Adams v. Albertson et al, No. 3:2010cv04787 - Document 83 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND VACATING HEARING by Judge Alsup granting 8 Motion to Dismiss; granting 34 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 68 Motion to Dismiss; granting 16 Motion to Dismiss; granting 19 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 20 Motion to Strike ; granting 23 Motion to Dismiss (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/14/2011) Modified on 2/14/2011 (whalc1, COURT STAFF).
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Adams v. Albertson et al Doc. 83 1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 MARK LETELL ADAMS, 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 13 14 Plaintiff, v. Defendants. / 16 18 19 20 ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND VACATING HEARING RONALD ALBERTSON, et al., 15 17 No. C 10-04787 WHA INTRODUCTION In this Section 1983 action, four defendants move to dismiss all claims against them. This order grants all four motions. STATEMENT Plaintiff Mark Letell Adams, who is proceeding pro se, filed this action in October 2010. 21 His first amended complaint, filed in November, is currently operative. The complaint states that 22 the action “is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” and it references a pattern and practice of 23 disparate treatment on the basis of Adams’s status as an African-American male that allegedly has 24 developed over the last seven years. These “prior unrelated incidents,” however, are not the basis 25 of the six claims for relief Adams brings in his complaint (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 15–17, 25). Instead, the 26 complaint focuses on his April 2010 arrest. 27 28 The facts alleged in the operative complaint include the following. On April 23, 2010, Adams’s wife was treated at the Palo Alto Medical Foundation health clinic. A doctor from the Dockets.Justia.com 1 clinic called the San Carlos Police Department and reported her suspicion that a domestic 2 violence incident had occurred. Later that afternoon, two SCPD officers conducted a welfare 3 check at the Adams home. The officers entered the Adams home without a search warrant or any 4 other proof of legal justification. After making two visits and conversing with both Adams and 5 his wife, the officers arrested Adams and brought him to a holding cell at the police station, where 6 he was kept “for most of the next one hour.” Adams then was booked into the San Mateo County 7 Jail, where he was held “approximately 9 hours more” until he posted $25,000 bail. Adams was 8 not given Miranda warnings, was not allowed to make a telephone call, and was denied access to 9 his heart medication. Ultimately, no domestic violence complaint was filed by Adams’s wife, and the SCPD’s felony domestic violence case against Adams was not prosecuted. An order 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 exonerating Adams’s bail was entered in June 2010, and Adams then filed and litigated a motion 12 for a judicial finding of factual innocence with respect to his arrest. During that litigation, the 13 SCPD and various other officials engaged in fraud and conspiracy to cover up the civil-rights 14 violations committed against Adams and to further deprive him of his constitutional rights, or so 15 it is alleged. 16 Adams brings six claims for relief based on this factual narrative. First, Adams claims 17 that the SCPD officers who performed the welfare check conducted an unlawful search of his 18 home without a warrant, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Second, Adams claims that he 19 was unlawfully detained and interrogated by the police officers, in violation of the Fifth and 20 Fourteenth Amendments. Third, Adams claims the conditions of his detainment and interrogation 21 deprived him of due process, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 22 Amendments. Fourth, Adams claims that fraud and false statements were made in the police 23 reports and tape recordings related to his arrest, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1018. Fifth, Adams 24 claims that the SCPD officers and a variety of others engaged in a conspiracy to violate Adams’s 25 civil and constitutional rights. Sixth, Adams claims that police officers and others have defamed 26 him and interfered with his family relationships through statements in police reports, audio 27 recordings, and other public records. 28 2 1 Adams brings all six claims against seven named defendants, requesting compensatory 2 and punitive damages totaling six million dollars. The defendants include a San Carlos police 3 sergeant, two San Carlos police officers, a San Carlos deputy city attorney, the County of San 4 Mateo, a San Mateo judge, and a San Mateo deputy district attorney. Three defendants — the 5 County of San Mateo, Linda Noeske (the deputy city attorney), Stephen Hall (the judge), and 6 Evelina Bozek (the deputy district attorney) — each now move to dismiss all claims against them. 7 This order follows full briefing and a hearing on the first three motions to dismiss; the Bozek 8 motion is decided upon the moving and opposition filings. 9 ANALYSIS None of the motions concerns the police officers; all of the motions are brought by non- 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 officer defendants. The motions rest on various grounds, but they all highlight the complaint’s 12 paucity of factual allegations regarding the moving defendants, and they all argue that the 13 complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). 14 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests for the legal sufficiency of the claims 15 alleged in the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 16 (9th Cir. 1995). All material allegations of the complaint are taken as true and considered in the 17 light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ibid. “While a complaint attacked by a 18 Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation 19 to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, 20 and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations 21 must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 22 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). In short, the complaint must contain sufficient 23 factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 24 A. 25 SAN MATEO COUNTY’S MOTION TO DISMISS The County of San Mateo moves to dismiss all claims against it for failure to state a claim 26 pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). Specifically, the County argues that Adams’s complaint fails to 27 allege any facts that form a causal link between the County and the events giving rise to the 28 complaint. “A municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself 3 1 causes the constitutional violation at issue.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). 2 This order finds the factual pleadings insufficient to state a claim against the County. 3 The conspiracy claim is the only claim for relief that explicitly implicates the County. To 4 state a claim for conspiracy to violate one’s constitutional rights, a plaintiff must plead specific 5 facts, not merely allege the existence of a conspiracy. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 6 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir 1988). The complaint alleges that, along with other defendants, the 7 County “conspired in a pattern of practice . . . to deprive plaintiff of his due process rights under 8 the United States and California Constitution in the plaintiff’s Motion for Judicial Finding of 9 Factual Innocence in Case No. SP000743” (Compl. ¶ 57). The complaint does not make any other mention of the County and does not state that Adams’s alleged constitutional injuries 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 resulted from any County policy, custom, or practice. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Of the 12 City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978). These vague and conclusory allegations do not 13 state a facially plausible conspiracy claim under Section 1983. 14 The other claims for relief do not even mention the County; all of these claims are based 15 on the actions of SCPD officers and other defendants involved in Adams’s April 2010 arrest and 16 related proceedings. For purposes of Section 1983, there is no respondeat superior liability, and 17 the actions of these other defendants cannot be attributed to the County. Delia v. City of 18 Rialto, 621 F.3d 1069, 1081 (9th Cir. 2010). Due to their complete lack of factual allegations 19 against the County, the non-conspiracy claims for relief also fail to state any cognizable claim 20 against the County. 21 In his opposition to the County’s motion, Adams argues that he “can provide a causal link 22 between the offending SCPD officers and the County agency that establishes domestic violence 23 policies for San Mateo County law enforcement officials to follow” (Opp. 6). Specifically, 24 Adams references a Domestic Violence Council and alleges that “ever since the DVC has been in 25 existence, it has knowingly and willfully established discriminatory policies as a pattern of 26 practice through the County’s special interest committee groups whereby various selected 27 members of the San Mateo County legal and public service community can collude their agenda 28 privately” (ibid.). The operative complaint, however, contains no reference to the DVC or its 4 1 policies. These new allegations in Adams’s opposition brief do not ameliorate the insufficient 2 manner in which he plead his complaint. Accordingly, all claims against the County of San 3 Mateo are DISMISSED. The County’s motion to strike is DENIED AS MOOT. 4 B. 5 DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY LINDA NOESKE’S MOTION TO DISMISS Defendant Linda Noeske moves to dismiss all claims against her for failure to state a 6 claim pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). Adams alleges that Noeske “was at all times pertinent to the 7 allegations of this Complaint a Deputy City Attorney employed by the City of San Carlos 8 Attorney’s office.” Noeske is sued both “individually and in her official capacity” (Compl. ¶ 10). 9 This order finds the factual allegations in the complaint insufficient to state a cognizable claim 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 against defendant Noeske in either capacity. As to Noeske in her individual capacity, the complaint is devoid of any factual allegations; 12 Noeske is mentioned only with respect to her official involvement in Adams’s factual-innocence 13 proceedings following his April 2010 arrest. Specifically, Noeske is alleged to have made 14 “fraudulent and false statements in email writings and statements filed with the Superior Court of 15 San Mateo County” and to have conspired with other defendants “in a pattern of practice . . . to 16 deprive plaintiff of his due process rights” in connection with those proceedings (id. ¶¶ 55, 57). 17 Noeske also is alleged to have “made defamatory statements that the plaintiff is currently in 18 ‘criminal proceedings’ for a judicial determination of factual innocence” (id. ¶ 60). Finally, the 19 complaint alleges that “[t]he City Attorney’s office has twice intentionally obstructed the 20 plaintiff’s lawful effort to take the depositions of SCPD witnesses in violation of the California 21 Constitution Article 1 § 15” (ibid.), and Noeske admits to being the City representative who filed 22 oppositions to Adams’s civil discovery requests (Br. 1–2). The allegations catalogued here are 23 the only portions of the complaint that reference defendant Noeske. 24 The first four claims for relief are based on the circumstances of Adams’s April 2010 25 arrest and the conditions under which he subsequently was held in custody. These pleadings do 26 not mention defendant Noeske or explain how anyone from the City Attorney’s office could have 27 had anything to do with the relevant acts of the police officers. Accordingly, the first four claims 28 for relief fail to state a plausible claim against defendant Noeske. 5 1 The fifth claim for relief alleges that Noeske and other defendants engaged in a conspiracy 2 to deprive Adams of his civil rights. As noted, a conspiracy claim under Section 1983 must be 3 pled with factual specificity, and mere conclusory allegations that a conspiracy exists will not 4 survive a motion to dismiss. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626. Adams’s conspiracy claim against 5 defendant Noeske does not pass muster under this standard. The complaint contains only the 6 conclusory statement that Noeske conspired with other defendants to deprive Adams of his due 7 process rights and to make fraudulent and false statements. The complaint does not plead any 8 specific acts taken by Noeske in furtherance of this alleged conspiracy, and it does not identify 9 any statements or emails as allegedly false or fraudulent. As such, the complaint fails to state a 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 cognizable conspiracy claim under Section 1983. The sixth claim for relief alleges that Noeske “made defamatory statements that the 12 plaintiff is currently in ‘criminal proceedings’ for a judicial determination of factual innocence 13 despite the fact that the SMCDA already rejected the SCPD felony charges against plaintiff, no 14 accusatory pleading was ever filed by the SMCDA and the plaintiff has never had a criminal 15 record” (Compl. ¶ 60). Even if true, this statement would not give rise to a defamation claim. 16 Adams instituted his factual innocence proceedings pursuant to the criminal procedure provisions 17 of the California Penal Code. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8. As such, they were in fact 18 “criminal proceedings.” This characterization refers to the procedural nature of the action and is 19 independent from the questions of whether Adams ever had a criminal record and whether 20 criminal charges had been pressed against him previously. Because truth is an absolute defense to 21 defamation, the allegation that defendant Noeske referred to the factual innocence proceedings as 22 “criminal proceedings” does not support a claim for defamation. Bray v. Ventura County Bar 23 Ass’n, 55 F.App’x 459, 460 (9th Cir. 2003). No other allegedly defamatory statements are pled 24 against Noeske. 25 The sixth claim for relief also includes an allegation that Adams’s efforts to depose police 26 officers for his factual innocence proceeding were unlawfully thwarted by Noeske’s office. 27 Adams, however, was not entitled to take these depositions in the first place. Cal. Const. Art. 1 28 § 15; Cal. Penal Code §§ 1335, 1336, 1349. Because California allows defendants in criminal 6 1 cases to take depositions only in limited, exceptional circumstances, Noeske’s oppositions to 2 Adams’s deposition requests were a legitimate part of the criminal proceedings. Adams labels the 3 opposition to his request as “unlawful,” but he does not identify any filings or actions by Noeske 4 that were allegedly improper in form or content. As such, the discovery allegations also fail to 5 support a claim for relief against defendant Noeske. 6 The complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible claim for 7 relief against defendant Noeske under any of its six legal theories. Adams’s opposition to 8 Noeske’s motion to dismiss does not address the majority of the deficiencies discussed herein. 9 Regarding the conspiracy claim, Adams argues that Noeske is “bound by the same domestic violence policy” that connects all defendants (Opp. 6), but this alleged domestic violence policy 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 is not pled in the complaint. New facts raised for the first time in Adams’s opposition brief 12 cannot argue away the deficiencies in his pleadings. Adams’s opposition, however, does not 13 advance any other arguments in defense of the complaint. Accordingly, all claims against 14 defendant Linda Noeske are DISMISSED. 15 C. 16 JUDGE STEPHEN HALL’S MOTION TO DISMISS Judge Stephen Hall moves to dismiss all claims against him pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) 17 and on other alternative grounds. Adams alleges that Hall “was at all times pertinent to the 18 allegations of this Complaint a Presiding Judge employed by the County of San Mateo Superior 19 Court.” Like defendant Noeske, Hall “is sued individually and in his official capacity” 20 (Compl. ¶ 9). Adams, however, has not stated a cognizable claim against Judge Hall in 21 either capacity. 22 The only factual allegations against Hall in the entire complaint are that he currently is the 23 Presiding Judge of the Superior Court of San Mateo County and that he formerly was a police 24 officer and sergeant of the SCPD (Compl. ¶ 56). These facts both address Hall’s official duties; 25 indeed, the complaint itself states that “[a]t all times relevant to the allegations of this Complaint 26 and in all actions of the defendants alleged, defendants were acting under color of law and 27 pursuant to their authority” (Compl. ¶ 13). The complaint does not contain any factual allegations 28 7 1 against Hall in his personal capacity. As such, it does not state a plausible or cognizable claim 2 against him in that capacity. (i.e., that he is a judge and a former policeman) do not connect him in any way with the incidents 5 giving rise to the complaint. Hall is not even alleged to have presided over the relevant court 6 proceedings; the complaint states that the two hearings regarding Adams’s April 2010 arrest 7 were before a different judge (Compl. ¶ 48). The Superior Court of San Mateo County is 8 included in the list of entities and individuals that allegedly conspired to deprive Adams of his 9 civil rights, but the complaint does not identify any acts taken by Hall in furtherance of this 10 alleged conspiracy. As explained with reference to the other movants, the mere conclusory 11 For the Northern District of California As to the complaint against Hall in his official capacity, the two facts alleged against him 4 United States District Court 3 allegation that a conspiracy exists is insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 12 Adams’s opposition brief raises for the first time a new factual allegation that “the 13 Presiding Judge of the Superior Court or his/her representative” participated as a member of the 14 San Mateo County Domestic Violence Council (Opp. 6). As noted with respect to the other 15 movants, however, there is no mention of this alleged Domestic Violence Council in the 16 complaint. New facts raised in an opposition brief do not cure the shortcomings of an 17 insufficiently pled complaint, and Adams does not offer any other response to Hall’s arguments 18 under FRCP 12(b)(6). 19 The complaint fails to state any plausible claim upon which relief can be granted against 20 Hall, in either his individual or his official capacity. Accordingly, all claims against defendant 21 Stephen Hall are DISMISSED. This order does not reach Hall’s alternate grounds for dismissal. 22 D. DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY EVELINA BOZEK’S MOTION TO DISMISS 23 Defendant Evelina Bozek moves to dismiss all claims against her pursuant to 24 FRCP 12(b)(6) and on other alternative grounds. Adams alleges that Bozek “was at all times 25 pertinent to the allegations of this Complaint a Deputy District Attorney employed by the County 26 of San Mateo District Attorney’s office.” Like defendants Noeske and Hall, Bozek “is sued 27 individually and in her official capacity” (Compl. ¶ 8). Adams, however, has not stated a 28 cognizable claim against Bozek in either capacity. 8 1 As to Bozek in her individual capacity, the complaint is devoid of any factual allegations; 2 Bozek is mentioned only with respect to her official involvement in the legal proceedings 3 following Adams’s April 2010 arrest. Specifically, Adams alleges that after he requested copies 4 of the audio tapes from his April 2010 arrest, Bozek left him a voice message noting when the 5 tapes would be available and then provided the tapes to him (id. ¶¶ 50–51). No other actions by 6 Bozek are alleged in the complaint, but the tapes themselves are alleged to “show two different 7 audio file dates of creation and modification” (id. ¶ 51). On that basis, Adams alleges that the 8 tapes Bozek provided “have been altered subsequent to April 23rd and do not comply with the 9 common law rule of evidence called the ‘best evidence rule’” (ibid.). Adams further alleges that “Deputy District Attorney Evelina Bozek has offered audio tapes that have been subjected to 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 spoilage in a conspiracy to violate the plaintiff’s civil rights and constitutional rights under the 12 substantive due process procedures under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution” 13 (id. ¶ 50). The allegations catalogued here are the only portions of the complaint that reference 14 defendant Bozek. 15 The first four claims for relief are based on the circumstances of Adams’s April 2010 16 arrest and the conditions under which he subsequently was held in custody. These pleadings do 17 not mention defendant Bozek or explain how anyone from the District Attorney’s office could 18 have had anything to do with the relevant acts of the police officers. Accordingly, the first four 19 claims for relief fail to state a plausible claim against defendant Bozek. The sixth claim for relief 20 concerns defamation; it too fails to mention Bozek or allege that she had any specific 21 involvement with the allegedly defamatory statements. Accordingly, the sixth claim for relief 22 also fails to state a plausible claim for relief against Bozek. 23 The fifth claim for relief is the only one that even mentions Bozek; it alleges that she and 24 other defendants conspired to deprive Adams of his civil rights. As noted, a conspiracy claim 25 under Section 1983 must be pled with factual specificity, and mere conclusory allegations that a 26 conspiracy exists will not survive a motion to dismiss. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626. Adams’s 27 conspiracy claim against Bozek does not pass muster under this standard. The complaint contains 28 only the conclusory statement that Bozek conspired with other defendants to deprive Adams of 9 1 his civil and due process rights, without alleging any facts supporting the existence of a 2 conspiracy. Although Adams alleges that Bozek provided him with inauthentic tape recordings, 3 the complaint does not allege any specific acts taken by Bozek or anyone else to tamper with the 4 tape recordings in furtherance of a conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights. Nor does the 5 complaint identify any discrepancy between the tape recordings and Adams’s own recollection of 6 his arrest. 7 The complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible claim for motion to dismiss does not address the majority of the deficiencies discussed herein. Regarding 10 the conspiracy claim, Adams argues that Bozek is “bound by the same domestic violence policy” 11 For the Northern District of California relief against defendant Bozek under any of its six legal theories. Adams’s opposition to Bozek’s 9 United States District Court 8 that connects all defendants (Opp. 4), but this alleged domestic violence policy is not plead in the 12 complaint. Adams acknowledges that in order to prove a conspiracy under Section 1983, he 13 “must show an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights,” but his 14 complaint pleads no such facts (id. 6). New factual allegations that Adams raises for the first time 15 in opposition briefs, supplemental briefs, or requests for judicial notice do not correct the 16 deficient manner in which he pled his complaint. Accordingly, all claims against defendant 17 Evelina Bozek are DISMISSED. This order does not reach Bozek’s alternate grounds for 18 dismissal. 19 * * * 20 After the February 3 hearing on the first three motions to dismiss and motion to strike, the 21 parties were requested to file supplemental briefing on the question of whether and to what extent 22 the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to Adams’s claims for relief such that this district court 23 lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over all or some of the action. The three supplemental briefs 24 filed by the four moving defendants generally greed that jurisdiction is lacking to the extent 25 Adams is seeking review of rulings or decisions by the state court, but declined to opine on which 26 portions of Adams’s vaguely-pled complaint seek such relief. Adams’s supplemental brief not 27 only addressed the Rooker-Feldman doctrine but also improperly raised other, unrelated, new 28 arguments that were not included in his oppositions to the motions to dismiss; these new 10 1 arguments are untimely and therefore shall not be considered. No ruling on the applicability of 2 the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to this action will be made at this time. Adams, however, is hereby 3 put on notice of the Court’s firm view that any error committed by a state court judge must be 4 appealed to the next highest state court level and may not be “appealed” to the federal district 5 court as a supposed denial of due process. 6 7 CONCLUSION The County of San Mateo’s motion to dismiss all claims against it is GRANTED. The 8 County of San Mateo’s motion to strike is DENIED AS MOOT. Defendant Linda Noeske’s motion 9 to dismiss all claims against her is GRANTED. Defendant Stephen Hall’s motion to dismiss all claims against him is GRANTED. Defendant Evelina Bozek’s motion to dismiss all claims against 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 her is GRANTED. All requests for judicial notice are DENIED AS MOOT. This order does not 12 address the claims against any other defendant. The hearing on defendant Bozek’s motion set for 13 March 3, 2011, is VACATED. Leave to amend the complaint as to these defendants will not be 14 allowed. The Court has considered plaintiff’s proposals for cure in his oppositions, and they 15 are hopeless. 16 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 19 Dated: February 14, 2011. WILLIAM ALSUP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11
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