B.O.L.T. et al v. City of Rancho Cordova et al, No. 2:2014cv01588 - Document 26 (E.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part 13 Motion to Dismiss signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr on 12/5/14. (Kaminski, H)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 B.O.L.T., an unincorporated association of motorcycle riders and enthusiasts; MARK TEMPLE, an individual; NOREEN MCNULTY, an individual; WARREN PEARL, an individual; LYLE DUVAUCHELLE, an individual; GLENN OSBORN, an individual; JEFFREY RABE, an individual; DAVID ZALITSKIY, an individual; WILLIAM LANGHORNE, an individual; THOMAS BELL, an individual; ROBERT BALTHORPE II, an individual, 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 No. 2:14-CV-01588-GEB-DAD ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DISMISSAL MOTION Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF RANCHO CORDOVA, a political subdivision of the state of California; COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, a political subdivision of the state of California; RANCHO CORDOVA POLICE DEPARTMENT, an independent legal agency of the COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO and the CITY OF RANCHO CORDOVA; SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF S DEPARTMENT; MICHAEL GOOLD, in his official capacity as the Chief of Police of the CITY OF RANCHO CORDOVA; RANCHO CORDOVA POLICE TRAFFIC SERGEANT G. LANE, in his 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 individual and official capacity as Supervisor of the Traffic Division; SCOTT R. JONES, in his official capacity as the SHERIFF of the COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO; RANCHO CORDOVA POLICE OFFICER S. CARRDOZZO (badge number 480); RANCHO CORDOVA POLICE OFFICER M. JAMES (badge number 507); RANCHO CORDOVA POLICE OFFICER S. PADGETT (badge number 1174), 8 Defendants. 9 Each 10 of the 13 Rancho 14 Department (“collectively the Entity Defendants”), Michael Goold 15 sued in his official capacity as the Chief of Police of the City 16 of Rancho Cordova, Rancho Cordova Police Traffic Sergeant G. Lane 17 sued as Supervisor of the Traffic Division in both his individual 18 and official capacities, Scott R. Jones as the Sheriff of the 19 County of Sacramento in his official capacity, Rancho Cordova 20 Police 21 Rancho Cordova Police Officer M. James sued in his individual 22 capacity, and Rancho Cordova Police Officer S. Padgett sued in 23 his 24 referenced 25 individual capacities are collectively referenced as “Individual 26 Defendants”). 28 Officer individual as S. Cardozzo capacity “Defendants” sued (all and of Sacramento in his County individual Defendants the Civil of (“Rule”) 12(b)(6): City of Rancho Cordova, County of Sacramento, Department, Rule dismissal 12 Police Federal seek Plaintiffs Cordova under parties 11 27 Complaint following are defendants Procedure Sheriff s capacity, collectively sued in their Plaintiffs Complaint contains claims alleged under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 2 1 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 2 The dismissal motion concerns the following assertions 3 in the Complaint. Plaintiffs are California residents with “class 4 M1 5 Cordova 6 (Compl. Overview ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 1.) Defendants “engaged in a 7 pattern . . . of denying Plaintiffs . . . their constitutional 8 rights . . . [by] arresting [and citing them for non-compliance 9 with California helmet law] without specific probable cause to 10 believe that the motorcyclist has actual knowledge of [his or 11 her] helmet s non-compliance” with that law. (Id.) 12 motorcycle and license[s]” the County who of “travel Sacramento through on their . . . Rancho motorcycles.” “The helmet law requires specific intent[,]” and “[a] 13 motorcyclist who is wearing a helmet that was certified [as 14 compliant with that law] by the manufacturer at the time of sale 15 must have actual knowledge of the helmet s non-conformity to be 16 guilty of violating the helmet law.” (Id. ¶¶ 53-54.) Therefore, 17 “the ticketing officer must have probable cause to believe that 18 [a motorcyclist wearing a helmet that was certified as compliant 19 when purchased, had] actual knowledge of [his or her helmet s] 20 non-conformity” before a citation is issued to the motorcyclist. 21 (Id. ¶ 56.) 22 Each Plaintiff was “at all times riding a motorcycle 23 wearing a manufacturer certified helmet,” yet was cited for a 24 helmet law violation. (Id. ¶ 62.) “[P]laintiffs. . . [lacked] 25 actual knowledge of the[ir] helmet[s ] non-conformity [with the 26 legal requirement and had no]. . . decertification information.” 27 (Id. ¶ 87.) 28 Plaintiffs allege they “have all been 3 [ticketed or] 1 arrested without probable cause” and suffered injury. (Id. ¶ 57.) 2 II. LEGAL STANDARD 3 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a [pleading] must 4 contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a 5 claim to relief that is plausible on its face. ” Ashcroft v. 6 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 7 Twombly, 8 plausible „when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 9 the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 10 liable for the misconduct alleged. ” Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 11 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “Plausibility 12 requires pleading facts, as opposed to conclusory allegations.” 13 Id. “Factual allegations must . . . 14 above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 550 U.S. 15 16 17 544, 570 (2007)). Bell Atl. Corp. v. “A claim is facially raise a right to relief III. DISCUSSION A. Statute of Limitations Defendants seek dismissal of all “claims asserted by 18 Plaintiffs 19 arguing the claims are barred by California s two-year statute of 20 limitations 21 claims accrued before July 4, 2012, which is more than two years 22 before the Complaint was filed. (Defs. Mot. Dismiss (“Mot.”) 23 4:23-5:5, ECF No 11.) Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff 24 Temple s claim that is premised on a stop occurring on December 25 1, 2009. (Id. at 5:6-8.) “Plaintiffs . . . agree the statutory 26 period is 2-years from the date of accrual (i.e. arrest).” (Pls. 27 Opp n Mot. Dismiss (“Opp n”) 5:25-26, ECF No. 17.) 28 Dalke, for McNulty, personal Bell, injury Zalutskiy actions and since Balthorpe[,]” the challenged “For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the 4 1 forum state s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, 2 along with the forum state s law regarding tolling, including 3 equitable tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is 4 inconsistent with federal law.” 5 927, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). 6 for personal injury actions is two years. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 7 335.1. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, California s statute of limitations 8 Plaintiffs Complaint reveals Dalke s claim accrued on 9 September 27, 2011 (Compl. ¶ 64); one of Temple s claims accrued 10 on December 11 February 17, 2012 (Id. ¶ 68); Bell s claim accrued on April 29, 12 2010 (Id. ¶ 73); Zalutskiy s claim accrued on June 21, 2012 (Id. 13 ¶ 74); and Balthorpe s claim accrued on October 27, 2010 (Id. ¶ 14 75). Therefore, this portion of the motion is granted. 15 B. 1, 2009 (Id. ¶ 67); McNulty s claim accrued on Plaintiff B.O.L.T. 16 Defendants argue Plaintiff B.O.L.T. s claims should be 17 dismissed because B.O.L.T. “does not claim any direct injury to 18 itself” 19 standing to sue on behalf of its members. (Mot. 8:24-25.) 20 and does not meet the requirements for associational For an organization to sue on behalf of its members, it 21 must 22 standing: “(a) its membership would otherwise have standing to 23 sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are 24 germane to the organization s purpose; and (c) neither the claim 25 asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of 26 individual members of the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. Apple Advert. 27 Comm n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 28 . . satisfy . from three requirements averments in the 5 to secure organizational “[S]tanding cannot be inferred pleadings, but rather must 1 affirmatively appear in the record.” FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of 2 Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990). 3 The Complaint lacks any allegations demonstrating 4 associational standing. Therefore, Defendants motion to dismiss 5 B.O.L.T. s claims is granted. 6 C. Official Capacity 7 Defendants Against Jones, and Defendants Goold, Jones, and Lane 8 Claims Goold, Lane each argue the 9 official capacity claims against him should be dismissed since a 10 suit against an officer in his official capacity is tantamount to 11 suing the municipality and a department thereof, thus making the 12 official capacity suit needlessly duplicative. 13 Plaintiffs counter their official capacity claims 14 should not be dismissed because Plaintiffs seek equitable relief 15 and if successful, “the injunction will have to be served on 16 [Goold, Jones and Lane] themselves, and not the county.” (Opp n 17 9:19-20.) 18 Therefore, the motion is denied. 19 D. Defendants Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department and 20 the Rancho Cordova Police Department 21 Sacramento County Sheriff s Department and the Rancho 22 Cordova Police Department seek dismissal of all claims alleged 23 against them, contending they are not subject to suit since a 24 department 25 amendable to suit for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 26 1983, and because they are redundant parties. (Mot. 7:19-21, 8:1- 27 4.) 28 of a municipality is not considered a “person” Plaintiffs have not responded to the redundancy portion 6 1 of the motion. Therefore, this portion of the dismissal motion is 2 granted. 3 E. 4 Privileges and Immunities Clause Defendants of dismissal Plaintiffs of “right Plaintiffs to travel claims 5 alleging 6 Privileges and Immunities Clause of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.” 7 (Compl. ¶ 121.) Defendants argue “Plaintiffs vaguely allege that 8 the enforcement of the Helmet Laws somehow impacts their right to 9 travel[, and] fail to present . . . facts . . . support[ing]... 10 violation seek under the this claim.” (Mot. 10:26-28.) 11 “The word travel is not found in the text of the 12 Constitution. Yet the constitutional right to travel from one 13 State to another is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence.” Saenz 14 v. 15 omitted). 16 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) (internal quotation marks The “right to travel” . . . embraces at least three different components. It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State. 17 18 19 20 21 22 Roe, Id. at 500. 23 Plaintiffs allege violation of their right to travel in 24 a conclusory manner, which is insufficient to plead plausible 25 right to travel claims. Therefore, Plaintiffs right to travel 26 claims alleged under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 27 Fourteenth Amendment are dismissed. 28 /// 7 1 F. First Amendment 2 Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs First 3 Amendment claims, arguing they are not supported by “the facts 4 contained in Plaintiffs Complaint.” (Mot. 11:11-12.) 5 Plaintiffs Complaint contains the following conclusory 6 allegations about the First Amendment claims: “Each individual 7 defendant specifically targeted Plaintiffs, and other motorcycle 8 enthusiasts, simply because of their association and/or how they 9 expressed themselves by the type of helmet they wore in violation 10 of the First Amendment.” (Compl. ¶ 135.) 11 The First Amendment protects certain “conduct intending 12 to express an idea . . . only if it is sufficiently imbued with 13 elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First 14 and Fourteenth Amendments, which means that an intent to convey a 15 particularized message is present, and the likelihood is great 16 that 17 Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 18 2010) 19 omitted). Further “[i]t is beyond debate that freedom to engage 20 in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an 21 inseparable 22 freedom of speech.” Nat l Ass n for Advancement of Colored People 23 v. State of Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958). the message (internal aspect will be understood citations, of the by quotation „liberty . those marks, . . , who view and which it.” brackets embraces 24 However, Plaintiffs conconlusory allegations fail to 25 allege plausible free speech or association claims. Therefore, 26 Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiffs First Amendment claims 27 is granted. 28 /// 8 1 G. Individual Defendants 2 1. 3 The Individual Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs 4 Fourteenth Amendment claims, arguing Plaintiffs “fail to identify 5 any conduct by the officers that implicates Fourteenth Amendment 6 protections[;]” “a plaintiff cannot invoke . . . the Fourteenth 7 Amendment 8 right if that right has explicit constitutional protection under 9 a more specific provision[;]” and “Plaintiffs expressly contend 10 that the officers are responsible for issuing them citations, 11 which 12 California law.” (Mot. 12:10-15, 17-19.) 13 Fourteenth Amendment to prosecute Plaintiffs The an allege gravamen of alleged are violation tantamount Plaintiffs of to a fundamental arrests allegations under is that 14 Plaintiffs were ticketed without probable cause, and that this 15 constituted a seizure proscribed by the Fourth Amendment. 16 A traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 17 See Del. v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). 18 has made clear that “we analyze[] the constitutionality of the 19 challenged 20 Amendment s 21 person,” “[b]ecause the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit 22 textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of 23 physically intrusive governmental conduct[; and] that Amendment, 24 not the more generalized notion of „substantive due process, 25 must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Graham v. Connor, 26 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). 27 28 [seizures] . . . solely prohibition Plaintiffs against allegations by reference unreasonable do The Supreme Court not to the seizures allege Fourth of the plausible Fourteenth Amendment claims, and rather assert that the citations 9 1 they 2 Compl. ¶¶ 46, 63-77, 84.) Accordingly, the Individual Defendants 3 motion 4 granted. received to constitute dismiss arrests Plaintiffs under California Fourteenth law. Amendment (See claims is 5 2. Qualified Immunity 6 Each Individual Defendant argues his qualified immunity 7 defense shields him 8 Plaintiffs 9 clearly established law that would have placed. . . [him] on Fourth that. . from being Amendment . claims, liability contending required is particular 12 evaluation of evidence should include prior to issuing citations 13 regarding helmet use.” (Mot. 7:5-8.) or what investigate no 11 procedure to “there for notice or w[as] to 10 manner [he] exposed that in investigation a or 14 Plaintiffs rejoin the “law was clearly established in 15 Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486 (9th Cir. 16 1996).” (Opp n 7:22-24.) 17 In Rodis v. City, Cnty. of S.F., 558 F.3d 964, 969 (9th 18 Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit summarized a holding in Easyriders 19 as 20 motorcyclist s actual knowledge that a certified helmet does not 21 comply with helmet safety laws before ticketing [him or her].” follows: 22 “[an] officer[] “The . . . officer have probable cause of a qualified immunity [affirmative defense] 23 shield[s] 24 reasonably believes that his or her conduct complies with the 25 law.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009); see also 26 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “[T]he Supreme 27 Court 28 contours has an must mandated of the from that, right personal in liability qualified [at 10 issue] when immunity must an officer cases, be the clearly 1 established . . . , 2 reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation 3 he confronted. ” 4 (9th Cir. 2013). In other words, “qualified immunity protects 5 [an] 6 reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation 7 he confronted.” Chavez v. U.S., 683 F.3d 1102, 1110 (9th Cir. 8 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). officer 9 it must be „clear to a liability each fails to show be that a to a reasonable 12 Plaintiff was ticketed without probable cause, and was “wearing a 13 manufacturer certified helmet” at the time of the citation and 14 did not have actual knowledge of the helmet s non-compliance with 15 California law. (Compl. ¶¶ 62, 87-89.) 18 Individual cause clear situation here where Plaintiffs allege in the Complaint that each each probable would 11 Therefore, believe it police 17 could movant unless 10 16 officer that Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 711 F.3d 941, 951 from Here, meaning existed Defendant s in the qualified immunity motion is denied. H. Plaintiffs’ Request for Leave to Amend 19 Lastly, Plaintiffs request in their opposition brief 20 that they be granted “leave to file an amended and supplemental 21 complaint.” (Opp n 13:9.) Plaintiffs state: 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 A supplemental pleading is required to allege relevant facts occurring after the original pleading was filed. F.R.C.P. Rule 15(d). Supplemental pleadings are favored because they enable the court to award complete relief in the same action, avoiding the costs and delays of separate suits. Therefore, absent a clear showing of prejudice to the opposing parties, they are liberally allowed. Keith v. Volpe, 858 F2d 467, 473–474 (9th Cir. 1988); Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lanahan & Reilley, LLP, 2011 WL 3741004, (ND CA 2011) (citing text)] A 11 1 supplemental pleading is designed to bring the action “up to date” and to set forth new facts affecting the controversy that have occurred since the original pleading was filed. Manning v. City of Auburn, 953 F2d 1355, 1359–1360 (11th Cir. 1992). 2 3 4 As new actions accrued after this action was filed, plaintiffs request leave to file an amended and supplemental complaint based upon these new facts, and this court s order on defendants motion. 5 6 7 8 (Id. at 13:10-23.) 9 This request is essentially a motion for leave to amend 10 under Rule 15. However, the request does not provide the notice 11 prescribed in Local Rule 230(b). Even assuming arguendo that the 12 request is considered a “related or counter-motion,” under Local 13 Rule 230(e), the request is still defective. Rule 7 prescribes, 14 in relevant part: “A request for a court order must be made by 15 motion. The motion must: . . . state with particularity the 16 grounds 17 7(b)(1)(B). Further, Local Rule 137(c) prescribes: “If filing a 18 document requires leave of court, such as an amended complaint 19 after 20 counsel shall attach the document proposed to be filed as an 21 exhibit to moving 22 Plaintiffs request 23 opposition to Defendants dismissal motion does not comply with 24 these requirements. for the seeking time to the amend order as papers for . a . matter seeking leave . to .” of course such amend 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 12 R. has leave contained Therefore, this request is denied. 25 Fed. . Civ. P. expired, . . .” within its 1 /// 2 IV. 3 For the stated CONCLUSION reasons, the motion to dismiss is 4 GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART. Plaintiffs are granted forty 5 (40) days from the date on which this order is filed to file a 6 First 7 identified here. 8 Dated: Amended Complaint addressing December 5, 2014 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13 the pleading deficiencies
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