Medical Advocates for Healthy Air et al v. United States Environmental Protection Agency et al, No. 3:2011cv03515 - Document 23 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING AIR COALITION TEAM'S MOTION TO INTERVENE AS A DEFENDANT (SI, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/12/2011)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Medical Advocates for Healthy Air et al v. United States Environmental Protection Agency et al Doc. 23 1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 9 MEDICAL ADVOCATES FOR HEALTHY AIR and SIERRA CLUB, United States District Court For the Northern District of California ORDER DENYING AIR COALITION TEAM’S MOTION TO INTERVENE AS A DEFENDANT Plaintiffs, 10 11 No. CV 11-3515 SI v. 12 UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, et al., 13 Defendants. / 14 15 The motion by Air Coalition Team (“ACT”) to intervene as a defendant is scheduled for a 16 hearing on October 14, 2011. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court determines that the matter 17 is appropriate for resolution without oral argument, and VACATES the hearing. For the reasons set 18 forth below, the Court DENIES ACT’s motion to intervene. 19 20 BACKGROUND 21 On July 18, 2011, plaintiffs Medical Advocates for Healthy Air and Sierra Club filed this action 22 against defendants Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson, and 23 EPA Regional Administrator Jared Blumenfield. Plaintiffs allege that the EPA is in violation of the 24 Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7509(c)(1) and 7511(b)(2)(A), because it failed to determine by 25 May 15, 2011 whether the San Joaquin Valley (“Valley”) had attained the federal standard limiting the 26 maximum 1-hour concentration of ozone (“1-hour standard”). Compl. ¶¶ 41-47. Plaintiffs further allege 27 that the EPA is in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), because 28 it unreasonably delayed in responding to plaintiffs’ petition to the EPA requesting that it take action to Dockets.Justia.com determine whether the Valley had attained the 1-hour standard. Compl. ¶¶ 48-53. The complaint 2 requests declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of a declaration that the EPA is in violation of the 3 CAA and the APA, and an order directing the EPA to determine if the Valley has attained the 1-hour 4 standard and to respond to plaintiffs’ petition. Compl., Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 1-3. The complaint also 5 requests that the Court retain jurisdiction over this matter “until such time as EPA has complied with 6 its non-discretionary duties under the Clean Air Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.” Id. ¶ 4. 7 The San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District (the “District”) has moved to 8 intervene as a defendant. Docket 12. The District’s mandate is to “adopt and enforce plans, rules and 9 regulations to achieve and maintain both the federal and state ambient air quality standards” in the 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 Valley. District’s Mot. to Intervene at 3. Neither plaintiffs nor the EPA opposes the District’s motion. 11 Dockets 17, 19.1 12 ACT has also moved to intervene as a defendant as a matter of right pursuant to Federal Rule 13 of Civil Procedure 24(a), or alternatively, with permission of the Court pursuant to Rule 24(b). ACT 14 is an unincorporated coalition “comprised of members and representatives from the California Cotton 15 Ginners and Growers Associations, the County Farm Bureaus for King, Fresno, Madera, Tulare and 16 Kern Counties, California Citrus Mutual, Western Plan Health Association, and other similarly situated, 17 interested parties and entities.” ACT’s Mot. to Intervene at 6. ACT claims that its members “engage 18 in daily operations that produce nitrogen oxides through fuel combustion and industrial processes, as 19 well as use commercial pesticides formulations that release volatile organic compounds into the air.” 20 Id. at 6-7. Ozone is formed by the chemical reaction between nitrogen oxides and volatile organic 21 compounds in the presence of sunlight. Compl. ¶ 26; ACT’s Mot. to Intervene at 7. ACT asserts that 22 because the business operations of its members contribute to the production of ozone, ACT has an 23 interest in the consequences the flow from a finding of nonattainment in the Valley: EPA regulations 24 that “will adversely impact the way ACT and its members conduct their business operations.” ACT’s 25 Mot. to Intervene at 8. Plaintiffs oppose ACT’s motion for intervention, contending that ACT’s alleged 26 interests do not directly relate to the merits of this case, and any impact to these interests is based on 27 28 1 The Court will grant the Air District’s unopposed motion in a separate order. 2 1 assumption and speculation. EPA does not oppose ACT’s motion. Docket 18. 2 3 4 LEGAL STANDARDS I. Intervention by Right Rule 24(a)(2) permits intervention by right if the intervening party can “claim an interest 6 relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing 7 of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, 8 unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 24(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit 9 has further provided a four-part test for analyzing Rule 24(a)(2) motions to intervene: (1) the motion 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 5 must be timely; (2) the applicant must claim a “significantly protectable” interest relating to the property 11 or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition 12 of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and (4) the 13 applicant’s interest must be inadequately represented by the parties to the action. Wilderness Soc’y et 14 al. v. United States Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citing Sierra Club v. 15 EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993) (abrogated on other grounds by Wilderness Soc’y., 630 F.3d 16 1173). Proposed intervenors must satisfy all four criteria; “[f]ailure to satisfy any one of the 17 requirements is fatal to the application.” Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947 (9th 18 Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). 19 20 II. Permissive Intervention 21 Even if a party does not quality for intervention of right, a court may permit that party’s “timely 22 application” for intervention “[w]hen an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action have a 23 question of law or fact in common.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2). In deciding whether a party should be 24 permitted to intervene a court may consider the following factors, among others: the nature and extent 25 of the intervenors' interest; their standing to raise relevant legal issues; the legal position they seek to 26 advance, and its probable relation to the merits of the case; whether the intervenors’ interests are 27 adequately represented by other parties; and whether parties seeking intervention will significantly 28 contribute to full development of the underlying factual issues in the suit and to the just and equitable 3 1 adjudication of the legal questions presented. Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326, 2 1329 (9th Cir. 1977). Permissive intervention “is committed to the broad discretion of the district 3 court.” Orange County v. Air Cal., 799 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1986). 4 5 6 DISCUSSION I. Intervention by Right Motions for intervention as of right are evaluated in accordance with the four-part Wilderness 8 Society test. Plaintiffs do not contend that ACT’s motion is untimely, and therefore the Court does not 9 address the first factor of the test. Under the second and third prongs of the test, the applicant must claim 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 7 a “significantly protectable” interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the 11 action, and the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter 12 impair or impede its ability to protect that interest. Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1177. ACT contends 13 that it has a proprietary interest in the litigation because “if chemical use or industrial process is banned, 14 ACT and its members will lose their ability to effectively produce commodities of choice and will be 15 forced out of the market.” ACT’s Mot. to Intervene at 11. ACT argues that the disposition of the action 16 may impair its ability to protect its interests because the relief requested by plaintiffs “will affect ACT 17 and its members’ interests, including their right to farm, crop choice, industrial process and land use 18 issues” and “the result of a nonattainment determination changes the playing field and rules for ACT 19 and its members.” Id. at 12. 20 Plaintiffs argue that ACT has no interest directly related to the merits of this case, and that 21 “ACT’s alleged interests are speculative and several steps removed from the outcome of this case.” Pls.’ 22 Opp’n at 2. Plaintiffs note that even if they prevail, the only relief that plaintiffs could obtain is an order 23 directing the EPA to make a determination as to whether the Valley has attained the 1-hour standard. 24 Plaintiffs assert that even assuming that the EPA determined that the Valley had failed to meet the 25 standard, the effect on ACT’s interests is still speculative because at that point the District might or 26 might not adopt regulations affecting ACT’s members. 27 A prospective intervenor has a significant protectable interest if (1) the interest is protected under 28 some law; and (2) there is a relationship between the legally protected interest and the claims at issue. 4 1 Wilderness Soc’y., 630 F.3d at 1176. A prospective intervenor’s “significant and protectable interest” 2 is impaired if the relief sought “would necessarily result in practical impairment” of its interest. Id. at 3 1179. In Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d at 1482, the Ninth Circuit held that the City of Phoenix had a 5 significant protectable interest because the suit sought to compel the EPA to change the terms of permits 6 issued under the Clean Water Act, and the City owned the permits at issue as well as the treatment plants 7 covered by the permits. The court held that the City’s interests would be impaired if it was not allowed 8 to intervene because “the lawsuit would affect the use of real property owned by the intervenor by 9 requiring the defendant to change the terms of permits it issues to the would-be intervenor.” Id. at 1483. 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 4 Similarly, in Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth 11 Circuit held that a construction company had a significant protectable interest in a suit alleging that a 12 city’s land management plan did not comply with the Endangered Species Act because the company was 13 a beneficiary to approved building projects, and the relief sought by the plaintiffs would have revoked 14 the plan to complete these projects. Id. at 820-22. 15 In contrast, a prospective intervenor does not have a significant protectable interest if there is 16 no relationship between a legally protected interest and the claims at issue, such that the resolution of 17 the plaintiff’s claims will not actually affect the prospective intervenor. In Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 18 F.3d 405 (9th Cir. 1998), a group of male employees sought to intervene in a class action brought by 19 female employees who alleged that their employer subjected them to a hostile work environment. With 20 regard to intervention in the liability phase, the court found there was no significant protectable interest 21 because “Plaintiffs’ action focuses exclusively on whether the Forest Service . . . subjected female 22 employees to a hostile work environment. Resolution of plaintiffs’ action, therefore, will not affect the 23 proposed intervenors’ claims that the Forest Service subjected male employees to discriminatory 24 treatment.” Id. at 410 (emphasis in original). The male employees also argued that the remedies would 25 affect their interests, because they “could go beyond ending harassment of female employees to create 26 discrimination against male employees.” Id. at 411. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument, finding 27 “[t]hat possibility is not inherent in any of the requested remedies. When an applicant’s purported 28 interest is so tenuous, intervention is inappropriate.” Id.; see also Benny v. England, 791 F.2d 712, 721 5 1 (9th Cir. 1986) (“This possibility that our decision could affect [the applicants’] interests is too tenuous 2 to entitle them to intervene [as] of right.”). The Court agrees with plaintiffs that ACT has not demonstrated that it has a significant and 4 protectable interest “relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action,” or that 5 “the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect that 6 interest.” Wilderness Soc'y, 630 F.3d at 1179. ACT claims that its members enjoy the right to farm, to 7 choose their crops and industrial processes, and to decide how to use their land, and that these interests 8 are protected by law. ACT’s Mot. to Intervene at 12. While that may be true, there is still no 9 “relationship between the legally protected interest and the claims at issue.” Sierra Club, 995 F.2d at 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 3 1484. Unlike in Sierra Club or Berg, the determination of plaintiffs’ claims, even if they are successful, 11 will not directly affect the use of property owned by ACT’s members. In the event plaintiffs prevail in 12 this case, the Court would declare the EPA in violation of the Clean Air Act and the Administrative 13 Procedure Act, and order it to comply with those statutes. Such relief will not practically impair the 14 prospective intervenors’ rights to farm and engage in business operations. ACT speculates that a 15 resolution in favor of plaintiffs, and a subsequent finding of nonattainment, will increase regulation 16 unfavorable to ACT’s members. However, “that possibility is not inherent in any of the requested 17 remedies” and is too tenuous to grant intervention. Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 410. 18 ACT’s reliance on this Court’s recent decision in Wild Equity Institute, et al. v. City of San 19 Francisco, et al., No. C 11-00958 SI, 2011 WL 2532436 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2011), is misplaced. In 20 Wild Equity, the Court permitted a non-profit corporation promoting public golf courses to intervene 21 as a defendant in an action where the injunction sought by plaintiffs, if obtained, will inhibit the 22 intervenors’ members’ continued use of a public golf course. 2011 WL 2532436, at *2. Here, unlike 23 in Wild Equity, the injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs will not inhibit the continued business 24 operations of ACT’s members. In the event that plaintiffs prevail in this case, the injunctive relief 25 would require the EPA to comply with the law in the form of making a finding of attainment or 26 nonattainment for the Valley, and responding to plaintiffs’ petition to the EPA. A court order requiring 27 the EPA to make a finding and respond to plaintiffs will not “necessarily result in practical impairment” 28 of ACT’s members’ rights to farm and engage in business operations. Sierra Club, 995 F.2d at 1482. 6 1 2 This action is far more similar to the situation faced by Judge Armstrong of this District in 3 Medical Advocates for Healthy Air, et al. v. Johnson, C 06-0093 SBA, 2006 WL 1530094 (filed Jun. 4 2, 2006), where this same party, ACT, sought to intervene in another Clear Air Act against the EPA. 5 Judge Armstrong denied both intervention as of right and permissive intervention, finding that ACT did 6 not have a “significantly protectable interest” to support its intervention in a Clean Air Act suit to 7 compel EPA to comply with the deadline to prepare contingency measures because “the scope of this 8 litigation is limited to the determination of an appropriate deadline by which EPA must promulgate an 9 FIP [federal implementation plan] containing contingency measures.” United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Because the Court finds that ACT has failed to satisfy the second and third prongs of the 11 Wilderness Society test for intervention by right, the Court will not address the fourth factor of 12 inadequate representation. 13 14 II. Permissive Intervention 15 ACT alternatively contends that it should be allowed to intervene at the Court’s discretion 16 because “ACT’s members all have property interests and involvement in the industries which [would] 17 be directly impacted by any action in this litigation.” ACT’s Mot. to Intervene at 15. Plaintiffs dispute 18 that ACT has made a showing of the factors required for permissive intervention. 19 Permissive intervention is appropriate when an applicant has shown that (1) there are 20 independent grounds for jurisdiction; (2) the motion is timely; and (3) its claim or defense, and the main 21 action, have a question of law or a question of fact in common. Northwest Forest Resource Council v. 22 Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 839 (9th Cir. 1996). Even if the applicant satisfies these threshold requirements, 23 however, the Court has the discretion to deny permissive intervention. Donnelly, 159 F.3d 412. 24 The Court agrees with plaintiffs that ACT has not made the necessary threshold showing for 25 permissive intervention. Rather, ACT simply reiterates the same interests that it asserts in its argument 26 for intervention by right. For the same reasons described above, the Court finds that ACT’s interests 27 are too attenuated from this case. Accordingly, the Court declines to grant permissive intervention. 28 7 1 2 3 4 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES the motion to intervene of ACT in its entirety. Docket 13. 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 8 Dated: October 12, 2011 SUSAN ILLSTON United States District Judge 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
