Kennard Watkins v. Ben Curry et al, No. 3:2010cv02539 - Document 26 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SI, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/25/2011)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Kennard Watkins v. Ben Curry et al Doc. 26 1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 KENNARD WATKINS, 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 No. C 10-2539 SI (pr) Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. BEN CURRY; et al., Defendants. / 13 14 INTRODUCTION 15 Kennard Watkins, formerly an inmate at the Correctional Training Facility (“CTF”) in 16 Soledad, filed a pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, complaining of a one-year 17 delay in receiving a letter. Per order filed on March 31, 2011, this court found that liberally 18 construed, Watkins stated a cognizable First Amendment claim under § 1983 against defendant 19 Amy Dzioba and ordered service. Dzioba has moved for summary judgment and Watkins has 20 opposed the motion. For the reasons discussed below, Dzioba’s motion for summary judgment 21 will be granted and judgment will be entered in her favor. 22 23 BACKGROUND 24 This case is about a single piece of mail that went missing in a prison mailroom handling 25 thousands of letters per day. The letter turned up almost a year later and was delivered to 26 Watkins, but neither party knows with certainty where the letter spent those twelve months 27 before it was handed to Watkins. 28 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Dockets.Justia.com 1 Watkins was an inmate at CTF during the relevant time period. Amy Dzioba was the 2 mailroom supervisor at CTF during the relevant time period. She supervised seven full-time 3 office assistants and “miscellaneous redirected staff” in the mailroom. Dzioba Decl., ¶ 3. In 2007, Watkins filed a complaint with the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) 5 regarding his criminal case and trial. Watkins Depo., RT 10-11. The LAPD sent Watkins a 6 form response letter via certified mail, dated September 27, 2007. Complaint, Unnumbered 7 Exhibits (Docket #1 p. 21 of 35). The letter notified Watkins that the LAPD had received his 8 complaint and was investigating it.1 Id. The letter did not require Watkins to take any action 9 at all. Id. The letter from the LAPD was addressed to Kennard Watkins at a Soledad post office 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 4 box address but did not identify Watkins as a prisoner and did not include his prisoner 11 identification number or housing assignment unit.2 Id. at 23.3 12 13 The letter from the LAPD arrived at CTF. Neither party provided any evidence as to when it first arrived at the prison. 14 An unknown person put the letter in correctional counselor ("C/O") Summers’ mail slot 15 on September 29 or 30, 2008 – almost a year after it was mailed. Id. at 20. C/O Summers called 16 17 1 18 This correspondence is to advise you that the [LAPD] is continuing to actively investigate your complaint you reported on September 20, 2007. Your complaint is being thoroughly investigated and will undergo several levels of review. We ask for your continued patience, as these types of investigations take time to complete. At the conclusion of the investigation and review, you will be notified in writing of the investigative findings. 19 20 21 22 23 The letter said: Docket # 1, p. 21 of 35. 2 24 25 A regulation regarding incoming inmate mail address requirements states: “[a]ll incoming mail shall be properly addressed. Appropriately addressed mail shall include the inmate’s name and department identification number.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3133. 3 About five months after sending the September 27, 2007 letter, the LAPD sent another letter to Watkins informing him “that the investigation was complete and [his] allegations were unfounded.” Watkins Depo, RT 11. The LAPD did not deny his complaint due to any failure 27 by Watkins to take action. Watkins Depo, RT. 16. 26 28 2 1 Watkins into her office and delivered the letter to him on October 3, 2008. When Watkins 2 received his letter, it had been opened and stapled to its envelope. Id. The envelope had a 3 certified mail return receipt request still attached to it. Id. 4 C/O Summers wrote up a memorandum about the circumstances surrounding the receipt 5 of the letter. In the memorandum, Summers reported a conversation she had with Dzioba in 6 which Dzioba said that, “[b]ecause this letter was addressed without any CDC # or inmate 7 housing identification, the individual who processed it probably thought it was a staff member 8 and did log it in on 10/9/07.” Complaint, Unnumbered Exhibits (Docket #1 p. 20 of 35). Within three days of receiving the letter, Watkins filed an inmate appeal regarding the 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 delay in receiving his mail. The inmate appeal response stated that the reviewer interviewed 11 Amy Dzioba by telephone, and Dzioba reportedly said that: 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 [This] [p]iece of mail was inappropriately addressed, and upon receipt, mail was processed in error by the mailroom. We sent the mail into the institution. Since then we have made procedural changes to locate inmates more thoroughly to ensure these errors do not happen. We also will return mail to sender for additional information if inmate is not located by mailroom staff. Complaint, Unnumbered Exhibits (Docket #1 p. 17 of 35). In her declaration, Dzioba stated that in December 2008 she was interviewed regarding Watkins’ inmate appeal. Upon investigation, she had determined that: 20 [S]ome staff member of the Mail Room, accidentally sent the letter somewhere into the administration building of the prison, rather than to plaintiff at his housing unit. This initial error was responsible for some of the delay in plaintiff receiving it. The letter was filed in plaintiff’s central file, perhaps by the records department, instead of being routed to the plaintiff. 21 Dzioba Decl., p. 2. Dzioba did not know which staff member processed the letter when it first 22 arrived at the CTF mailroom. Id. Dzioba did not remember if she was the employee who sent 23 the letter into the administration building of the prison, but doubted that she was the employee 24 who did so because she was the mailroom supervisor and generally was not involved in 25 distributing mail. Id. Dzioba did not deliver the letter to Summers’ mail slot, and did not know 26 who put it there or how long the letter was in Summers’ mail slot before Summers delivered it 19 27 28 3 1 to Watkins. Id. 2 3 LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that 5 there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant is entitled to judgment 6 as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court will grant summary judgment “against a 7 party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential 8 to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . . since a 9 complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 4 necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 11 (1986). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law, and 12 a dispute about such a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 13 could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 14 248 (1986). Generally, as is the situation with defendant's challenge to the First Amendment 15 claim, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record which 16 demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden then shifts to the 17 nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings, and by his own affidavits, or by the depositions, 18 answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is 19 a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. 20 Where, as is the situation with defendant's qualified immunity defense, the moving party 21 bears the burden of proof at trial, he must come forward with evidence which would entitle him 22 to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. See Houghton v. Smith, 965 23 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). He must establish the absence of a genuine issue of fact on 24 each issue material to his affirmative defense. Id. at 1537; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 25 When the defendant-movant has come forward with this evidence, the burden shifts to the non- 26 movant to set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue of fact on the defense. 27 28 4 1 A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it 2 is based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See 3 Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (treating plaintiff's 4 verified complaint as opposing affidavit where, even though verification not in conformity with 5 28 U.S.C. § 1746, plaintiff stated under penalty of perjury that contents were true and correct, 6 and allegations were not based purely on his belief but on his personal knowledge). Plaintiff's 7 initial complaint and opposition to summary judgment is not verified and cannot be used as 8 evidence. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is signed under penalty of perjury and suffices as 9 an admissible opposing affidavit. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility 11 determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. 12 Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence 13 must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and inferences to be drawn 14 from the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at 631. 15 16 17 DISCUSSION A. First Amendment Claim 18 Prisoners enjoy a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. Witherow v. Paff, 52 19 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)). Prison 20 officials have a responsibility to forward mail to inmates promptly. Bryan v. Werner, 516 F.2d 21 233, 238 (3d Cir. 1975). However, a temporary delay or isolated incident of delay or other mail 22 interference without evidence of improper motive does not violate a prisoner's First Amendment 23 rights. See Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1999); accord Smith v. Maschner, 899 24 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990) (isolated incidents of mail interference without evidence of 25 improper motive do not give rise to a constitutional violation); Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 782 26 (7th Cir. 1999) (content-neutral, short-term, and sporadic delays in prisoner's receipt of mail did 27 28 5 not violate his First Amendment rights). Absent evidence of a broader plan or course of conduct 2 to censor plaintiff's mail unconstitutionally, an honest error by prison officials does not justify 3 relief under § 1983. See Lingo v. Boone, 402 F. Supp. 768, 773 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (prisoner not 4 entitled to monetary relief under § 1983 where prison officials erroneously withheld a single 5 piece of mail on the grounds that it was inflammatory); see also Smith, 899 F.2d at 944 6 (defendants opened a single piece of legal mail by accident; “[s]uch an isolated incident, without 7 any evidence of improper motive or resulting interference with Smith's right to counsel or to 8 access to the courts, does not give rise to a constitutional violation”); cf. Antonelli v. Sheahan, 9 81 F.3d 1422, 1431-32 (9th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff stated a claim where he alleged not merely 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 negligent, but deliberate, obstruction of his mail that resulted in mail delivery being delayed for 11 an inordinate amount of time).4 12 On the undisputed evidence, a First Amendment violation is not shown. This was an 13 isolated incident of mail mishandling. There is not a whit of evidence that the delay was based 14 on the content of the letter or that the one-year delay was purposeful. And there is no evidence 15 that the delay had any impact on any legal proceeding. On this record, no reasonable jury could 16 conclude that Watkins' First Amendment rights had been violated by the one-year delay in the 17 delivery of the mail. 18 Watkins argues that there was deliberate mishandling of the letter. As proof, he urges 19 that the person who handled his letter did not follow CTF mailroom policies for handling 20 improperly addressed mail (which this letter indisputably was). According to Dzioba, the 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 The Ninth Circuit has yet to determine whether more than mere negligence is necessary for a First Amendment violation, although Antonelli seems to suggest that mere negligence would not be actionable. Several other circuits have concluded that a First Amendment claim may not rest on a merely negligent act. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 179, 201 (4th Cir. 2006) (“negligent acts by officials causing unintended denials of religious rights do not violate the Free Exercise Clause”); Richard v. McDonnell, 841 F.2d 120, 122 (5th Cir. 1988) (negligent loss of mail not actionable); Covenant Media of SC, LLC v. City of North Charleston, 493 F.3d 421, 436-37 (4th Cir. 2007) (“To hold that negligent handling of the application amounts to a constitutional violation by the City would only trivialize the fundamental rights the First Amendment was meant to protect.”) 6 1 following procedure exists for handling mail that does not have an inmate's CDCR number on 2 it: 5 If the mail does not have the inmate’s CDC number written on it, a search by inmate name is performed. If there is no exact match between the recipient of the mail and an inmate, the mail is returned to sender. If there is an exact match, the mailroom will write the inmate’s CDC number and housing location on the mail and process it. If not, the mail is returned to sender. 6 Opposition, Defendant’s Responses to Interrogatories, Set One, p.2.5 Showing that the mail was 7 not handled in accordance with written policy supports an inference that the mail was 8 mishandled, but does not support an inference that the mail was intentionally mishandled. 9 Whether it was intentional or negligent or an innocent mistake is speculative. The evidence 10 suggests the absence of any reason or motive for defendant to intentionally delay or mishandle 11 the mail: Watkins did not know Dzioba and this was the only piece of mail he ever complained 12 about being mishandled. Watkins Depo., RT 39-41. 3 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 4 13 At best, Watkins has established that someone in the mailroom did not follow the 14 mailroom policies when he or she processed Watkins’ letter. Watkins has not presented any 15 evidence that would allow a jury to reasonably infer that Dzioba or any other person deliberately 16 sent the letter into the prison administration buildings because of an improper motive. Rather, 17 the evidence shows only that, in a mailroom sorting and delivering thousands of pieces of mail 18 daily, a CTF mailroom employee ignored mailroom policies and mishandled a single letter. That 19 one incident of mail delay does not rise to the level of a First Amendment violation. 20 Watkins also argues that the sheer length of the delay proves a constitutional violation. 21 However, he has not shown that the length of the delay was anything other than pure 22 happenstance. The letter could have turned up in a week, a year, or a decade – or maybe never. 23 24 5 Dzioba stated that this was the current policy, and did not state whether this was the policy in place when the mailroom processed Watkins’ letter. Nonetheless the court will assume, for purposes of this motion, that the same policy was in place when Watkins' letter was 26 received because Dzioba did not state that there was a different policy at an earlier time, despite being asked for the “current and past regulations” for handling misaddressed mail. See 27 Opposition, Defendant's Responses to Interrogatories, Set No. 1, p. 2. 25 28 7 1 Thus the cases where evidence is developed showing that delay has been caused by a prison 2 policy (such as prison officials’ need to inspect mail) are not helpful in guiding the analysis of 3 a letter that simply goes missing, only to never turn up or to turn up a year late. With no 4 evidence of a purposeful delay in delivery, the loss of the letter for a year did not amount to a 5 First Amendment violation by whoever delayed the mail. 6 7 B. Dzioba's Individual Liability Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the 9 plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 8 right. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 11 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981). A person deprives another of a constitutional right within the 12 meaning of § 1983 if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act or omits 13 to perform an act which he is legally required to do, that causes the deprivation of which the 14 plaintiff complains. 15 individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose 16 acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633 17 To defeat summary judgment, sweeping conclusory allegations will not suffice; the plaintiff 18 must instead “set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s” actions which violated 19 his or her rights. Leer, 844 F.2d at 634.6 See Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. The inquiry into causation must be 20 Watkins relies heavily on Dzioba’s alleged admission in a telephone interview about 21 Watkins' inmate appeal – in which she said “[w]e sent the letter into the institution” – to show 22 that Dzioba’s actions proximately caused the delay in receiving his mail. Nevertheless, in a 23 24 6 The parties agree that there is no respondeat superior liability in a section 1983 action. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile 25 Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1984); accord Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (local governments cannot be liable under § 1983 under respondeat 26 superior theory). Nonetheless, much of Watkins' argument attempts to foist exactly this kind of liability on Dzioba. 27 28 8 1 deposition, Watkins admitted that he did not know the identity of the mailroom employee who 2 processed the letter. See Watkins Depo., RT 27 (“Amy [Dzioba] spoke of the individual. 3 However, that leads me to believe that thats [sic] one of her employees . . . That she [Dzioba] 4 had knowledge of the letter being sent to records.”) He also does not dispute the evidence that, 5 as the mailroom supervisor, Dzioba generally was not involved in distributing incoming mail and 6 therefore it was unlikely that she actually handled his mail. As Dzioba correctly notes, the 7 evidence does not support the inference that Dzioba mishandled Watkins’ letter, only that 8 someone in the CTF mailroom mishandled the letter. Under § 1983, a supervisor “is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed 11 to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, all that 12 Watkins has shown is that one year after the letter was sent into the administration building, 13 Dzioba, as the mailroom supervisor, investigated and found out that some mailroom employee 14 mishandled his letter. Watkins has not provided evidence that Dzioba participated in, directed, 15 or knew of any mailroom employee’s alleged wrongful conduct and failed to stop it. Dzioba is 16 entitled to summary judgment on the ground that Watkins has not provided evidence from which 17 a reasonable jury could find that she proximately caused the purported deprivation of his First 18 Amendment right to receive mail. 19 20 C. Qualified Immunity 21 The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability for 22 civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 23 constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 24 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court set forth 25 a two-pronged test to determine whether qualified immunity exists. First, the court asks: 26 “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show 27 28 9 the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?” Id. at 201. If no constitutional right was 2 violated if the facts were as alleged, the inquiry ends and defendants prevail. Id. If, however, 3 “a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next, 4 sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established . . . The contours of the right 5 must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 6 violates that right. . . .The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly 7 established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in 8 the situation he confronted.” Id. at 201-02 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 9 (1987)). Although Saucier required courts to address the questions in the particular sequence 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 set out above, courts now have the discretion to decide which prong to address first, in light of 11 the particular circumstances of each case. See Pearson v. Callahan, 553 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 12 As discussed, the record does not show that a year-long delay in delivery of a single piece 13 of mail violated Watkins’ First Amendment rights. Even if a constitutional violation had been 14 shown, Dzioba, or any CTF mailroom employee, would prevail on the second Saucier prong. 15 For the purposes of qualified immunity the official’s conduct must be viewed not as a broad 16 general proposition, but in the context of the specific facts of the case. Saucier, 522 U.S. at 202. 17 The specific facts of this case show that the letter was improperly addressed because it 18 did not include the recipient’s CDCR number or otherwise indicate that the recipient was a 19 prisoner rather than a staff member. A reasonable prison official in Dzioba's position (or in the 20 position of the mailroom employee who actually handled the letter) would not have understood 21 that sending the letter into the administration building of the prison would be unlawful where 22 the letter did not have the recipient’s prisoner number or otherwise indicate that the recipient was 23 a prisoner (e.g., by including the housing unit address). Even if the person handling the mail 24 ignored CTF mailroom policies on handling misaddressed mail by sending the letter to the 25 administration building, qualified immunity would not be defeated. See Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 26 F.3d 1062, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 2009) (prison operations manual describing duties that, if 27 28 10 1 performed, may have avoided the alleged wrong to plaintiff, irrelevant to qualified immunity 2 inquiry because manual did not establish a federal constitutional right). Dzioba is entitled to 3 qualified immunity against Watkins' claim. 4 CONCLUSION 5 For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 7 (Docket # 22.) Defendant is entitled to judgment on the merits, because the isolated delay in 8 the mail did not rise to the level of a First Amendment violation and because plaintiff has not 9 demonstrated that defendant’s actions caused any delay in mail. Defendant also is entitled to 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 6 qualified immunity. Judgment will be entered in defendant’s favor and against plaintiff. The 11 clerk will close the file. 12 13 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: October 25, 2011 _______________________ SUSAN ILLSTON United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
