Molaris et al v. County of Sierra, et al.,, No. 2:2011cv01565 - Document 24 (E.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER granting 19 Motion to Dismiss signed by Judge William B. Shubb on 1/19/12: Plaintiffs have twenty days from the date of this Order to file an amended complaint, if they can do so consistent with this Order. (Kaminski, H)
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Molaris et al v. County of Sierra, et al., Doc. 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA ----oo0oo---- 10 11 12 13 JILL MOLARIS, J.P., a minor, and M.P., a minor, by and through their guardian ad litem, MARK WOODS, 14 NO. CIV. 2:11-1565 WBS KCN Plaintiffs, 15 v. ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS 16 17 18 19 20 21 COUNTY OF SIERRA, a California Municipality, SIERRA COUNTY DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES/SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, a government agency organized and existing pursuant to the law and policy of the COUNTY OF SIERRA, CAROL ROBERTS, Director of the DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES, JAMES CURTIS, JAMES MARKS, JODI BENSON, and DOES 125, 22 23 24 25 Defendants. ________________________________/ ----oo0oo---Plaintiffs Jill Molaris and her minor children, J.P. 26 and M.P., brought this civil rights case against defendants the 27 County of Sierra, Sierra County Department of Human 28 Services/Social Services Department, Social Services Director 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Carol Roberts, county counsel James Curtis, social worker 2 supervisor James Marks, and social worker Jodi Benson based on 3 defendants’ conduct relating to Molaris’s custody of her minor 4 children. 5 federal statutory claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, 6 state statutory claims under California Civil Code sections 43, 7 52.1, and 52, and state law claims for intentional infliction of 8 emotional distress, abuse of process, negligence, invasion of 9 privacy, and denial of due process. In their First Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege Before the court is 10 defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety 11 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure 12 to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 13 To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead 14 “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 15 on its face.” 16 (2007). 17 than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” 18 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 19 (2009), and “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely 20 consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the 21 line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to 22 relief.’” 23 whether a plaintiff has stated a claim, the court must accept the 24 allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable 25 inferences in favor of the plaintiff. 26 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. 27 Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 28 (1972). Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 This “plausibility standard,” however, “asks for more Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 2 In deciding Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 1 2 3 4 5 In relevant part, § 1983 provides, Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 6 7 While § 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, it 8 provides a cause of action against any person who, under color of 9 state law, deprives an individual of federal constitutional 10 rights or limited federal statutory rights. 11 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). 12 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Because “[s]ection 1983 does not contain its own 13 statute of limitations,” “federal courts borrow the statute of 14 limitations for § 1983 claims applicable to personal injury 15 claims in the forum state.” 16 991 (9th Cir. 1999). 17 for personal injury actions is two years. 18 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). 19 claim accrues, federal law controls and thus a “claim accrues 20 when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury 21 which is the basis of the action.” TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, In California, the statute of limitations Jones v. Blanas, 393 In determining when a § 1983 TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991. 22 Here, plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on June 23 10, 2011, thus plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim must be based on alleged 24 misconduct that occurred within the two years prior to that date. 25 See Sain v. City of Bend, 309 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002) 26 (“[W]e hold that a § 1983 action is commenced in federal district 27 court for purposes of the statute of limitations when the 28 complaint is filed.”). In their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), 3 1 however, plaintiffs allege that M.P. and J.P. “were detained and 2 removed from the custody of their mother” on January 26, 2009, 3 and “declared dependents of the juvenile court” on February 26, 4 2009. 5 removal of M.P. and J.P. in January 2009 and resulting dependency 6 in February 2009 are therefore untimely and barred by the statute 7 of limitations.1 (FAC ¶¶ 29-30.) Putting aside the alleged removal of the minor children 8 9 Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims based on the in January 2009, it is unclear from the FAC whether defendants 10 engaged in any conduct within the two-year statute of limitations 11 that caused the deprivation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. 12 Specifically, while the FAC alleges various instances of 13 misconduct by defendants, such as including false information in 14 status reports, it does not allege that the misconduct caused a 15 subsequent removal of the minor children. 16 even clear from the FAC that defendants’ alleged misconduct in 17 the two years prior to this lawsuit caused the continued 18 separation of the minor children from their mother as the FAC 19 makes numerous allegations suggesting that the children were in 20 the custody of their mother at all times. In fact, it is not (See FAC ¶ 44 21 1 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiffs have neither alleged in their FAC nor argued in their cursory opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss that their claims based on the January 2009 removal are timely because the statute of limitations was tolled. See generally TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 992 (“[W]here the federal courts borrow the state statute of limitations, we also borrow the forum state’s tolling rules.”). In fact, plaintiffs do not even address the statute of limitations in their opposition. In paragraph 51 of their FAC, plaintiffs again refer to the “removal and detention of Plaintiffs J.P. and M.P.. [sic] from the care and custody of” their mother. Neither the FAC nor plaintiffs’ opposition suggest that the removal alleged in this paragraph was separate from the January 2009 removal or occurred within the two years before plaintiffs filed this lawsuit. 4 1 (“Plaintiff MOLARIS’S daughter, Plaintiff MP, received four “A+”, 2 one “A-”, and one “B+”, for the school year ending in June 2010, 3 while in the care of her mother.”); id. ¶ 47 (alleging that 4 “Plaintiff’s [sic] J.P. and M.P. were terrified that they were 5 going to be removed from their mother” based on a petition that 6 was heard on October 27, 2010); id. ¶ 50 (“On or about October 7 22, 2010, Plaintiff J.P. reported to his social worker, SW John 8 Hiatt, that he was worried about being taken away from his mom . 9 . . .”).) In their six-page opposition to defendants’ motion, 10 11 over half of which simply cuts and pastes eleven paragraphs from 12 the FAC, plaintiffs fail to even identify the constitutional 13 right at issue with regard to the alleged conduct after January 14 of 2009. 15 gives rise to plaintiffs’ claims. 16 allegations clearly supporting a plausible constitutional 17 violation occurred outside the applicable statute of limitations, 18 the court must grant defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ § 19 1983 claim as untimely. 20 complaint based on alleged misconduct that occurred during the 21 statutory period, the court expects plaintiffs to identify the 22 constitutional right giving rise to their § 1983 claim in the 23 amended complaint. 24 The court will not guess what constitutional amendment Accordingly, because the only If plaintiffs wish to file an amended Defendants also assert entitlement to absolute immunity 25 for any alleged misconduct that occurred during the two-year 26 statutory period. 27 similarity in the functions performed by social workers to the 28 functions performed by prosecutors, “social workers are entitled The Ninth Circuit has held that, based on the 5 1 to absolute immunity in performing quasi-prosecutorial functions 2 connected with the initiation and pursuit of child dependency 3 proceedings.” 4 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987). 5 extends only to functions that were entitled to absolute immunity 6 at common law, however, “the scope of absolute immunity for 7 social workers is extremely narrow.” 8 889, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, 9 Inc., 508 U.S. 429 (1993)); see also id. at 897 (“The burden is Meyers v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Because absolute immunity Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 10 on the official claiming absolute immunity to identify the 11 common-law counterpart to the function that the official asserts 12 is shielded by absolute immunity.”). For example, social workers “are not entitled to 13 14 absolute immunity from claims that they fabricated evidence 15 during an investigation or made false statements in a dependency 16 petition affidavit that they signed under penalty of perjury, 17 because such actions aren’t similar to discretionary decisions 18 about whether to prosecute.” 19 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).2 20 is dismissing plaintiffs’ FAC in its entirety, the court will 21 defer ruling on defendants’ claim of absolute immunity if and 22 until plaintiffs file an amended complaint that sufficiently Beltran v. Santa Clara Cnty., 514 Because the court 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 Defendants cite Beltran v. Santa Clara County, 491 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2007) for the proposition that “social workers are immune for their ‘actions in investigating and presenting evidence to the dependency court.’” Id. at 1101 (quoting Doe v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d 820, 825 (9th Cir. 2003)). The Ninth Circuit voted, however, to rehear Beltran en banc. The en banc decision, Beltran, 514 F.3d 907, reached the opposite conclusion and expressly overturned Doe v. Lebbos. See Beltran, 514 F.3d at 908-09. 6 1 alleges violations of a constitutional right that occurred within 2 the statutory period. 3 The lack of a timely § 1983 claim also forecloses 4 plaintiffs’ claims under §§ 1985 and 1986 and plaintiffs’ Monell 5 claim. 6 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The absence of a section 1983 deprivation of 7 rights precludes a section 1985 conspiracy claim predicated on 8 the same allegations.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 9 Trerice v. Pedersen, 769 F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985) (“This See Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1168 10 Circuit has recently adopted the broadly accepted principle that 11 a cause of action is not provided under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 absent a 12 valid claim for relief under section 1985.”); Dixon v. Wallowa 13 Cty., 336 F.3d 1013, 1021 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the 14 lack of a successful § 1983 claim “precludes section 1983 15 municipal liability regardless of whether there was a County 16 policy”). 17 dismiss those claims as well. The court must therefore grant defendants’ motion to 18 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may 19 decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law 20 claims if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which 21 it has original jurisdiction.” 22 Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) 23 (“[A] federal district court with power to hear state law claims 24 has discretion to keep, or decline to keep, them under the 25 conditions set out in § 1367(c).”). 26 deciding whether to dismiss supplemental state claims include 27 judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. 28 Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pac. Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also 7 Factors courts consider in 1 Cir. 1992). 2 eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point 3 toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining 4 state law claims.” 5 1171 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Acri, 114 6 F.3d at 1000. 7 “[I]n the usual case in which federal law claims are Reynolds v. Cnty. of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, Plaintiffs’ case has been pending for only seven 8 months, the court has yet to issue a Status (Pretrial Scheduling) 9 Order, and the pending motion is the first that has been filed in 10 the case. Plaintiffs also do not appear to regard their state 11 law claims with great importance, spending one line in their 12 opposition responding to defendants’ six pages of argument 13 attacking the sufficiency of their state law claims. 14 Opp’n at 6:17-18 (“Plaintiffs have plead sufficient facts to 15 support a violation of Civil Code Sections 43 and 52.1 against 16 defendants.”).) 17 or unusual circumstances suggesting that the court should retain 18 jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims in the absence of 19 any federal claims, the court will decline to exercise 20 supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(3) over plaintiffs’ 21 state law claims and will accordingly grant defendants’ motion to 22 dismiss those claims. (See Pls.’ As none of the parties raise any extraordinary IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 23 24 dismiss plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint in its entirety be, 25 and the same hereby is, GRANTED. Plaintiffs have twenty days from the date of this Order 26 27 /// 28 /// 8 1 to file an amended complaint, if they can do so consistent with 2 this Order. 3 4 DATED: January 19, 2012 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9
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