-EFB Boyd, Jr. et al v. Feather River Community College District et al, No. 2:2011cv00231 - Document 19 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER denying 12 Motion to Dismiss, signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 10/2011. Defendants shall file their Answer to the First Amended Complaint within 20 days of this Order. (Kastilahn, A)
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-EFB Boyd, Jr. et al v. Feather River Community College District et al Doc. 19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 14 EMORY BOYD, JR., QUINTON HANCOCK, and NICHOLOS PAGE, Plaintiffs, 15 16 17 18 19 20 v. FEATHER RIVER COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, MERLE TRUEBLOOD, JOSH WHITE, and JAMES JOHNSON, Defendants. ) Case No. 2:11-CV-0231 JAM-EFB ) ) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS ) MOTION TO DISMISS ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )_ This matter is before the Court on Defendants Feather 21 River Community College District (“FRC”), James Johnson 22 (“Johnson”), Merle Trueblood (“Trueblood”) and Joshua White 23 (“White”) (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 24 #12) Plaintiffs Emory Boyd, J.R. (“Boyd”), Quinton Hancock 25 (“Hancock”) and Nicholos Page (“Page”) (collectively 26 “Plaintiffs”) First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. #7). 27 Defendants seek to dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim 28 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Plaintiffs oppose the motion (Doc. #15). For the reasons set 2 forth below, Defendants motion is DENIED.1 3 4 I. 5 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS This action arises from allegations of racial 6 discrimination against African American football players at FRC. 7 Plaintiffs are African American, and allege that they were 8 recruited to play football on the FRC football team, paid out- 9 of-state tuition, and did all that was required of them to 10 participate in FRC s athletic program as members of the football 11 team. 12 Am. Compl., ¶¶ 10-13. The FAC alleges that Plaintiffs knew that many players 13 previously on the team received athletic scholarships to four 14 year colleges, and Plaintiffs understood that upon successful 15 completions of the FRC program (both academically and on the 16 football field) they would receive the best efforts of the 17 football coaching staff to place them at four year colleges with 18 scholarships. 19 Plaintiffs suffered racially discriminatory treatment from White 20 (the Assistant Coach), including being unfairly criticized, 21 personally insulted, verbally abused, and taunted. 22 ¶ 20. 23 favored less committed and less skilled white players over their 24 African American counterparts, gave white players more playing 25 time and more opportunities on the field, and treated them in a 26 more favorable and less hostile manner. Am. Compl., ¶ 17. However, the FAC alleges that Am. Compl., Plaintiffs allege that Johnson (the Head Coach) and White Am. Compl., ¶ 19. The 27 1 28 This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 23(g). Oral argument was originally scheduled for September 7, 2011. 2 1 FAC alleges that White s racist behavior went so far as to 2 include physical attacks on African American students, Am. 3 Compl., ¶ 22, calling African American students derogatory 4 names, Am. Compl., ¶ 25, and attempting to provoke fights with 5 them. 6 FRC Athletic Director) and Johnson were made aware of White s 7 racially hostile conduct, but failed to take corrective action. 8 Am. Compl., ¶ 21. 9 changed FRC s football team from predominantly black to Id. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that Trueblood (the Instead, between 2009-2010, Defendants 10 predominantly white, Am. Compl., ¶¶ 44-50, and in the course of 11 doing so unfairly cut Plaintiffs from the football team in order 12 to replace them with white players. 13 Plaintiffs allege that they were eligible both academically and 14 athletically to return to play football for FRC in the 2010-2011 15 season. 16 violation of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 17 Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief, compensatory, economic, and 18 punitive damages, and attorneys fees. 19 dismiss all of Plaintiffs claims in the FAC, for failure to 20 plead sufficient facts to support the claims. Am. Compl., ¶ 38. Am. Compl., ¶ 48. Plaintiffs bring claims for Defendants move to 21 22 II. OPINION 23 A. Legal Standard 24 A party may move to dismiss an action for failure to state 25 a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal 26 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 27 dismiss, the court must accept the allegations in the complaint 28 as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 3 In considering a motion to 1 plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), 2 overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 3 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). 4 are mere “legal conclusions,” however, are not entitled to the 5 assumption of truth. 6 (2009), (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 7 555 (2007)). 8 to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 9 plausible on its face.” Assertions that Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff needs Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Dismissal is 10 appropriate where the plaintiff fails to state a claim 11 supportable by a cognizable legal theory. 12 Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 13 Balistreri v. Upon granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 14 claim, the court has discretion to allow leave to amend the 15 complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). 16 “Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not 17 appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could 18 not be saved by amendment.” 19 Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). 20 21 22 23 B. Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Claims for Relief 1. Violation of Title VI- Racially Hostile Educational Environment The first claim for relief, brought against FRC, asserts 24 that Plaintiffs were subjected to a racially hostile educational 25 environment, in violation of Title VI, and that FRC did not take 26 steps to end the harassment. 27 should be dismissed because Plaintiffs failed to plead facts 28 showing that they were harassed because of their race. Defendants argue that the claim 4 Further 1 Defendants contend that the allegations of the FAC do not show 2 severe or pervasive harassment, rather, the decision to drop 3 certain players from the team, or give certain players more time 4 on the field, are personnel management decisions, not instances 5 of discrimination. 6 allegations showing that FRC was deliberately indifferent to the 7 allegations of racial harassment, or that the harassment 8 interfered with Plaintiffs educational pursuits. Lastly, Defendants argue that there are no 9 Title VI mandates that “No person in the United States 10 shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be 11 excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 12 subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 13 receiving Federal financial assistance.” 14 § 2000d. 15 Title VI, 42 U.S.C. To state a claim for damages under Title VI, a plaintiff 16 must allege that (1) the entity involved is engaging in racial 17 discrimination; and (2) the entity involved is receiving federal 18 financial assistance. 19 High School Dist., 48 F.Supp.2d 1225, 1229 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 20 plaintiff need not plead that he was an intended beneficiary of 21 the federally funded program. 22 intent at trial, it need not be plead in the complaint. 23 Monteiro v. The Tempe Union High School Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 24 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). 25 Education s guidance on Title VI, which mandates that the 26 following elements establish a violation of Title VI under the 27 hostile environment theory: (1) A racially hostile environment 28 existed; (2) the recipient had actual or constructive notice of Davison ex rel. Sims v. Santa Barbara Id. A While a plaintiff must prove Courts look to the Department of 5 1 the racially hostile environment; and (3) the recipient failed 2 to respond adequately to redress the racially hostile 3 environment. 4 1033. 5 sufficiently severe that it would interfere with the educational 6 program of a reasonable person of the same age and race as the 7 victim. 8 directed at the complainant in order to create a hostile 9 educational environment. 10 See e.g. Davison, supra; Moneteiro, 158 F.3d at Racial harassment creates a hostile environment if it is Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 1033. Racist attacks need not be Id. Here, the FAC has alleged that FRC receives federal 11 funding, Am. Compl., ¶ 11, and Plaintiffs have alleged that FRC 12 was engaging in racial discrimination, Am. Compl., ¶¶ 19-56. 13 The FAC alleges that FRC had notice of the discrimination, Am. 14 Compl., ¶ 21; ¶ 35, but failed to take steps to correct the 15 problem, Am. Compl., ¶¶ 34-36. 16 Defendants contentions that the alleged discrimination is 17 not sufficiently severe and pervasive, and that Plaintiffs have 18 not sufficiently shown a racist intent behind the hostility, are 19 premature. 20 trial. Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 1026. 21 the harassment and discrimination was racially motivated, 22 Compl., ¶ 100, and further, the Court can infer that Plaintiffs 23 were being harassed based on their race from the wealth of 24 allegations in the FAC. 25 the allegations of inferior treatment of African American 26 football players and a purging of African Americans from the 27 football team, coupled with the swearing, name-calling and 28 general hostility aimed at Plaintiffs, are sufficient to show A plaintiff does not need to prove intent until Plaintiffs have alleged that Am. At this early stage in the pleadings, 6 1 severe and pervasive racial discrimination for a hostile 2 educational environment claim. 3 Defendants also argue that the harassment did not interfere 4 with Plaintiffs education and only affected Plaintiffs ability 5 to play on the football team. 6 sufficient allegations that the harassment and discrimination 7 occurred at FRC and resulted in an environment permeated by 8 racial hostility, see e.g., Am. Compl., ¶ 27, affected Boyd s 9 ability to receive school credit for football courses, Am. However, the FAC contains 10 Compl., ¶ 66, and eventually led to Boyd dropping out, Page 11 taking online classes in South Carolina rather than stay at FRC, 12 and Hancock completing the academic program but like Boyd and 13 Page, losing the ability to pursue football scholarships at 14 four-year colleges. 15 that the hostile environment at FRC interfered with Plaintiffs 16 education. 17 claim for a racially hostile educational environment. 18 Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the first claim for relief is 19 DENIED. 20 21 2. These allegations are sufficient to show Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state a Violation of Title VI- Racial Discrimination in Education 22 The second claim for relief, brought against FRC, alleges 23 that FRC discriminated against Plaintiffs based on their race. 24 Plaintiffs assert that this discrimination was intentional, and 25 is evidenced by the deliberate change of the football team from 26 majority black to majority white, the verbal abuse and 27 discrimination directed at African American football players, 28 and FRC s deliberate indifference to the complaints of racism 7 1 and discrimination. 2 arguments for and against this claim as were made for and 3 against the first claim for relief. 4 Court finds that the FAC sufficiently alleged race 5 discrimination in violation of Title VI. 6 motion to dismiss the second claim for relief is DENIED. 7 3. 8 9 Defendants and Plaintiffs offer the same As discussed above, the Accordingly, the Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981- Intentional Discrimination in the Making of a Contract The third claim for relief, brought against Trueblood and 10 Johnson, asserts that Trueblood and Johnson interfered with 11 Plaintiffs ability to make and enforce contracts, in violation 12 of 42 U.S.C. ¶ 1981. 13 to FRC for educational services and in return FRC entered into a 14 contractual relationship to provide access to FRC programs, 15 activities and instruction. 16 Trueblood and Johnson s malicious conduct in cutting them from 17 the football team, this violated the contract formed between 18 Plaintiffs and FRC. 19 this contractual relationship with FRC, they expected equal 20 opportunity to be able to participate fully in the college s 21 athletic program on the same terms as the college s non-black 22 students. 23 players who were academically eligible. Am. Compl., ¶ 50. 24 Trueblood and Johnson had the authority from FRC to recruit or 25 reject student athletes for the football team, and used this 26 authority to change the usual policy in a racially 27 discriminatory manner, preventing Plaintiffs from returning to 28 the football team and obtaining the benefits that they expected Plaintiffs allege that they paid tuition Am. Compl., ¶ 117. Because of Plaintiffs argue that when they entered In the past, the policy was to accept all returning 8 1 from attendance at FRC. 2 Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not alleged (and 3 cannot allege) that they had a contract to play football, and 4 therefore, being cut from the team did not violate any contract 5 rights. 6 the end of the academic year that they would be contacted if 7 they were invited back to play on the team a second year, 8 Defendants assert that this clearly shows the lack of either an 9 express or implied contract involving participation on the Because the FAC alleges that Plaintiffs were told at 10 football team. Plaintiffs payments to FRC were in exchange for 11 academic instruction, and Defendants note there are no 12 allegations that they were denied academic instruction. 13 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides: 14 17 That all persons shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens. The statute defines, makes and enforces contracts to include the making, performance, modification and termination of a contract, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual relationship. 18 Flores v. Von Kleist, 739 F.Supp.2d 1236, 1256 (E.D. Cal. 2010) 19 (internal citations omitted). 20 1981 a plaintiff must identify an “impaired contractual 21 relation,” by showing that intentional racial discrimination 22 prevented the creation of a contractual relationship or impaired 23 an existing contractual relationship. 24 WL 2803037, *4 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2010) (internal citations 25 omitted). 26 for purposes of Section 1981. 27 172 (1976); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 n.23 (2003). 28 Section 1981 s protection extends to college athletics. 15 16 To state a claim under Section Schiff v. Barrett, 2010 A contract for educational services is a “contract” Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 9 Pryor 1 v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass n., 288 F. 3d 548 (3rd. Cir. 2 2002). 3 stated a claim under Section 1981 when they alleged that the 4 National Collegiate Athletic Association s rules regarding 5 academic eligibility to receive athletic scholarships was 6 discriminatory towards African American student-athletes and 7 interfered with their rights under contract. 8 alleged discriminatory academic eligibility rule adopted by the 9 NCAA, the plaintiffs in Pryor were unable to reap the benefits In Pryor, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs had Because of the 10 of their contracts, as they were prohibited from playing a sport 11 during their freshman year and consequently denied their 12 promised athletic scholarships. 13 Pryor had actually signed contracts (National Letters of Intent) 14 to play a sport at their respective colleges and receive an 15 athletic scholarship, therefore Defendants argue that it is 16 distinguishable from the present case. 17 have believed that they would be invited back to play football 18 for a second year, the FAC does not allege that any contract to 19 that effect existed. 20 receiving athletic scholarships to play football at FRC. 21 Further, Plaintiffs do not allege that they were denied 22 admission to FRC or denied academic instruction. 23 However, the plaintiffs in While Plaintiffs may Nor have Plaintiffs alleged that they were Plaintiffs do however allege that because of a change in 24 policy (the decision not to invite back all academically 25 eligible football players to be on the team) they were denied 26 the benefits of the contract they formed with FRC, in which FRC, 27 Johnson and Trueblood contracted to provide equal opportunities 28 and benefits to Plaintiffs. Am. Compl., ¶ 54. 10 Instead, the 1 team roster was limited and Plaintiffs were cut as part of an 2 intentional, racially discriminatory, effort by Defendants to 3 reduce the number of African American football players on the 4 FRC team. 5 at this stage of the pleadings to show that Plaintiffs were 6 denied the benefits that they contracted for. 7 already found that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that 8 Defendants had intent to discriminate under Title VI, and the 9 intentional discrimination analysis is the same under Title VI Am. Compl., ¶ 51. These allegations are sufficient 10 and Section 1981. 11 sufficiently stated a claim for violation of Section 1981. 12 motion to dismiss the third claim for relief is DENIED. 13 4. 14 Pryor, supra. The Court has Accordingly, Plaintiffs have The Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983- Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 15 The fourth claim for relief, brought against Trueblood and 16 Johnson, alleges that Trueblood and Johnson violated Plaintiffs 17 rights under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth 18 Amendment, by treating black student-athletes differently than 19 white student-athletes. 20 student athletes were treated worse than non-black athletes. 21 Specifically, Trueblood is alleged to have announced his 22 intention to “change the face” of the football team, desiring 23 fewer African American and more whites on the team. 24 ¶ 45. 25 implemented a policy of ridding the team of African American 26 players (including Plaintiffs) and replacing them with white 27 players. 28 done with the intent to discriminate against African Americans. The FAC alleges that African American Am. Compl., Trueblood, along with Johnson, are alleged to have Am. Compl., ¶¶ 45-50. Plaintiffs assert that this was 11 1 As a result of the discrimination, Plaintiffs allege they 2 suffered emotional distress and anxiety. 3 Defendants argue that the allegations against Trueblood and 4 Johnson are insufficient to show purposeful acts of 5 discrimination. Simply because more African American football 6 players were cut from the team than football players of other 7 ethnicities, Defendants argue this does not show intentional 8 discrimination giving rise to an equal protection claim. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 To prevail in a Section 1983 civil action against state actors for the deprivation of: Rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants (2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities and (4) caused him damage. Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. Accordingly, the conduct complained of must have deprived the plaintiff of some right, privilege or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 17 Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 18 2005) (internal citations omitted). 19 The “Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 20 commands that no State shall „deny to any person within its 21 jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, which is 22 essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated 23 should be treated alike.” 24 Ctr, Inc. 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (internal citations omitted). 25 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the 26 Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff 27 “must show that the defendant acted with an intent or purpose to 28 discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 12 1 protected class.” 2 Elementary Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1748793, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3 18, 2009). 4 four separate elements: (1) that the defendants treated 5 plaintiff differently from others similarly situated; (2) this 6 unequal treatment was based on an impermissible classification; 7 (3) the defendants acted with discriminatory intent in applying 8 this classification; and (4) plaintiff suffered injury as a 9 result of the discriminatory classification. 10 T.A. ex rel. Amador v. McSwain Union A plaintiff may satisfy this showing by alleging Id. At this stage in the pleadings, when the Court must accept 11 as true the allegations of the FAC and draw all reasonable 12 inferences in Plaintiffs favor, the FAC sufficiently alleges a 13 violation of Section 1983. 14 were discriminatorily cut from the team, along with numerous 15 other African American players, and that white students were not 16 rejected from the team in this manner. 17 Plaintiffs have alleged that the discrimination was intentional, 18 and the allegations of the FAC regarding the high number of 19 black students cut from the team in comparison to the number of 20 white students cut from the team supports the allegations of 21 discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause. 22 Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the fourth claim for relief 23 is DENIED. 24 25 26 5. Plaintiffs have alleged that they Am. Compl., ¶¶ 46-48. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981- Intentional Discrimination in the Making of a Contract The fifth claim for relief, brought against White, alleges 27 that White s discriminatory treatment of African American 28 student-athletes violated the Plaintiffs contract rights under 13 1 Section 1981. 2 FRC for educational services, FRC, and by extension White, 3 entered into a contractual relationship with each plaintiff. 4 Am. Compl., ¶ 128. In rendering these services in a 5 discriminatory, harassing and hostile manner towards African 6 American students, White violated Section 1981 s mandate against 7 discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. 8 Compl., ¶¶ 129-131. 9 this claim for relief as were raised against the third claim for 10 Plaintiffs allege that when they paid tuition to Am. Defendants raise the same arguments against relief, that no contract to play football existed. 11 However, the claim against White is not that he denied 12 Plaintiffs the ability to play football, but that when they 13 participated in FRC s football program he intentionally treated 14 them with racial hostility and discrimination. 15 above, a contract for purposes of Section 1981 for services 16 exists between schools and the students. 17 172; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275 n.23. 18 harassment impaired an existing contractual relationship, 19 preventing Plaintiffs from full and equal access to the benefits 20 of their contracts with FRC. 21 facts to state a claim that White violated their rights under 22 Section 1981, accordingly, the motion to dismiss the fifth claim 23 for relief is DENIED. 24 6. 25 26 As discussed Runyon, 427 U.S. at White s discrimination and Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983- Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment The sixth claim for relief, brought against White, alleges 27 that by intentionally treating black students differently and 28 worse than non-black students, White violated the equal 14 1 Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 the same arguments for dismissal of the sixth claim for relief 3 that they raised for dismissal of the fourth claim, that 4 Plaintiffs fail to show intentional discrimination. 5 already discussed above, the allegations against White are 6 sufficient to show intentional discrimination. 7 meet the necessary elements of an equal protection claim, as 8 discussed in the Court s analysis of the fourth claim. 9 Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the sixth claim for relief is 10 Defendants raise However, as The allegations DENIED. 11 12 13 III. ORDER For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss is 14 DENIED. Defendants shall file their Answer to the First Amended 15 Complaint within twenty (20) days of this Order. 16 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: October 20, 2011 ____________________________ JOHN A. MENDEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15
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