6), Judge Duffy was 9 required to sit as a “thirteenth juror” and determine whether the evidence was enough to convince her that the premeditation allegation and gang enhancement were true. Id. Porter 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 argues that in making this decision, she ruled that the evidence was legally insufficient and 12 thus called for an acquittal. As the California Supreme Court held, Judge Duffy did not 13 have the authority to grant an acquittal in connection with a Section 1181(6) motion. Id. 14 Her statements on the record regarding the credibility and state of the evidence relate to 15 her adjudication of the motion for a new trial; they do not signal an attempt to grant an 16 acquittal on the gang enhancement and deliberation allegations. She would have granted 17 Porter’s earlier motion for acquittal had she actually found the evidence presented at trial 18 legally insufficient. Based on these facts, the high court ruled that under state law the trial 19 court’s order granting a new trial pursuant to Section 1181(6) was not an order of acquittal 20 barring retrial on double jeopardy grounds. A state court’s interpretation of state law binds 21 a federal court sitting in habeas corpus. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). 22 Further, the California Supreme Court reasonably determined that retrial did not 23 violate federal double jeopardy principles. Porter, 47 Cal. 4th at 135 n.4. As the court 24 stated, Porter’s federal double jeopardy claim is foreclosed by U.S. Supreme Court 25 authority. In Tibbs v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court distinguished between two forms of 26 reversal of a jury’s verdict in criminal cases: (1) where the prosecution has failed to 27 produce sufficient evidence to prove its case, in which case the Double Jeopardy Clause 28 bars the prosecutor from making a second attempt at conviction; and (2) where a judge 20 1 disagrees with a jury’s resolution of conflicting evidence and concludes that a guilty 2 verdict is against the weight of evidence, in which case the Double Jeopardy Clause does 3 not bar retrial. 11 457 U.S. 31, 42-44 (1981). The California Supreme Court correctly 4 determined that Porter’s case falls in the second category and that his retrial did not violate 5 the prohibition against double jeopardy. Id. at 132-38. Consequently, Porter has failed to show that he is entitled to federal habeas corpus 6 7 relief on double jeopardy grounds. 8 9 IV. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Porter’s last claim on habeas corpus is that his trial counsel, Thomas S. 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 Worthington (“Worthington”), rendered ineffective assistance by: (1) failing to introduce 12 exculpatory evidence at trial of GSR on co-suspect Williams and instead stipulating that no 13 GSR was found on Williams; (2) failing to properly interview eyewitness Eugenio Ramos; 14 (3) failing to present evidence that Porter had physical weakness on his left side; and (4) 15 failing to present evidence of Porter’s alcohol blackouts. To prevail on either of the four subclaims, Porter must show that trial counsel’s 16 17 performance fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing 18 professional norms, and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 19 unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 20 466 U.S at 694. Porter also bears the burden of demonstrating that the state court which 21 issued the last reasoned decision on his IAC subclaims applied Strickland to the facts of 22 his case in an “objectively unreasonable” manner. Riley, 352 F.3d at 1317. “The 23 question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s 24 determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a 25 substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). 26 11 27 28 Reversal on the second ground does not mean that acquittal was the only proper verdict; instead, it means that the court disagrees with the jury’s resolution of conflicting testimony. See Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 42. It thus has the same effect as a deadlocked jury and does not result in an acquittal barring retrial. Id. 21 1 After a careful review of the record, the Court finds that Porter’s first two subclaims 2 are procedurally barred and that his last two subclaims do not meet AEDPA’s high bar for 3 habeas relief. 4 5 6 7 1. IAC for Failure to Conduct Independent Testing of GSR Samples Prior to Trial and for Stipulating to the Absence of Gunshot Residue Porter claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to test results 8 completed prior to trial by Steven Dowell from the Los Angeles County Coroner’s office. 9 Even though GSR samples were available from the backs of Porter’s and Williams’ hands, their palms, and their clothing, Dowell only analyzed the samples from the backs of their 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 hands. Ex. 18, Ex. K at 703. Dowell found no GSR particles on either Williams or Porter. 12 Instead of ordering a more complete test of those GSR samples by his own defense expert, 13 Porter’s trial counsel Worthington stipulated to those results at trial. Ex. 2, 6 RT 1303. 14 Porter argues that had Worthington ordered the samples to be retested by a defense expert, 15 Worthington could have discovered the evidence that Celia Harnett found five years 16 later—that GSR particles were present on Williams’ hands and clothing, but not on 17 Porter’s. 18 The last reasoned state court decision on this claim was rendered by Judge Russell 19 Scott of the Monterey County Superior Court on November 21, 2012. In re Anthony 20 Porter, No. HC 7331 (Super. Ct. of Monterey Cty., Nov. 21, 2012); Ex. 18, Ex. K. The 21 state court denied Porter’s IAC claim for counsel’s failure to retest on three grounds: (1) as 22 waived by Porter’s resentencing agreement preventing him from challenging his sentence; 23 (2) as procedurally barred for being successive and untimely; and (3) as lacking in merit. 24 Ex. 18, Ex. K at 711-12. With respect to the procedural default, the state court reasoned 25 that Porter should have included his GSR-related claim for relief in his first habeas petition 26 filed on August 14, 2006 since he was aware of the basis for the claim, i.e. that there was 27 no independent GSR testing conducted by the defense. Because Porter failed to provide an 28 adequate explanation for failing to include the claim in his 2006 petition, the state court 22 1 concluded that it was procedurally defaulted under In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 767-68 2 (1993). 3 The Court finds that the procedural bar doctrine applies in this case and bars federal 4 review of Porter’s IAC subclaim for failure to conduct GSR retesting. Federal courts may 5 not “review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court 6 rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal ground and adequate to 7 support the judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) overruled on 8 other grounds by Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). For a state law ground to be 9 “independent,” it must not be interwoven with federal law. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1989). For it to be adequate, it must be based on a state law rule that is “firmly 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 established” and “regularly followed.” Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 317 (2011). 12 Federal review is barred as long as the state court relied on the procedural bar as a separate 13 basis for its decision, even if the state court also discussed the merits of the claim. See 14 Loveland v. Hatcher, 231 F.3d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 2000). 15 Here, the superior court relied on a procedural bar as a separate basis for its 16 disposition of the claim. It had an independent and adequate state law ground for denial of 17 Porter’s IAC claim based on GSR retesting: Porter had violated California’s law against 18 presenting new claims for relief which were known, or should have been known, at the 19 time he filed his first collateral attack on the judgment. See In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 767; 20 see also Walker, 562 U.S. at 321 (holding that California’s practice of barring a petitioner 21 from obtaining relief on a claim when he “substantially delayed” filing his habeas petition 22 is an independent and adequate procedural bar). Even though the superior court also 23 discussed the merits of Porter’s claim, it indicated that it was denying relief on a few 24 independent grounds by separating its decision into subsections entitled “Waiver,” 25 “Procedural Bar,” “Merits” and then explicitly stating “relief […] is denied” under each 26 subsection. Ex. 18, Ex. K at 711. The five-page explanation of why Porter’s claim is 27 procedurally defaulted further shows the state court’s intention to expressly rely on 28 procedural default as a separate reason for denial of Porter’s IAC claim. Id. at 702-06. 23 1 Since the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court denied Porter’s 2 habeas petition raising the same IAC subclaim without explanation (Exs. 24, 25), it is 3 presumed that they did so on the same grounds as the superior court, thus relying at least in 4 part on the procedural bar. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). 5 Porter claims that he can meet the requirements for “cause and prejudice,” one of 6 the exceptions excusing procedural default. He is correct that if he could demonstrate 7 cause for the default and prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, this 8 Court would be able to review his claim on the merits. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 9 However, Porter is unable to meet his burden of showing cause. Neither of his explanations for the default constitute cause under the law. His first explanation—that 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 appellate counsel who prepared and filed the first habeas petition was ineffective—does 12 not constitute cause because there is no constitutional right to counsel in habeas 13 proceedings and therefore Porter cannot show that counsel who filed his first habeas 14 petition was ineffective. See id. at 752-54 (suggesting that if the petitioner has no 15 constitutional right to counsel in the proceeding where the default occurred, attorney error 16 does not amount to cause for the default). His second explanation—that he did not know 17 the factual basis for his IAC claim because it was only after the double jeopardy issue was 18 litigated and the case returned to the superior court for retrial that the new GSR testing 19 could be done—is equally unavailing. The factual basis for his claim is not the new GSR 20 evidence discovered five years later; the factual basis for his claim is that the original GSR 21 testing was incomplete and that his attorney erred by not requesting a retesting. Porter was 22 aware of these facts and had he actually believed his attorney had rendered deficient 23 performance at trial, he should have claimed so in his first habeas petition. Because there is 24 no “objective factor external to the defense” that impeded Porter’s ability to comply with 25 the state rule against successive petitions, this Court cannot find that Porter has shown 26 cause for the default. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 478, 488 (1986). 27 28 Because Porter’s IAC claim with respect to the gunshot residue testing is procedurally barred, this Court does not review its merits. 24 1 2. IAC for Failure to Properly Interview Eyewitness Ramos 2 Porter further claims that Worthington was ineffective for failing to interview 3 eyewitness Ramos in Spanish and for failing to impeach him at trial with a recording of the 4 911 call made after the incident. Porter argues that during the 911 call, Ramos suggested 5 that the driver was the shooter and that therefore Worthington should have impeached 6 Ramos with the 911 call when Ramos testified at trial that it was the passenger who shot at 7 the victims’ house. He further points to evidence from a 2011 interview with Ramos, 8 conducted by Public Defender Investigator Ferrer (“Ferrer”), that Ramos had trouble 9 understanding English and that when interviewed in Spanish, he was clear that the passenger of the vehicle shot the weapon. Ex. 19, Vol. 2 at 133-134. Had Worthington 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 interviewed Ramos in Spanish, Porter argues, he would have unearthed the favorable 12 evidence later acquired by investigator Ferrer. 13 Both subclaims were presented to the Monterey County Superior Court in Porter’s 14 March 11, 2011 habeas petition. The court found them to be successive and untimely for 15 the same reasons as the IAC claim related to GSR testing discussed above. In re Anthony 16 Porter, No. HC 7331 (Super. Ct. of Monterey Cty., Nov. 21, 2012); Ex. 18, Ex. K at 712- 17 716. The state court held that Porter should have presented these grounds for ineffective 18 assistance of counsel when he filed his first habeas petition in 2006: “If there was any 19 deficiency in trial counsel’s performance related to his examination of Ramos […], the 20 deficiency was the same in 2010 when [the second habeas petition was filed in state court] 21 as it was in 2005 when Porter [first] petitioned for habeas corpus.” Id. at 713. 22 This Court determines that the state procedural bar is valid, that the court denied 23 Porter’s claim based on adequate and independent state ground, and that Porter has not 24 established cause and prejudice excusing procedural default. Porter attempts to show cause 25 by claiming that the factual basis for the IAC claim was not available before 2011 because 26 it was not until investigator Ferrer interviewed Ramos in Spanish that Porter learned of the 27 discrepancy between Ramos’ testimony in Spanish and in English. Although that is true, 28 nothing prevented Porter’s counsel at the time of the default from questioning Ramos’ 25 1 proficiency in English given Ramos’ testimony at trial when he appeared to have trouble 2 distinguishing between basic words such as “male” and “female.” Ex. 18, Ex. K at 714. 3 The factual basis for the claim—Ramos’ difficulty with English and the discrepancy 4 between the 911 call and the trial testimony—was not unavailable in 2006 when Porter 5 filed his first habeas petition; it was simply not investigated and presented to the state 6 court. Cf. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222 (1988) (concealment by government could 7 be cause for procedural default if it was reason for failure of petitioner’s lawyers to raise 8 jury challenge in trial court). 9 10 Porter’s second basis for ineffective assistance of counsel is procedurally barred, and therefore habeas relief on that basis is DENIED. United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 3. IAC for Failure to Present Evidence of Physical Weakness 13 Porter claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of 14 Porter’s physical weakness. According to Dr. Anne Flood, a mental health expert who 15 Worthington interviewed prior to trial and who had visited Porter in jail, Porter often 16 rested his arm on his chest or abdomen and dragged his left foot. See Porter, 2006 WL 17 3649273, at *7. Dr. Flood thought that Porter might have suffered a stroke affecting the 18 left side of his body. Id. Dr. Tom Reidy, who Worthington hired to determine if Porter had 19 suffered a stroke or brain trauma that could manifest as weakness on his left side, could not 20 discover any evidence to support a conclusion of brain injury. Id. Still, Porter argues, 21 Worthington should have called Dr. Flood to testify about her observations of Porter. 22 The California Court of Appeal in People v. Porter, No. H029031, 2006 WL 23 3649273 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2006) rejected Porter’s claim. It held that trial counsel 24 made a reasonable decision not to introduce the theory of Porter’s physical weakness 25 because it lacked evidentiary support. Id. at *7. In the absence of medical proof that Porter 26 had suffered brain injury, Dr. Flood’s observations would have been of “limited probative 27 value.” Id. Porter admitted that he pulled himself up and sat on the frame of the window on 28 the passenger’s side. Even though Worthington could have argued that Porter was 26 1 physically able to sit in the window but not able to fire a weapon while holding himself up, 2 Worthington’s decision not to pursue this line of defense appears to have been a tactical 3 choice made after a complete investigation into the issue. See Jennings, 290 F.3d at 1014 4 (“[A]ttorneys have considerable latitude to make strategic decisions about what 5 investigations to conduct once they have gathered sufficient evidence upon which to base 6 their tactical choices.”) (emphasis in the original). 7 This Court cannot find that the state court’s decision involved an unreasonable 8 application of federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts in the light of the 9 evidence. Porter’s request for habeas relief on the basis of IAC related to evidence of 10 physical weakness is DENIED. United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 4. IAC for Failure to Present Evidence of Alcohol Blackouts 13 Lastly, Porter argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present 14 evidence that Porter suffered from alcohol blackouts. Porter’s theory is that this evidence 15 would have bolstered his defense by showing that he was drunk, unaware of what going on 16 around him, and incapable of forming an intent to kill. 17 The California Court of Appeal reasonably determined that trial counsel did not 18 render ineffective assistance when he did not call Dr. Reidy and Dr. Flood to testify about 19 Porter’s history of alcohol blackouts. Porter, 2006 WL 3649273, at *8. Multiple witnesses 20 testified that Porter had abused alcohol in the past and that he was extremely intoxicated 21 on the day of the funeral. Id. A forensic toxicologist testified for the defense on the effects 22 of alcohol consumption and the capacity of a heavy drinker to appear outwardly 23 unimpaired even when severely intoxicated. Given the extensive testimony presented at 24 trial of Porter’s alcohol use, trial counsel could have decided that the value of Dr. Reidy’s 25 and Dr. Flood’s additional testimony regarding alcohol blackouts would have been 26 minimal. The Court of Appeal reasonably determined that Porter had not overcome “the 27 strong presumption that [his] counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 28 professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 27 The Court of Appeal’s decision that Porter had failed to show prejudice under the 1 2 second prong of Strickland was equally reasonable. Porter, 2006 WL 3649273, at *8. The 3 Court fails to see how the result of trial would have been different had the jury been 4 informed of Porter’s alcohol blackouts. If the evidentiary value of past blackouts was to 5 show that Porter was immature and easily influenced, the jury could have made that 6 inference from the extensive testimony of alcohol abuse presented at trial. Any evidence 7 that Porter may have suffered from an alcohol blackout during the night of the shooting 8 would have directly contradicted Porter’s own testimony that he remembered being in the 9 car and shouting from the window, but not shooting the weapon. This Court cannot find that the Court of Appeal was objectively unreasonable in 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 applying federal law to Porter’s claim. As a result, Porter’s last basis for his ineffective 12 assistance of trial counsel claim fails. 13 14 15 V. Petitioner May Appeal This Decision A federal district court must issue a certificate of appealability in order for an 16 appeal to be taken from a habeas corpus proceeding such as this one. 28 U.S.C. 17 § 2253(c)(1). A court may only issue a certificate of appealability “if the applicant has 18 made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). The 19 applicant does not need to show a likelihood of succeeding on the merits: “The question is 20 the debatability of the underlying constitutional claim, not the resolution of that debate.” 21 Although the Court has rejected Porter’s double jeopardy and ineffective assistance 22 of trial counsel claims, he has nonetheless made a substantial showing of the denial of his 23 constitutional rights. Porter has made an especially strong showing of the denial of his 24 Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel for his trial counsel’s failures to 25 conduct an independent and complete test of the GSR samples, to interview Ramos in 26 Spanish, and to impeach Ramos with the 911 call. Porter put forward a significant amount 27 of evidence requiring serious consideration. The Court finds that he has made the showing 28 required to appeal this Order. 28 1 2 CONCLUSION In light of the foregoing, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED IN 3 PART AND DENIED IN PART. Porter has met the heavy burden of showing that the state 4 appellate court was objectively unreasonable in denying his two claims challenging the 5 validity of the resentencing agreement: that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of 6 counsel in instructing him to sign the agreement, and that the agreement was not entered 7 into knowingly and intelligently. Even with the strict limits on federal habeas relief 8 imposed by AEDPA, this Court has the authority and the obligation to remedy violations 9 of constitutional rights, such as those that occurred in Porter’s case on retrial. The resentencing agreement signed on September 9, 2010, its sentencing provisions, and the 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 waiver of post-conviction rights are therefore VACATED. If the state wishes to retry 12 Porter on the gang enhancement allegations (Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1)) and on the 13 allegations that the attempted murders were willful, deliberate and premeditated (Id. 14 § 664(a)), it has to do so within one hundred and twenty (120) days of this order. The 15 Clerk shall serve this order upon Petitioner’s counsel of record, Respondent, and the 16 Monterey County County District Attorney’s Office. 17 Porter’s petition for habeas relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial 18 counsel and double jeopardy is DENIED. Porter’s twenty-five year sentence imposed on 19 May 6, 2005 remains undisturbed. 20 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 23 24 Dated: 07/17/2017 _____________________________________ THELTON E. HENDERSON United States District Judge 25 26 27 28 29
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