Wolfenden v Rand Beers, et al, No. 2:2013cv02092 - Document 13 (E.D. Cal. 2014)

Court Description: ORDER granting 9 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction signed by District Judge Troy L. Nunley on 6/20/14. (Kaminski, H)

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Wolfenden v Rand Beers, et al Doc. 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHRISTOPHER WOLFENDEN, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 No. 2:13-cv-2092 TLN DAD v. ORDER JEH CHARLES JOHNSON, ET AL., 15 Defendant. 16 This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendants Jeh Charles Johnson,1 Mari- 17 18 Carmen Jordan, Leslie Ungerman, and Alejandro Mayorkas’s (collectively referred to as 19 “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss.2 (ECF No. 9.)3 Plaintiff Christopher Wolfenden (“Plaintiff”) 20 has filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion (ECF No. 10), and Defendants have filed a reply 21 (ECF No. 11). The Court has considered the arguments raised by both parties and for the reasons 22 set forth below hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9). 23 /// 24 1 25 26 27 28 This suit was originally brought against Rand Beers who was acting as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. On December 23, 2013, Jeh Charles Johnson was sworn in as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. Accordingly, Defendants have moved this Court to substitute Johnson as Defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). Defendants’ request is hereby GRANTED. 2 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). 3 Page numbers cited herein refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic docketing system and not those assigned by the parties. 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 I. 2 Plaintiff is a citizen of Australia and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. Factual Background 3 (Compl., ECF No. 1 at ¶ 2.) He was placed into removal proceedings following conviction for 4 driving under the influence and unlawful possession of marijuana under Nevada Revised Statutes 5 453.336. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 2.) While in removal proceedings, Plaintiff submitted multiple 6 requests to the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) requesting a prima facie finding of 7 eligibility for naturalization so that the Immigration Judge could terminate removal proceedings 8 in order to allow Plaintiff to pursue a naturalization application before the United States 9 Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 2, 13, 15.) 10 The USCIS did not respond, which led to Plaintiff filing the instant action in this Court on 11 October 9, 2013. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants, in violation of the Administrative 12 Procedures Act, 5 USC §701 et seq., are unlawfully withholding or unreasonably delaying action 13 on Plaintiff’s requests and have failed to carry out the adjudicative functions delegated to them by 14 law. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 20.) In Plaintiff’s Complaint, he requests that this Court enter an order: (1) 15 “requiring Defendants to make an affirmative communication on the [P]laintiff’s prima facie 16 eligibility for naturalization;” (2) “entering a declaratory judgment that the [P]laintiff is prima 17 facie eligible for naturalization but for the pendency of removal proceedings;” (3) “awarding 18 Plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act;” and (4) “granting 19 such further relief at law and in equity as justice may require.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 24.) 20 In response, Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss alleging that this Court lacks 21 jurisdiction to award the relief sought by Plaintiff. (ECF No. 9 at 3.) Defendants further assert 22 that because the relief sought from the USCIS is not a legally mandated duty, Plaintiff fails to 23 state a claim for which this Court can grant relief. (ECF No. 9 at 6–7.) 24 25 26 II. Legal Standards a. Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 27 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the court’s subject matter jurisdiction 28 over the claims asserted. The party seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of 2 1 establishing it. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Stock 2 West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 3 1989). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be made on 4 the grounds that the complaint fails to present such a jurisdictional basis, i.e., that the lack of 5 jurisdiction appears from the “face of the complaint,” or as a matter of fact, i.e., lack of 6 jurisdiction based on extrinsic evidence apart from the pleadings. Warren v. Fox Family 7 Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). 8 9 10 b. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain 11 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 12 662, 678–79 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give the 13 defendant fair notice of what the claim ... is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl., v. 14 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). “This simplified notice 15 pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define 16 disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 17 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 18 On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. 19 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of every 20 reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 21 Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n. 6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 22 “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 23 relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 24 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 25 for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 26 Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual 27 allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1986). 28 While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 3 1 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 2 pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 3 elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 4 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 5 statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove 6 facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the ... laws in ways that have not 7 been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 8 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 9 Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 10 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697 (quoting 11 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Only where a plaintiff has failed to “nudge[ ] [his or her] claims . . . 12 across the line from conceivable to plausible” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680. 13 While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than 14 “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility inquiry is 15 “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 16 common sense.” Id. at 679. 17 III. 18 The Court first addresses Defendants’ brief contention that this Court lacks subject matter 19 20 21 Analysis jurisdiction and subsequently addresses Defendants 12(b)(6) argument. a. Subject Matter Jurisdiction The Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) authorizes suit by “[a] person suffering legal 22 wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the 23 meaning of a relevant statute.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 61 (2004) 24 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702). Section 706 defines the scope of review stating that “the reviewing court 25 shall compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed . . .” 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 26 (West). The Supreme Court has explained that this section limits the district court’s jurisdiction 27 and precludes review where the agency’s action or inaction is not legally required, and thus 28 discretionary. See Norton, 542 U.S. at 64 (“a claim under § 706(1) can proceed only where a 4 1 plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take. 2 These limitations rule out several kinds of challenges.” (emphasis in original)). 3 Here, Plaintiff asks this Court to order the USCIS to “make an affirmative communication 4 on Plaintiff’s prima facie eligibility for naturalization.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 24(a).) Plaintiff cannot 5 provide this Court with any precedent supporting his allegation that the relief sought by Plaintiff 6 is a clear and ministerial duty. In contrast, Defendants have supplied the Court with case law 7 supporting their contention that the USCIS’s determination of Plaintiff’s naturalization eligibility 8 is discretionary due to the pending removal proceedings and thus not legally required. See 9 Sandoval-Valenzuela v. Gonzalez, No. C 08-2361 RS, 2008 WL 3916030, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10 25, 2008) (“the APA similarly also does not provide jurisdiction because USCIS [United States 11 Citizenship & Immigration Services] is not required to take action in regards to prima facie 12 eligibility determinations”); Escobar-Garfias v. Gonzales, No. 06-CV-103-BR, 2007 WL 281657, 13 at *8 (D. Or. Jan. 26, 2007) (“[T]he USCIS is not obligated under any existing regulation to issue 14 a determination as to a person’s prima facie eligibility for naturalization pursuant to § 1239.2(f) 15 when a removal proceeding is pending nor has the BIA or any court found the USCIS has a 16 mandatory duty to make such a determination under those circumstances.”); see also Fuks v. 17 Divine, No. 05 C 5666, 2006 WL 1005094, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2006) (declining to determine 18 whether the INS had a clear and ministerial duty to communicate plaintiff’s prima facie eligibility 19 to the immigration court because the court found that the claim for mandamus no longer 20 presented a live case or controversy). Accordingly, this Court finds that the relief sought by 21 Plaintiff is discretionary and thus does not authorize a cause of action under the APA. Moreover, 22 as discussed below, even if this Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this matter, it still could 23 not provide Plaintiff the relief he seeks. 24 25 b. Failure to State a Claim The Writ of Mandamus is a “ ‘drastic and extraordinary’ remedy ‘reserved for really 26 extraordinary causes.’ ” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 369 (2004) (quoting Ex parte 27 Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259–60, (1947)). In Cheney, the United States Supreme Court explained: 28 [T]he Writ is one of the most potent weapons in the judicial arsenal, 5 1 three conditions must be satisfied before it may issue. First, the party seeking issuance of the writ must have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires-a condition designed to ensure that the writ will not be used as a substitute for the regular appeals process. Second, the petitioner must satisfy the burden of showing that [his] right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable. Third, even if the first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances. 2 3 4 5 6 7 Id. at 380–81 (citations and quotations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has articulated madamus 8 relief as requiring three elements: “ ‘(1) the plaintiff’s claim is clear and certain; (2) the 9 [defendant official’s] duty is ministerial and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt; and 10 (3) no other adequate remedy is available.’ ” Johnson v. Reilly, 349 F.3d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 11 2003) (quoting R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Babbitt, 113 F.3d 1061, 1065 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1997)). 12 Moreover, even if all three elements are satisfied, the trial court retains discretion in ordering 13 mandamus relief. Indep. Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 505 (9th Cir. 1997); Oregon 14 Natural Res. Council v. Harrell, 52 F.3d 1499, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995). 15 As previously addressed, USCIS is not required to issue a determination as to a person’s 16 prima facie eligibility for naturalization pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f). See Sandoval- 17 Valenzuela v. Gonzalez, 2008 WL 3916030, at *5. Although USCIS may issue a determination 18 of eligibility, Plaintiff has been unable to provide this Court with any authority which identifies 19 that USCIS’s duty as “so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt.” Consequently, the Court 20 will not compel USCIS, through mandamus, to make a determination as to Plaintiff’s prima facie 21 eligibility for naturalization. Without any existing statutes, regulations, or court decisions finding 22 that USCIS has a mandatory duty to issue a determination as to Plaintiff’s prima facie eligibility 23 for naturalization, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss must be granted. Id. 24 IV. 25 For the aforementioned reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) is hereby 26 Conclusion GRANTED. Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is directed to CLOSE this case. 27 28 6 1 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: June 20, 2014 3 4 5 Troy L. Nunley United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7

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