Ray v. Chiled Protective Services et al, No. 3:2009cv00252 - Document 27 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING 15 DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT as to all claims agaisnt all defendants, who are entitled to judgment as matter of law. (SI, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/22/2011) Modified on 2/22/2011 (ys, COURT STAFF).
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Ray v. Chiled Protective Services et al Doc. 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 EDWARD VINCENT RAY, JR., Plaintiff, 12 13 14 No. C 09-252 SI (PR) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. NATHAN HOBBS and CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES, 15 Defendants. / 16 17 INTRODUCTION 18 19 This is a federal civil rights action filed by a pro se state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 20 § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Hobbs, a family maintenance worker for the Alameda 21 County Social Services Agency, Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”), and 22 defendant DCFS1 made defamatory statements that injured plaintiff’s reputation and caused him 23 to lose parental rights, including custody of his daughter and the ability to visit with her. 24 (Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”) at 5–8, 10). Defendants move for summary judgment on 25 grounds that there are no triable issues of fact and that they are entitled to summary judgment 26 1 The agency defendant originally named in the instant matter was “Child Protective Services”; however, the correct name of the social service agency from which plaintiff seeks 28 relief is the Alameda County Social Services Agency, Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”). See Order of Service at 3. 27 Dockets.Justia.com 1 as a matter of law. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“MSJ”) at 1). For the reasons set forth below, 2 defendants’ motion is GRANTED. Judgment will be entered in favor of defendants. Plaintiff 3 shall take nothing by way of his amended complaint. 4 BACKGROUND 5 6 I. Juvenile Dependency Petition and Proceedings Regarding Kymberly Ray The following facts appear to be undisputed except as noted. On August 27, 2006, 8 plaintiff’s child, Kymberly Ray, was taken by police from the family home when plaintiff and 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 7 his two adult children were arrested for armed robbery. (MSJ, Declaration of Alameda County 10 Deputy County Counsel Todd Boley (“Decl. Boley”), Ex. A; Pl.’s Opp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Opp.”) 11 at 3–4). On August 29, 2006, DCFS initiated a juvenile dependency petition regarding 12 Kymberly. (Decl. Boley, Ex. A at 11–13; Am. Compl. at 2). In the petition, child welfare 13 worker Susan Shaddick (“Shaddick”) alleged that Kymberly came within the jurisdiction of the 14 juvenile court pursuant to § 300(b) of the California Welfare & Institutions Code. (Id.). In 15 relevant part, this section states: 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Any child who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the court: [...] (b) The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left, or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 300. 25 The dependency petition specifically stated that “[t]he mother and father, Tina and 26 Edward Ray, have substance abuse problems that render them unable to provide appropriate care 27 to their four-year-old daughter, Kymberly Ray . . . .” (Decl. Boley, Ex. A at 13; Am. Compl. at 28 3). In support of this statement, the petition listed the following allegations: 2 a) 1 2 b) 3 c) 4 5 d) 6 7 e) 8 f) United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 g) 10 11 The father and the parents’ adult children were arrested for armed robbery on August 27, 2006, and are currently incarcerated at Santa Rita Jail for multiple robberies; The minor, Kymberly Ray, said that her father, brother and sister had been arrested for “going out robbing” and that her mother had told her this; The mother and father have engaged in domestic violence in the presence of the minor and the minor has seen the father hit her mother in the face; The mother says the father was court-ordered into domestic violence treatment, but he left the state and then was extradited back; The trailer in which the family was living was without running water, toilet facilities, or a working refrigerator; The mother admits to using crack cocaine as recently as two days ago and alcohol with the father and their adult children in a trailer where the family was living; The mother says that she drank alcohol because the father “made her” and she was afraid she would be beaten if she did not. (Decl. Boley, Ex. A at 13; Am. Compl. at 3).2 12 On August 30, 2006, Shaddick filed a detention report regarding Kymberly wherein 13 Shaddick detailed the circumstances surrounding the conditions that prompted Kymberly’s 14 detention in protective custody. (Decl. Boley, Ex. A at 1–10). These circumstances supported 15 Shaddick’s statements in the dependency petition. The detention report requested that Kymberly 16 continue to be detained in foster care because there was a substantial danger to Kymberly’s 17 physical or emotional health and there was no reasonable means by which to protect her without 18 removing her from her parents’ physical custody. (Decl. Boley, Ex. A at 8). A hearing was set 19 for September 14, 2006.3 (Decl. Boley, Ex. A at 6). 20 On September 8, 2006, plaintiff’s counsel, Jason Davis, filed an Order for Prisoner’s 21 Appearance at Hearing Affecting Prisoner’s Parental Rights so that plaintiff could appear at the 22 September 13, 2006 hearing. (Decl. Boley, Ex. B). That same day, an Alameda County judicial 23 officer issued an order to deliver plaintiff into the custody of the Alameda County Deputy 24 25 2 Plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that “of the 8 listed reasons [for DCFS taking protective custody of Kymberly], only one was proven to be true.” (Am. Compl. at 2). Plaintiff 26 does not specify which reason was proven true but adds “[o]nce the other 7 were unproven 27 [DCFS] and Hobbs created various other claims to keep this farce of a case alive.” (Id.). Plaintiff explains neither how or when the one reason was proven true nor how or when the 28 remaining seven were proven untrue. 3 The hearing actually was held on September 13, 2006. (Decl. Boley, Ex. E.) 3 1 Sheriff for the hearing. (Id.). 2 On September 13, 2006, Shaddick filed a jurisdiction report which repeated the 3 statements made in the detention report. (Decl. Boley, Ex. C). Shaddick asked that the court 4 find the allegations in the jurisdiction report to be true and recommended that Kymberly remain 5 in foster care for two weeks until she could join her mother at a residential drug treatment 6 program, Project Pride. (Decl. Boley, Ex. C; see Am. Compl. at 2). At the hearing on September 13, 2006, plaintiff signed a Waiver of Rights – Juvenile 8 Dependency form on which he indicated that he read and understood the petition filed by 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 7 Shaddick, that he requested the court to appoint him an attorney and that he wished to submit 10 the petition on the basis of the social worker’s or probation officer’s report and other documents, 11 if any. (Decl. Boley, Ex. D). Plaintiff also indicated that by submitting the petition on the social 12 worker’s report, he was his waiving rights to: (1) a trial or hearing; (2) the right to see and hear 13 witnesses who testify; (3) the right to cross-examine witnesses, the social worker or probation 14 officer who prepared the report and the witnesses’ statements contained therein; (4) the right to 15 testify on his own behalf and to present his own evidence and witnesses; (5) the right to use the 16 authority of the court to compel witnesses to come to court and produce evidence; and (6) any 17 privilege against self-incrimination in the proceeding. (Id.). He also indicated that he 18 understood that: (1) if he submitted the petition on the report, the court would probably find the 19 petition true; (2) if the petition were found true and the child was declared a dependent of the 20 court, the court may assume custody of the child and not offer or provide reunification services 21 to plaintiff; and (3) if the court assumed and retained custody of the child for 12–18 months it 22 would make a permanent plan for Kymberly that could result in the termination of plaintiff’s 23 parental rights. (Id.). After plaintiff waived the aforementioned rights, his attorney indicated 24 by signature that he explained to plaintiff his rights and the consequences of submitting the 25 petition. (Id.). 26 A minute order from the September 13, 2006 hearing indicated that both plaintiff and the 27 child’s mother were present, that the reports by Shaddick and DCFS were admitted into evidence 28 and that the parents had waived the aforementioned rights. (Decl. Boley, Ex. E at 1). The court 4 1 ordered plaintiff and Kymberly’s mother to return to the courtroom on September 28, 20064 for 2 an uncontested jurisdictional hearing. (Id. at 1–2). On October 3, 2006, Shaddick filed an addendum report wherein she recommended that 4 Kymberly Ray be committed to DCFS for suitable placement with her mother as long as her 5 mother remained in residential drug treatment. (Decl. Boley, Ex. F at 3). Shaddick also stated 6 that there was clear and convincing evidence that parental reunification services should be 7 denied to plaintiff, as he was incarcerated on serious charges, including twenty-seven counts of 8 armed robbery, and he would “more than likely” not be able to reunify with his daughter in the 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 3 time provided by law. (Id. at 4). Shaddick went on to say that DCFS did not believe there 10 would be a detriment to Kymberly if reunification services were denied to plaintiff, and any 11 detriment that might incur would be mitigated by the child’s placement with her mother, who 12 was receiving reunification services. (Id.). 13 A minute order from the October 3, 2006 hearing indicated that both parents appeared by 14 separate counsel at the hearing, that all reports from DCFS were admitted into evidence, and that 15 Kymberly would remain in the custody of DCFS and reside in the residential treatment facility 16 with her mother. (Decl. Boley, Ex. G at 1). The court adjudged Kymberly a dependent child 17 of the court, denied reunification services to plaintiff, and transferred the matter to DCFS for 18 monitoring. (Id.). 19 20 II. Defendant Hobbs’ Involvement in Managing Kymberly Ray’s Case 21 In October 2006, Kymberly’s case was assigned to DCFS family maintenance worker 22 defendant Hobbs. (See MSJ, Decl. Nathan Hobbs (“Decl. Hobbs”), p. 1, ¶ 1& p. 2, ¶ 3). As a 23 family maintenance worker, defendant Hobbs was required to monitor the children on his 24 caseload and to implement corresponding court orders. (Id., ¶. 1–2, ¶ 2). Defendant Hobbs also 25 was responsible for reporting to the court on a regular basis regarding the children’s progress. 26 (Id.). Defendant Hobbs had no role in the initial removal of Kymberly Ray from her home, the 27 filing of the juvenile dependency petition with the court, the finding by the court that Kymberly 28 4 The hearing was continued to October 3, 2006. (Decl. Boley, Ex. G at 1). 5 1 was properly in its jurisdiction or the order issued by the court denying reunification services to 2 plaintiff. (Decl. Hobbs, p. 2, ¶ 3; see Opp. at 6 & 14). On March 7, 2007, defendant Hobbs filed a status review report with the court, his first 4 appearance in the proceedings. (See Decl. Hobbs, p. 2, ¶ 5; Decl. Boley, Ex. H). In this report, 5 defendant Hobbs stated that he had received information from the residential treatment program 6 where Kymberly and her mother were residing that Kymberly had “perform[ed] sexually explicit 7 acts on two boys (age 5 and 8),” displayed “other forms of sexualized behavior” and exhibited 8 “boundary/personal space issues” with staff. (Decl. Boley, Ex. H at 7; see Decl. Hobbs, p. 2, ¶ 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 3 5; Am. Compl. at 4 & 7). Defendant Hobbs stated that Kymberly was receiving counseling for 10 these issues. (Decl. Hobbs, p. 2, ¶ 5; Decl. Boley, Ex. H at 7–8). Defendant Hobbs’ report 11 incorporated the allegations of the August 29, 2006 Petition submitted by Shaddick and 12 recommended that the court retain jurisdiction over Kymberly for another six months until her 13 mother completed her residential treatment program. (Decl. Boley, Ex. H at 1 & 4). Defendant 14 Hobbs did not discuss any recommendations pertaining to plaintiff in this report. (Decl. Hobbs, 15 p. 2, ¶ 6; see Decl. Boley, Ex. H). 16 A minute order from the March 16, 2007 hearing indicated that both parents’ counsel 17 were present. (Decl. Boley, Ex. I at 1). The court adopted defendant Hobbs’ March 16, 2007 18 findings, retained jurisdiction over Kymberly, and gave defendant Hobbs permission to transport 19 Kymberly to see her father in custody. (Id. at 1–2). 20 On March 20, 2007, plaintiff was convicted of twenty-one counts of armed robbery with 21 enhancements for utilizing firearms and knives in the commission of the crimes and for inflicting 22 great bodily harm. (Decl. Boley, Ex. O). Plaintiff was sentenced to thirty-eight years and four 23 months in state prison. (Id.). 24 Defendant Hobbs filed a second status review report on August 14, 2007. (Decl. Boley, 25 Ex. J). In this report, defendant Hobbs stated that Kymberly and her mother were still living at 26 the residential treatment program and that plaintiff was serving his state prison sentence at San 27 Quentin State Prison. (Id. at 2). Defendant Hobbs then stated that he had made two attempts 28 to bring Kymberly to visit plaintiff, but that they were unsuccessful. (Id. at 6). Defendant also 6 1 indicated in this report that there was a suspicion of child abuse by plaintiff, based on the 2 following alleged incident: In May it was reported that the minor told another four-year-old Project Pride resident to insert a toy shark down the back of her pants. When another [] resident talked to the minor about the incident, the minor reportedly disclosed that “My [d]ad touched me there.” This alleged disclosure prompted a CALICO Center Interview . . . on 5/24/2007[;] however the forensic interview yielded no evidence of sexual maltreatment. Nevertheless, a strong suspicion remains among the therapists and program staff that the minor may have endured some form of sexual abuse. 3 4 5 6 7 8 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 (Id. at 5-6). Defendant Hobbs also stated in this report that he believed visitation with plaintiff was 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 not advisable at the time because: “1) the minor becomes upset when the father is mentioned and does not want to visit him, 2) there are suspicions of the father’s role in sexually inappropriate behavior toward the minor, and 3) the father is placed in a high-security out-ofcounty state prison.” (Decl. Boley, Ex. J at 8). Defendant Hobbs recommended that the court retain jurisdiction over Kymberly, but did not make any custody or reunification recommendations with respect to plaintiff. (Id. at 11–12). A minute order from the August 24, 2007 hearing indicated that the mother appeared 17 18 19 20 represented by counsel and that plaintiff appeared by counsel, Erlinda Castro. (Decl. Boley, Ex. K at 1). The court adopted defendant Hobbs’ August 14, 2007 findings and retained jurisdiction over Kymberly. The court did not make any orders regarding plaintiff. (Id. at 1–2). On February 13, 2008, defendant Hobbs filed a final status review report regarding 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Kymberly’s custody. (Decl. Boley, Ex. L). Defendant Hobbs recommended in this report that the court terminate its jurisdiction over Kymberly and award custody to her mother. (Id. at 11–12). The report did not make any recommendations pertaining to plaintiff, but noted that he was now incarcerated at High Desert State Prison in Susanville (Lassen County) California. (Id. at 6). On February 19, 2008, the court entered a final judgment regarding custody of Kymberly, which terminated its jurisdiction over Kymberly and awarded custody to her mother. (Decl. Boley, Ex. M). The court did not award any visitation rights to plaintiff. (Id.). 7 DISCUSSION 1 2 I. Standard of Review 3 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits demonstrate 4 that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 5 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect 6 the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute 7 as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a 8 verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those 10 portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine 11 issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving 12 party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no 13 reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. But on an issue for which the 14 opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, as is the case here, the moving party need 15 only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. 16 at 325. 17 Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the 18 pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is 19 a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The nonmoving party has the burden of 20 identifying, with reasonable particularity, the evidence that precludes summary judgment. Id. 21 “Sweeping conclusory allegations will not suffice to prevent summary judgment.” Leer v. 22 Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). If the nonmoving party fails to make the requisite 23 showing, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 24 323. 25 26 II. Claims 27 In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that defendants Hobbs and DCFS made 28 defamatory statements that injured plaintiff’s reputation and caused him to lose parental rights, 8 including custody of and visitation rights to his daughter, Kymberly. Specifically, he alleges that 2 Hobbs and DCFS made false statements in their reports, including the following: (1) that 3 Kymberly was the “aggressor” of inappropriate sexual behavior with other children at the 4 residential treatment program; (2) that plaintiff physically abused Kymberly’s mother in front 5 of the child; (3) that plaintiff had a substance abuse problem; (4) that the family trailer did not 6 have running water, a working refrigerator or toilet facilities; (5) that Kymberly said that her 7 father had engaged in sexual maltreatment of her; and (6) that there were suspicions on the part 8 of Project Pride staff that plaintiff had engaged in sexual maltreatment of Kymberly. (Am. 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 Compl. at 2 & 4–8). Plaintiff also alleges that by allowing the juvenile court judge to read these 10 allegedly defamatory statements, defendants violated his due process rights. (Id. at 8). 11 12 A. 13 Generally, “defamation” refers to the publication of false statements about a party and 14 may be alleged as a cause of action under state tort law. In California, a written defamatory 15 statement, known as “libel,” is defined as “a false and unprivileged publication by writing . . . 16 which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, or which causes him to be 17 shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.” Cal. Civ. Code, 18 § 45. Defamation Claim Arising Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 19 An allegation of defamation, without more, does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 20 § 1983, even where, as here, the alleged defamatory statements are made under color of state 21 law. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701–10 (1976); see also Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 22 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (claim of slander by police officer may allege tort claim in state 23 court, but is not cognizable in federal court because there is no violation of a federally-protected 24 right). This is so because a person’s reputation, standing alone, is not a liberty or property 25 interest protected by due process – i.e., an interest sufficient to give rise to a federal civil rights 26 action – unless it is accompanied by “some more tangible interests.” Paul, 424 U.S. at 701. In 27 defamation jurisprudence, this has become known as the “stigma plus” test. See Siegert v. 28 Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 234 (1991). 9 Alteration or extinguishment of a right or status previously recognized by state law 2 constitutes such a “tangible interest” and satisfies the “stigma plus” test. Paul, 424 U.S. at 711. 3 “[T]here is no question that parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in making 4 decisions about the care, custody, and control of their children.” Miller v. California, 355 F.3d 5 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (parents have 6 a “fundamental right” to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their 7 children). Indeed, this situation presents circumstances “sufficient to invoke the procedural 8 guarantees contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Miller, 355 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 F.3d at 1175; see Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 (“it cannot . . . be doubted that the Due Process Clause 10 of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions 11 concerning the care, custody, and control of their children”). It necessarily follows, then, that 12 parents are entitled to certain procedural protections before their fundamental right to make 13 decisions regarding the care, custody and control of their children are altered or extinguished. 14 Those procedural protections are, of course, notice and an opportunity to be heard. 15 16 B. 17 As an initial matter, the court notes that defendant Hobbs did not become involved in 18 managing Kymberly Ray’s case until long after her initial removal from the home following 19 plaintiff’s arrest for armed robbery, the filing of the juvenile dependency petition with the court, 20 the finding by the court that Kymberly was properly in its jurisdiction, the court’s ultimate 21 determination that Kymberly was a dependent child of the court, its decision to deny plaintiff 22 reunification services and transferring the matter to DCFS for monitoring. (Decl. Hobbs, ¶ 3 at 23 2.) Even plaintiff concedes as much. (See Opp. at 6 & 14). The court further notes, and 24 plaintiff “agrees[, that] defendant Hobbs did not make any of the statements contained in the 25 ‘original dependency proceeding.’” Id. at 6. Plaintiff nonetheless seeks to hold defendant 26 Hobbs liable because he “became a party when he failed to correct the unfounded allegations” 27 set forth in the dependency petition filed by Shaddick. Id. 28 Analysis of Plaintiff’s Defamation Claim against Defendant Hobbs Plaintiff cites to no authority, and the court is unaware of any, that points to a 10 constitutional duty placed on Hobbs to investigate and/or correct the allegations set forth by 2 Shaddick in the juvenile dependency petition. Given that plaintiff submitted the juvenile 3 dependency petition without contesting any of the allegations contained therein – after being 4 advised that if he did so the court would probably find the petition true – it is unclear how 5 defendant Hobbs would have been on notice that there was any dispute as to the accuracy of the 6 allegations. As noted earlier, although plaintiff alleges that seven of the eight allegations in the 7 juvenile dependency petition were not proven, he fails to point to any evidence that supports his 8 assertion.5 “Sweeping conclusory allegations will not suffice to prevent summary judgment.” 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 Leer, 844 F.2d at 634. 10 Perhaps most fatal to plaintiff’s claim is that at the first opportunity he had to dispute the 11 allegations in the juvenile dependency petition – the September 13, 2006 jurisdictional hearing 12 at which plaintiff appeared in person – he instead waived his constitutional rights and submitted 13 the petition on the basis of Shaddick’s report, implicitly conceding the truth of the allegations. 14 And, on October 3, 2006, when plaintiff again had an opportunity to dispute the allegations – 15 in person – he again failed to object to the admission of Shaddick’s reports and the information 16 contained therein. It was at this hearing that the juvenile court adjudged Kymberly a dependent 17 child of the court, denied reunification services to plaintiff, and transferred the matter to DCFS 18 – ultimately to defendant Hobbs – for monitoring. Even after defendant Hobbs became involved 19 in monitoring Kymberly’s case, the record shows plaintiff was represented by counsel at the 20 juvenile dependency proceedings and that the court adopted the findings in defendant Hobbs’ 21 written reports without any objection by plaintiff through counsel. 22 Thus, the record before the court demonstrates that after plaintiff was arrested and 23 juvenile dependency proceedings were initiated regarding Kymberly Ray, up until the time the 24 juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction over Kymberly, awarded custody to her mother and 25 terminated plaintiff’s parental rights, plaintiff received more than sufficient procedural 26 5 Had he done so, it is possible his claim against Hobbs might have presented a genuine issue for trial sufficient to survive summary judgment. See Costanich v. DSHS, 627 F.3d 1101, 28 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment where plaintiff produced evidence showing that social worker deliberately falsified evidence in a child abuse investigation and included false evidentiary statements in a supporting declaration). 27 11 1 protections guaranteed by due process. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 711. Specifically, plaintiff 2 received notice of the juvenile court dependency proceedings, appeared in person at both 3 hearings, waived his constitutional rights regarding the proceedings and submitted the petition 4 without challenging any of the evidence presented therein. On this record, plaintiff simply has failed to go beyond the pleadings and, by his own 6 affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” 7 on his defamation claim against defendant Hobbs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Due to plaintiff’s 8 failure to identify, with reasonable particularity, evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial, 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 5 defendant Hobbs is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 10 U.S. at 323.6 11 12 C. 13 Local government entities, such as DCFS, are “persons” subject to liability under 42 14 U.S.C. 1983 where official policy or custom causes a constitutional tort. Monell v. Dep’t. of 15 Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Here, plaintiff has not provided any evidence that 16 supports his conclusory allegations of liability against DCFS, specifically that any of DCFS’ 17 policies caused the alleged defamatory statements. Even if plaintiff had submitted sufficient 18 evidence to defeat summary judgment as to defendant Hobbs, DCFS cannot be held liable simply 19 because it was Hobbs’ employer. See Monell 436 U.S. at 691 (under no circumstances is there 20 respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, i.e. solely because one is responsible for 21 the actions or omissions of another). Analysis of Plaintiff’s Defamation Claim Against DCFS 22 As was the case with his allegations against defendant Hobbs, plaintiff again has failed 23 to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” on his defamation claim 24 against defendant DCFS. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Plaintiff’s “sweeping conclusory 25 allegations” against DCFS are simply insufficient to preclude summary judgment. Leer, 844 26 F.2d at 634. Due to plaintiff’s failure to identify, with reasonable particularity, evidence that any 27 28 6 The Court’s finding that defendant Hobbs is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s defamation claim obviates the need to address defendant Hobbs’ arguments regarding his entitlement to absolute or qualified immunity. 12 1 constitutional tort was the result of official DCFS policy or custom, defendant DCFS is entitled 2 to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 3 CONCLUSION 4 5 Plaintiff having failed to show that there are triable issues of material fact, defendants’ 6 motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 15) is GRANTED as to all claims against all 7 defendants, who are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 8 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 10 The clerk shall terminate the pending motion, enter judgment in favor of defendants, and close the file. IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 12 DATED: February 22, 2011 SUSAN ILLSTON United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13
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