Struggs v. Evans et al, No. 3:2008cv03909 - Document 39 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING 16 MOTION TO DISMISS. Signed by Judge Maxine M. Chesney on December 6, 2010. (mmcsec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/6/2010)
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Struggs v. Evans et al Doc. 39 1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 11 12 13 14 15 ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) WARDEN MIKE EVANS, et al., ) ) Defendants. ______________________________ ) CEDRIC LYNN STRUGGS, No. C 08-3909 MMC (PR) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS (Docket No. 16) On August 15, 2008, plaintiff, a California prisoner incarcerated at Salinas Valley 16 State Prison (“SVSP”) and proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled civil rights action under 17 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thereafter, the Court determined plaintiff’s amended complaint (“AC”) 18 stated a cognizable claim that he was denied due process in connection with a disciplinary 19 hearing. 20 Now pending before the Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss the AC pursuant to 21 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground that plaintiff’s 22 allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff has filed 23 opposition to the motion to dismiss, defendants have filed a reply, and plaintiff has filed a 24 sur-reply. For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss. 25 BACKGROUND 26 In the AC, plaintiff makes the following allegations: 27 Plaintiff was charged with a serious rules violation in connection with a riot that 28 occurred on November 25, 2007, at SVSP. (AC at 3-3A.) Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing, Dockets.Justia.com 1 which was scheduled for December 29, 2007, was postponed by the senior hearing officer, 2 defendant Lt. R.W. Fritz (“Fritz”), when plaintiff complained that he was not ready to 3 proceed because the investigating officer had “intentionally manipulated” the questions asked 4 of plaintiff and his cellmate, and plaintiff’s requested witnesses were not present at the 5 hearing. (AC at 3B-3C.) The hearing was reconvened on January 3, 2008. At the hearing, 6 plaintiff asked that he be allowed to question his witnesses, but Fritz, while conceding he had 7 told plaintiff on December 29, 2007, that plaintiff could call witnesses, denied plaintiff’s 8 request. (AC at 3C-3D.) Fritz also denied plaintiff’s request to view videotaped evidence 9 that would have shown the statements made by prison officials in their reports were 10 inaccurate. (AC at 3D.) Plaintiff was found guilty of participation in a riot and was assessed 11 ninety days forfeiture of good-time credits. (See AC Attachment “Rules Violation Report – 12 Part C” dated Jan. 3, 2008.) Plaintiff appealed the disciplinary finding of guilt. The appeal 13 was denied at all levels of review. (AC at 3D.) 14 Plaintiff then filed the instant civil rights action, in which he claims that correctional 15 officers filed, in connection with plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing, untruthful reports about the 16 riot, that those reports were relied upon to find plaintiff guilty, and that plaintiff was not 17 allowed to call witnesses and present video evidence at the disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff 18 seeks the following relief: 19 20 21 To retrain officers to conduct written reports accordingly [sic] to what they see, and not to what other officers want them to write. Dismiss Respondent(s) findings, grant plaintiff a hearing by Jury, award monetary Damages. (AC at 3-4.) 22 Upon review of the AC, the Court found plaintiff’s allegations state cognizable claims 23 for the denial of due process at his disciplinary hearing. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 24 484, 487 (1995) (holding procedural protections of due process apply where punishment 25 imposed for disciplinary infraction affects duration of sentence); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 26 U.S. 539, 564-70 (1974) (setting forth procedural requirements for disciplinary hearings); 27 Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (setting forth evidentiary requirements for 28 disciplinary hearings). 2 DISCUSSION 1 2 A. Standard of Review A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted 3 4 if the complaint does not proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on 5 its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 127 S Ct 1955, 1974 (2007). The court “must 6 accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 7 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007), but need not accept as true allegations that are legal 8 conclusions, unwarranted deductions of fact or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. 9 Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988, amended, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). 10 Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient 11 facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 12 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 13 In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must construe the complaint in the light 14 most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all factual allegations as true. See Cahill v. Liberty 15 Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Federal courts are particularly liberal in 16 construing allegations made in pro se civil rights complaints. See Thompson v. Davis, 295 17 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may not 18 consider any material outside the complaint but may consider exhibits attached thereto. See 19 Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001); Fed. 20 R. Civ. P. 10(c) (treating exhibits attached to complaint as part of complaint for purposes of 21 ruling on 12(b)(6) motion). 22 B. Analysis 23 As noted, plaintiff claims the disciplinary hearing at which he was assessed ninety 24 days of good-time credits did not comply with the requirements of due process. He seeks 25 both injunctive relief and monetary damages. 26 27 28 Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot proceed because his claims are barred by the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Under Heck, in order to state a claim for damages for an allegedly unconstitutional 3 1 conviction or term of imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness 2 would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a plaintiff asserting a violation of 42 U.S.C. 3 § 1983 must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed or declared invalid. See 4 id. at 486-87. A claim for damages arising from a conviction or sentence that has not been so 5 invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. See id. 6 Heck bars a claim of unconstitutional deprivation of time credits because such a claim 7 necessarily calls into question the lawfulness of the plaintiff’s continuing confinement, i.e., it 8 implicates the duration of the plaintiff’s sentence. See Sheldon v. Hundley, 83 F.3d 231, 233 9 (8th Cir. 1996). Heck also bars a claim for use of the wrong procedures in a disciplinary 10 hearing that resulted in the deprivation of time credits, if “the nature of the challenge to the 11 procedures [is] such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment.” Edwards v. 12 Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645 (1997). 13 Plaintiff argues his claims are not barred by Heck and its progeny because plaintiff has 14 not requested restoration of the ninety days of lost credits, and he has completed a term of 15 administrative segregation in connection with the disciplinary hearing. In support of his 16 argument, plaintiff relies on the case of Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004) (per 17 curiam), in which the United States Supreme Court held Heck did not bar a suit for monetary 18 damages where the plaintiff claimed prison officials had retaliated against him by charging 19 him with a disciplinary infraction that caused him to be held for several days in pre-hearing 20 detention. Specifically, the Supreme Court found the plaintiff’s damages claims were not 21 barred because the plaintiff was challenging only the disciplinary charge and resulting period 22 of pre-hearing detention, neither of which had resulted in the loss of good time credits. 540 23 U.S. at 753-54. In particular, while the plaintiff eventually was tried and found guilty of a 24 lesser disciplinary charge, such finding did not result in the loss of any time credits and was 25 not being challenged by the plaintiff. Id. Based on such facts, the Supreme Court concluded 26 that Heck did not bar the plaintiff’s claims, because a determination thereof would not 27 implicate the duration of the plaintiff’s sentence; thus, the plaintiff had raised no claim on 28 which habeas relief could have been granted. Id. at 754. 4 1 Defendants argue Muhammad is distinguishable from plaintiff’s claims herein, 2 because plaintiff is challenging the validity of a disciplinary finding of guilt that resulted in 3 the loss of good time credits. Consequently, defendants argue, a finding by this Court that 4 plaintiff was denied due process at his disciplinary hearing would necessarily call into 5 question the validity of the ninety-day credit forfeiture. 6 The Court finds the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards v. Balisok, 7 520 U.S. 641 (1997), dispositive of this matter. In Edwards, the plaintiff was found guilty of 8 prison infractions that resulted in the deprivation of thirty days of good-time credits. He filed 9 a civil rights action for damages, claiming his right to due process had been violated because 10 the hearing officer did not allow him to call witnesses who possessed exculpatory evidence, 11 and that the hearing officer was biased and untruthful about the nonexistence of the witness 12 statements at issue. See id. at 646-47. The Supreme Court held that even though the plaintiff 13 was not expressly seeking restoration of the lost good-time credits, his claims were barred by 14 Heck because a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of the 15 deprivation of the good-time credits. See id. at 647. Specifically, the Supreme Court found 16 the plaintiff’s claims of witness preclusion, as well as his claims of bias and deceit on the part 17 of the decision-maker, were the type of procedural defects that, if proven, would require the 18 plaintiff’s finding of guilt to be set aside. See id. at 647. 19 Here, plaintiff claims his right to due process at his disciplinary hearing was violated 20 when prison officials filed untruthful reports about the riot, those reports were relied upon by 21 the hearing officer to find plaintiff guilty, and plaintiff was not allowed to call witnesses and 22 present video evidence in his favor. Such claims, if established, would necessarily imply the 23 invalidity of plaintiff’s disciplinary proceedings and, consequently, the forfeiture of time 24 credits as well. See id.; see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974) (holding 25 prisoners have limited due process right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence 26 at disciplinary hearing); 27 Accordingly, the Court will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for 28 failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649. 5 1 The dismissal is without prejudice to plaintiff’s filing a new civil rights action under 24 2 U.S.C. § 1983 if and when his disciplinary finding of guilt is invalidated. See Trimble v. 3 City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, if plaintiff wishes to challenge 4 the decision that resulted in the forfeiture of credit, he must do so in a petition for a writ of 5 habeas corpus. See Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding habeas 6 corpus is sole remedy for challenge to deprivation of time credits). 7 8 9 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and the instant action is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to plaintiff’s filing a new civil 10 rights action if and when a cause of action accrues. 11 This order terminates Docket No. 16. 12 The Clerk shall close the file. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 15 16 DATED: December 6, 2010 _____________________________ MAXINE M. CHESNEY United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6
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