Kaur et al v. City of Lodi et al, No. 2:2014cv00828 - Document 45 (E.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING ENTITY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr on 10/14/14. Plaintiffs are granted fourteen (14) days from the date on which this order is filed to file an amended complaint addressing the referenced deficiencies in the dismissed claims.(Mena-Sanchez, L)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 12 13 SUKHWINDER KAUR, individually and as the successor in interest for the Decedent PARMINDER SINGH SHERGILL; KULBINDER KAUR SOHOTA; SARABJIT SINGH SHERGILL, v. 15 17 18 19 20 21 ORDER GRANTING ENTITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS Plaintiffs, 14 16 No. 2:14-cv-00828-GEB-AC CITY OF LODI; CITY OF LODI POLICE DEPARTMENT; MARK HELMS, in his individual capacity as the Chief of Police for the City of Lodi; SCOTT BRATTON, in his individual capacity as a City of Lodi Police Officer; ADAM LOCKIE, in his individual capacity as a City of Lodi Police Officer; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, 22 Defendants. 23 On August 25, 2014, Defendants City of Lodi and the 24 25 City of Lodi 26 Defendants”), and Police Chief Mark Helms, filed a motion under 27 Federal 28 dismissal is sought of the portion of the fifth claim in the Rule Police of Civil Department Procedure 1 (collectively, (“Rule”) “the 12(b)(6) in entity which 1 First 2 Defendants, and dismissal of the seventh claim. Amended 3 In Complaint the in fifth (“FAC”) claim, alleged against Plaintiff the Sukhwinder interest for decedent Parminder alleges that “[t]he inadequacy” entity Kaur, 4 successor 5 (“Parminder”), 6 Defendants “custom or policy” of “training, supervising and/or 7 disciplining 8 persons 9 behind [City of Lodi Police Officers] B[ratton] and L[ockie s] 10 [„Officer Defendants ] use of excessive and deadly force against 11 P[arminder].” 12 portion 13 decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 14 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which allows a municipality to be sued under 15 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a constitutional violation stemming from 16 “inadequate training or supervision [that] was the moving force 17 behind [a constitutional] deprivation.” Sandoval v. Las Vegas 18 Metro. Police Dep t, 756 F.3d 1154, 1168 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 19 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387-90 (1989)). “For a 20 policy 21 constitutional right, the identified deficiency in the policy 22 must be closely related to the ultimate injury.” Long v. County 23 of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation 24 omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, to allege a 25 viable Monell claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate in the complaint 26 “that 27 moving 28 constitutional rights . . . [and] that the injury to [Parminder] its police suffering of to the (FAC the be from the mental 81 claim [entity force ¶ officers moving illness” (emphasis is alleged force Defendants ] behind the responsible was added), under behind policy for ECF Shergill the entity contacting moving No. force 32.) Supreme of This Court s deprivation deficiencies deprivation 2 of “the the the Singh as were of a the [Parminder s] 1 would have been avoided had the [entity Defendants] adequately 2 trained 3 general policies to guide [each Officer Defendant s] exercise of 4 [his] professionally-informed discretion” when interacting with 5 Parminder. Id. However, “Monell does not concern liability of 6 individuals.” Guillory v. County of Orange, 731 F.2d 1379, 1382 7 (9th 8 challenge the Monell claim. Although Police Chief Mark Helms has 9 filed a reply brief that contains an untimely challenge to the 10 supervisory claim alleged against him in his individual capacity, 11 that challenge is ignored because it was not timely noticed under 12 the applicable federal rule. [the Cir. Officer 1984). Defendants] Therefore, and/or Police Chief instituted Mark adequate Helms cannot 13 In the seventh claim, the same Plaintiff alleges in the 14 same capacity that the entity Defendants violated Parminder s 15 rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act 16 (“ADA”) 17 Defendants] to deal with persons suffering from mental illness,” 18 and 19 accommodation 20 unreasonable force.” (Id. ¶¶ 33, 93.) Plaintiff s allegations 21 further indicate that had the Officer Defendants been trained to 22 make 23 practices,” 24 violent 25 disability.” (Id. ¶ 92.) This ADA claim is not alleged against 26 Police Chief Mark Helms; therefore, he is not an appropriate 27 movant and is ignored. to by failing train the to “adequately Officer Defendants P[arminder] modifications the to to Officer confrontation the before entity Defendants with train[] “to Defendants P[arminder] 28 3 provide employing could [the have Officer reasonable deadly “policies “avoid[ed] because of and and a his 1 The entity Defendants dismissal motion is premised on 2 the argument that Plaintiff has not pled factual allegations from 3 which a reasonable inference could be drawn that any alleged 4 training deficiency in the entity Defendants training policy was 5 causally 6 Parminder. (See Defs. Reply Pl. s Opp n (“Defs. Reply”) 2:3-5, 7 ECF No. 38 (“Defendants seek to dismiss the ADA claim and the 8 [Monell] claims for the same fundamental reason: these claims 9 fail to plead a link between the alleged violation and the harm 10 connected either officer s decision to shoot suffered.”).) 11 12 to I. LEGAL STANDARD “In reviewing . . . [a motion to] dismiss[] . . . a 13 complaint, 14 allegations, together with all reasonable inferences, state a 15 plausible claim for relief.” United States ex rel. Cafasso v. 16 Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2011) 17 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Further, 18 19 20 21 22 23 we inquire whether the complaint s factual We accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Although factual allegations are taken as true, we do not assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Therefore, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. 24 Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations 25 omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sprewell v. 26 Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Nor is 27 the court required to accept as true allegations that are merely 28 conclusory, unwarranted deductions 4 of fact, or unreasonable 1 inferences.”). 2 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 3 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 4 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. 5 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). 6 II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS “A claim has facial plausibility when the 7 The following factual allegations pertain to the entity 8 Defendants motion. On January 25, 2014, Parminder s “sister-in- 9 law . . . called 9-1-1 to request assistance in transporting 10 [him] to the Veteran s Clinic” because his family had “concluded 11 that [he] was in need of psychiatric care and treatment.” (FAC ¶ 12 21.) When the Officer Defendants “arrived . . . at . . . the 13 [f]amily [h]ome,” Parminder s sister-in-law informed them “that 14 P[arminder] 15 needed to be transported to the Veteran s Clinic for care and 16 treatment.” 17 family that there was nothing [the Officer Defendants] could do 18 because P[arminder] was not home and had not threatened violence 19 to himself or others.” (Id. ¶ 27.) The Officer Defendants then 20 asked Parminder s sister-in-law “if P[arminder] was in the area,” 21 and 22 “P[arminder] 23 (Id.) 24 P[arminder,] they would try to talk with him.” (Id. ¶ 28.) The 25 Officer Defendants then “drove to the [p]ark.” (Id.) she was (Id. presently ¶¶ responded The 25-26.) “that routinely Officer suffering The [he] walked to Defendants from Officer may the be mental Defendants in [p]ark replied illness the in “that “told area” and the since the morning.” if they saw 26 The Officer Defendants “saw P[arminder] while he was 27 walking through the [p]ark and attempted to detain him.” (Id. ¶ 28 30.) “When the [Officer Defendants] confronted P[arminder,] he 5 1 walked away from the officers . . . towards his [f]amily [h]ome.” 2 (Id. ¶ 32.) The Officer Defendants then “followed closely behind 3 P[arminder] and repeatedly yelled at [him], demanding that [he] 4 submit to their questioning.” (Id. ¶ 34.) The Officer Defendants 5 “drew 6 P[arminder], 7 continued to walk towards his [f]amily [h]ome.” (Id.) their police-issued as he was firearms facing and from away trained them on the officers and 8 The Officer Defendants then “yelled at P[arminder] to 9 „Stop! P[arminder] responded . . . by turning around to face 10 them.” (Id. ¶ 37.) “Approximately 20 feet separated P[arminder] 11 from [the Officer Defendants] when [he] turned around to face 12 [them]. P[arminder] had his hands up and yelled „Don t shoot! ” 13 (Id. ¶ 38.) The Officer Defendants “opened fire . . . , killing 14 P[arminder],” 15 witnesses stated that P[arminder] did not charge at [the Officer 16 Defendants], 17 immediately before the shooting.” (Id. ¶ 48.) who and “was did unarmed.” not 18 present (Id. a 2:20-22.) threat to the Two “eye- officers, III. DISCUSSION 19 The entity Defendants argue the Monell claim “is 20 insufficient” since “the FAC fails to state a connection between” 21 the 22 supervision of [the entity Defendants police] officers regarding 23 contacts with person[s] suffering from mental illness” and the 24 Officer Defendants shooting of Parminder when “he was unarmed 25 and not threatening the officers.” (Defs. Mem. P.&.A. Supp. Mot. 26 Dismiss Pl. s FAC (“Defs. Mot.”) 8:10-13, 8:22-23, 10:5, ECF No. 27 33.) alleged “inadequate policy 28 6 related to the training and 1 Plaintiff counters, “maintained inter that 3 “fail[ing] 4 skills” related to “how to interact with persons suffering from 5 mental 6 Opp n”) 7:28, 6:1-6 (citing FAC ¶ 57), ECF No. 35.) Plaintiff 7 argues that by maintaining these “deficient customs or policies,” 8 the entity Defendants “subjected Parminder to a deadly encounter 9 with illness.” the Lodi (Pl. s Officer Officers Police Mem. or in entity Defendants train” customs the 2 to deficient alia, P.&A. Defendants[] Opp n who policies” the Defs. were by “necessary Mot. (“Pl. s ill-prepared [to] 10 appropriately . . . contact Parminder, as demonstrated by the 11 Officer 12 adequate justification.” (Id. 7:28-8:2 (emphasis added).) Defendants decision to kill Parminder without an 13 The entity Defendants make a similar argument regarding 14 the ADA claim, contending: “The allegations in the FAC do not 15 plead 16 disability as required by the ADA] caused [him] to suffer,” which 17 “results in a failure to state a claim.” (Defs. Mot. 7:13-17.) 18 Specifically, 19 allegation 20 failure to accommodate [Parminder s] alleged disability.” (Id. 21 7:7-8.) how 22 the failure the that to entity the accommodate Defendants [alleged] [Parminder s argue: “There injury—shooting—flows alleged is no from a Plaintiff counters, inter alia: “Parminder s death was 23 causally related 24 accommodate his disability, because, had the Officer Defendants 25 been properly trained when contacting person[s] suffering from 26 mental 27 Parminder, his death would not have resulted when he encountered 28 Officer illness to and Defendants.” the Officer employed (Pl. s Defendants those Opp n 7 skills 11:17-21.) when failure to contacting Plaintiff also 1 argues: “Had 2 because of 3 justification for shooting him and would have employed other, 4 more appropriate techniques for responding to persons suffering 5 from mental illness.” (Id. 13:25-28 (emphasis added).) the his Officer mental Defendants illness, they accommodated would not Parminder have found 6 The entity Defendants reply that “[t]he FAC fails to 7 state how accommodating [Parminder s] mental illness would have 8 changed the officer s decision to shoot him . . . [and] fails to 9 allege why if the officers had done the things the FAC alleges 10 they should have done . . . they would have not shot him. (Defs. 11 Reply 4:5-9.) 12 Plaintiff s factual allegations in the FAC are 13 insufficient to support drawing a reasonable inference that a 14 causal nexus exists between any alleged deficiency of the entity 15 Defendants 16 individuals and the shooting of Parminder, and therefore do not 17 allege the causation component of the Monell and ADA claims. See 18 Sandoval, 756 19 liability under 20 training 21 deprivation”); Head v. Glacier Nw. Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1065 (9th 22 Cir. 2005) (stating “that a motivating factor standard is the 23 appropriate 24 Plaintiff s factual allegations in the FAC establish that the 25 officers 26 justification, but fail to connect the shooting with Parminder s 27 mental illness. 28 training or F.3d regarding at 1168 Monell shot unarmed (stating requires supervision standard interacting was for and with that a “prov[ing] the causation moving in mentally municipality s that force the non-threatening ill ADA inadequate behind the context”). Parminder without Therefore, the entity Defendants dismissal motion is 8 1 granted. However, Plaintiffs are granted fourteen (14) days from 2 the 3 complaint addressing the referenced deficiencies in the dismissed 4 claims. 5 Dated: date on which this order October 14, 2014 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9 is filed to file an amended
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