-EFB (PC) Walton v. Butler et al, No. 2:2009cv00479 - Document 58 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Edmund F. Brennan on 9/1/2011 recommending that 39 MOTION for SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed by defendant's be granted; that the Clerk be directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant's; and that the Clerk be directed to close this case. Motion referred to Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr. Any party may file objections to the F&Rs w/i 14 days after being served.(Waggoner, D)
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-EFB (PC) Walton v. Butler et al Doc. 58 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 RONALD E. WALTON, Plaintiff, 11 12 vs. 13 No. CIV S-09-0479 GEB EFB P J. BUTLER, et al., Defendants. 14 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS / 15 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in a civil rights action brought 16 17 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to 18 protect claims against defendants Orum, Butler, Shea, Clarey, Orrick, Sisto, and Guillory, and on 19 plaintiff’s due process claim against defendant Majors. Defendants move for summary 20 judgment. For the following reasons, the court will recommend that the motion be granted. 21 I. Background 22 Unless otherwise noted, the court finds that the following facts are not disputed by the 23 parties or following the court’s review of the evidence submitted, have been determined to be 24 undisputed. 25 26 On November 20, 2007, defendant Butler served as the chairperson for plaintiff’s Unit Classification Committee meeting, where plaintiff’s housing situation was reviewed. Defs.’ 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ MSJ”), Stmt. of Undisputed Facts in Supp. Thereof (“SUF”) 1. 2 Defendant Orum, a correctional counselor, was the recorder for this meeting. SUF 2. At the 3 meeting, plaintiff’s classification score was reduced from 29 to 27 points. SUF 3. Due to the 4 reduction in plaintiff’s points, the committee recommended that plaintiff be transferred from his 5 current, level three housing in the dormitory in Gym H, to a level two housing unit.1 SUF 4. 6 The committee referred its recommendation for plaintiff’s level two placement to the 7 transferring authority for endorsement. SUF 5. Transfers are made after the transferring 8 authority approves the committee’s recommendations and upon available bed space. SUF 6. 9 Plaintiff believes that no recommendation was ever made because he would have received an 10 “endorsement chrono” with an explanation either rejecting or approving the recommendation. 11 Pl.’s Opp’n, Pl.’s Stmt of Disputed Facts and Undisputed Facts (“Pl.’s SUF”) ¶ 4. 12 Where an inmate has pending disciplinary charges, those charges shall be resolved before 13 the inmate is transferred. SUF 7. While waiting to be transferred, plaintiff received a rules 14 violation in December 2007, stemming from a physical altercation plaintiff had with another 15 inmate. SUF 8. Plaintiff’s transfer recommendation was postponed pending review of the 16 disciplinary proceeding. SUF 9. 17 Plaintiff contends he was not charged with disciplinary action, and submits evidence that 18 he was the victim of an assault. Pl.’s SUF ¶¶ 7, 10; Pl.’s Opp’n, Pl.’s Decl. (“Pl.’s Decl.”), Ex. 19 4. An “enemy chrono” signed by defendant Orrick states that on December 12, 2007, staff 20 observed inmate Pearson hit plaintiff in the nose with a fist. Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 4. It notes that 21 defendant Shea responded to the area and took Pearson into custody, and that plaintiff was 22 escorted to the medical clinic for treatment. Id. The enemy chrono also indicates that Pearson 23 was re-housed in an adjacent facility, and that Pearson would be listed in plaintiff’s central file 24 1 25 26 Aside from plaintiff’s claims of overcrowding and dangerous conditions in the gym, where level three inmates were housed, the record does not reflect how level two housing differed from level three housing. See Pl.’s Opp’n., Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. Thereof (“Pl.’s P. & A.”) at 1, 3, 5. 2 1 as an enemy. Id. 2 Defendants Guillory and Orrick were sergeants in the facility where plaintiff’s housing 3 unit was located during all relevant times. SUF 26. They, along with defendants Shea, Clarey, 4 Butler, and Orum declare that at no time before December 2007, did they have any indiction or 5 suspicion that plaintiff’s safety was in jeopardy. SUF 23, 27; Defs.’ MSJ, Butler Decl. ¶ 17, 6 Orum Decl. ¶ 5. Defendant Sisto, who was the Warden at California State Prison, Solano during 7 the relevant time period, declares that he too, was not aware of any safety risk to plaintiff 8 associated with plaintiff’s housing in December 2007. SUF 24, 25. 9 Plaintiff’s rules violation was ultimately dismissed, but an inmate work stoppage created 10 a state of emergency at California State Prison, Solano and further postponed plaintiff’s transfer 11 recommendation. SUF 10. According to plaintiff, the work stoppage lasted only three days in 12 January of 2008 and should not have affected his transfer. Pl.’s SUF 10; Pl.’s P. & A. at 7-8. 13 On April 1, 2008, plaintiff and another inmate (inmate Rash) were involved in a physical 14 altercation. SUF 11; Defs.’ MSJ, Majors Decl., Ex. E. Defendants Clarey and Shea, 15 correctional officers in plaintiff’s housing unit, responded to the altercation and restrained 16 plaintiff and inmate Rasg. SUF 11, 12; Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 2. Plaintiff subsequently received a rules 17 violation (S2-08-04-0771) for mutual combat. SUF 12. Plaintiff contends he was the victim of 18 assault and believes that because he had complained about his housing status, he was charged 19 with mutual combat, and was not transferred out of level three housing. Pl.’s SUF 11; Pl.’s P. & 20 A. at 12. 21 Defendants Guillory, Orrick , Shea, Clarey, Butler, and Orum declare that at no time 22 before April 2008, did they have any indiction or suspicion that plaintiff’s safety was in 23 jeopardy. SUF 23, 27; Defs.’ MSJ, Butler Decl. ¶ 17, Orum Decl. ¶ 5. Defendant Sisto also 24 declares he was not aware of any safety risk to plaintiff associated with plaintiff’s housing in 25 April 2008. SUF 24, 25. 26 //// 3 1 Plaintiff declares he made Orrick and Shea aware that he had concerns for his safety, but 2 does not indicate when he did so or through what means, except for stating that Shea was the 3 reporting officer as to the December 12, 2007 assault. Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 5. 4 Plaintiff declares that in February, March, and April of 2008, he had conversations with 5 defendants Orum and Butler, informing them that he “was having serious problems and 6 incompatibility issues with the prisoner [he] was living with . . . .”2 Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiff declares he 7 similarly informed defendants Clarey and Shea, but does not indicate when those conversations 8 too place. Id. Plaintiff declares that in February and March of 2008, he wrote letters to defendant Sisto 9 10 requesting that his housing status be changed. Id. ¶ 4, Ex. 3. On February 4, 2008, plaintiff filed a citizen’s complaint directed to Orum and Butler. 11 12 Id. ¶ 2, Ex. 1. Plaintiff complained that because defendant Orum “fail[ed] to act,” plaintiff was 13 “assaulted by a level 3 inmate” and that “Shea and John Doe c/o failed to protect [plaintiff] 14 resulting in an assault.” Id. Plaintiff complained that he should have been housed in a level two 15 environment with other level two inmates. Id. On February 4, 2008, plaintiff also submitted an inmate appeal complaining that he was 16 17 still being housed in level three and was “under the gun with inmates with level 3 points or 18 more.” Id. ¶ 3, Ex. 2. Plaintiff stated that if he remained with level three inmates, he “could be 19 forced to fight to protect [himself].” Id., Ex. 2. However, it appears that the latter statement was 20 not included with the February 4th appeal, but was instead included as part of plaintiff’s March 21 21, 2008 appeal to the second level of review, following Butler’s March 14, 2008 response to the 22 appeal at the first level of review. Id., Ex. 2. 23 //// 24 2 25 26 The parties do not state whether inmate Rash was plaintiff’s bunkmate, although the inmates’ designations on the April 2008 rules violation report, suggest that they may have been assigned to the same triple bunk. See Majors Decl. Ex. E (referring to plaintiff with “HD-127-L” and to inmate Rash with “HD-127-M”). 4 1 Defendant Majors, a correctional sergeant, reviewed report S2-08-04-0771 regarding the 2 April 2008 altercation to make sure that the information contained in the rules violation report 3 matched the information contained in the incident report. SUF 13. As the rules report reviewer, 4 Majors was also responsible for initially determining whether an inmate was entitled to a staff 5 assistant or an investigative employee. SUF 14. Majors determined that plaintiff was not 6 entitled to a staff assistant or an investigative employee based because: (1) plaintiff spoke 7 English, was literate, and was educated enough to understand the nature of the proceedings and 8 the charges; (2) the mutual combat charge was not complex to the point where he felt that 9 plaintiff could not understand the nature of the charge; (3) the underlying incident report was 10 extensive and complete with witness reports and photographs; and (4) plaintiff had no personal 11 impediments to conducting his own investigation because he was in general population and lived 12 in the same housing unit where the underlying incident took place. SUF 15. 13 After Majors’s review, he forwarded the rules violation report to the senior hearing 14 officer, who made his own determination that plaintiff was not entitled to a staff assistant or an 15 investigative employee. SUF 16. Plaintiff was subsequently found guilty of mutual combat. 16 SUF 17. On May 15, 2008, plaintiff had another Unit Classification Committee hearing where 17 18 Orum served as the recorder and Butler as the chairperson. SUF 18. At this hearing, plaintiff’s 19 classification score was increased to 33, due to the guilty finding in report S2-08-04-0771. SUF 20 19. This higher score made plaintiff ineligible for transfer to a level two housing unit. SUF 20. 21 Therefore, the committee found that plaintiff’s current housing was appropriate. SUF 21. 22 II. 23 Summary Judgment Standards Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 24 fact and [ ] the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 25 Summary judgment avoids unnecessary trials in cases in which the parties do not dispute the 26 facts relevant to the determination of the issues in the case, or in which there is insufficient 5 1 evidence for a jury to determine those facts in favor of the nonmovant. Crawford-El v. Britton, 2 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-50 (1986); Nw. 3 Motorcycle Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1994). At bottom, a 4 summary judgment motion asks “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to 5 require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter 6 of law. 7 The principal purpose of Rule 56 is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims 8 or defenses. Celotex Cop. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Thus, the rule functions to 9 "‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for 10 trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 11 1963 amendments). Procedurally, under summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the 12 initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the 13 record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine 14 issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th 15 Cir. 2001) (en banc). If the moving party meets its burden with a properly supported motion, the 16 burden then shifts to the opposing party to present specific facts that show there is a genuine 17 issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248; Auvil v. 18 CBS "60 Minutes", 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1995). 19 A clear focus on where the burden of proof lies as to the factual issue in question is 20 crucial to summary judgment procedures. Depending on which party bears that burden, the party 21 seeking summary judgment does not necessarily need to submit any evidence of its own. When 22 the opposing party would have the burden of proof on a dispositive issue at trial, the moving 23 party need not produce evidence which negates the opponent’s claim. See e.g., Lujan v. National 24 Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). Rather, the moving party need only point to matters 25 which demonstrate the absence of a genuine material factual issue. See Celotex v. Cattret, 477 26 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). ("[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on 6 1 a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the 2 ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'"). Id. at 324. 3 Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon 4 motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 5 element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 6 trial. See id. at 322. In such a circumstance, summary judgment must be granted, "so long as 7 whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary 8 judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id. at 323. 9 To defeat summary judgment the opposing party must establish a genuine dispute as to a 10 material issue of fact. This entails two requirements. First, the dispute must be over a fact(s) 11 that is material, i.e., one that makes a difference in the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty 12 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248 ("Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit 13 under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment."). Whether a 14 factual dispute is material is determined by the substantive law, id., which here involves an 15 Eighth Amendment claim that the defendants deliberately disregarded plaintiff’s safety by failing 16 to remove him from level three housing in the gym, resulting in him being assaulted by level 17 three inmates. If the opposing party is unable to produce evidence sufficient to establish a 18 required element of its claim that party fails in opposing summary judgment. “[A] complete 19 failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily 20 renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. 21 Second, the dispute must be genuine. In determining whether a factual dispute is genuine 22 the court must again focus on which party bears the burden of proof on the factual issue in 23 question. Where the party opposing summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial 24 on the factual issue in dispute, that party must produce evidence sufficient to support its factual 25 claim. Conclusory allegations, unsupported by evidence are insufficient to defeat the motion. 26 Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). Rather, the opposing party must, by affidavit 7 1 or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, designate specific facts that show there is a genuine issue 2 for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. More significantly, to 3 demonstrate a genuine factual dispute the evidence relied on by the opposing party must be such 4 that a fair-minded jury "could return a verdict for [him] on the evidence presented." Anderson v. 5 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 252. Absent any such evidence there simply is no reason 6 for trial. 7 The court does not determine witness credibility. It believes the opposing party’s 8 evidence, and draws inferences most favorably for the opposing party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. 9 at 249, 255; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of “thin air,” 10 and the proponent must adduce evidence of a factual predicate from which to draw inferences. 11 American Int’l Group, Inc. v. American Int’l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir.1991) (Kozinski, 12 J., dissenting) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). If reasonable minds could differ on material 13 facts at issue, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 14 441 (9th Cir. 1995). On the other hand,“[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a 15 rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 16 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). In that case, the court must grant summary 17 judgment. 18 Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply 19 show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken 20 as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 21 ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). If the evidence 22 presented and any reasonable inferences that might be drawn from it could not support a 23 judgment in favor of the opposing party, there is no genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 24 U.S. at 323. Thus, Rule 56 serves to screen cases lacking any genuine dispute over an issue that 25 is determinative of the outcome of the case. 26 //// 8 1 On February 22, 2010, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a 2 motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 3 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and Klingele v. 4 Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988). 5 III. 6 Discussion A. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendants Orum, Butler, Shea, Clarey, Orrick, Sisto, and Guillory 7 8 Plaintiff alleges that defendants Orum, Butler, Shea, Clarey, Orrick, Sisto, and Guillory 9 violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by being deliberately indifferent 10 to his safety needs when they failed to remove him from level three housing in the gym, resulting 11 in him being assaulted by level three inmates in December 2007 and April 2008. 12 Under the Eighth Amendment, “prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from 13 violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (internal 14 quotation marks, ellipsis, and citation omitted). However, “not . . . every injury suffered by one 15 prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials 16 responsible for the victim’s safety.” Id. at 834. A prison official may be held liable for an 17 assault suffered by one inmate at the hands of another only where the assaulted inmate can show 18 that the injury is sufficiently serious, id. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 19 (1991)), and that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm, id. at 837. 20 Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether prison officials, “acting with deliberate indifference, 21 exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious damage to his future health.” Id. at 22 834 (internal quotation omitted). 23 To be deliberately indifferent, the “official must both be aware of facts from which the 24 inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the 25 inference.” Id. “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a 26 question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from 9 1 circumstantial evidence . . . and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a 2 substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id. at 842. The “obviousness of a 3 risk,” however, is not conclusive, and “a prison official may demonstrate that the obvious 4 escaped him . . .” Id. at 843, n.8. 5 Here, plaintiff has failed to raise a disputed issue of material fact as to whether 6 defendants Orum, Butler, Shea, Clarey, Orrick, Sisto, or Guillory were deliberately indifferent to 7 the risk that plaintiff could be assaulted by another inmate. 8 9 Plaintiff’s evidence establishes defendants Orrick and Shea were aware of the December 2007 attack and that Orrick separated plaintiff from the inmate who assaulted him. Pl.’s Decl. 10 ¶ 5, Ex. 4. This evidence does not show that Orrick or Shea knew that plaintiff was at risk to an 11 attack after this incident. 12 Plaintiff submits evidence that, prior to the April 2008 assault, he made Shea, Butler, 13 Orum and Clarey aware that he and his bunkmate were not compatible. Id. ¶ 2. However, 14 plaintiff’s vague complaints regarding incompatibility would not have made these defendants 15 aware of any substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiff’s health. There is no evidence that 16 plaintiff specifically informed defendants why he and his bunkmate were incompatible or that he 17 feared a physical attack from his bunkmate. 18 Plaintiff’s evidence also shows that Orum, Butler and Sisto knew that plaintiff wanted to 19 be removed from level three housing. In the citizen’s complaint directed to Orum and Butler, it 20 is evident that plaintiff wanted to be moved out of level three housing and into level two 21 housing. Id., Ex. 1. Also evident is plaintiff’s point that if he were not in level three housing, he 22 would not have been assaulted by a level three inmate. Id. However, the complaint does not 23 convey the message that by remaining in level three housing, plaintiff was exposed to a 24 substantial risk of serious harm. Additionally, plaintiff’s evidence that he sent letters to Sisto 25 requesting that his housing status be changed does not show that plaintiff expressed any concern 26 for his safety in those letters. See id. ¶ 4, Ex. 3. Plaintiff’s preference for and requests to be 10 1 housed with level two inmates would not put defendants on notice of any threat of harm to 2 plaintiff. 3 Plaintiff submits evidence that Butler reviewed his inmate appeal complaining that he 4 was “under the gun” because of his housing situation. Id. ¶ 3, Ex. 2. There is no evidence that 5 Butler would have determined from the cryptic statement that plaintiff feared a physical assault 6 from another inmate or otherwise faced substantial risk of serious harm. When submitting this 7 appeal to the second level of review, plaintiff added statements that he had been assaulted on 8 December 12, 2007 and that he “now could be forced to fight to protect [himself].” See id., Ex. 9 2. There is no evidence any defendant was aware of this statement. See Defs.’ MSJ, Sisto Decl. 10 ¶¶ 4-5, Ex. C. Even if there was, it would not have notified defendants that plaintiff’s safety was 11 in jeopardy, as the inmate who assaulted plaintiff in December had been re-housed in a different 12 facility, and plaintiff did not identify any other specific threat to his safety. 13 Thus, it is undisputed that Orum, Butler, Shea, Clarey, Orrick, Sisto, and Guillory were 14 not aware, prior to the December 2007 assault or the April 2008 assault, that plaintiff's safety 15 was in jeopardy. No reasonable factfinder could conclude from plaintiff’s evidence that these 16 defendants were aware of facts from which they could infer that plaintiff was exposed to a risk of 17 serious harm. 18 In addition, based on the undisputed facts and this record, no reasonable factfinder could 19 conclude that these defendants actually did infer that plaintiff was exposed to a risk of serious 20 harm. Rather, the declarations of these defendants show that they did not make such an 21 inference. SUF 23, 25, 27; Defs.’ MSJ, Butler Decl. ¶ 17, Orum Decl. ¶ 5. Plaintiff argues that 22 a factfinder could conclude that defendants made the inference because the risk to plaintiff, a 23 mental health patient, being housed in an overcrowded gym after already being assaulted once, 24 was obvious. Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 1; Pl.’s P. & A. at 3, 5, 11-13. However, the undisputed facts show 25 that the risk of plaintiff being assaulted was not obvious. Plaintiff offers no evidence regarding 26 how his mental health status related to a risk of him being assaulted, and the inmate who 11 1 assaulted plaintiff in December of 2007 was re-housed. Pl.’s Decl. Ex. 4. Moreover, plaintiff 2 never informed any of the defendants that he felt that his bunkmate or any other inmate put his 3 safety in jeopardy. While he requested to be removed from level three housing, this did not give 4 defendants any reason to suspect that he was in danger of violence from another inmate. 5 Thus, plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of material fact that defendants Orum, 6 Butler, Shea, Clarey, Orrick, Sisto, or Guillory were deliberately indifferent to the risk that he 7 would be attacked by another inmate, and summary judgment should be granted in their favors. 8 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 252 9 10 B. Plaintiff's Claim Against Defendant Majors Plaintiff claims defendant Majors violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due 11 process by failing to assign a staff assistant of investigative employee to assist plaintiff in the 12 disciplinary proceedings regarding the April 2008 rules violation report. 13 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects prisoners from being 14 deprived of liberty without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 15 However, “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full 16 panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Id. In a disciplinary 17 proceeding where a liberty interest is at stake, due process requires that “some evidence” support 18 the disciplinary decision, and that the inmate receive: “(1) advance written notice of the 19 disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and 20 correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a 21 written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary 22 action.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 455 (1985) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 23 563-67). Where an inmate is illiterate or the facts of the case are complex, he may be entitled to 24 seek the aid of a fellow inmate or staff. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570. 25 26 It is undisputed that the mutual combat charge was not complex and that plaintiff is not illiterate. SUF 15. It is also undisputed that Majors determined that plaintiff was able to 12 1 understand the nature of the proceedings and the charge against him. SUF 15. Plaintiff attempts 2 to raise a triable issue as to this claim on the ground that he was a participant in the Mental 3 Health Services Delivery System and was on a related medication. Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 1; Pl.’s P. & A. 4 at 2, 4, 9-10. Plaintiff does not submit any evidence regarding how this affected his ability 5 defend himself against the mutual combat charge. Due process does not require that all mental 6 health patients be provided with assistance in disciplinary proceedings and plaintiff fails to show 7 why his status as a mental health patient required it here. 8 9 10 Thus, plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of material fact that defendant Majors violated his right to due process by denying him an investigative employee or staff assistant, and summary judgment should be granted in Majors’ favor. 11 C. Qualified Immunity 12 For the reasons discussed above, the court concludes that defendants are entitled to 13 summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims. Therefore, the court need not address defendants’ 14 argument for qualified immunity. 15 IV. Recommendation 16 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 17 1. Defendants’ January 18, 2011 motion for summary judgment be granted; 18 2. The Clerk be directed to enter judgment in defendants’ favors; and 19 3. The Clerk be directed to close this case. 20 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 21 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 22 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 23 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 24 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 25 //// 26 //// 13 1 within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 2 Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 3 Dated: September 1, 2011. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 14
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