Oldright v. Curry, No. 3:2007cv03231 - Document 12 (N.D. Cal. 2011)

Court Description: ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY. Signed by Judge Maxine M. Chesney on February 2, 2011. (mmcsec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/2/2011)

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Oldright v. Curry Doc. 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 9 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 ) ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) ) B. CURRY, Warden, ) ) Respondent. ______________________________ ) WILLIAM G. OLDRIGHT, No. C 07-3231 MMC (PR) ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY On June 19, 2007, petitioner, a California prisoner incarcerated at the Correctional Training Facility at Soledad and proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a 2005 decision by the California Board of Prison Hearings (“Board”) to deny petitioner parole. Respondent filed an answer to the petition and petitioner filed a traverse. Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), which addressed important issues relating to federal habeas review of Board decisions denying parole to California state prisoners. After the parties filed supplemental briefs explaining their views of how the Hayward en banc decision applies to the facts presented in the instant petition, the United States Supreme Court filed its opinion in Swarthout v. Cooke, No. 10-333, – S. Ct. –, 2011 WL 197627 (U.S. Jan. 24, 2011), which 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 opinion clarifies the constitutionally required standard of review applicable to the claims 2 raised herein. 3 For the reasons discussed below, the petition will be denied. 4 BACKGROUND 5 In 1991, in the Superior Court of Kern County (“Superior Court”), a jury found 6 petitioner guilty of second degree murder and found the allegation of use of a firearm to be 7 true. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of eighteen years to life in state prison. The 8 judgment of conviction was affirmed on appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied 9 review. Petitioner’s third parole suitability hearing, which is the subject of the instant petition, 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 was held on November 8, 2005. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board, after discussing 12 the facts of the commitment offense with petitioner, reviewing his mental health reports as 13 well as social and criminal history, and evaluating his progress while incarcerated, found 14 petitioner was not yet suitable for parole and would pose a current unreasonable risk of 15 danger to society or threat to public safety if released from prison. (Resp’t Answer to Order 16 to Show Cause (“Answer”) Ex. C.)1 17 After he was denied parole, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 18 Superior Court, challenging the Board’s decision. In an opinion issued June 14, 2006, the 19 Superior Court denied relief, finding the Board properly applied state parole statutes and 20 regulations to reach its decision. (Ex. E.) Thereafter, the California Court of Appeal 21 summarily denied petitioner habeas relief, and the California Supreme Court denied review. 22 (Exs. F & G) 23 Petitioner next filed the instant petition, in which he claims the Board did not provide 24 him with a hearing that met the requirements of federal due process because the decision to 25 deny parole was not supported by some evidence that petitioner poses a current danger to 26 society if released, and the Board misapplied applicable state parole regulations when 27 1 28 All references herein to exhibits are to exhibits submitted by respondent in support of the Answer. 2 1 weighing the evidence on which it relied to reach its decision. DISCUSSION 2 3 A. Standard of Review 4 A federal district court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of 5 a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 6 custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 7 § 2254(a). The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on 8 the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a 9 decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 12 presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams (Terry) v. 13 Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409-13 (2000). Section 2254(d) applies to a habeas petition filed by a 14 state prisoner challenging the denial of parole. Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 15 F.3d 1123, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2006). 16 Here, as noted, the state appellate courts summarily denied petitioner relief. Thus, the 17 Superior Court was the highest state court to address the merits of petitioner’s claim in a 18 reasoned decision, and it is that decision which this Court reviews under § 2254(d). See Ylst 19 v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 20 (9th Cir. 2005). 21 B. 22 Petitioner’s Claims Under California law, prisoners serving indeterminate life sentences, like petitioner 23 herein, become eligible for parole after serving minimum terms of confinement required by 24 statute. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1078 (2005). Regardless of the length of time 25 served, “a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of 26 the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from 27 prison.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 (“CCR”), § 2402(a). In making the determination as to 28 whether a prisoner is suitable for parole, the Board must consider various factors specified by 3 1 state statute and parole regulations. In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 654 (2002); see CCR 2 § 2402(b)–(d). When a state court reviews a Board’s decision denying parole, the relevant 3 inquiry is whether “some evidence” supports the decision of the Board that the inmate poses 4 a current threat to public safety. In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, 1212 (2008). 5 As noted, petitioner claims the Board did not provide him with a hearing that met the 6 requirements of federal due process because the decision to deny parole was not supported by 7 some evidence that petitioner poses a current danger to society if released, and the Board 8 misapplied applicable state parole regulations when weighing the evidence on which it relied 9 to reach its decision. Federal habeas corpus relief is unavailable for an error of state law. Swarthout v. 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 Cooke, No. 10-333, – S. Ct. –, 2011 WL 197627 at *2 (U.S. Jan. 24, 2011). Under certain 12 circumstances, however, state law may create a liberty or property interest that is entitled to 13 the protections of federal due process. In particular, while there is “no constitutional or 14 inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a 15 valid sentence,” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 16 (1979), a state’s statutory parole scheme, if it uses mandatory language, may create a 17 presumption that parole release will be granted when, or unless, certain designated findings 18 are made, and thereby give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See id. at 19 11-12. The Ninth Circuit has determined that California law creates such a liberty interest in 20 release on parole. Cooke, 2011 WL 197627 at *2. 21 When a state creates a liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires fair procedures 22 for its vindication, and federal courts will review the application of those constitutionally 23 required procedures. Id. In the context of parole, the procedures necessary to vindicate such 24 interest are minimal: a prisoner receives adequate process when “he [is] allowed an 25 opportunity to be heard and [is] provided a statement of the reasons why parole was denied.” 26 Id. “The Constitution does not require more.” Id. 27 28 Here, the record shows petitioner received at least the process found by the Supreme Court to be adequate in Cooke. See id. (finding process adequate where petitioners “were 4 1 allowed to speak at their parole hearings and to contest the evidence against them, were 2 afforded access to their records in advance, and were notified as to the reasons why parole 3 was denied”). Specifically, the record shows that petitioner was represented by counsel at 4 the hearing (Ex. C at 2), that the Board afforded petitioner and his counsel time to review 5 documents relevant to petitioner’s case (Ex. C at 5), that petitioner discussed with the Board 6 the details of the commitment offense and other factors considered by the Board (Ex. C at 7 11-46, 54-65), that both petitioner and his counsel spoke at the hearing and advocated 8 petitioner’s release (Ex. C at 65-70), and that petitioner received a thorough explanation as to 9 why the Board denied parole (Ex. C at 71-75). Further, because California’s “some evidence” rule is not a substantive federal 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 requirement, whether the Board’s decision to deny parole was supported by some evidence of 12 petitioner’s current dangerousness is not relevant to this Court’s decision on the instant 13 petition for federal habeas corpus relief. Cooke, 2011 WL at *3. The Supreme Court has 14 made clear that the only federal right at issue herein is procedural; consequently, “it is no 15 federal concern . . . whether California’s ‘some evidence’ rule of judicial review (a procedure 16 beyond what the Constitution demands) was correctly applied.” Id. 17 As the record shows petitioner received all the process to which he was 18 constitutionally entitled, the Court finds the state court’s adjudication of petitioner’s claims 19 did not result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 20 clearly established federal law, nor did it result in a decision that was based on an 21 unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court 22 proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will 23 be denied. 24 C. 25 Certificate of Appealability A certificate of appealability will be denied as to each of petitioner’s claims. See 28 26 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a); Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases Under § 2254, Rule 11 27 (requiring district court to issue or deny certificate of appealability when entering final order 28 adverse to petitioner). Specifically, petitioner has neither made “a substantial showing of the 5 1 denial of a constitutional right,” Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 554-55 (9th Cir. 2010) 2 (en banc) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)), nor demonstrated that his claim is “debatable 3 among reasonable jurists.” Id. at 555. CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons stated above, the Court orders as follows: 6 1. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby DENIED. 7 2. A certificate of appealability is hereby DENIED. 8 The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 DATED: February 2, 2011 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 5 12 _________________________ MAXINE M. CHESNEY United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6

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