Haggarty et al v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:2010cv02416 - Document 149 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES (Dkt. Nos. 125, 133) signed by Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley on 9/18/2012 (ahm, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/18/2012)
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Haggarty et al v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Doc. 149 1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 10 Northern District of California United States District Court 11 12 CHARLES P. HAGGARTY and GINA M. HAGGARTY, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, 13 Plaintiffs, 14 Case No.: 10-2416 CRB (JSC) ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES (Dkt. Nos. 125, 133) v. 15 16 WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendant. 17 18 Now pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to compel more complete 19 20 discovery responses from Plaintiffs. Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs have failed “to provide 21 complete and straightforward responses” to certain of Defendant’s Special Interrogatories and 22 Requests for Admission and Production. (Dkt. No. 125.) At the Court’s request, Defendant 23 submitted Plaintiffs’ disputed responses for the Court’s review. (Dkt. No. 133.) After careful 24 consideration, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s motion as outlined 25 below. 26 BACKGROUND 27 This case arises out of Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendant violated the implied 28 covenant of good faith and fair dealing and California’s Unfair Competition Law with regard to Dockets.Justia.com 1 the index tied to the interest rate in Plaintiffs’ adjustable rate mortgage contracts (“the 2 Notes”). Plaintiffs entered into the Notes with World Savings FSB, which was later renamed 3 Wachovia Mortgage FSB and then acquired by Defendant. A provision in the Notes provides for 4 the possibility of a new index in certain circumstances, including when the existing index is 5 “substantially recalculated.” Plaintiffs argue that the 11th District Cost of Funds Index 6 (“COFI”)—the contested index tied to the Notes— was substantially recalculated when it 7 increased by 66 percent. The parties disagree as to what constitutes a “substantial 8 recalculation” and whether the change of index provision in the Notes was discretionary or 9 obligatory. DISCUSSION 10 Northern District of California United States District Court 11 Interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for production may inquire into 12 any matter permissible under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a); Fed. 13 R. Civ. P. 34(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a). A party may move to compel disclosure or discovery when 14 responses are evasive or incomplete. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). Defendant objects to the 15 adequacy of Plaintiffs’ responses to 1) Special Interrogatories 1-12 and 16-21; 2) Requests for 16 Admissions 3, 13, 14, 15, 24, 25, 27, and 28; and 3) Request for Production 140. (Dkt. No. 125.) 17 1) Special Interrogatories 18 “An interrogatory response should be complete and not refer to other pleadings or 19 documents.” Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharmaceuticals Co., 2007 WL 3343043 *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 20 2007)(internal citation omitted). Subject to any objections, a party must fully answer 21 interrogatories in writing and under oath. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). Objections must be 22 supported: “[a] recitation that the discovery request is overly broad, burdensome, oppressive, 23 and irrelevant is not adequate to voice a successful objection.” Quiroz v. Cate, 2012 WL 24 3236490 *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2012)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When “the 25 responding party objects to a discovery request, the party moving to compel bears the burden 26 of demonstrating why the objections are not justified.” Fields v. Banuelos, 2012 WL 2888734 27 *2 (E.D. Cal. July 13, 2012); Quiroz, 2012 WL 3236490 at *5 (stating the same standard). The 28 responding party must answer interrogatories using not only personal knowledge but also 2 1 “information immediately available to him or under his control.” Jacobs v. Sullivan, 2012 WL 2 3704741 *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2012). 3 While contention interrogatories are permitted, they “are often overly broad and 4 unduly burdensome when they require a party to state ‘every fact’ or ‘all facts’ supporting 5 identified allegations or defenses.” Mancini v. Insurance Corp. of New York, 2009 WL 1765295 6 *3 (S.D. Cal. June 18, 2009); Bovarie v. Schwarzenegger, 2011 WL 719206 *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 7 2011)(stating that an interrogatory “seeking every fact that underlies every affirmative 8 defense is unduly burdensome”); S.E.C. v. Berry, 2011 WL 2441706 *4 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 9 2011)(noting that contention interrogatories that ask for “each and every fact or application of Northern District of California law to fact . . . may be held overly broad and unduly burdensome”)(internal quotation marks 11 United States District Court 10 and citation omitted). In responding to interrogatories, “a requirement to state ‘all facts’ does 12 not require a listing [by the responding party] of trivial or non-material matters.” Kim v. City of 13 Santa Clara, 2009 WL 4021389 *3 (N.D. Cal Nov. 19, 2009). For additional clarity, courts can 14 also modify the language in “each interrogatory to seek ‘the material or principal facts’ instead 15 of ‘all facts.’” Mancini, 2009 WL 1765295 at *3. In reading broad interrogatories, courts also 16 consider the parties’ relative access to information: “at least in cases where defendants 17 presumably have access to most of the evidence about their own behavior, it is not at all clear 18 that forcing plaintiffs to answer these kinds of questions, early in the pretrial period, is 19 sufficiently likely to be productive to justify the burden that responding can entail.” Kim, 2009 20 WL 4021389 at *2 (quoting In re Convergent Technologies Securities Litigation, 108 F.R.D. 21 328, 337-338 (N.D. Cal. 1985)). 22 To address Plaintiffs’ objections that Defendant’s interrogatories are overly broad, the 23 Court rules as a preliminary matter that the terms “all,” “any,” and “each” used in Defendant’s 24 written discovery requests shall be construed as “all material,” “any material,” and “each 25 material.” 26 A. Special Interrogatories 1, 3 and 4 27 These interrogatories ask Plaintiffs about the basis for their contention that the COFI 28 was “substantially recalculated” as that term is used in Section 3(F) of their COFI notes. 3 1 Plaintiffs’ response is straightforward: Defendant’s “decision to withdraw the charter of 2 Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, a single determinative event unrelated to the movement of interest 3 rates” increased COFI by 66% and permanently reset it “up to 100 basis points higher than it 4 would have been without this action taken by” Defendant. This response adequately explains 5 Plaintiffs’ theory of the case. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to compel further responses is 6 DENIED. 7 B. Interrogatory 2 8 Defendant asks Plaintiffs to describe “every type of event or set of circumstances” that 4 at 6.) Interrogatory 1 asked Plaintiffs to provide their definition of recalculated. Interrogatory 11 Northern District of California “would cause the COFI to be ‘recalculated’ as YOU define the term ‘recalculated.’” (Dkt. No. 133- 10 United States District Court 9 2 ask Plaintiffs to hypothesize any number of possible recalculations, none of which necessarily 12 have any bearing on the actual event Plaintiffs contend did cause COFI to be recalculated. When 13 an interrogatory calls for an opinion, it “must be phrased with particularity” to avoid being an 14 improper hypothetical. Baker v. Perez, 2011 WL 4842427 *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2011)(internal 15 citation omitted). Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to compel a further response to 16 Interrogatory No. 2 is DENIED as an improper hypothetical. 17 C. Interrogatories 5-12 18 According to Defendant, “Special Interrogatories 1-12 seek basic information regarding 19 Plaintiffs’ contentions,” and Plaintiffs improperly object that “the interrogatories call for the 20 premature disclosure of expert opinion.” (Dkt. No. 125 at 5-6.) Defendant seeks to compel 21 Plaintiffs to “fully answer” these interrogatories and clarify if they “are relying solely on expert 22 opinions.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiffs respond that the interrogatories require “positions and 23 commitments that Plaintiffs should not have to make . . . before the case is fully developed.” 24 (Dkt. No. 125 at 7-8.) While “[a]n interrogatory is not objectionable merely because it asks for 25 an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of fact to law,” the court can 26 allow a party to wait to answer such an interrogatory “until designated discovery is complete.” 27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2). Here, the parties stipulated to the completion of expert disclosures by 28 October 22, 2012. (Dkt. No. 143.) By that time—only six weeks before trial—Plaintiffs should 4 1 have fully developed their case and thus be able to definitively advise Defendant as to their 2 position on the issues raised by these interrogatories. Accordingly, Plaintiffs shall supplement 3 their answers to Special Interrogatories 5-12 on or before October 22, 2012. 4 D. Interrogatories 16-21 5 Defendant also objects to Plaintiffs’ “blanket references to the entire record in the case” 6 in Special Interrogatories 16-21. (Dkt. No. 125 at 6.) Defendant argues that “Wells Fargo 7 cannot discern from this mass of evidence which facts, documents, and witnesses Plaintiffs 8 contend support Plaintiffs’ theories.” (Id.)(emphasis omitted). A party cannot note “that all 9 facts can be found within the entire universe of documents involved in the underlying Northern District of California litigation” to answer an interrogatory since “referring to a wide universe of documents does 11 United States District Court 10 not specify the records in sufficient detail.” Mancini v. Insurance Corp. of New York, 2009 WL 12 1765295 *2 (S.D. Cal. June 18, 2009). 13 1. Interrogatories 16 and 17: Defendant asks Plaintiffs to “state all facts” that 14 support Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendant breached two legal duties. (Dkt. Nos. 133-4 at 14- 15 15.) In both questions, Plaintiffs respond that Defendant “refused to provide an appropriate 16 alternative index pursuant to section 3(f) of the contract.” (Id.) This answer is responsive; 17 however, Plaintiffs go on to note that they “rely on supporting facts as disclosed in the record 18 in this case.” (Id.) This reliance is not proper. If Plaintiffs rely on other material facts in 19 addition to lack of index substitution, Plaintiffs shall so state them in a supplement to their 20 responses by September 26, 2012. 21 2. Interrogatories 18 and 19: Defendant asks Plaintiffs to “identify all persons with 22 knowledge of any fact(s)” that support Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendant breached two legal 23 duties. (Dkt. Nos. 133-4 at 15-16.) At this late stage of the litigation, when fact discovery has 24 closed, it is unclear what Defendant hopes to glean from this question. Defendant knows 25 Plaintiffs’ theory of the case and Defendant knows which of its employees were involved in the 26 COFI decision. Discovery should not be ordered just for the sake of ordering discovery. 27 Defendant’s motion to compel a further response is DENIED. 28 5 1 3. Interrogatories 20 and 21: Defendant asks Plaintiffs to “identify all documents 2 that contain or refer to any fact(s)” that support Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendant breached 3 two legal duties. (Dkt. Nos. 133-4 at 17.) In both cases, Plaintiffs respond that they “rely on 4 supporting facts as disclosed in the record in this case, including the parties’ document 5 productions, depositions, and other discovery, along with third-party discovery and expert 6 reports and discovery, none of which is complete in this case.” (Dkt. No. 133-4 at 17-18.) This 7 reliance is not proper. With the benefit of the close of discovery and the Court’s guidance in 8 limiting the scope of this question to only material documents and facts, Plaintiffs shall 9 supplement their responses by September 26, 2012. Northern District of California 2) Requests for Admission 11 United States District Court 10 Requests for admission cannot be used to solicit “admissions or denials as to legal 12 conclusions.” Martin v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 2012 WL 3070680 *1 (E.D. Cal. July 27, 13 2102); see also Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 60 F.Supp.2d 1050, 1057 (S.D. Cal. 14 1999)(“Requests for admission cannot be used to compel an admission of a conclusion of 15 law.”). Requests are “limited to persons and documents within the responding party’s control” 16 as determined by reasonable inquiry, which “does not require the responding party to 17 interview or subpoena records from independent third parties in order to admit or deny a 18 request for admission.” AmeriPride Services, Inc. v. Valley Indus. Services, Inc., 2011 WL 19 1321873 *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011). 20 Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ responses to Requests for Admissions 3, 13, 14, 15, 24, 21 25, 27, and 28 are insufficient. (Dkt. No. 125 at 6.) In particular, Defendant baldly contends that 22 “Plaintiffs responded to several of Wells Fargo’s RFAs by asserting they lack knowledge 23 sufficient to provide a response” without meeting their “obligation to perform a reasonable 24 inquiry.” (Dkt. No. 125 at 7.) Defendant notes that “[e]vasive denials may be deemed an 25 admission” and that “Plaintiffs’ responses are evasive and incomplete, as they claim to lack 26 information on subjects on which they have taken stances in other briefing.” (Id.) Defendant 27 supports this conclusion by referring “e.g., Dkt. No. 112-1,” which is a declaration by Benjamin 28 6 1 Hartzog, who was retained by Plaintiffs “to provide an expert opinion regarding the impact of 2 Wells Fargo’s actions on the Plaintiffs’ mortgage loans.” (Dkt. No. 112-1 at 2.) The Court disagrees that this expert declaration is a reasonable basis to compel an 3 how this declaration supports its opinion, refer the Court to a page cite within the declaration, 6 or link this declaration with any particular RFA of the nine contested. (Dkt. No. 125 at 7.) 7 Plaintiffs note that this declaration was completed after Plaintiffs submitted their RFA 8 responses. (Dkt. No. 125 at 9.) This fact is not persuasive, however, since Plaintiffs “are under a 9 continuing duty to amend their prior responses to interrogatories, requests for production, or 10 requests for admission if the party learns that the earlier response is in some material respect 11 Northern District of California admission by Plaintiffs, particularly when Defendant declines to provide any explanation as to 5 United States District Court 4 incomplete or incorrect.” Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1057 (S.D. Cal. 12 1999). 13 Nonetheless, after a review of the contested RFAs and Plaintiffs’ responses, the Court 14 finds them sufficient. The RFAs in question refer to technical questions about the COFI, its 15 calculation, and other market indexes—in each instance, Plaintiffs respond that the request 16 requires information outside of Plaintiffs’ control and that “they have made a reasonable 17 inquiry” regarding all information in their control. (Dkt. No. 133-5.) It is not obvious to the 18 Court why Plaintiffs would have information in their personal control about market indexes 19 related to Defendant’s loan accounts. Other than a reference to a declaration without any 20 explanatory text, Defendant does not support the contention that Plaintiffs are being “evasive” 21 or otherwise dishonest in their RFA responses. Consequently, Defendant’s motion to compel 22 additional responses to the indicated RFAs is DENIED. 23 3) Request for Production No. 140 24 Defendant’s Request for Production 140 asks for “ALL DOCUMENTS identified in YOUR 25 answers to Special Interrogatory Numbers 1-21.” (Dkt. No. 133-6 at 5.) Defendant alleges that 26 “Plaintiff did not produce any documents in response to this request, presumably because their 27 Interrogatory responses referenced every document in the litigation.” (Dkt. No. 125 at 7.) 28 Defendant requests that when Plaintiffs supplement their interrogatory responses, they 7 1 “produce all documents identified” and “list any allegedly protected documents in a privilege 2 log.” (Id.) Plaintiffs already agreed that they “will produce responsive, non-privileged 3 documents, if any, within their possession, custody, and control that have not already been 4 produced by either party.” (Dkt. No. 133-6 at 5.) After Plaintiffs have supplemented their 5 interrogatory responses, if any, in compliance with this Order, Plaintiffs shall, as they already 6 agreed, produce any documents that are responsive and have not already been produced. To 7 the extent relevant documents are privileged, Plaintiffs shall provide Defendant with a 8 privilege log. 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. Northern District of California United States District Court 11 12 Dated: September 18, 2012 _________________________________ JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8
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