Chattman v. Davis et al, No. 3:2007cv00729 - Document 9 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY. Signed by Judge JEFFREY S. WHITE on 2/19/10. (jjo, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/19/2010)
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Chattman v. Davis et al Doc. 9 1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 11 ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY Petitioner, 9 10 No. C 07-0729 JSW (PR) KENNETH CHATTMAN, vs. RANDY GROUNDS, Respondent. 12 / 13 Petitioner, a prisoner of the State of California, has filed a habeas corpus petition 14 15 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This Court ordered Respondent1 to show cause why a writ 16 should not issue. Respondent filed an answer and a memorandum of points and 17 authorities in support of the answer. He also lodged the record with the Court. 18 Petitioner has filed a traverse. For the reasons stated below, the petition is denied on the 19 merits. 20 BACKGROUND 21 In 1984 Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder in Ventura County 22 Superior Court. He was sentenced to prison for a term of seven years to life. This 23 petition is directed to a 2004 denial of parole by the Board of Prison Terms. 24 The respondents named in the petition are J. Tilton, who Petitioner identifies as the Director of Corrections; J. Davis, who he identifies as the Chair of the Board of Parole Hearings, and B. Curry, then warden of the Correctional Training Facility (“CTF”), where Petitioner is housed. The proper respondent on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the person in charge of the facility where the habeas petitioner is housed. Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). To the extent that the order to show cause might be interpreted as directed to Tilton and Davis, it is annulled. Randy Grounds, the Acting Warden of CTF, is substituted for respondent Curry pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 25 26 27 28 Dockets.Justia.com DISCUSSION 1 2 I. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), codified 3 4 under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a state 5 prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the Petitioner is not 6 challenging his underlying state court conviction.” White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 7 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004). Under AEDPA, this Court may entertain a petition for habeas 8 relief on behalf of a California state inmate “only on the ground that he is in custody in 9 violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 10 2254(a). The writ may not be granted unless the state court’s adjudication of any claim on 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court Standard of Review 12 the merits: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 13 application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 14 the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 15 determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 16 proceeding.” Id. at § 2254(d). Under this deferential standard, federal habeas relief will 17 not be granted “simply because [this] court concludes in its independent judgment that 18 the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or 19 incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 20 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). While circuit law may provide persuasive authority in determining whether the 21 22 state court made an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, the only 23 definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the 24 holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court 25 decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 26 II. Respondent’s Claims 27 In order to preserve the issues for appeal, Respondent argues that California 28 prisoners have no liberty interest in parole, and that if they do, the only due process 2 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 1 protections available are a right to be heard and a right to be informed of the basis for the 2 denial – that is, Respondent contends there is no due process right to have the result 3 supported by sufficient evidence. Because these contentions are contrary to Ninth 4 Circuit law, they are without merit. See Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 5 2007) (applying "some evidence" standard used for disciplinary hearings as outlined in 6 Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445-455 (1985)); Sass v. California Bd. of Prison 7 Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2006) (the some evidence standard identified in 8 Hill is clearly established federal law in the parole context for purposes of § 2254(d)); 9 McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (“California’s parole scheme 10 gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.”). 11 III. 12 13 14 Petitioner’s Claims Petitioner contends that there was not “some reliable evidence” to support the denial of parole. The Ninth Circuit has held that due process requires that parole denials be 15 supported by “some evidence in the record” and not be “otherwise arbitrary.” Irons v. 16 Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying "some evidence" standard used for 17 disciplinary hearings as outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445-455 (1985)); 18 McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904 (same). Ascertaining whether the some evidence standard 19 is met “does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the 20 credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is 21 whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by 22 the [parole] board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56; see also Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. “[The] 23 some evidence standard is minimal, and assures that ‘the record is not so devoid of 24 evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise 25 arbitrary.’" Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 457). 26 It is now established under California law that the task of the Board of Parole 27 Hearings and the governor is to determine whether the prisoner would be a danger to 28 society if he or she were paroled. See In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181 (2008). The 3 1 constitutional “some evidence” requirement therefore is that there be some evidence that 2 the prisoner would be such a danger, not that there be some evidence of one or more of 3 the factors that the regulations list as factors to be considered in deciding whether to 4 grant parole. Id. at 1205-06. 5 6 7 8 9 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 13 14 15 16 The chairman of the Board read into the record, without objection, this summary of the facts of the crime, taken from a probation officer’s report: On 7/13/87, at 1630 hours, Oxnard Police Department responded to the report of shots being fired in the parking lot of Elmo’s Bright Spot Bar . . . . Officers observed the victim, L. D. Jackson, slumped over the driver’s seat with a bullet hole in his right temple. An expended 223 caliber cartridge was located near the vehicle. An autopsy was performed . . . and the cause of death was determined to be a single gunshot wound to the head. The victim apparently died instantly. Officers interviewed several witnesses who reported that prior to this incident they observed the victim . . . and Kenneth Chattman arguing in Nulg . . . Park. Jackson brandished a knife and Chattman threatened him. They both left the area a short time later. The witnesses observed Chattman and his brother, Elmo Chattman, junior, driving into the parking lot of Elmo’s Bright Spot Bar. The witnesses observed Kenneth Chattman exit the vehicle with a rifle and shoot Mr. Jackson. Chattman then returned to the vehicle and left the scene at a high rate of speed. (Ex. 4, pt. 1 at 8-9.) Petitioner agreed that this was how the crime occurred. (Id. at 9.) The nature of the offense was one basis for the Board’s conclusion that Petitioner 17 would be a danger to society if paroled. At the time of the hearing in 2004 Petitioner 18 was forty-five years old and had served a bit more than twenty-five years on his 19 indeterminate sentence of seven years to life. This significant passage of time certainly 20 reduces the evidentiary value of the offense itself, but the Court concludes that the 21 particularly calculating and callous nature of the offense – the sentencing judge called it 22 an “assassination” (id. at 16) – still is entitled to some weight; whether that would be 23 enough in itself to constitute “some evidence” need not be resolved, because the denial 24 also is supported by other evidence. There was evidence at the hearing that Petitioner 25 had failed to sufficiently participate in self-help programs, such as Alcoholics 26 Anonymous. (Id., pt. 1- pt. 2 at 28-33, 49.) There also was evidence that Petitioner had 27 a pattern of not conforming to institutional rules, although because the most recent 28 disciplinary violation report was only a minor counseling memorandum issued in April 4 1 of 2003, this ground for denial is not particularly weighty. (Id. pt. 2 at 33-35.) The 2 combination of the circumstances of the offense and these post-offense factors 3 constitutes “some evidence.” 4 5 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 6 Petitioner also contends that the evidence supporting the denial was not “reliable,” and thus that relying on it was a violation of his due process rights. The Ninth Circuit stated in McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2002), 7 that to comply with due process a parole denial must not only be supported by “some 8 evidence,” but it must have some indicia of reliability. Id. at 904. This was repeated in 9 another parole case, Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 2003). The 10 McQuillion court quoted and cited Jancsek v. Oregon Board of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389 11 (1987). McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904. In Jancsek the court held that due process requires 12 that a parole denial be supported by “some evidence,” reasoning that Superintendent v. 13 Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 456 (1985), which applied that standard to prison disciplinary 14 decisions that affected the length of the prisoner’s incarceration, should apply in parole 15 cases because grant or denial of parole also affects the length of incarceration. Id. at 16 1390. As relevant here, however, Jancsek also held, without explanation or discussion, 17 that the “some evidence” relied upon by the Board must have “some indicia of 18 reliability.” Id. Jancsek, in its turn, cited Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th 19 Cir.1987), a disciplinary case, in which the court was squarely presented with the 20 question whether “some evidence” must possess some indication of reliably, and 21 answered “yes.” Id. at 705. Cato cited two cases from other circuits, Mendoza v. Miller, 22 779 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1985), and Kyle v. Hanberry, 677 F.2d 1386 (11th Cir. 1982), as 23 support. Like McQullion, Biggs, Jancsek, and Cato, those cases did not point to a 24 Supreme Court case that imposed a reliability requirement. See Mendoza, 779 F.2d at 25 1295; Kyle, 677 F.2d at 1390-91. 26 None of the cases discussed above identified a Supreme Court case that imposed 27 the reliability requirement, and this Court has found none. As a consequence, even if the 28 evidence upon which the Board relied here did not have indicia of reliability, that lack 5 1 would not be a violation of “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 2 Supreme Court of the United States,” and thus would not be grounds for federal habeas 3 relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, the state courts’ denial of this claim was 4 not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court 5 authority. 6 IV. 7 For the Northern District of California The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have recently 8 been amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a 9 certificate of appealability in the ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 10 United States District Court Appealability 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). 11 A Petitioner may not appeal a final order in a federal habeas corpus proceeding 12 without first obtaining a certificate of appealability (formerly known as a certificate of 13 probable cause to appeal). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A judge 14 shall grant a certificate of appealability "only if the applicant has made a substantial 15 showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The certificate 16 must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. See id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district 17 court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy 18 § 2253(c) is straightforward: the Petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists 19 would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or 20 wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 21 22 For the reasons set out above, jurists of reason would not find the result debatable. A certificate of appealability will be denied. CONCLUSION 23 24 25 26 27 The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. A certificate of appealability is DENIED. The Clerk shall close the file. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: February 19, 2010. JEFFREY S. WHITE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28 G:\JSWALL\Pro-Se Prisoner\2007\Chattman729.ruling-parole.wpd 6 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 FOR THE 3 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4 5 KENNETH CHATTMAN, Case Number: CV07-00729 JSW 6 Plaintiff, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 7 v. 8 J DAVIS et al, 9 Defendant. 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 13 14 / I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California. That on February 19, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office. 15 16 17 18 Kenneth Chattman C05576 P.O. Box 689 Soledad, CA 93960 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Dated: February 19, 2010 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk By: Jennifer Ottolini, Deputy Clerk
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