Claxton v. Colusa County, No. 2:2008cv01058 - Document 39 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: ORDER signed by Judge Morrison C. England, Jr on 3/26/10 ORDERING that the Motion for Certification, Request for Clarification, and Motion for Stay is accordingly GRANTED. The Court makes the following findings: The Court certifies its January 15, 2 010 grant of Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of a Mandate 29 as a final judgment for purposes of Rule 54(b); Given the parties' agreement that final resolution of the Writ will streamline the case, and likely avoid the need for extensive discovery and trial as to the remaining claims, there is no just reason for delay as to such determination; and the present matter is hereby stayed during the pendency of the certification process. (Becknal, R)
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Claxton v. Colusa County Doc. 39 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DANIEL D. CLAXTON, 12 No. 2:08-cv-01058-MCE-EFB PetitionerPlaintiff, 13 ORDER v. 14 COUNTY OF COLUSA; et al., 15 RespondentsDefendants. 16 17 ----oo0oo---- 18 19 Through these proceedings, Petitioner/Plaintiff Daniel D. 20 Claxton challenges Colusa County’s refusal to permit his proposed 21 subdivision of farmland into smaller parcels. 22 lawsuit, initially filed in Colusa County on April 5, 2008, 23 contained both a state claim seeking administrative mandamus 24 under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5, as well as 25 federal claims alleging that Plaintiff’s equal protection and due 26 process rights were violated in contravention of 42 U.S.C. 27 § 1983. 28 basis of those federal claims. Plaintiff’s On May 13, 2008, Defendants removed the case on the 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 On February 4, 2009, the parties presented a stipulation 2 proposing that this matter be bifurcated, so that the Petition 3 for Writ of Mandate could be decided by this Court in advance of 4 Plaintiff’s other claims. 5 Court’s Order on February 11, 2009. 6 That stipulation was adopted as the In the Stipulation to Bifurcate, the parties agreed that 7 “economy and efficiency will be promoted by bifurcating the 8 Petition for Writ of Mandate from the other causes of action”, 9 noting specifically that there were “few similarities” between 10 the writ hearing and disposition of the remainder of the case. 11 See Docket No. 15, 2:22-24. 12 mandate proceeding is heard before the judge based primarily on 13 the administrative record, as opposed to the constitutional 14 claims which necessitate full discovery and typically entail 15 adjudication through full jury trial. 16 expressly agree that proceeding first on the Writ of Mandate, “in 17 advance of conducting discovery”, would “likely dispose of some, 18 if not all, of the issues relevant to the remaining causes of 19 action.” 20 As the parties explained, the The parties went on to Id. at 3:10-13. By Memorandum and Order filed January 15, 2010, the Court 21 granted Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Mandate. Through the 22 Present Motion, Defendants seek certification of the Court’s 23 January 15, 2010 Order as immediately appealable under Federal 24 Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). 25 ongoing procedures in this matter during the stay of the 26 certification process, and finally seek clarification of one of 27 the Court’s docket entries made on January 15, 2010. 28 /// Defendants also seek a stay of 2 1 Despite Plaintiff’s own admission in the Stipulation to 2 Bifurcate that the mandamus petition has “few similarities” with 3 the remainder of the action, he now argues in opposition to 4 Defendants’ request that the issues are not substantially 5 different. 6 its interlocutory order subject to immediate appellate review 7 under Rule 54(b). Docket No. 36, 3:4. The Court disagrees, and finds Defendants’ Motion is accordingly well taken. 8 Rule 54(b) provides in pertinent part as follows: 9 “When an action presents more than one claim for relief.... or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but few than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.... 10 11 12 13 Requiring parties to seeks certification under Rule 54(b) 14 “eliminates improper appeals of nonfinal judgments while 15 permitting prompt appeals when necessary.” 16 Co. v. Dastar Corp., 318 F.3d 881, 889 (9th Cir. 2003). 17 American States Ins. While Plaintiff appears to claim that any factual similarity 18 between the factual bases underlying the writ of mandate and 19 federal claims should preclude Rule 54(b) certification, the 20 Ninth Circuit recognized in Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 21 (9th Cir. 1989), that certification is proper, even in the face 22 of such interrelationship, as long as the claim for which 23 certification is sought is “substantially different” from the 24 remaining claims. Id. at 1520.1 25 1 26 27 28 Although Plaintiff cites Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2005) for the proposition that factual overlap militates against certification, that case is factually distinguishable as involving a straightforward employment case where claims could not, as here, be readily severed. (continued...) 3 1 Here, Plaintiff’s claim for administrative mandamus under 2 state law is unquestionably “substantially different” from 3 Plaintiff’s federally rooted constitutional claims. 4 mandate challenges the application by a local agency of existing 5 law or policy to a given set of fact, whereas claims for due 6 process and equal protection brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 7 involve complex issues of invidious discrimination as well as the 8 infringement of fundamental property interests. 9 being intrinsically different on a substantive basis, they are A writ of In addition to 10 also procedurally inapposite, as indicated above, since a 11 mandamus proceeding operates much like an appeal, being based on 12 the administrative record, as opposed to § 1983 claims which are 13 typically resolved through a jury trial after the development of 14 a new factual record through discovery. 15 parties have previously agreed that a final resolution of the 16 writ proceedings would likely dispose of the remaining causes of 17 action, it is unlikely that the same set of issues will have to 18 be addressed on appeal again. 19 Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981). 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// Finally, because the See Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 (...continued) See id. at 879-880 (noting that Wood’s wrongful constructive discharge was not “truly separable” from his other claims). Moreover, even the Wood panel is careful to state that “we do not mean to suggest that claims with overlapping facts are foreclosed from being separate for purposes of Rule 54(b). Id. at 881. Finally, nothing in Wood disapproves of the reasoning earlier employed in Gregorian, despite the fact that Gregorian is cited within the body of the Wood opinion. 4 1 Given the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion for Certification, 2 Request for Clarification, and Motion for Stay is accordingly 3 GRANTED.2 4 1. The Court makes the following findings: The Court certifies its January 15, 2010 grant of 5 Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of a Mandate (Docket No. 29) as a 6 final judgment for purposes of Rule 54(b); 7 2. Given the parties’ agreement that final resolution of 8 the Writ will streamline the case, and likely avoid the need for 9 extensive discovery and trial as to the remaining claims, there 10 11 12 13 14 is no just reason for delay as to such determination; and 3. The present matter is hereby stayed during the pendency of the certification process.3 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: March 26, 2010 15 16 _____________________________ MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, this matter was deemed suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Local Rule 230(g). 3 Finally, with respect to Defendants’ clarification request, Defendants are correct that the Judgment which had been rendered by the Clerk of Court on January 15, 2010, following the Court’s Memorandum and Order filed that same day, was filed in error. That error was corrected by the Clerk’s Notice of Docket Correction filed February 1, 2010. Consequently, prior to this Order, while Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Mandate had been granted, in accordance with the final judgment rule the Court’s order had not been reduced to judgment. 5
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