Henshall v. Central Parking, Inc. et al, No. 3:2009cv04481 - Document 38 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS with prejudice re 14 , 20 . (SI, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/6/2009) (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/12/2009: # 1 cs) (ys, COURT STAFF).
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Henshall v. Central Parking, Inc. et al Doc. 38 1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 WILLIAM HENSHALL, 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 No. C 09-04481 SI Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS v. CENTRAL PARKING, INC., et al., 12 Defendants. / 13 14 15 Defendants Central Parking, Inc., New South Parking, and Ampco System Parking, Inc. move 16 to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim, or in the alternative, for a more definite 17 statement of plaintiff’s claims.1 This matter is currently set for hearing on November 20, 2009. 18 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral 19 argument and hereby VACATES the hearing. Having considered the papers submitted, and for good 20 cause shown, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motions to dismiss. 21 22 BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff William Henshall is a former employee of defendant Ampco System Parking, Inc. 24 (“Ampco”). In July 2000, during plaintiff’s employment with Ampco, he purported to renounce his 25 United States citizenship. Plaintiff believes that his renunciation of citizenship should also have 26 permitted him to rescind his social security number. Plaintiff wrote to Ampco on several occasions after 27 1 28 Defendants also move for an order declaring plaintiff a vexatious litigant. The Court will address this request in a separate order. Dockets.Justia.com United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 renouncing his citizenship, asking Ampco to remove any reference to his social security number from 2 his employment records, and to cease withholding taxes from his earnings on the ground he was not a 3 United States citizen subject to taxation laws. Ampco refused. 4 In June 2007, Ampco’s contract to provide parking services at San Francisco International 5 Airport was awarded to defendants Central Parking, Inc. (“CPI”) and New South Parking (“NSP”). 6 Plaintiff applied for employment with CPI/NSP. Plaintiff refused to submit an Internal Revenue Service 7 (“IRS”) form W-4 or Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) form I-9 as a precondition to 8 employment, and CPI/NSP refused to hire plaintiff. Subsequently, plaintiff instituted a series of 9 lawsuits against the three defendants. He now appears before this Court for the fourth time. 10 Plaintiff’s first action in this Court was Henshall v. Central Parking, Inc., No. 07-4458 11 (“Henshall I”).2 Plaintiff filed the complaint in that action on July 30, 2007 in the San Mateo County 12 Superior Court against defendants CPI and NSP. Defendants removed the case to this Court. Plaintiff 13 challenged defendants’ policy of requiring him to complete the W-4 and I-9 forms as a precondition to 14 employment. On October 16, 2007, the Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint with 15 prejudice. See Oct. 16, 2007 Order (Docket No. 13, No. 07-4458). The Court found that federal courts 16 have repeatedly rejected the theories advanced by plaintiff, namely, that despite being born in this 17 country, he is not a citizen of the United States and is therefore not subject to federal laws relating to 18 taxes or immigration and naturalization; that he need not provide a W-4 to a prospective employer; that 19 he is not an “employee” for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code; that he may refuse to provide his 20 social security number to a prospective employer; and that he has a constitutional right to private 21 employment. Id. at *3. 22 Plaintiff filed a second action against the same defendants in San Mateo County Superior Court, 23 on September 6, 2007, again challenging defendants’ policy of requiring him to complete a W-4 and an 24 I-9. Defendants again removed the action to this Court. Henshall v. Central Parking, Inc., No. 07-5097 25 (“Henshall II”). The Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the doctrines of res 26 judicata and collateral estoppel precluded the suit. See Jan. 16, 2008 Order (Docket No. 56, No. 07- 27 2 28 Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of documents from the prior cases involving plaintiff. The Court finds that judicial notice of these documents is appropriate and grants the requests. 2 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 5097). 2 Plaintiff filed a third action, this time against Ampco and its general manager, Joy Riddle, in San 3 Mateo County Superior Court on August 1, 2008. Defendants removed the suit to this Court. Henshall 4 v. Ampco Parking, Inc., No. 08-4723 (“Henshall III”). In his third action, plaintiff claimed that 5 renunciation of his United States citizenship in 2000 should also have allowed him to rescind his social 6 security number. Plaintiff asserted that defendants therefore violated his rights when they kept records 7 containing his social security number, and that defendants’ unlawful acts caused taxes to be improperly 8 levied against him, constituting theft of his property. On January 21, 2009, the Court entered an order 9 dismissing the complaint with prejudice. See Jan. 21, 2009 Order (Docket No. 36, No. 08-4723). The 10 Court found that collateral estoppel precluded plaintiff from asserting that he was not a United States 11 citizen – an assertion that formed the basis of all his claims. Id. at *4. The Court further found that, 12 even if collateral estoppel did not apply, plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 13 granted. Id. at *4-5. 14 Plaintiff filed the present action on July 2, 2009 in San Mateo County Superior Court against 15 defendants CPI, NSP, and Ampco. Defendants removed the case to this Court. At the center of 16 plaintiff’s claims, once again, is the allegation that he is not a United States citizen and is therefore not 17 subject to federal laws relating to taxation and immigration and naturalization. Plaintiff’s complaint is 18 essentially a verbatim copy of the complaint previously dismissed with prejudice in Henshall III, except 19 that he adds CPI and NSP as defendants in his first cause of action, for wrongful termination, and styles 20 the claim as involving tortious interference. Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action, stated only against 21 Ampco, are for keeping false and fraudulent records, theft of property, retaliatory termination, and 22 breach of contract. All of the claims relate to plaintiff’s contention that he should be permitted to 23 rescind his social security number, have it expunged from his employment records, avoid paying taxes, 24 and decline to provide W-4 and I-9 forms to prospective employers. 25 Presently before the Court are defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state 26 a claim, or alternatively for a more definite statement of plaintiff’s claims. As both motions to dismiss 27 raise principally the same arguments, the Court will address them together. 28 3 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 LEGAL STANDARD 2 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it 3 fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, 4 the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 5 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires the plaintiff 6 to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 7 In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court 8 must assume that the plaintiff’s allegations are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the 9 plaintiff’s favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the 10 court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions 11 of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” St. Clare v. Gilead Scis., Inc. (In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig.), 536 12 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). 13 If the court dismisses the complaint, it must decide whether to grant leave to amend. The Ninth 14 Circuit has “repeatedly held that a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend 15 the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 16 allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). 17 18 DISCUSSION 19 The Court agrees with defendants that all the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint are barred by 20 the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The doctrine of res judicata “bars all grounds for 21 recovery that could have been asserted, whether they were or not, in a prior suit between the same 22 parties on the same cause of action.” In re Int’l Nutronics, Inc., 28 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.1994) 23 (original emphasis) (citation omitted). The party asserting res judicata must show: “(1) an identity of 24 claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) privity between parties.” Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council, 25 Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003). The doctrine of collateral 26 estoppel, on the other hand, “prevents relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessarily decided, 27 after a full and fair opportunity for litigation, in a prior proceeding.” Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 28 994 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). A prior federal court decision will have preclusive effect under 4 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 the doctrine of collateral estoppel where “(1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous proceeding 2 is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the first proceeding ended with a final 3 judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in 4 privity with a party at the first proceeding.” Id. (citation omitted). 5 The sole claim asserted against CPI and NSP is for “tortious interference/wrongful termination.” 6 This Court has issued a final judgment dismissing plaintiff’s first suit against the same defendants, 7 Henshall I. In that suit, plaintiff asserted that he was not required to provide his social security number 8 or a W-4 or I-9 form to a prospective employer. Plaintiff claims in the present suit that CPI and NSP 9 “wrongfully terminated” – that is, did not hire – plaintiff because he refused to submit his social security 10 number, a W-4 form, or an I-9 form prior to the commencement of employment. Although the claim 11 is cast in slightly different terms now than it was in the prior suit, both claims rest on the identical 12 assertion that plaintiff is not a United States citizen. Because that issue was necessarily decided in the 13 prior proceeding, plaintiff is collaterally estopped from attempting to reassert the claim now. 14 Plaintiff brings five claims against Ampco: “tortious interference/wrongful termination,” keeping 15 “false and fraudulent records,” theft of property, retaliatory termination, and breach of contract. The 16 court previously issued a final judgment on the merits in Henshall III, which involved identical parties 17 and, at least with respect to the second through fifth causes of action, identical claims. Indeed, 18 plaintiff’s current complaint is essentially a verbatim copy of the complaint previously dismissed with 19 prejudice in Henshall III, except that the first cause of action, now labeled “tortious 20 interference/wrongful termination,” was previously styled solely as “wrongful termination.” Despite 21 the change in moniker for the first cause of action, however, both the prior claim and the present claim 22 involve the allegation that if Ampco had complied with plaintiff’s request to transmit his employment 23 records to CPI/NSP, the records would have demonstrated to CPI/NSP that plaintiff was not required 24 to submit a W-4 or I-9 form or provide his social security number prior to the commencement of 25 employment. Accordingly, collateral estoppel bars relitigation of the issues previously raised and 26 dismissed in Henshall III. 27 Moreover, to the extent there is any substantive difference between the wrongful termination 28 claims previously asserted and the “tortious interference” claim asserted in the current complaint, such 5 1 that collateral estoppel did not apply, plaintiff’s claim would clearly be barred by res judicata. “Newly 2 articulated claims based on the same nucleus of facts may still be subject to a res judicata finding if the 3 claims could have been brought in the earlier action.” Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l 4 Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003). In other words, a litigant may not “avoid 5 preclusion by attaching a different legal label to an issue that has, or could have, been litigated” in a 6 prior proceeding between the same parties. Id. at 1077-78. Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful termination, 7 while styled differently in its present incarnation, rests on the very same nucleus of facts as his prior 8 claims. Therefore, plaintiff’s suit is precluded by res judicata as well. 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 The Court therefore GRANTS defendants’ motion. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 11 12 13 14 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. (Docket Nos. 14, 20). 15 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 18 Dated: November 6, 2009 SUSAN ILLSTON United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
