(PC) Walters v. Mason et al, No. 2:2015cv00822 - Document 29 (E.D. Cal. 2017)
Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 12/11/2017 RECOMMENDING that the 1 Complaint be dismissed, without leave to amend. Referred to District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller. Objections due within 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations. (York, M)
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(PC) Walters v. Mason et al Doc. 29 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 ANDREW WALTERS, 11 Plaintiff, 12 No. 2:15-cv-0822-KJM-CMK-P vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 13 DAVID A. MASON, et al., 14 Defendants. / 15 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 16 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).1 17 As plaintiff was previously informed, the court is required to screen complaints 18 brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 19 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion 20 thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 21 granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 22 23 24 25 26 1 The undersigned originally screened plaintiff’s complaint and found his claim to be not cognizable as he is challenging the validity of his criminal conviction. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). However, in response to the findings and recommendation that this action be dismissed, plaintiff informed the court that his conviction has been reversed on appeal, and he is no longer incarcerated. As such, the prior findings and recommendation were not adopted by the District Court, and this matter was referred back to the undersigned for further proceedings. 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 2 complaints contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 3 to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and 4 directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the 6 plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 7 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts 8 by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy 9 this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by 10 law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 11 12 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS Plaintiff claims that his criminal conviction is invalid because the trial court judge 13 lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence. More specifically, he claims the court lost 14 jurisdiction over him as certain time restrictions were not complied with. He alleges the trial 15 court judge, David Mason, imposed the invalid sentence, and that the District Attorney, Sophia 16 Meyer, the probation department, Elias Fernandez, and his public defender, Willaim Briggs, each 17 assisted in the Judge’s decision to impose the sentence. He claims that his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, 18 and Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated, as well as other pendent state law claims. 19 He is asking for compensatory and special damages of an unspecified amount. 20 21 II. DISCUSSION Plaintiff’s complaint is defective in that it seeks monetary relief from defendants 22 who are immune from such relief, and names defendants who were not acting under color of state 23 law for purposes of § 1983. 24 Plaintiff alleges Judge Mason imposed an invalid sentence on him. However, 25 judges are absolutely immune from damage actions for judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction 26 of their courts. See Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). 2 1 This immunity is lost only when the judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction or performs 2 an act that is not judicial in nature. See id. Judges retain their immunity even when they are 3 accused of acting maliciously or corruptly, see Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per 4 curiam); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978), and when they are accused of acting 5 in error, see Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1999). This immunity 6 extends to the actions of court personnel when they act as “an integral part of the judicial 7 process.” See Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). Here, the 8 only facts alleged make it clear that plaintiff only challenges acts that would be within the 9 Judge’s judicial role. The complaint only alleges that the Judge imposed an invalid sentence, not 10 that the Judge acted outside his judicial role. Whether the sentence imposed is an invalid 11 sentence or not, such an act is clearly within the Judge’s judicial role even if it was erroneous. 12 There is nothing in the complaint to indicate that this case relies on the Judge’s actions outside 13 his role as a judge. Thus, he is entitled to absolute immunity from this action, which seeks only 14 damages. 15 Plaintiff also alleges Elias Fernandez from the County Probation Department 16 assisted Judge Mason in imposing the invalid sentence. It is unclear from the allegations in the 17 complaint in what manner defendant Fernandez assisted Judge Mason, but a reasonable 18 interpretation of the complaint leads to the assumption that defendant Fernandez is a probation 19 officer, who likely assisted Judge Mason by preparing a presentence or probation report which is 20 used in determining a defendant’s sentence. “[P]robation officers preparing reports for the use of 21 state courts possess an absolute judicial immunity from damage suits under [§] 1983 arising from 22 acts performed within the scope of their official duties.” Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 157 23 (9th Cir. 1986). Again, plaintiff does not allege any facts that defendant Fernandez acted outside 24 his official role in assisting Judge Mason in determining what sentence to impose. As such, 25 Defendant Fernandez is entitled to immunity as to those acts. 26 Next, plaintiff alleges defendant Meyer, a District Attorney, also assisted Judge 3 1 Mason. However, prosecutorial immunity protects eligible government officials when they are 2 acting pursuant to their official role as advocate for the state. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 3 409, 430 (1976). This immunity extends to actions during both the pre-trial and post-trial phases 4 of a case. See Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 1984). State prosecutors 5 are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for acts taken in their official capacity. See 6 Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123-25 (1997). Again, the only acts alleged have to do with the 7 sentence the court imposed on plaintiff. Any assistance defendant Meyer gave Judge Mason 8 would fall within her official prosecutorial role. Prosecutorial immunity would therefore protect 9 defendant Meyer from this action. 10 Finally, plaintiff names his public defender as a defendant for any assistance he 11 may have provided the judge. However, public defenders, in their roll as advocates, are generally 12 not considered state actors acting under color of state law for § 1983 purposes. In general, § 1983 13 imposes liability upon any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of a 14 federally protected right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person 15 who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . , 16 subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 17 jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunity secured by the 18 Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 19 other proper proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Public defenders act as an advocate 20 for their client and are not acting under color of state law for § 1983 purposes, nor are attorneys 21 appointed by the court to represent a defendant in place of the public defender. See Georgia v. 22 McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 (1992); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320-25 (1981). 23 Therefor, to the extent plaintiff has named his public defender as a defendant to this action, he 24 cannot maintain such an action against such an individual. 25 Leave to amend should only be granted if it appears possible that the defects in 26 the complaint could be corrected. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 4 1 2000) (en banc); see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se 2 litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, 3 unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 4 amendment.”) (citing Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)). Here, plaintiff fails 5 to name a defendant against whom he can maintain an action. Because it does not appear possible 6 that the deficiencies identified herein can be cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not 7 entitled to further leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire action. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 8 1131. Therefore, leave to amend should not be granted. 9 10 III. CONCLUSION Plaintiff’s complaint is defective in that it seeks monetary relief from defendants 11 who are immune from such relief, and names defendants who were not acting under color of state 12 law. As such defects are not subject to cure, no leave to amend should be granted and the court 13 should decline jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims. 14 15 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed, without leave to amend. 16 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 17 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days 18 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 19 objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of 20 objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. 21 See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 22 23 24 25 DATED: December 11, 2017 ______________________________________ CRAIG M. KELLISON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 5
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