(HC) Sanders v. Swarthout et al, No. 2:2010cv02470 - Document 13 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Edmund F. Brennan on 3/23/11 RECOMMENDING that 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied; referred to Judge John A. Mendez; Objections to F&R due within 14 days. (Dillon, M)
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(HC) Sanders v. Swarthout et al Doc. 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 KEVIN SANDERS, 11 12 13 14 15 16 Petitioner, No. CIV S-10-2470 JAM EFB P vs. GARY SWARTHOUT, et al., Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS / Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with a petition for a writ of 17 habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges the decision of the California Board 18 of Parole Hearings (hereinafter “Board”) to deny him parole at a parole consideration hearing 19 held on August 6, 2009. He claims that the Board’s 2009 decision finding him unsuitable for 20 parole violated his federal right to due process and the Ex Post Facto Clause. 21 As discussed below, the United States Supreme Court has held that the only inquiry on 22 federal habeas review of a denial of parole is whether the petitioner has received “fair 23 procedures” for vindication of the liberty interest in parole given by the state. Swarthout v. 24 Cooke, 562 U.S. ___, No. 10-333, 2011 WL 197627, at *2 (Jan. 24, 2011) (per curiam). In the 25 context of a California parole suitability hearing, a petitioner receives adequate process when 26 he/she is allowed an opportunity to be heard and a statement of the reasons why parole was 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 denied. Id. at **2-3 (federal due process satisfied where petitioners were “allowed to speak at 2 their parole hearings and to contest the evidence against them, were afforded access to their 3 records in advance, and were notified as to the reasons why parole was denied”); see also 4 Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979). For the reasons that follow, 5 applying this standard here requires that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied on 6 petitioner’s due process claim. 7 I. Procedural Background 8 9 Petitioner is confined pursuant to a 1995 judgment of conviction entered against him in the Alameda County Superior Court following his conviction on a charge of second degree 10 murder. Pet. at 1.1 Pursuant to that conviction, petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years to life in 11 state prison. Id. 12 The parole consideration hearing that is placed at issue by the instant petition was held on 13 August 6, 2009. Petitioner appeared at and participated in the hearing. Id. at 44-136. Following 14 deliberations held at the conclusion of the hearing, the Board panel announced their decision to 15 deny petitioner parole for seven years and the reasons for that decision. Id. at 138-52. 16 Petitioner challenged the Board’s 2009 decision in a petition for writ of habeas corpus 17 filed in the Alameda County Superior Court. Answer, Ex. A. The Superior Court denied that 18 petition in a decision on the merits of petitioner’s claims. Pet. at 33-37. Petitioner subsequently 19 challenged the Board’s 2009 decision in a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the 20 California Court of Appeal and a petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court. 21 Answer, Exs. B, C. Those petitions were summarily denied. Pet. at 39, 40. 22 II. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 23 24 An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 25 1 26 Page number citations such as these are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties. 2 1 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 2 application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 3 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000). 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas corpus relief: An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 12 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 13 Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established 14 United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set 15 forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable 16 from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different result. Early v. 17 Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406 (2000)). 18 Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court 19 may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the 20 Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s 21 case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because 22 that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied 23 clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 24 unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (internal 25 citations omitted) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the 26 legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”). “A state 3 1 court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 2 ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington 3 v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). 4 III. Petitioner’s Claims 5 A. Due Process 6 Petitioner’s first claim is that the Board’s 2009 decision finding him unsuitable for parole 7 violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because it was not based on “some 8 evidence” that he posed a current risk of danger if released from prison. Pet. at 9-23. 9 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action that 10 deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. A litigant alleging a 11 due process violation must first demonstrate that he was deprived of a liberty or property interest 12 protected by the Due Process Clause and then show that the procedures attendant upon the 13 deprivation were not constitutionally sufficient. Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 14 490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989). 15 A protected liberty interest may arise from either the Due Process Clause of the United 16 States Constitution “by reason of guarantees implicit in the word ‘liberty,’” or from “an 17 expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 18 (2005) (citations omitted). See also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). The 19 United States Constitution does not, of its own force, create a protected liberty interest in a 20 parole date, even one that has been set. Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17-21 (1981); 21 Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (There is “no constitutional or 22 inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid 23 sentence.”); see also Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 24 However, “a state’s statutory scheme, if it uses mandatory language, ‘creates a presumption that 25 parole release will be granted’ when or unless certain designated findings are made, and thereby 26 gives rise to a constitutional liberty interest.” Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12. See also Allen, 482 4 1 U.S. at 376-78. California’s parole scheme2 gives rise to a liberty interest in parole protected by the 2 3 federal due process clause. McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902-03 (9th Cir. 2002) 4 (“California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.”); see 5 Swarthout v. Cooke, No. 10-333, 562 U.S. ___, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 1067, *5-6 (Jan. 24, 2011) 6 (per curiam) (stating that the Ninth Circuit’s determination that California’s parole law creates a 7 liberty interest protected by the federal due process clause “is a reasonable application of our 8 cases.”). However, the United States Supreme Court has held that correct application of 9 California’s “some evidence” standard is not required by the federal Due Process Clause. 10 Swarthout, 2011 WL 197627, at *2. Rather, this court’s review is limited to the narrow question 11 of whether the petitioner has received adequate process for seeking parole. Id. at *3. (“Because 12 the only federal right at issue is procedural, the relevant inquiry is what process [petitioner] 13 received, not whether the state court decided the case correctly.”) Adequate process is provided 14 when the inmate is allowed a meaningful opportunity to be heard and a statement of the reasons 15 why parole was denied. Id. at **2-3 (federal due process satisfied where petitioners were 16 “allowed to speak at their parole hearings and to contest the evidence against them, were 17 afforded access to their records in advance, and were notified as to the reasons why parole was 18 denied”); see also Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16. 19 Here, the record reflects that petitioner was present at the 2009 parole hearing, that he 20 participated in the hearing, and that he was provided with the reasons for the Board’s decision to 21 deny parole. Pursuant to Swarthout, this is all that due process requires. Accordingly, petitioner 22 is not entitled to relief on his due process claim. 23 //// 24 25 26 2 In California, a prisoner is entitled to release on parole unless there is “some evidence” of his or her current dangerousness. In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1205-06, 1210 (2008); In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 651-53 (2002). 5 1 B. Ex Post Facto 2 In his second ground for relief, petitioner claims that the Board’s application of a change 3 in California Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(2)3 to delay his next parole hearing for a period of seven 4 years violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Pet. at 22-25; 5 Traverse at 13-14. He argues that he had “a constitutional right for the Board to still have the 6 discretion to provide him a hearing annually or two years after a parole denial.” Pet. at 24. 7 Under the statute as it existed prior to the enactment of “Marsy’s Law,” 8 indeterminately-sentenced inmates like petitioner were denied parole for one year unless the 9 Board found, with stated reasons, that it was unreasonable to expect that parole could be granted 10 the following year, in which case the subsequent hearing could be extended up to five years. 11 Cal. Pen. Code § 3041.5(b)(2) (2008). However, at his 2009 parole hearing petitioner was 12 subject to the terms of the amended statute, which authorizes denial of a subsequent parole 13 hearing for seven, ten, or even fifteen years. Cal. Pen. Code, § 3041.5(b)(3) (2010). Petitioner 14 asserts that application of the extended deferral period violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because 15 it increases the risk that he will serve a longer prison term than he would have served under the 16 prior statute. Pet. at 23. He points out that Marsy’s Law appears to eliminate the Board’s 17 authority to schedule his next parole suitability hearing within the following three years. Id. at 18 23-24. 19 20 In the only reasoned state court decision on this claim, the California Superior Court rejected petitioner’s arguments: 21 Finally, Petitioner also contends that Marsy’s Law, which became effective before his 2009 parole determination hearing, violates the ex-post facto prohibition. This contention also lacks merit. Retroactive changes to a state’s parole laws, in some instances, may be violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause. (Garner v. Jones (2000) 529 U.S. 244, 250 (Garner).) When a statutory change 22 23 24 25 26 3 The change to California Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(2) resulted from the passage of Proposition 9 in 2008. The statutes enacted and statute modifications made pursuant to Proposition 9 are collectively known as “Marsy’s Law.” 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 “creates only the most speculative and attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect of increasing the measure of punishment for covered crimes,” there is no ex post facto violation. (Cal. Dept. of Corrections v. Morales (1995) 514 U.S. 499, 509 (Morales).) The dispositive issue is whether the retroactive application of the change in parole law “creates a significant risk of prolonging [a prisoner’s] incarceration.” (Garner, supra, 529 U.S. at p. 251.) Petitioner has not so shown, on the face of the statute or as applied to his case. The latest amendments to subdivision (b) of section 3041.5 that are at issue do not alter the definition of Petitioner’s crime, so the question remains whether the changes increase the punishment for Petitioner’s criminal acts. The United States Supreme Court addressed a similar question in Morales, which involved a defendant who had committed murder while on parole for a prior murder. The Supreme Court found that the amendments to the statute as applied to Morales did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, holding that the amendment created “only the most speculative and attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect of increasing the measure of punishment for covered crimes.” (Morales, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 509.) 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 The Supreme Court revisited retroactive changes in laws governing parole suitability hearing [sic] five years later. In Garner, when the defendant committed his offense, the rules of the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles (“Georgia Board”) required reconsideration of parole to take place every three years. (Garner, supra, 529 U.S. at p. 247.) The Georgia Board subsequently amended its rules to provide that reconsideration hearings would take place at least every eight years. (Id.) The Supreme Court found that the change in the rules survived the ex post facto facial challenge. (Id.) The Supreme Court reiterated that the Ex Post Facto Clause should not be employed for “the micromanagement of an endless array of legislative adjustments to parole and sentencing procedures.” (Garner, supra, 529 U.S. at p. 252.) 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Petitioner claims that Marsy’s Law violates the ex post facto clause as applied to him. Under the previous statute, a prisoner could have a suitability hearing within a year of the denial, and now the statute exposes prisoners to additional imprisonment of three, five, seven, ten or fifteen years. Petitioner is only entitled to parole if he no longer poses an unreasonable threat to public safety, regardless of the time served. As Petitioner concedes, he has received multi-year [sic] The 2009 denial of parole was based on several factors, including his institutional disciplinary history. Therefore, based on the number of factors on which the Board relied upon for finding that Petitioner is an unreasonable risk of danger to the public if released on parole, it is unlikely that the Board would have given Petitioner a shorter denial if the statute so allowed. 7 1 2 Pet. at 35-37. The United States Constitution provides that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post 3 facto Law.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. A law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United 4 States Constitution if it: (1) punishes as criminal an act that was not criminal when it was 5 committed; (2) makes a crime’s punishment greater than when the crime was committed; or (3) 6 deprives a person of a defense available at the time the crime was committed. Collins v. 7 Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 52 (1990). The Ex Post Facto Clause “is aimed at laws that 8 retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.” Himes 9 v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 620 10 (9th Cir. 2002)). See also Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995). The Ex 11 Post Facto Clause is also violated if: (1) state regulations have been applied retroactively to a 12 defendant; and (2) the new regulations have created a “sufficient risk” of increasing the 13 punishment attached to the defendant’s crimes. Himes, 336 F.3d at 854. Not every law that 14 disadvantages a defendant is a prohibited ex post facto law. The retroactive application of a 15 change in state parole procedures violates ex post facto only if there exists a “significant risk” 16 that such application will increase the punishment for the crime. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 17 244, 259 (2000). 18 California Penal Code section 3041.5 has been amended several times since the date of 19 petitioner’s conviction to allow for longer periods of time between parole suitability hearings. 20 Ex Post Facto challenges to those amendments have all been rejected. See Morales, 514 U.S. at 21 509 (1981 amendment to Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5, which increased maximum deferral period 22 of parole suitability hearings to five years did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it 23 simply altered the method of setting a parole release date and did not create a meaningful “risk 24 of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes”); Watson v. Estelle, 886 25 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 1989) (not a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause to apply 26 § 3041.5(b)(2)(A) to prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment prior to the implementation of 8 1 California’s Determinate Sentence Law in 1977); Clifton v. Attorney General Of the State of 2 California, 997 F.2d 660, 662 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993) (same). See also Garner, 529 U.S. at 249 3 (upholding Georgia’s change in the frequency of parole hearings for prisoners serving life 4 sentences, from three to eight years, in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983); 5 Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) (holding that inmates are not required to bring their 6 challenges to the constitutionality of state parole procedures in habeas petitions exclusively, but 7 may pursue their claims in § 1983 actions). 8 Recently, the Ninth Circuit overturned a district court decision granting preliminary 9 injunctive relief to plaintiffs in a class action seeking to prevent the Board from enforcing the 10 amended deferral periods established by Marsy’s Law. Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, ___ F.3d 11 ___, No. 10-15471, 2011 WL 198435 (9th Cir. Jan.24, 2011). The court found it unlikely that 12 plaintiffs would succeed on the merits of their underlying challenge premised on the Ex Post 13 Facto Clause. The court initially compared and contrasted Marsy’s Law with existing Supreme 14 Court precedent: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Here, as in Morales and Garner, Proposition 9 did not increase the statutory punishment for any particular offense, did not change the date of inmates’ initial parole hearings, and did not change the standard by which the Board determined whether inmates were suitable for parole. However, the changes to the frequency of parole hearings here are more extensive than the change in either Morales or Garner. First, Proposition 9 increased the maximum deferral period from five years to fifteen years. This change is similar to the change in Morales (i.e., tripled from one year to three years) and the change in Garner (i.e., from three years to eight years). Second, Proposition 9 increased the minimum deferral period from one year to three years. Third, Proposition 9 changed the default deferral period from one year to fifteen years. Fourth, Proposition 9 altered the burden to impose a deferral period other than the default period . . . . Neither Morales nor Garner involved a change to the minimum deferral period, the default deferral period, or the burden to impose a deferral period other than the default period. 24 25 2011 WL 198435, at *5. However, the Ninth Circuit found these distinctions non-dispositive 26 due to the availability of advance parole hearings at the Board’s discretion, reasoning that, “as in 9 1 Morales, an advance hearing by the Board ‘would remove any possibility of harm’ to prisoners 2 because they would not be required to wait a minimum of three years for a hearing .” Id. at *6 3 (quoting Morales, 514 U.S. at 513). The Ninth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs had failed to 4 demonstrate a significant risk that their incarceration would be prolonged by application of 5 Marsy’s Law, and thus found that plaintiffs had not established a likelihood of success on the 6 merits of their ex post facto claim.4 7 In light of these cases, the state court’s rejection of petitioner’s Ex Post Facto claim was 8 neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, controlling principles of United States 9 Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on that claim. 10 11 12 IV. Conclusion Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied. 13 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 14 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 15 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 16 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 17 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 18 within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 19 Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 20 In any objections he elects to file, petitioner may address whether a certificate of 21 appealability should issue in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 22 11, Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a 23 certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant); Hayward v. 24 4 25 26 One district court has dismissed a petitioner’s challenge to Marsy’s Law on the ground that it improperly duplicates the class action claim still pending on the merits in Gilman. See Bryant v. Haviland, No. CIV S-09-CV-3462 GEB CHS P, 2011 WL 23064, *2-5,15 (E.D.Cal., Jan.4, 2011). 10 1 Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (prisoners are required to obtain a certificate of 2 appealability to review the denial of a habeas petition challenging an administrative decision 3 such as the denial of parole by the parole board). 4 DATED: March 23, 2011. 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 11
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