Estate of Evangelina Macias et al v. Waste Management Corporate Services, Inc. et al, No. 3:2014cv01532 - Document 48 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: AMENDED ORDER GRANTING LEAVE AND DENYING AS MOOT MOTION TO DISMISS. Signed by Judge Alsup on 9/25/2014. (whalc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/25/2014).
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Estate of Evangelina Macias et al v. Waste Management Corporate Services, Inc. et al Doc. 48 1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 13 THE ESTATE OF EVANGELINA MACIAS, an individual, ANNA LAURA MACIAS, MARIA DE JESUS MACIAS, and VICTOR MACIAS, individually and as co-successors in interest of decedent Evangelina Macias, 14 Plaintiffs, 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 15 No. C 14-01532 WHA AMENDED ORDER GRANTING LEAVE AND DENYING AS MOOT MOTION TO DISMISS v. 18 WASTE MANAGEMENT HOLDINGS, INC., a corporation, WASTE MANAGEMENT SAFETY SERVICES, LLC, a limited liability company, and DOES 1–50, inclusive, 19 Defendants. 16 17 / 20 21 22 INTRODUCTION In this action alleging wrongful death and other state-law claims, defendants move to 23 dismiss the second amended complaint for (1) failure to state a claim; (2) lack of personal 24 jurisdiction; and (3) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Moreover, plaintiffs seek leave to amend 25 the second amended complaint to cure any deficiencies identified herein. For the reasons 26 discussed, the motion to dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT. Furthermore, to the extent stated in the 27 last paragraph of this order, leave to amend is GRANTED. 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 STATEMENT 2 The following well-pled facts are assumed to be true for purposes of the present motion. 3 Plaintiffs are the estate and family members of decedent Evangelina Macias. On June 18, 2012, 4 Macias was working at Waste Management of Alameda County’s dump-site when a co-worker 5 drove a front-end tractor loader over her body. Macias later died that day. Plaintiffs then sued 6 WMAC and other defendants in an action filed last year, but that action was dismissed for lack 7 of subject-matter jurisdiction. 8 9 Now, plaintiffs have filed the instant action this year. WMAC is no longer a defendant but two other entities are: Waste Management Holdings, Inc. (WMAC’s indirect parent corporation), and Waste Management Safety Services, LLC (one of WM Holdings’ indirect 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 subsidiaries). Following two pleadings in this action, the second amended complaint now claims 12 wrongful death, negligence, loss of consortium, survival action, and negligent infliction of 13 emotional distress. 14 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), defendants move to dismiss the second 15 amended complaint on three grounds: (1) failure to state a claim; (2) lack of personal 16 jurisdiction, and (3) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Following full briefing, supplemental 17 responses, and oral argument from both sides, this order decides below. ANALYSIS 18 19 1. STATING A CLAIM. 20 WM Holdings and WM Security Services argue that the second amended complaint fails 21 to state a claim because they owed no duty to Macias. Pointing to sections of the workers’ 22 compensation law, they assert that only Macias’ employer (WMAC) held the non-delegable duty 23 to provide a safe workplace for Macias, and that plaintiffs have an exclusive remedy against 24 WMAC — but not WM Holdings or WM Safety Services. See Cal. Lab. Code 3600 et al; 6400. 25 By suing WM Holdings and WM Safety Services instead of WMAC, plaintiffs circumvent 26 California’s exclusive remedy system, or so it is alleged. 27 28 2 1 This order disagrees. It is true that under California law, “[e]mployers have a 2 nondelegable duty to furnish their employees with a safe place to work,” so that “[a]n 3 employer’s parent corporation is not responsible for the working conditions of its subsidiary’s 4 employees based on the existence of the parent-subsidiary relationship.” But a parent 5 corporation can still be liable “if it assumes a duty to act by affirmatively undertaking to provide 6 a safe working environment at the subsidiary’s workplace.” In other words, “a plaintiff who 7 recovers workers’ compensation from an employer can pursue common law tort actions against 8 third parties for independent acts of negligence . . . even if the third party tortfeasor is the parent 9 company of the plaintiff's employer . . . .” Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 4th 105, 109–10 (2004) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Waste Management is instructive. There, a defective trash truck had killed a subsidiary’s 12 employee on the job. The employee’s family later sued the subsidiary’s parent corporation for 13 negligence and wrongful death, alleging that the parent had controlled the subsidiary’s budget 14 and had refused to allocate corporate funds to repair or replace the subsidiary’s defective trucks. 15 After the superior court had overruled the parent’s demurrer, the California Court of Appeal 16 reversed that decision, largely because the plaintiffs had not alleged any independent tort 17 committed by the parent itself. The operative complaint there had also failed to allege that the 18 parent directed the subsidiary’s safety operations, ordered or required the subsidiary to continue 19 using the defective trucks, or otherwise assumed an independent duty to ensure the safety of the 20 subsidiary’s employees. Id. at 111. 21 That is not the case here. In this action, the second amended complaint does allege that 22 defendants assumed a duty to provide a safe work environment for WMAC’s employees (see, 23 e.g., Second Amd. Compl. ¶ 32). To that end, the second amended complaint asserts facts as to 24 how WM Holdings created WM Safety Services “for the purpose of developing safety training 25 and policies” — including a safety policy requiring protected zones for workers from dangerous 26 vehicles — at WMAC and other facilities throughout the country. The second amended 27 complaint goes on to claim that WM Holdings and/or WM Safety Services inspected WMAC for 28 compliance with their safety policies, gave approvals to and recommendations for WMAC’s 3 1 safety policies and procedures, were responsible for monitoring and controlling security cameras 2 at WMAC, participated in Cal/OSHA investigations and independent investigations of 3 workplace injuries at WMAC, and knew about the dangers associated with the operating 4 procedures and driving of WMAC’s front-end tractor loaders (see id. ¶¶ 15, 20, 32). 5 Based on such factual allegations within the second amended complaint, this order finds 6 that plaintiffs sufficiently state an assumption of duty by WM Holdings and WM Safety 7 Services, at least at this point. It may be that at the summary-judgment stage, the record will not 8 support a triable issue of fact as to whether WM Holdings and WM Safety Services assumed 9 such a duty, but this order must take as true all factual allegations contained within the four corners of the second amended complaint. 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 2. 12 WM Holdings and WM Securities Services also move to dismiss the second amended 13 SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION. complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 14 The sole basis for this action is federal-diversity jurisdiction. The problem, however, is 15 that the second amended complaint fails to allege plaintiffs’ domicile. A “natural person’s state 16 citizenship is then determined by her state of domicile, not her state of residence.” Kanter v. 17 Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2001). But the second amended complaint 18 merely asserts how plaintiffs are residents of California and United States citizens, and nothing 19 more in that regard. 20 Nevertheless, plaintiffs all submit supplemental declarations, stating that California is 21 their fixed and permanent home and appending copies of their California driver’s licenses. In 22 that connection, plaintiffs request leave to amend the second amended complaint so that they can 23 allege domicile (Opp. 10). WM Holdings and WM Securities Services oppose this request in 24 their reply, but do not identify any bad faith, undue delay, or prejudice that the defense would 25 suffer as a result of another amended complaint (Reply 9). 26 In light of Rule 15(a)’s generous standard to “freely give leave” for pleading 27 amendments, and only to the extent stated in the last paragraph of this order, plaintiffs’ request to 28 further amend their complaint to allege domicile is GRANTED. 4 1 3. PERSONAL JURISDICTION. 2 WM Holdings and WM Security Services further challenge whether there is personal 3 jurisdiction over this action. There exist two types of personal jurisdiction — general and 4 specific — both of which are asserted here. To that end, WM Holdings and WM Security Services submit declarations from their 5 6 vice presidents. In brief, these declarations state how WM Holdings and WM Security Services 7 are incorporated outside of California, with principal places of business outside of California, 8 and no offices, employees, or real property within California. The declarations further state that 9 WM Holdings and WM Safety Services are not registered to conduct business in California, does not solicit, market, or advertise any services to residents of California, and did not employ or 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 train Macias or other employees at WMAC’s dump-site (Smith Decl. ¶¶ 3–14; Martin Decl. ¶¶ 12 3–14). 13 from Greg Weiss, pursuant to the September 22 order that requested supplemental defense 14 declarations and permitted plaintiffs to respond thereto (Dkt. No. 37). Weiss is a now- 15 terminated employee of Waste Management National Services, Inc. — not a party here — and he 16 has “entered into an agreement with [plaintiffs’ counsel] as a Trial Consultant in this matter” 17 (Lacy Decl. ¶ 6). In any event, Weiss declares (among other items) that WM Safety Services 18 “produced all safety materials and safety training schedules for any and all [WM Holdings] 19 affiliates,” and that certain employees of WM Safety Services had the ability to access and 20 review security-camera recordings at any Waste Holdings affiliate, such as WMAC (Weiss Decl. 21 ¶¶ 2–7). The defense objects to Weiss’s declaration as untimely and false, further alleging that 22 his declaration may stem from privileged information to which Weiss was privy as a Waste 23 Management employee earlier in this litigation. 24 Following the defense’s reply, plaintiffs have provided a supplemental declaration Nonetheless, this order finds that discovery is needed to clarify the controverted issue of 25 personal jurisdiction here. Indeed, a district court has “broad discretion” in permitting discovery 26 to aid its determination of personal jurisdiction, where, for example, “pertinent facts bearing on 27 the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory showing of the facts is 28 necessary.” Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977) 5 1 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, to the extent stated in the last paragraph below, this 2 order permits discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss is thus 3 DENIED AS MOOT. 4 5 CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed, the defense’s motion to dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT. The that specific issue, each side can take up to four depositions over a total of twelve hours (not 8 counting breaks). In addition, each side may request a reasonable and limited number of 9 documents, up to twelve narrowly and reasonably-directed document requests. Please note that 10 if the discovery sought has a substantial relation to the issue of personal jurisdiction, it shall not 11 For the Northern District of California parties shall conduct discovery on whether there is personal jurisdiction over this action, and on 7 United States District Court 6 be a proper objection that the discovery sought also bears upon the merits. Moreover, to the 12 extent stated, plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall file a third 13 amended complaint that not only cures the subject-matter jurisdiction issue by properly alleging 14 their citizenship, but also alleges personal jurisdiction in detail and any other amendments 15 relating to their claims of relief, by DECEMBER 19, 2014. Any follow-on motion to dismiss 16 plaintiffs’ new pleading must be filed by JANUARY 8, 2015, to be heard on a normal 35-day 17 track. The parties shall return for a further case management conference at 8 AM ON FEBRUARY 18 12, 2015. Please file a joint case management statement at least seven days before this 19 conference. Finally, all initial disclosures under Rule 26 must be completed by JANUARY 8, 20 2015, on pain of preclusion under Rule 37(c), including full and faithful compliance with Rule 21 26(a)(1)(A)(iii). 22 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 25 Dated: September 25, 2014. WILLIAM ALSUP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 26 27 28 6
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