-JFM Johnson v. Green Roof Real Estate, LLC, No. 2:2011cv00031 - Document 20 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge John F. Moulds on 11/7/11 RECOMMENDING that Plaintiff's motion for default judgment as to defendants on plaintiff's ADA claim and Unruh Civil Rights Act claim be granted; Plaintiff be awarded statutory damages in the amount of $8,000.00; Plaintiff be granted an injunction requiring defendants to provide properlyconfigured disabled parking space(s) including a van accessible disabled parking space, accessible route, accessible entrance, accessibility signage and striping in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG) contained in 28 CFR Part 36; and The Clerk of the Court be directed to close this case. Referred to Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr; Objections due within 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations. (Becknal, R)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
-JFM Johnson v. Green Roof Real Estate, LLC Doc. 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 SCOTT N. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, 11 No. 2:11-cv-0031-GEB-JFM vs. 12 GREEN ROOF REAL ESTATE, LLC, 13 Defendant. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS / 14 Pending before the court is plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against 15 16 defendant Green Roof Real Estate, LLC, owners of Pinecrest Apartments, an apartment complex 17 with a leasing office located at 2228 Edison Avenue, Sacramento, California. Upon review of 18 the docket, the motion for default judgment and all attached exhibits, THE COURT FINDS AS 19 FOLLOWS: 20 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff initiated this action on January 3, 2011, alleging violations of the 21 22 Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., and the California Unruh 23 Civil Rights Act. A certificate of service filed April 20, 2011 demonstrates that the summons 24 and complaint were served on defendant on April 1, 2011 by delivering a copy to Glady Fang, 25 defendant’s agent for service, at 1200 Safreno Way, Pleasanton, CA 94566. Doc. No. 7. 26 ///// 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 On July 5, 2011, pursuant to plaintiff’s request, the Clerk of Court entered the 2 default of defendants. On September 2, 2011, plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment, and 3 served a copy of the motion by mail on the defendants. 4 DISCUSSION 5 It is within the sound discretion of the district court to grant or deny an 6 application for default judgment. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In 7 making this determination, the court considers the following factors: 8 10 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning the material facts, (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 11 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). “In applying this discretionary 12 standard, default judgments are more often granted than denied.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. 13 Castworld Products, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting PepsiCo, Inc. v. 14 Triunfo-Mex, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 431, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1999)). 9 As a general rule, once default is entered, the factual allegations of the complaint 15 16 are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. Tele Video Systems, Inc. v. 17 Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). However, although 18 well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are admitted by defendant’s failure to respond, 19 “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not 20 established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992). 21 A. 22 The Americans with Disabilities Act Title III of the ADA provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against 23 on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 24 privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person 25 who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. 26 § 12182(a). Discrimination includes “a failure to remove architectural barriers ... in existing 2 1 facilities ... where such removal is readily achievable .” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). Under the 2 ADA, the term readily achievable means “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out 3 without much difficulty or expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9). 4 “To prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) 5 [he] is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, 6 leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public 7 accommodations by the defendant because of her disability.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 8 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). Further, “[t]o succeed on a ADA claim of discrimination on 9 account of one's disability due to an architectural barrier, the plaintiff must also prove that: (1) 10 the existing facility at the defendant's place of business presents an architectural barrier 11 prohibited under the ADA, and (2) the removal of the barrier is readily achievable.” Parr v. L & 12 L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1085 (D. Haw. 2000). 13 Although “[t]he Ninth Circuit has yet to rule on whether the plaintiff or defendant 14 bears the burden of proof in showing that removal of an architectural barrier is readily 15 achievable,” the Circuit, and various district courts throughout the Circuit, have often applied the 16 burden-shifting framework set forth in Colorado Cross Disability Coalition v. Hermanson 17 Family, Ltd., 264 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 2001); Vesecky v. Garick, Inc., 2008 WL 4446714, at *2 18 (D. Ariz. Sept.30, 2008) (citing Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 506 F.3d 1191, 1202 (9th Cir. 2007) and 19 various district court cases). In Colorado Cross, the Tenth Circuit stated that the “[p]laintiff 20 bears the initial burden of production to present evidence that a suggested method of barrier 21 removal is readily achievable” and that if plaintiff meets that burden, the burden shifts to the 22 defendant, who “bears the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding its affirmative defense that a 23 suggested method of barrier removal is not readily achievable.” Colo. Cross Disability Coal., 24 264 F.3d at 1006. 25 26 Recently, in Molski v. Foley Estates Vineyard and Winery, LLC, 531 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2008), the Circuit addressed Colorado Cross directly for the first time. The court 3 1 declined to apply Colorado Cross’s burden-shifting framework in the context of barrier removal 2 from within historic buildings and instead placed the burden squarely on the defendant. The 3 court reasoned that by requiring “the entity undertaking alterations [to] consult with the State 4 Historic Preservation Officer,” the ADA guidelines for historic buildings place the burden on the 5 “party with the best access to information regarding the historical significance of the building” 6 rather than “on the party advocating for remedial measures.” 531 F.3d at 1048. 7 In a recent opinion addressing both Colorado Cross and Molski, the District of 8 Arizona stated that while it was “mindful of the informational imbalance that may exist between 9 plaintiffs and defendants with respect to the ease and cost with which architectural barriers may 10 be removed ... until the Ninth Circuit provides additional and specific instruction to the lower 11 courts [it] will follow the overwhelming majority of federal courts that apply the burden-shifting 12 framework of Colo. Cross, specifically in cases where a historic building is not at issue.” 13 Vesecky, 2008 WL 4446714, at *2. This court agrees, especially in the context of a default 14 judgment proceeding in which defendant has not appeared. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9). 15 Here, plaintiff alleges (1) that he is disabled, Compl. ¶ 1; (2) that defendant’s 16 business is a place of public accommodation1, id. ¶ 2; (3) that plaintiff was denied access to 17 defendant’s business because of plaintiff's disability, id. ¶ 4; and (4) that defendant’s business 18 has architectural barriers (lack of properly configured disabled parking space(s) including a van 19 accessible disabled parking space, accessible route, accessible entrance, accessibility signage and 20 striping), id. Additionally, plaintiff alleges that these architectural barriers are readily 21 removable. Id. ¶ 4. His complaint also specifically states that he seeks injunctive relief “to 22 remove all barriers to access which are readily achievable....” Id. ¶ 4. Therefore, the injunction 23 1 24 25 26 Although the residential facilities of an apartment complex are not subject to the ADA, the leasing office is a place of public accommodation. See, e.g., Beveridge v. CRS Cambridge Court Housing Corp., 2009 WL 798942 (D. Ariz. 2009) (“the Americans with Disabilities Act does not apply to private rental facilities”); ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual (a rental office located within a private residential complex is a place of public accommodation that is subject to the ADA). 4 1 would only require defendant to remove the architectural barriers if it is readily achievable to do 2 so. Moreover, 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b) specifically lists “[c]reating designated accessible parking 3 spaces” and “[w]idening doors” as examples of typical “steps to remove barriers.” 4 Because plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true on default, the court finds that 5 plaintiff has made out a prima facie Title III discrimination claim. Additionally, the court finds 6 that the majority of the Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment to plaintiff on 7 that claim. Therefore, the court recommends that plaintiff be granted default judgment against 8 defendants on his ADA claim and award plaintiff an injunction requiring defendants to provide 9 properly configured disabled parking space(s) including a van accessible disabled parking space, 10 accessible route, accessible entrance, accessibility signage and striping in accordance with the 11 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act 12 Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG) contained in 28 CFR Part 36. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) 13 (authorizing injunctions under the ADA). 14 B. 15 Unruh Civil Rights Act The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides: “All persons within the jurisdiction of this 16 state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national 17 origin, disability, medical condition, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full 18 and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business 19 establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). To prevail on his disability 20 discrimination claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, plaintiff must establish that (1) he was 21 denied the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in a 22 business establishment; (2) his disability was a motivating factor for this denial; (3) defendants 23 denied plaintiff the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services; 24 and (4) defendants' wrongful conduct caused plaintiff to suffer injury, damage, loss or harm. 25 California Civil Jury Instructions (BAJI), No. 7.92 (Spring 2009). A plaintiff who establishes a 26 violation of the ADA need not prove intentional discrimination under the Unruh Act. See 5 1 Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 46 Cal.4th 661 (Cal. 2009) (interpreting Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f), which 2 provides “A violation of the right of any individual under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 3 1990 (Public Law 101-336) shall also constitute a violation of this section”). 4 Here, because plaintiff’s complaint properly sets out the necessary elements for 5 his ADA claim, plaintiff has also properly set out the necessary elements for his Unruh Civil 6 Rights Act claim. Therefore, and because there are no policy considerations which preclude the 7 entry of default judgment on this claim, Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72, the court will recommend 8 that plaintiff's motion for default judgment on his Unruh Civil Rights Act claim be granted. 9 The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides for a minimum statutory damage amount of 10 $4,000 per violation, and “any attorney's fees that may be determined by the court in addition 11 thereto.” Id. § 52(a). Plaintiff seeks $8,000 in damages for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights 12 Act, based on two actual visits to defendants’ property. Compl. ¶ 4. The court will recommend 13 that plaintiff be awarded those statutory damages. Plaintiff does not seek attorney fees or 14 litigation costs. 15 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 16 1. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment as to defendants on plaintiff’s ADA 17 claim and Unruh Civil Rights Act claim be granted. 18 2. Plaintiff be awarded statutory damages in the amount of $8,000.00; 19 3. Plaintiff be granted an injunction requiring defendants to provide properly 20 configured disabled parking space(s) including a van accessible disabled parking space, 21 accessible route, accessible entrance, accessibility signage and striping in accordance with the 22 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act 23 Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG) contained in 28 CFR Part 36; and 24 4. The Clerk of the Court be directed to close this case. 25 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 26 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen 6 1 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 2 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 3 “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 4 within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 5 Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 6 DATED: November 7, 2011. 7 8 9 10 /014;john0031.mdj 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 7
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
