Crider et al v. Pacific Acquisitions & Associates, LLC, No. 3:2014cv03498 - Document 36 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS TO RONNIQUE CRIDER; DENYING MOTION AS TO RAYMOND CRIDER. Re: Dkt. No. 28 . Signed by Judge Nathanael Cousins. (lmh, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/3/2015)
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Crider et al v. Pacific Acquisitions & Associates, LLC Doc. 36 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 RONNIQUE CRIDER, RAYMOND DALE CRIDER, 10 Plaintiffs, 11 United States District Court Northern District of California v. 12 PACIFIC ACQUISITIONS & ASSOCIATES, LLC, 13 14 Defendant. 15 16 Case No. 14-cv-03498-NC ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS TO RONNIQUE CRIDER; DENYING MOTION AS TO RAYMOND CRIDER Re: Dkt. No. 28 Husband and wife Raymond and Ronnique Crider allege that Pacific Acquisitions & Associates, LLC harassed Ronnique at her workplace by calling her repeatedly to collect a 17 consumer debt. Pacific is no longer a company in good standing, so the Criders move for 18 19 default judgment, claiming Pacific violated the federal and state Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The Criders request an award of statutory and emotional damages, 20 attorneys’ fees, and costs. The Court finds that Ronnique Crider has sufficiently stated a 21 22 claim that she was subject to the protection under the FDCPA and RFDCPA, and was a victim of Pacific’s unlawful acts. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the motion for default 23 judgment as to Ronnique Crider and awards her $16,209.00. However, the Court finds that 24 25 Raymond Crider is not a debt holder and was not the target of Pacific’s debt collection actions, and is not entitled to default judgment. The Court DENIES the motion for default 26 judgment as to Raymond Crider. 27 / 28 Case No. 14-cv-03498-NC Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 I. BACKGROUND The Criders are married and both worked at Saint Mary’s College in Moraga, 3 California in February 2014. Dkt. No. 1, Complaint at ¶ 2. Ronnique Crider has debt on a 4 credit card used exclusively by her for personal, family, or household purposes. Dkt. No. 5 31 at ¶ 2. Pacific is a Delaware LLC, and its primary business is debt collection. 6 Complaint at ¶ 12. Pacific attempted to collect on Ronnique’s credit card debt. Dkt. No. 7 31 at ¶ 2. On February 23, 2014, an employee from Pacific called Ronnique’s office and 8 spoke with a student worker. Complaint at ¶ 2. Pacific asked the student worker several 9 questions in order to get more information about her, including who the worker’s direct supervisor was. Id. Ronnique overheard the conversation, took the phone from the 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 student, and told the Pacific employee not to call her at work. Id. The caller told 12 Ronnique that he could do whatever he wanted, and that he was going to come out to her 13 place of employment and serve her. Id. Pacific called Ronnique again that same day and 14 left the following message on her work phone: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Yes, uh, this message is for Ronnique Crider. This is, uh, Miles Gordon calling from Pacific Acquisitions & Associates contacting you in regards to uh your claim that’s been forwarded to my immediate attention. I did not hear back from you. Uh, my next step will be to go ahead and give uh Michael Viola a call and go over this information with him uh so that we can go ahead and get you the documentation we need to get out to your place of employment. My office number is 855-715-7569. You’ll refer to the claim number of 6898. I have not heard back from you. I’m giving you the benefit of the doubt and uh, will wait to see if I hear back from you. If I don’t hear back from you by today at 3:00 p.m. PST I will move forward. I know I have the correct uh email, I hear you stating your name so I don’t know what the discrepancy is, but I will move forward after today. Id. at ¶ 3. Ronnique told Raymond about the phone calls from Pacific. Id. at ¶ 2. The next 25 day, Raymond drafted a letter requesting Pacific not to call Ronnique at work, not to call 26 her co-workers, and not to come to her place of employment. Id at ¶ 4. Ronnique signed 27 the letter and faxed it to Pacific in the morning. Id. Later that day, Pacific called 28 Ronnique at work again and left the following voicemail: Case No.14-cv-03498-NC 2 1 This message is for Ronnique Crider. This is, uh, Miles Gordon calling from Pacific Acquisitions & Associates contacting you in regards to your, uh, claim that’s been forwarded to my immediate attention. There has been a complaint filed against you. I am planning on getting you out the, uh, documents that we need to get to you at your place of employment. I can be reached at my office number of 855-715-7569. Uh, you’ll refer to the claim number of 6898-C as in cat; A as in apple 2593. If I don’t hear back from you then basically I’ll give Mike a call and go over some information with him, clarify some information and then go ahead and move forward with this. Uh it would definitely be in your best interest to contact me as soon as you get this message. Once again, this is Miles Gordon calling from Pacific Acquisitions & Associates. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Id. at ¶ 5. The Criders allege that these messages caused fear, anxiety, and emotional distress because they were worried Pacific would contact Ronnique’s supervisor, and that 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 word would spread to Raymond’s colleagues, which would have a negative impact on their 12 employment. Id. at ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 28 at 8. 13 On August 1, 2014, Ronnique and Raymond Crider sued Pacific for violating 14 (1) California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“RFDCPA”); (2) intrusion 15 upon seclusion; (3) the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”); 16 (4) negligence; and (5) negligent training and supervision. On December 8, 2014, Pacific 17 answered the complaint, represented by counsel. Dkt. No. 9. The parties conducted 18 discovery in this case, and shortly before a mediation conference in June 2015, Pacific’s 19 counsel notified the Court that the company was no longer in good standing with the state 20 of Delaware, so counsel lacked the capacity to represent Pacific. Dkt. No. 22 at 2. The 21 Criders filed a motion to strike defendant’s answer and enter default, which the Court 22 granted. Dkt. Nos. 25, 27. The Criders now move for default judgment against Pacific, 23 seeking $1,000 in statutory damages for a violation of the FDCPA, $1,000 in statutory 24 damages for a violation of the RFDCPA, $15,000 in emotional distress damages, $11,250 25 in attorneys’ fees, and $459.00 in advance costs. Dkt. No. 28 at 11. 26 /// 27 28 Case No.14-cv-03498-NC 3 1 2 II. LEGAL STANDARD Default may be entered against a party who fails to plead or otherwise defend an 3 action and against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). 4 After entry of default, the Court has discretion to grant default judgment on the merits of 5 the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In 6 deciding whether to grant default judgment, the Court considers the following factors: 7 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the sufficiency of the complaint; (3) the 8 merits of the plaintiff’s substantive claim; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) 9 the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel v. 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). The factual allegations of the complaint, 12 except those concerning damages, are deemed admitted by the non-responding parties. 13 Shanghai Automation Instrument, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 995; see also Geddes v. United Fin. 14 Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[t]he general rule of law is that upon default the 15 factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will 16 be taken as true”). 17 III. DISCUSSION 18 19 A. Jurisdiction When presented with a motion for default judgment, the Court has “an affirmative 20 duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.” In re Tuli, 21 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this 22 action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the complaint alleges violations of the FDCPA. 23 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the related state law 24 claim under the RFDCPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Both parties consented to the 25 jurisdiction of this Court, prior to Pacific’s default. Dkt. No. 13 at 5. 26 Additionally, because Pacific appeared in this lawsuit and answered the complaint, 27 the Court finds that service was proper and that personal jurisdiction over Pacific is 28 appropriate. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (a party waives objections to service and personal Case No.14-cv-03498-NC 4 1 2 3 4 jurisdiction by failing to object in a motion to dismiss). B. Default Judgment 1. Merits and Sufficiency of the Complaint Under the second and third Eitel factors, in deciding whether to grant default 5 judgment, the Court must examine the merits of the plaintiffs’ substantive claims and the 6 sufficiency of the complaint. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. At this stage, the Court takes 7 “the well-pleaded factual allegations” in the complaint as true; however, the “defendant is 8 not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.” 9 DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007). “[N]ecessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of No. America, 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992). In 12 their supplemental motion for default judgment, the Criders state that they are dismissing 13 their claims for intrusion upon seclusion, negligence, and negligent supervision. Thus, the 14 remaining claims are (a) a violation of the RFDCPA; and (b) a violation of the FDCPA. 15 16 a. RFDCPA Claims The Criders allege that Pacific violated the RFDCPA by threatening to call 17 Ronnique’s supervisor. Cal. Civ. Code. § 1788.17. To qualify for protection under the 18 RFDCPA, plaintiffs must be “debtors” as the term is defined in California Civil Code § 19 1788.2(h) (“a natural person from whom a debt collector seeks to collect a consumer debt 20 which is due and owing or alleged to be due and owing from such person”). Additionally, 21 defendants must be “debt collectors,” defined as “any person who, in the ordinary course 22 of business, regularly, on behalf of himself or herself or other engages in debt collection.” 23 Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(c). Here, the Criders allege in the complaint that they are debtors, 24 and that Pacific is a debt collector. However, in the supplemental briefing, only Ronnique 25 Crider qualifies as a debtor. Ronnique states that the debt Pacific is seeking to collect is on 26 her credit card, that she exclusively uses. Therefore, Raymond is not a debtor. 27 28 The RFDCPA prohibits a debt collector from threatening to take any illegal action in connection with collecting a debt. Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.10(f). The Criders allege that Case No.14-cv-03498-NC 5 1 Pacific threatened to take illegal action, namely communicating with Ronnique’s employer 2 regarding an outstanding debt, a violation of the RFDCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.12(a). 3 The Court finds that Ronnique Crider has alleged a sufficient claim under the RFDCPA, 4 but Raymond Crider has not. 5 6 b. FDCPA “In enacting the FDCPA, Congress sought to counter the abusive, deceptive, and 7 unfair debt collection practices sometimes used by debt collectors against consumer.” 8 Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs allege that they are 9 “consumers” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) (“any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt”). Additionally, the complaint alleges that defendants 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 are “debt collectors,” as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). As noted above, only Ronnique 12 Crider in fact is a consumer with relationship to the debt Pacific sought to collect. 13 The Criders allege that Pacific violated three sections of the FDCPA. First, the 14 Criders allege that Pacific violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(3), which prohibits a debt collector 15 from communicating with a consumer about an outstanding debt at the consumer’s place 16 of employment if the debtor knows or has reason to know that the consumer’s employer 17 prohibits the consumer from receiving this type of communication. However, the Criders 18 admit in their declaration supporting their motion for default judgment that there is no 19 evidence Pacific knew, or had reason to know, that Ronnique’s employer prohibited her 20 from receiving debt collection calls. Dkt. No. 33 at 5. 21 Second, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(3) prohibits debt collectors from communicating with 22 consumers after the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing to cease further 23 communication about the debt. Ronnique faxed a letter to Pacific at 9:37 a.m. requesting 24 that Pacific cease all further communication about the debt, but Pacific called Ronique 25 later that same day. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 4. 26 Third, 15 U.S.C. § 1692d prohibits debt collectors from engaging in any conduct, 27 the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in the 28 collection of a debt. While there is no clear definition of what constitutes harassment, the Case No.14-cv-03498-NC 6 1 Ninth Circuit held that repeated threats of garnishment, numerous demands for overnight 2 payment, and multiple calls to a consumer’s place of employment constituted harassment. 3 Fox v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., 15 F.3d 1507, 1516 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, Pacific 4 made three phone calls to Ronnique’s work over the course of two days. Pacific did not 5 threaten to garnish wages, and did not use obscene or abusive language. However, Pacific 6 did make threats to contact Ronnique’s employer directly. In total, the Court finds Ronnique Crider has sufficiently stated a claim for a 7 8 violation of the FDCPA, at least under 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(3), but Raymond Crider has 9 not. 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 2. Remaining Eitel Factors The first factor weighs in favor of the Criders because plaintiffs would be prejudiced 12 if the motion is denied, as plaintiffs would likely be without a recourse for recovery. See 13 Young v. Law Offices of Herbert Davis, 13-cv-1108 JSW (NC), 2014 WL 3418209, at *5 14 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2014). The Criders have attempted to engage Pacific and its counsel, 15 but have been told that Pacific is unable to represent itself in court. There is no indication 16 that Pacific has made any effort to remedy its defunct status, or that it intends to do so. 17 Dkt. No. 34-2 at 2. 18 Second, the Court considers the sum of money requested by the Criders. Generally, 19 courts are hesitant to enter default judgments where large amounts of money are at stake. 20 Manuel v. Thomas, 967 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that $4,405,000 award was too 21 large to enter default judgment). However, the Criders’ request for $27,709 is within the 22 range of reasonable awards for a default judgment. See Young, 2014 WL 2014 WL 23 3418209, at *5 (granting default judgment in the amount of $18,432.50 for violations of 24 the RFDCPA and FDCPA). 25 Third, the possibility of a material dispute is minimal. The Criders have provided the 26 Court with the exact language of Pacific’s messages, and with a copy of the fax sent to 27 Pacific requesting that Pacific stop contacting Ronnique Crider at work. 28 Fourth, it is unlikely that default was the result of excusable neglect, as Pacific’s Case No.14-cv-03498-NC 7 1 counsel clearly represented to the Court that Pacific could not defend itself because it was 2 not a corporation in good standing with the state of Delaware for failure to pay its taxes. 3 Finally, although federal policy generally favors decisions on the merits, Federal Rule 4 of Civil Procedure 55(b) permits entry of default judgment in situations where the 5 defendant refuses to litigate. Thus, the Court finds that the remaining Eitel factors also 6 weigh in favor of granting the Criders’ motion for default judgment. 7 8 C. Damages While the Court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true at the default judgment stage, the Court has discretion to award damages as appropriate. Geddes, 559 10 F.2d at 560. Here, the Criders seek (1) statutory damages under both the RFDCPA and 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 9 FDCPA, (2) emotional distress damages, (3) attorneys’ fees, (4) costs. 12 13 1. Statutory Damages Courts may award up to $1,000 in statutory damages under both the FDCPA and 14 RFDCPA. See Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 660 F.3d 1055, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011) 15 (damages under both statutes are cumulative; therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to statutory 16 remedies under both). In determining the appropriate amount of statutory damages under 17 the FDCPA, the Court must consider “the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by 18 the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such 19 noncompliance was intentional.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1); Young v. Law Offices of 20 Herbert Davis, No. C 13-01108 JSW, 2014 WL 3418209, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2014). 21 In this case, Pacific made three phone calls in two days, all to Ronnique Crider’s work. In 22 the first phone call, Pacific engaged in questioning a student worker at Ronnique’s office. 23 Additionally, Pacific threatened to tell Ronnique’s employer about her debt. Finally, 24 Pacific called Ronnique even after she told Pacific not to contact her. Under these 25 circumstances, the maximum statutory damages of $1,000 are appropriate. 26 The Criders also seeks $1,000 in statutory damages under the RFDCPA. Plaintiffs 27 are entitled to damages under this statute if defendants “willfully” and “knowingly” violate 28 the Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.30(b). Pacific contacted Ronnique at work, after Ronnique Case No.14-cv-03498-NC 8 1 2 told Pacific not to contact her, thus making its violation intentional. The Court finds that an award of $2,000 in statutory damages ($1,000 under each 3 statute) is appropriate; however, only Ronnique Crider is entitled to statutory damages. As 4 discussed above, only Ronnique is a consumer as defined by the statutes, and Pacific’s 5 violations of the statutes were only in relationship to Ronnique. 6 7 2. Emotional Distress Damages Plaintiffs may be awarded actual damages from a debt collector’s violations of the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. 1692k(a)(1); Fausto v. Credigy Servs. Corp., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 9 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Panahiasl v. Gurney, No. 04-cv-04479 JF, 2007 WL 738642, at *1 10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007). However, district courts in the Ninth Circuit disagree whether a 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 8 plaintiff must plead a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, or whether the 12 FDCPA permits an award of emotional distress damages without a separate claim. See 13 Alonso v. Blackstone Fin. Grp. LLC, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1199 (E.D. Cal. 2013) 14 (collecting cases). In Alonso, Judge Boone reasoned that the FDCPA is “a national law 15 intended to have nationwide application which requires uniformity in application.” Id. at 16 1200. Thus, because states have different elements of intentional infliction of emotional 17 distress claims, applying state law to recover emotional distress damages would be 18 counter-intuitive to the purpose of the statute. Id. The Court agrees and finds that 19 emotional distress damages are available to the Criders under the FDCPA. 20 Generally, in the Ninth Circuit, emotional distress damages may be proven through 21 corroborating medical evidence or non-expert testimony. Dawson v. Wash. Mut. Bank. 22 F.A., 390 F.3d 1139, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2004). However, a court may also award damages 23 for emotional distress based on the plaintiff’s subjective testimony where a plaintiff was 24 the victim of “egregious conduct” or where the “circumstances make it obvious that a 25 reasonable person would suffer significant emotional harm.” Id. at 1150. 26 In Chiverton v. Fed. Fin. Grp., Inc., a Connecticut district court awarded the 27 plaintiff $5,000 in emotional distress damages when a debt collector made repeated phone 28 calls to plaintiff’s work over several months, including a call to plaintiff’s supervisor. 399 Case No.14-cv-03498-NC 9 1 F. Supp. 2d. 96, 100 (D. Conn. 2005). Similarly, an Arizona district court awarded the 2 plaintiff $5,000 in emotional distress damages based on the plaintiff’s testimony that the 3 defendant’s unfair debt collection practices caused her “to suffer a great deal of mental 4 anguish in the form of stress, anxiety, sleeplessness, nightmares, hopelessness, 5 nervousness, change in appetite, restlessness, irritability, digestive disorders, chest pains, 6 migraines, depression, sudden weight gain and exacerbation of her pre-existing medical 7 conditions.” Perkons v. Am. Acceptance, LLC, No. 10-cv-8021 PCT, 2010 WL 4922916, 8 at *3 (D. Ariz. Nov. 29, 2010). Here, the Criders seek $15,000 in emotional distress damages. Ronnique Crider 9 declares that as a result of Pacific’s actions, she often suffered from an upset stomach and 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 had trouble sleeping. Dkt. No. 28-3 at ¶ 9. She was nervous and anxious at work, 12 wondering who knew about her debt problems and whether it would affect her 13 employment. Id. Ronnique alleges that she was worried whenever she saw her supervisor 14 because Ronnique did not know if Pacific had carried out the threat to tell her supervisor 15 about the debt. Id. at ¶ 7. Eventually, the Criders both sought employment elsewhere. Id. 16 at ¶ 9. 17 First, the Court finds that consistent with the above findings, only Ronnique Crider 18 can claim emotional distress damages. Second, the Court finds that Pacific’s conduct 19 would make it obvious that a reasonable person would suffer emotional harm. Pacific 20 called Ronnique at work and threatened to tell Ronnique’s supervisor about her debt, a 21 threat that Ronnique likely took seriously since Pacific already questioned a student 22 worker at Ronnique’s workplace. Thus, Ronnique is entitled to an award of emotional 23 distress damages. However, the Court finds that $15,000 is excessive. Pacific’s conduct is 24 not as egregious as the defendants in Chiverton. Ronnique alleges suffering similar to the 25 plaintiff in Perkons. Thus, the Court finds that an award to Ronnique of $5,000 in 26 emotional distress damages is appropriate. 27 28 Case No.14-cv-03498-NC 10 1 2 D. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Defendants are liable for a plaintiff’s reasonable attorneys’ fees in any successful action brought under the FDCPA and RFDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); Cal. Civ. Code 4 § 1788.30(c). To determine what is “reasonable,” courts first “calculate the ‘lodestar 5 figure’ by taking the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation and 6 multiplying it by a reasonable hourly rate.” Fischer v. SJB–P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 7 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court, in considering what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate, looks 8 to the prevailing market rate in the relevant community. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 9 895 (1984). In FDCPA actions, the “community” that a district court must consider is the 10 district in which the court sits. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 3 Cir. 2008). 12 The Criders’ counsel, Jim G. Price, spent a total of 25 hours on this case, and billed 13 the Criders at a rate of $450 per hour. Dkt. 28-2 at 2-4. Price has practiced for over 25 14 years and specializes in representation of consumers. Id. The Court finds the counsel’s 15 hourly rate of $450 per hour is too high, but that an award of $350 per hour is reasonable, 16 since Price asked for and was awarded $350 per hour in recent cases within this district. 17 See Page v. Performance Debt Resolution, No. 12-cv-04029 EDL, 2013 WL 621197, at * 18 7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2013) (awarding attorneys’ fees for the same counsel at the hourly 19 rate of $350 per hour); Young, 2014 WL 3418209, at *6 (awarding attorneys’ fees for the 20 same counsel at the rate of $350 per hour). Additionally, Price has included an itemized 21 breakdown of the 25 hours spent on the case, which the Court finds is reasonable 22 considering that Price litigated the case against Pacific’s counsel for some time before 23 Pacific became defunct. Dkt. No. 28-3. Therefore, the Court finds that an award of $8,750 24 in attorneys’ fees is reasonable. 25 The Criders also seek an award of actual costs of $459.00, which is supported by 26 Price’s declaration. Both the FDCPA and the RFDCPA permit the Court to award costs. 27 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.20(c). The Court finds that $459 in costs 28 is reasonable. Case No.14-cv-03498-NC 11 1 2 IV. CONCLUSION The Court concludes that the Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default 3 judgment for Ronnique Crider, but not for Raymond Crider. Additionally, the Court finds 4 that Pacific Acquisitions & Associates is liable to Ronnique Crider in the amount of 5 $2,000 in statutory damages, $5,000 in emotional distress damages, $8,750 in attorneys’ 6 fees, and $459 in costs. In total, Pacific is liable for $16,209.00. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 9 Dated: November 3, 2015 10 _____________________________________ NATHANAEL M. COUSINS United States Magistrate Judge United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case No.14-cv-03498-NC 12
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