Tompkins v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, No. 2:2012cv01481 - Document 16 (E.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER granting 7 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend, signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 10/1/12. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint must be filed within 20 days from the date of this Order. If Plaintiff elects not to file an Amended Complaint, the case will proceed on the original Complaint without the first and second causes of action. (Kastilahn, A)
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Tompkins v. Union Pacific Railroad Company Doc. 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BURLEY D. TOMPKINS, 12 15 2:12-cv-01481 JAM-GGH Plaintiff, 13 14 No. v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS Defendant. 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Defendant Union Pacific 18 19 Railroad Company’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss the first and 20 second causes of action (Doc. #7). 21 (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion (Doc. #9).1 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// Plaintiff Burley Tompkins 26 27 28 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for September 19, 2012. 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 I. 2 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed his complaint (Doc. #1) with this Court on 3 June 1, 2012. Plaintiff alleges seven causes of action pursuant 4 to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. §§ 5 51–60: (1) negligence in 1998; (2) negligence—deprivation of 6 medical care in 1998; (3) negligence in 2011; (4) violation of 7 the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 20301–20306; (5) 8 violation of the Federal Locomotive Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 9 20701–20703; (6) Violation of Federal Safety Regulation, 49 10 C.F.R. § 229.45; and (7) Violation of Federal Safety Regulation, 11 49 C.F.R. § 229.13. As noted above, Defendant only challenges 12 the first two claims in the instant motion. 13 A. First Cause of Action—Negligence in 1998 14 Plaintiff alleges that in or about August through October 15 1998, he was working for Defendant at Defendant’s Oroville yard 16 near Oroville, California. 17 him while he was releasing the handbrakes of an open-top gondola 18 car. 19 injury. 20 B. 21 22 During work, a trespasser startled As a result, he fell from the railcar and sustained a back Second Cause of Action—Deprivation of Medical Care in 1998 Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to timely report his 23 injury to Defendant, but Defendant’s manager harassed and 24 intimidated him by threatening to terminate him if he made an 25 on-duty injury claim. 26 prevent Plaintiff from timely filing an on-duty injury claim and 27 from seeking proper medical treatment until the statute of 28 limitations had run. Defendant intended to discourage and Defendant also prevented Plaintiff from 2 1 seeking and receiving proper medical treatment from in or about 2 August through October 1998 until about April 2010. 3 II. OPINION 4 A. Legal Standard 5 A party may move to dismiss an action for failure to state 6 a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal 7 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 8 dismiss, the court must accept the allegations in the complaint 9 as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the In considering a motion to 10 plaintiff. 11 overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 12 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). 13 are mere “legal conclusions,” however, are not entitled to the 14 assumption of truth. 15 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 16 (2007)). 17 plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 18 on its face.” 19 appropriate where the plaintiff fails to state a claim 20 supportable by a cognizable legal theory. 21 Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 22 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), Assertions that Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff needs to Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Dismissal is Balistreri v. Upon granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 23 claim, the court has discretion to allow leave to amend the 24 complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). 25 “Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not 26 appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could 27 not be saved by amendment.” 28 Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, 3 1 B. 2 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s first and second 3 causes of action for failure to plead facts that demonstrate 4 Plaintiff has satisfied the statute of limitations and for 5 failure to state a claim pursuant to FELA. 6 that the injury alleged in Plaintiff’s first and second causes 7 of action occurred in 1998 and would be barred by the three-year 8 statute of limitations unless an equitable doctrine applies. 9 Plaintiff argues that the Defendant should be estopped from Discussion Both parties agree 10 asserting the statute of limitations as a defense because 11 Defendant engaged in improper behavior by threatening him with 12 termination if he filed a claim. 13 threat of termination is insufficient to estop Defendant from 14 asserting the statute of limitations eleven years after the 15 limitations period expired. 16 Defendant responds that one FELA provides railroad employees with a private cause of 17 action for job-related injuries caused by an employer’s 18 negligence. 19 FELA claims is three years from the day the cause of action 20 accrued. 21 employee knows or has reason to know of the injury and its 22 cause. 23 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (collecting cases). 24 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60. 45 U.S.C. § 56. The statute of limitations for The cause of action accrues when an Frasure v. Union Pac. R. Co., 782 F. Supp. 477, 480 Nonetheless, this limitation period is flexible, and under 25 appropriate circumstances, it may be extended beyond three years 26 for equitable reasons. 27 U.S. 424, 427 (1965); Atkins v. Union Pac. R. Co., 685 F.2d 28 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 1982). Burnett v. New York Cent. R. Co., 380 The Ninth Circuit recognizes two 4 1 equitable doctrines: (1) equitable tolling and (2) equitable 2 estoppel. 3 (9th Cir. 1981). 4 5 See Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 696 1. Equitable Tolling Equitable tolling “may be applied if, despite all due 6 diligence, a plaintiff is unable to obtain vital information 7 bearing on the existence of his claim.” 8 Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000). 9 Santa Maria v. Pac. Defendant argues that equitable tolling does not apply. 10 Plaintiff does not respond to this argument in his opposition. 11 The Court finds that plaintiff has not pleaded facts to show 12 that Plaintiff was unable to obtain vital information. 13 Accordingly, equitable tolling is not applicable. 14 15 2. Equitable Estoppel Equitable estoppel focuses on the defendant’s affirmative 16 actions that prevent a plaintiff from filing a suit. Id. at 17 1176 (citing Naton, 649 F.2d at 696). 18 equitable estoppel applies, courts consider several factors, 19 such as whether the plaintiff actually relied on the defendant’s 20 representations, whether such reliance was reasonable, whether 21 there is evidence that the defendant’s purpose was improper, 22 whether the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that 23 its conduct was deceptive, and whether the purposes of the 24 statute of limitations have been satisfied. 25 696 (citations omitted). 26 plaintiff must plead with particularity the conduct that gives 27 rise to the estoppel. 28 Cir. 2003). To determine whether Naton, 649 F.2d at To survive a motion to dismiss, the Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 706 (9th 5 1 Plaintiff contends that threatening an employee with 2 termination to prevent the employee from filing a suit under 3 certain circumstances might be grounds for estoppel. 4 v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co., New York Cent. Sys., 355 F.2d 443, 5 444 (3d Cir. 1966). 6 Plaintiff has alleged insufficient facts to satisfy the 7 equitable estoppel factors because Plaintiff waited eleven years 8 after the expiration of the statute of limitations to file this 9 suit even though Plaintiff was not harassed or threatened in 10 11 See Longo In response, Defendant argues that those years. Even if a threat of termination were enough for equitable 12 estoppel to apply, it does not apply here because Plaintiff has 13 not alleged sufficient facts to estop Defendant from asserting 14 the statute of limitations as a defense eleven years after the 15 statute of limitations expired. 16 to remain dormant for years and does not allege that any 17 misrepresentations, misunderstandings, or threats occurred in 18 those years, equitable estoppel will not apply. 19 Union Pac. R. Co., 621 F.2d 902, 906 (8th Cir. 1980); Holifield 20 v. Cities Serv. Tanker Corp., 421 F. Supp. 131, 137 (E.D. La. 21 1976) aff’d, 552 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1977) (dismissing the 22 plaintiff’s claim because the plaintiff allowed it “to lay 23 dormant for over four years without any taint of the defendant’s 24 alleged misrepresentation or his own misunderstanding concerning 25 the injury”). 26 portion of the district court’s opinion dismissing the 27 plaintiff’s FELA claim on timeliness grounds. 28 The plaintiff argued that equitable estoppel should apply If a plaintiff allows a claim Fletcher v. In Fletcher, the Eighth Circuit affirmed that 6 621 F.2d at 907. 1 because the defendant’s agents delayed his action due to their 2 erroneous diagnoses of his injury. 3 this argument and affirming the dismissal, the Eighth Circuit 4 noted that “the railroad’s misrepresentations will not estop it 5 from asserting the statute of limitations where a substantial 6 period of time supervened after expiration of the delay caused 7 by the railroad.” 8 Accordingly, there was no equitable estoppel “simply because 9 there was no misrepresentation within three years of filing 10 suit.” 11 Id. at 906. In rejecting Id. (citing Holifield, 421 F. Supp. at 134). Id. at 907. Fletcher is instructive in this case because Plaintiff has 12 not alleged any facts showing that in the past eleven years, 13 Defendant has harassed Plaintiff or intimidated him in order to 14 discourage him from filing. 15 Defendant’s intent to discourage him from filing continued until 16 the statute of limitations had run, which was in 2001. 17 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant prevented Plaintiff from 18 seeking and receiving proper medical treatment until about April 19 2010. 20 facts that show affirmative actions by Defendant, such as 21 threats or misrepresentations, that occurred within the past 22 eleven years. 23 remain dormant. 24 after expiration of the delay caused by Defendant, Defendant is 25 not estopped from using the statute of limitations as a defense. 26 Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action are therefore 27 barred by FELA’s three-year statute of limitations unless 28 Plaintiff can allege facts to show affirmative actions by Plaintiff has only alleged that However, Plaintiff does not allege in particularity any Therefore, Plaintiff has allowed his claim to Because a substantial period of time supervened 7 1 Defendant within the past eleven years. 2 3. Failure to State a Claim under 49 C.F.R. § 225.33 3 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s second cause of 4 action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 49 5 C.F.R. § 225.33. 6 this time. The Court need not address this argument at 7 III. ORDER 8 For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion to 9 Dismiss is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff’s Amended 10 Complaint must be filed within twenty (20) days from the date of 11 this Order. 12 Complaint, the case will proceed on the original Complaint 13 without the first and second causes of action. If Plaintiff elects not to file an Amended 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 Dated: October 1, 2012 16 ____________________________ JOHN A. MENDEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8
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