IN RE CAPACITORS ANTITRUST LITIGATION, No. 3:2014cv03264 - Document 1714 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER Granting Counsel's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses. Signed by Judge James Donato on 6/27/2017. (jdlc1S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/27/2017)
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IN RE CAPACITORS ANTITRUST LITIGATION Doc. 1714 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 10 11 12 IN RE CAPACITORS ANTITRUST LITIGATION 13 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: 14 Master File No. 3:14-cv-03264-JD ALL DIRECT PURCHASER ACTIONS 15 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Direct Purchaser Class Counsel’s application for Attorneys’ 18 Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses (“Motion”) (Dkt. 1458) made in connection with DPPs’ Motion 19 for Final Approval of Settlements with Fujitsu Limited, NEC TOKIN Corporation, NEC TOKIN 20 America, Inc., Nitsuko Electronics Corporation, Okaya Electric Industries Co., Ltd. and Okaya Electric 21 America, Inc., ROHM Co., Ltd., and ROHM Semiconductor U.S.A., LLC (the “Settling Defendants”) 22 (Dkt. 1461). On March 30, 2017, Direct Purchaser Class Counsel led a Supplemental Report renewing 23 the Motion (Dkt. 1586). On April 6, 2017, the Court held a hearing on the Motion. 24 The Settlements total $32,600,000 in cash and secure agreements by each of the ve Settling 25 Defendants to cooperate in DPPs’ continued prosecution of their claims against the non-settling 26 Defendants. The Settlements are the rst in this litigation since its ling over two and a half years ago. 27 Direct Purchaser Class Counsel submit this Motion for attorneys’ fees seeking an award in the 28 amounts of $8,150,000 for fees accrued as of September 30, 2016, and $3,000,000 for costs advanced Master File No. 3:14-cv-0324-JD 1 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES Dockets.Justia.com 1 on behalf of the Class during the same period. As re ected in Counsel’s submission, their cumulative 2 lodestar and costs as of September 30, 2016 greatly exceed the compensation they seek in this Motion. 3 Upon consideration of Direct Purchaser Plaintif Counsel’s Motion, Lead Class Counsel’s 4 supporting declaration concurrently led therewith, all other papers in the Court’s les, and the 5 argument at the March 2, 2017 hearing, the Court nds the following and grants Direct Purchaser 6 Plaintif Counsel’s Motion. 7 I. LEGAL STANDARD 8 A. 9 Attorneys may recover reasonable attorneys’ fees from a common fund settlement they secure Attorneys’ Fees 10 on behalf of a class. The Supreme Court has explained that “a lawyer who recovers a common fund for 11 the bene t of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the 12 fund as a whole.” Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); see also Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 13 396 U.S. 375, 393 (1970); Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 123 (1885) (“where one or 14 more of many parties having a common interest in a trust fund takes, at his own expense, proper 15 proceedings to save it from destruction and to restore it to the purposes of the trust, he is entitled to 16 reimbursement either out of the fund itself or by a proportional contribution from those who accept the 17 bene t of his eforts”). “The rationale behind awarding a percentage of the fund to counsel in common 18 fund cases is the same that justi es permitting contingency fee arrangements in general. . . . The 19 underlying premise is the existence of risk—the contingent risk of non-payment.” In re Quantum Health 20 Resources, Inc. Sec. Litig., 962 F. Supp. 1254, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (emphasis in original). In addition, 21 attorneys’ fees are awarded as a means of ensuring the bene ciaries of a common fund share with those 22 whose labors created the fund. See In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1300 23 (9th Cir. 1994) (“WPPSS”) (“those who bene t from the creation of the fund should share the wealth 24 with the lawyers whose skill and efort helped create it.”). 25 B. 26 Counsel may also obtain reimbursement for costs from a common fund settlement. In re Media Costs Reimbursement 27 Vision Tech. Sec. Litig., 913 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Reasonable costs and expenses 28 incurred by an attorney who creates or preserves a common fund are reimbursed proportionately by Master File No. 3:14-cv-0324-JD 2 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES 1 those class members who benefit by the settlement.”) (citing, inter alia, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 2 396 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970)); see also Wolph v. Acer Am. Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151180, at 3 *18 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2013) (“Counsel are entitled to reimbursement of their reasonable out-of- 4 pocket expenses.”). “The prevailing view is that expenses are awarded in addition to the fee 5 percentage.” Williams v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., No. 12-CV-06493-WHO, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19341, 6 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2015) (citations omitted). 7 II. 8 THE COURT AWARDS DPPS’ COUNSEL $8,150,000—25 PERCENT OF THE FUND—AS PARTIAL PAYMENT OF THEIR FEES ACCRUED AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2016 9 A. The Percentage-of-the-Fund Method for Calculating Fees Is Appropriate Here 10 District courts in the Ninth Circuit use either the “percentage-of-the-fund” or the “lodestar” 11 method in calculating fees in common fund settlements. Fischel v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y, 307 F.3d 12 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In a common fund case, the district court has discretion to apply either the 13 lodestar method or the percentage-of-the-fund method in calculating a fee award.”). Using either 14 method, the ultimate inquiry is whether the end result is reasonable. Powers v. Eichen, 229 F.3d 1249, 15 1258 (9th Cir. 2000). 16 The percentage-of-the-fund method is preferred when counsel’s eforts have created a common 17 fund for the bene t of the class. “The use of the percentage-of-the-fund method in common-fund cases 18 is the prevailing practice in the Ninth Circuit for awarding attorneys’fees and permits the Court to focus 19 on a showing that a fund conferring bene ts on a class was created through the eforts of plaintifs' 20 counsel.” In re Korean Air Lines Co., Antitrust Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186262, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 21 Dec. 23, 2013); see also Bellinghausen v. Tractor Supply Co., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35266, at *33 (N.D. 22 Cal. Mar. 19, 2015) (“Because this case involves a common settlement fund with an easily quanti able 23 bene t to the class, the Court will primarily determine attorneys’ fees using the benchmark method but 24 will incorporate a lodestar cross-check to ensure the reasonableness of the award.”) (emphasis added). 25 Where there is an easily quanti able bene t to the class—namely, the cash recovery achieved 26 through the settlement—the percentage of the fund approach is appropriate. See In re Bluetooth Headset 27 Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because the bene t to the class is easily quanti ed 28 Master File No. 3:14-cv-0324-JD 3 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES 1 in common-fund settlements, we have allowed courts to award attorneys a percentage of the common 2 fund in lieu of the often more time-consuming task of calculating the lodestar.”). 3 Courts supervising antitrust cases in this District regularly apply the percentage of the fund 4 approach. See, e.g., In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. 07-1827 (N.D. Cal. January 14, 5 2013); Meijer v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 07-05985 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2011); Ross v. U.S. Nat’l Ass’n, 6 No. 07-02951, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107857, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Sept 29, 2010); In re CV Therapeutics, 7 Inc. Secs. Litig., No. 03-3709, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98244, at *2 (N.D. Cal. April 4, 2007); In re 8 Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. M-02-1486, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9 103027, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2007); In re Sorbates Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 98-4886, 10 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23468, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2002); Van Vranken v. ARCO, 901 F. Supp. 11 294, 298 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The Court will do so as well here. 12 Courts in the Ninth Circuit applying the “percentage of the fund” approach use a twenty- ve 13 percent benchmark. See Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Granulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1989). See 14 also In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934, 949 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Under the percentage- 15 of-recovery method, the attorneys’ fees equal some percentage of the common settlement fund; in this 16 circuit, the benchmark percentage is 25%”). 17 Selection of the benchmark or any other rate, however, must be supported by ndings that take 18 into account all of the circumstances of the case. Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th 19 Cir. 2002). The benchmark is subject to adjustment—upward or downward—based on the Court’s 20 analysis of the factors the Ninth Circuit considered in Vizcaino: (1) the results achieved for the class; (2) 21 the complexity of the case and the risk of and expense to counsel of litigating it; (3) the skill, experience, 22 and performance of counsel on both sides; (4) the contingent nature of the fee; and (5) fees awarded in 23 comparable cases. See id. at 1048-50. See also In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 24 No. 1917, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102408, at *62-69 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2016) (applying the Vizcaino 25 factors on indirect purchaser class counsel’s fee motion); In re: Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., 26 No. MDL No. 1917, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5383, at *171-74 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2016) (same) (direct 27 purchaser class counsel’s fee motion); In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 28 Master File No. 3:14-cv-0324-JD 4 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES 1 No. M-02-1486-PJH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190974, at *116-74 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2013) (“DRAM”) 2 (same). 3 B. 4 Here, each of the Vizcaino factors weighs in favor of awarding the requested $8,150,000, which The Vizcaino Factors Warrant Granting Counsel’s Fee Request 5 is twenty- ve percent of the total Settlement Fund ($32,600,000), and equal to the Ninth Circuit’s 6 benchmark. Counsel’s Motion requests the benchmark amount from these Settlements. The Court 7 nds it is appropriate here to award Direct Purchaser Plaintifs Counsel’s request for an award matching 8 this Circuit’s benchmark. 9 1. 10 Counsel Obtained an Exceptional Result for the Direct Purchaser Class With The Settlements. The most important factor is the result achieved for the class. In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) 11 Antitrust Litig., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102408, at *63 (citing In re Omnivision Techs., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 12 13 2d 1036, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2008). These ve Settlements—the rst ones in the consolidated Direct Purchaser Action—provide the Class with valuable monetary and non-monetary bene ts. 14 The Settling Defendants’ all-cash payments for the bene t of the Class together will total 15 $32,600,000. This is a large amount of money relative to the Settling Defendants’ comparatively 16 minimal individual and collective capacitor sales to U.S. purchasers between 2002 and 2014. DPPs 17 estimate that all Defendants together sold more than $7 billion in capacitors to U.S. purchasers during 18 that same period. See Dkt. 1458-1 at ¶ 85. The Settling Defendants are responsible for roughly $70 19 million—less than one percent—of the cartel’s United States sales. The Settlement Fund here 20 represents a significant percentage of each Settling Defendant’s total U.S. sales during that period: 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Fujitsu Limited agreed to pay DPPs $2,000,000. The parties estimate that the company’s dissolved former subsidiary, Fujitsu Media Device (“FMD”), sold less than $200,000 of capacitors to U.S. purchasers between 2002 and its 2009 dissolution. The settlement consideration here is more than ten times FMD’s entire relevant U.S. sales. See Dkt. 1458-1 at ¶ 86. NEC TOKIN agreed to pay DPPs $24,000,000. For purposes of its guilty plea and sentencing on federal criminal price xing charges, NEC TOKIN estimated its U.S. capacitors sales from 2002 to 2014 totaled $51,100,000. The settlement consideration here is 46.9% of NEC TOKIN’s estimated relevant U.S. sales. See Dkt. 1458-1 at ¶ 87. 28 Master File No. 3:14-cv-0324-JD 5 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Nitsuko agreed to pay DPPs $1,100,000. The parties have estimated that the company sold less than $100,000 of capacitors to U.S. purchasers between 2002 and 2014. The settlement consideration here is roughly 11 times Nitsuko’s entire relevant U.S. sales. See Dkt. 1458-1 at ¶ 88. The Okaya Defendants agreed to pay DPPs $3,650,000. The Okaya Defendants have represented that their sales to U.S. purchasers between 2002 to 2014 totaled close to $11,000,000. The settlement consideration here is approximately 33% of the Okaya Defendants’ relevant U.S. sales. See Dkt. 1458-1 at ¶ 89. ROHM agreed to pay DPPs $1,850,000. DPPs estimate that ROHM had approximately $7,000,000 in sales to U.S. purchasers between 2004 and 2014. The settlement consideration here is 26.4% of ROHM’s relevant U.S. sales. See Dkt. 1458-1 at ¶ 90. The Settlements’ monetary component—all cash—greatly bene ts the Direct Purchaser Class 10 by providing and, in fact, accelerating the Class’ chances for monetary recovery in this case through the 11 claims administration process that will soon commence. See Dkt. 1458-1 at ¶ 91. Here, a substantial 12 amount of money stands to be distributed to a relatively small Direct Purchaser Class. See id. at ¶ 83. 13 There is a real value to Class members of receiving a cash distribution from the Settlements in the near 14 term. In addition, given the number of Defendants in this action and the risk of treble damages at trial, 15 these Settlements likely will encourage additional favorable settlements. See id. at ¶ 92. 16 In addition to the monetary component, each of the Settling Defendants has agreed to provide 17 substantial assistance to the class. The Settling Defendants each have agreed to cooperate with DPPs in 18 their continued prosecution of the Class’ claims against the Non-Settling Defendants. See Dkt. 1458-1 at 19 ¶¶ 59-68. They agree to provide assistance such as giving attorney profers regarding facts developed in 20 their internal investigations, making key witnesses available for deposition or trial, and submitting 21 declarations on key issues such as liability, impact, damages, and class certi cation. See Dkts. 1298-2 to 22 3, 1298-8 to 10. 23 The assistance the Settling Defendants have agreed to provide is a substantial class bene t 24 because it will assist DPPs to maximize their monetary recovery against the Non-Settling Defendants. 25 See Dkt. 1458-1 at ¶ 93. See DRAM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190974, at *143 (cooperation “was valuable 26 in maximizing the monetary recovery against the other Defendants.”). 27 28 Master File No. 3:14-cv-0324-JD 6 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES 1 2 2. Counsel Took Signi cant Risks Prosecuting This Litigation. Counsel assumed a signi cant risk in undertaking this litigation. See Dkt. 1458-1 at ¶¶ 79-82. All 3 understood the risk of contingency litigation and the fact that recovery is never guaranteed. They 4 committed their time, money and energy to the prosecution of a multi-year, international price- xing 5 cartel case against 22 sprawling Defendant corporate families based almost entirely in Japan. See id. at 6 ¶ 80. This cartel case is complex, and complex antitrust cases like this one often take years to resolve 7 through settlement, trial, or appeal. See id. As the case has advanced, Counsel have committed their 8 time, money, and energy to this litigation while aware that certain Defendants have claimed poor 9 nancial health that could ultimately impede or diminish recovery for the Class. See id. at ¶¶ 79-80. As 10 is set forth in Lead Class Counsel’s declaration, Direct Purchaser Plaintifs’ Counsel have expended 11 millions of dollars of their time and incurred millions of dollars in expenses, all on a purely contingent 12 basis. Counsel have stated that they had to turn away case opportunities over the last two years to 13 ensure that they could keep dedicated to this case the resources needed to prosecute the Class’ claims. 14 This entails substantial risk. See id. at ¶ 82. 15 Counsel also incurred risk associated with having a parallel criminal proceeding, addressing the 16 impact of the FTAIA, and evaluating massive amounts of electronic transactional data necessary to 17 prove their case. Each of these risks weigh in favor of granting Counsel the requested fee award. 18 19 20 3. Advancing the Litigation to this Point and Obtaining the Settlements Has Required Professional Skill. The docket and the procedural history in this this case demonstrate Counsel’s expertise and the 21 Direct Purchaser Plaintifs’ successes to date. See Dkt. 1458-1. ¶¶ 18-78. Counsel have done much to 22 efectively prosecute the Class’ claims, and to do so eiciently. Counsel have not come by their 23 successes in this litigation easily. Defendants—including the Settling Defendants—have hired the best 24 antitrust counsel money can buy to defend them against the Direct Purchaser Plaintifs’ Sherman Act 25 claims. See Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., 297 F.R.D. 431, 449 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“The quality 26 of opposing counsel is important in evaluating the quality of Class Counsel’s work.”). Indeed, despite 27 guilty pleas, the Non-Settling Defendants maintain their innocence and contest liability. 28 Master File No. 3:14-cv-0324-JD 7 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES 1 4. 2 Awards in Similar Complex Antitrust Cases Demonstrate That Class Counsel Seek a Reasonable Fee Award. The requested award of $8,150,000 matches and is in keeping with the Ninth Circuit 3 benchmark. See Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt, 886 F.2d at 272. Class Counsel’s request is modest when 4 compared to percentages awarded plaintifs’ counsel in other, arguably less complex and challenging 5 antitrust cases in this District. See, e.g., In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. 07-1827 (N.D. 6 Cal. Jan. 14, 2013) (30%); Meijer v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 07-05985 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2011) (33 7 1/3%). It is also consistent with the awards in many other comparable cases. See In re Dynamic Random 8 Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. M-02-1486, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103027, at *1-2 (N.D. 9 Cal. Aug. 16, 2007) (25%); In re Sorbates Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 98-4886, 2002 U.S. Dist. 10 LEXIS 23468, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2002) (25%); Van Vranken v. Atl. Rich eld Co., 901 F. Supp. 11 294, 298 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (25%). As these precedents demonstrate, twenty- ve percent is easily 12 consistent with recognized “market rates,” i.e., rates typically awarded in similar contingency fee cases 13 in this District. See Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1050 (“market rates” are a question of “lawyers’ reasonable 14 expectations [for recovery of contingent fees], which are based on the circumstances of the case and the 15 range of fee awards out of common funds of comparable size.”). 16 17 5. Counsel Undertook a Signi cant Financial and Resource Burden in Prosecuting the Direct Purchaser Plaintifs’ Claims. 18 Counsel have invested signi cant amounts of time, money, and resources in this case for well 19 over two years, as shown in their time and expense records. The Court is well aware of the quality of 20 legal work done by Counsel on behalf of the Direct Purchaser Plaintifs. Under the active supervision of 21 Lead Class Counsel, the rms have working closely together as an eicient team. See Dkt. 1458-1 at 22 ¶¶ 12-16, 38-52. Class Counsel have set forth for the Court the details regarding their contributions to 23 this litigation in their declarations attached to Lead Class Counsel’s Declaration. See Dkt. 1458-1, Exs. 3- 24 17 at ¶ 3 in each declaration. 25 26 6. A Lodestar Cross-Check Con rms That the Fees Sought by Class Counsel Are Reasonable. A lodestar cross-check may be used to ensure that class counsel has done the work necessary to 27 justify the fee sought. Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1050; see also In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 28 Master File No. 3:14-cv-0324-JD 8 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES 1 306-07 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he lodestar cross-check calculation need entail neither mathematical 2 precision nor bean-counting. The district courts may rely on summaries submitted by the attorneys and 3 need not review actual billing records.”) (citation omitted). 4 Counsel’s cumulative lodestar as of September 30, 2016 is $44,444,689.40. See Dkt. 1458-1, 5 ¶¶ 8, 94-119 and Exs. 1-17. Using the lodestar cross-check, the fees sought here amount to less than one- 6 fth (approximately 18.4%) the lodestar submitted by Counsel. In the Ninth Circuit, a lodestar multiplier 7 of around 4 times has frequently been awarded in common fund cases such as this. See Vizcaino, 290 8 F.3d at 1051 (multiplier of 3.65 held “ within the range of multipliers applied in common fund cases”); 9 see also Atlantic Rich eld Co., 901 F. Supp. at 298 (“Multipliers in the 3-4 range are common in lodestar 10 awards for lengthy and complex class action litigation.”) (citations omitted). The fee amount Counsel 11 request in this Motion is signi cantly less that the cumulative lodestar in this case as one would expect 12 in the event of the initial settlements. The lodestar cross-check thus con rms that Counsel’s 13 $8,150,000 fee request is reasonable and should be awarded as requested. 14 III. 15 THE COURT AWARDS DPPS’ COUNSEL $3,000,000 AS PARTIAL REIMBURSEMENT FOR THEIR COSTS ADVANCED THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2016 16 The Court grants Counsel their request for a reimbursement of expenses they have incurred as 17 of September 30, 2016, in the amount of $3,000,000. This amount is to be paid from the Settlement 18 Fund. This amount is a fraction of the amounts incurred to date. It is appropriate to reimburse attorneys 19 prosecuting class claims on a contingent basis for “reasonable expenses that would typically be billed to 20 paying clients in non-contingency matters,” i.e., costs “incidental and necessary to the efective 21 representation of the Class.” See Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Omnivision 22 Techs., 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1048. Reasonable reimbursable litigation expenses include: those for document 23 production, experts and consultants, depositions, translation services, travel, mail and postage costs. See 24 In re Media Vision Tech. Sec. Litig., 913 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (court fees, 25 experts/consultants, service of process, court reporters, transcripts, deposition costs, computer 26 research, photocopies, postage, telephone/fax); Thornberry v. Delta Air Lines, 676 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th 27 Cir. 1982) (travel, meals and lodging), remanded on other grounds, 461 U.S. 952(1983). Under the 28 common fund doctrine, plaintifs’ counsel should receive reimbursement of all reasonable out-of-pocket Master File No. 3:14-cv-0324-JD 9 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES 1 expenses and costs in prosecution of the claims and in obtaining a settlement. Vincent v. Hughes Air 2 West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977). The Court nds that the advanced expenses set forth in the 3 Motion and Lead Counsel’s Declaration were reasonable and necessarily incurred in connection with 4 the Direct Purchaser Plaintifs’ prosecution of this action to date. 5 S 9 V ED APPRODONATO HON. JAMES United States District Judge NO 10 me J u d ge J a RT 11 s Dona to 13 A H ER 12 N F D IS T IC T O R C 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Master File No. 3:14-cv-0324-JD R NIA 8 FO Dated: June 27, 2017 LI UNIT ED 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. RT U O 6 S DISTRICT TE C TA 10 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES
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