Zamora v. Department of Homeland Security et al, No. 2:2009cv01292 - Document 34 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
Court Description: ORDER denying 17 Motion for Summary Judgment signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 8/5/09. The parties are ordered to file a Joint Status Report as required by the Courts previous Order (Docket #2) on or before August 25, 2009. (Kastilahn, A)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY OF ) ) THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND ) SECURITY and GALE ROSSIDES, ) ASSISTANT SECRETARY; ACTING ) ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ) TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ) ) ADMINISTRATION; THE UNITED ) STATES OF AMERICA and DOES 1) 20, ) ) Defendants. ) ______________________________/ JENNIFER ZAMORA, 2:09-CV-01292-JAM-EFB ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 22 23 Jennifer Zamora (“Plaintiff”) brought this action against 24 Janet Napolitano, Secretary of the Department of Homeland 25 26 Security (“DHS”), Gale Rossides, Assistant Secretary of the DHS, 27 and the Acting Administrator of the Transportation Security 28 Administration (collectively “Defendants”) for violations of 42 1 1 2 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) and several state law claims. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on June 3 24, 2009 (Docket #17). Defendants argue that they are entitled 4 5 to relief because Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is time barred or, 6 alternatively, because the claim is barred by the doctrine of 7 laches. 8 Plaintiff opposed the Motion (Docket #18). A hearing on the Motion was held in this court on July 29, 2009. 9 For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion is 10 11 DENIED. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 12 13 14 In 2003, Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) 15 alleging sexual harassment and a hostile work environment by her 16 17 supervisor at the Transportation Security Administration 18 (“TSA”). Plaintiff withdrew the EEOC administrative complaint 19 in May of 2006 and filed suit in federal court asserting Title 20 VII claims in early 2007. See Zamora v. Dept. of Homeland 21 Security, Case No. 2:07-cv-00023 (“Zamora I”). Zamora I was 22 initially dismissed as untimely. However, the Court later 23 24 reinstated the complaint because Plaintiff never received a 25 right to sue letter from the EEOC informing her of the 90-day 26 time bar on filing Title VII claims. In March 2009 the Court 27 dismissed Zamora I without prejudice, holding that Plaintiff 28 failed to assert a claim against the proper defendants. 2 1 2 Plaintiff filed the present action (“Zamora II”) in Sacramento County Superior Court in April 2009. The complaint 3 asserts the same claims as Zamora I, adds two new claims under 4 5 California state law, and names a proper defendant, Janet 6 Napolitano as Secretary of the DHS. 7 this Court on May 8, 2009. 8 Zamora II was removed to Defendants now move for summary judgment, alleging 9 that Plaintiff’s Title VII claim under the Civil Rights Act of 10 11 1964 is time barred and, in the alternative, that the Title VII 12 claim is barred under the doctrine of laches. 13 the motion. 14 Plaintiff opposes OPINION 15 Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, 16 17 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 18 together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 19 issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 20 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The 21 purpose of summary judgment “is to isolate and dispose of 22 factually unsupported claims and defenses.” Celotex v. Catrett, 23 24 25 26 477 U.S. 317, 323-324 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 27 for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 447 U.S. 242, 248- 49 (1986). If the moving party meets its burden, the burden of 28 3 1 2 production then shifts so that “the non-moving party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, 3 ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 4 5 trial.’” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors 6 Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 7 P. 56(e) and citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). 8 The Court must view the facts and draw inferences in the manner most favorable 9 to the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 10 11 12 13 14 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). A. The Statute of Limitations A government employee filing a Title VII action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 must file that action “[w]ithin 15 90 days of receipt of notice of final action” taken by the 16 17 relevant agency or the EEOC, or after 180 days “from the filing 18 of the initial charge” if the agency or the EEOC fails to take 19 any action on the matter. 20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Defendants argue that Plaintiff received sufficient 21 notice of final action during the litigation of Zamora I, thus 22 triggering the 90 day limitations period of section 2000e-16(c), 23 24 and that Plaintiff failed to file a complaint in Zamora II until 25 almost one year after receiving that notice. 26 14; Docket # 23, 4:15-16. Docket # 17, 6:3- Defendants cite a footnote in the 27 Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Missirilian v. Huntington Memorial 28 Hospital, 662 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1981), to argue that the 4 1 2 Court’s April 15, 2008 Order dismissing Zamora I constituted a “clear indication” of the commencement of the 90 day period. 3 Footnote 6 of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Missirilian notes 4 5 that a right to sue letter is not the only possible form of 6 notice sufficient to commence the 90 day period. 7 662 F.2d at 550 n.6. 8 Missirilian, Notice is sufficient where a Title VII plaintiff receives “a clear indication of when the ninety-day 9 period commences.” Id. at 550 (emphasis added). 10 Not only has Plaintiff still not received a right to 11 12 sue letter from the EEOC, but this Court’s April 15, 2008 Order 13 was not a “clear indication” of the commencement of the 90 day 14 period. Defendants do not point to any specific text within the 15 April 15, 2008 Order that would provide such “clear indication.” 16 17 See Docket # 17, 5:2-6:18. The April 15, 2008 Order merely 18 reinstated Zamora I, after it had been dismissed as untimely, 19 because the Court discovered that the EEOC had failed to deliver 20 a notice to sue letter to Plaintiff. Nowhere did the Order 21 specifically or clearly advise Plaintiff that the 90 day period 22 would commence immediately or that the Order would serve to 23 24 replace a notice to sue letter. Contrary to Defendants’ 25 assertion that Plaintiff “unquestionably knew” of the 26 commencement of the 90 day limitations period, Plaintiff has 27 never received any proper notice that specifies the date by 28 which she must file suit on her claims. 5 1 2 As such, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED with regards to the statute of limitations for a Title VII claim. 3 B. The Doctrine of Laches 4 5 A district court has the discretionary authority to 6 bar an action where “a party’s unexcused or unreasonable delay 7 has prejudiced his adversary.” 8 Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956, 958-59 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing International 9 T. & T. Corp. v. General T. & E. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 926 (9th 10 11 Cir. 1975)). The doctrine of laches protects against 12 difficulties caused by “unreasonable delay in bringing an 13 action, not against problems created by the pendency of a 14 lawsuit after it is filed.” Id. at 958. 15 Defendants argue that the passage of time since the 16 17 alleged harassment back in 2003, combined with Plaintiff’s “lack 18 of diligence and gross procedural error,” justify the motion for 19 summary judgment. 20 argument, Defendants cite delay during the administrative Docket at 17, 6:25-28. In support of their 21 action, delay in filing Zamora I after withdrawing the 22 administrative complaint, the failure to sue a proper defendant 23 24 in Zamora I, delay in filing Zamora II, and the loss of 25 availability of witnesses due to these delays. 26 Id. at 7:2-8:27. Defendants fail to show that Plaintiff’s actions have 27 resulted in Defendants suffering substantial prejudice. 28 as this Court noted in its June 5, 2008 Order denying 6 Indeed, 1 2 Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Defendants have contributed to the delay in the resolution of the dispute. See Zamora I, 3 Docket at 28, 6:13-23 (“This Court . . . finds that Defendants 4 5 contributed to the five year delay of which they now complain by 6 unnecessarily delaying the resolution of Zamora’s administrative 7 claim.”) 8 Moreover, Plaintiff’s alleged delay in filing Zamora I was recognized by this Court as partly a result of the EEOC’s 9 failure to issue a right to sue letter. See Zamora I, Docket at 10 11 31. The delay in filing Zamora II occurred under similar 12 circumstances. 13 action by failing to sue the appropriate defendants, this delay 14 While Plaintiff has caused some delay in the does not rise to such an unreasonable level so as to move this 15 Court to grant summary judgment in Defendants favor. 16 17 18 As such, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED with regards to the doctrine of laches. III. ORDER 19 20 For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion is 21 DENIED. The parties are ordered to file a Joint Status Report as 22 required by the Court’s previous Order (Docket #2) on or before 23 24 August 25, 2009. 25 26 IT IS SO ORDERED. 27 _____________________________ JOHN A. MENDEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE DATED: August 5, 2009 28 7
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