Lehr, et al. v. City of Sacramento, et al., No. 2:2007cv01565 - Document 97 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 20 pltf's Motion to Certify Class, signed by Judge Morrison C. England, Jr., on 8/21/09. (Kastilahn, A)
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Lehr, et al. v. City of Sacramento, et al. Doc. 97 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANTHONY LEHR, et al., 12 Plaintiffs, 13 14 No. 2:07-cv-01565-MCE-GGH v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CITY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 ----oo0oo---- 17 18 19 Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion is GRANTED. 20 21 BACKGROUND 22 23 Plaintiffs, numerous homeless individuals and several non- 24 profit entities, initiated this action on August 2, 2007, and 25 filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on August 31, 2007. 26 way of their FAC, Plaintiffs sought relief from alleged ongoing 27 violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to 28 the United States Constitution. By 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Plaintiffs specifically argued that: 1) enforcement of the City’s 2 “anti-camping” ordinance violated the Eighth Amendment’s 3 proscription against cruel and unusual punishment; 2) pursuant to 4 City policy, Defendants illegally confiscated Plaintiffs’ 5 personal property in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 6 Amendments; and 3) Defendants established and maintained 7 “policies, practices and conduct...intended and designed to 8 single out homeless people” that “had the purpose and effect of 9 depriving homeless people of their property in the City and 10 County of Sacramento,” and that were “based on Defendants’ animus 11 towards this disfavored group and lack[ed] a rational 12 relationship to any legitimate state interest.” 13 Defendant City of Sacramento (hereafter “Defendant” or 14 “City”) subsequently filed two Motions for Summary Judgment which 15 were granted in part and denied in part. 16 named Plaintiff, Connie Hopson, remains with claims against the 17 City. 18 which she alleges Defendant’s policies and practices of property 19 confiscation and destruction deprived her, and the putative class 20 members she seeks to represent, of their Fourth and Fourteenth 21 Amendment rights. 22 class comprised of: 23 Accordingly, only one Relevant to the instant Motion is her second claim, by As to that claim, Plaintiff seeks to certify a 25 All persons in the City of Sacramento...who were, or are, or will be homeless at any time after August 2, 2005, and whose personal belongings have been taken and destroyed, or will be taken and destroyed, by one or more of the defendants. 26 In light of the fact that only one named Plaintiff alleges 24 27 any wrongdoing by the City, Defendant opposes Plaintiffs’ instant 28 putative class as lacking the requisite numerosity. 2 1 For the following reasons, the City’s arguments are rejected and 2 Plaintiffs’ Motion is granted. 3 STANDARD 4 5 6 A court may certify a class if a plaintiff demonstrates that 7 all of the prerequisites of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) 8 have been met, and that at least one of the requirements of 9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) have been met. See Fed. R. 10 Civ. P. 23; see also Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 11 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996). 12 court must conduct a “rigorous analysis” to determine whether the 13 party seeking certification has met the prerequisites of Rule 23. 14 Id. at 1233. 15 certify a class, its discretion must be exercised within the 16 framework of Rule 23. 17 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001). 18 Before certifying a class, the trial While the trial court has broad discretion to Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., Rule 23(a) provides four prerequisites that must be 19 satisfied for class certification: (1) the class must be so 20 numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, 21 (2) questions of law or fact exist that are common to the class, 22 (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 23 typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the 24 representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 25 interests of the class. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 3 1 Rule 23(b) requires a plaintiff to establish one of the 2 following: (1) that there is a risk of substantial prejudice from 3 separate actions; (2) that declaratory or injunctive relief 4 benefitting the class as a whole would be appropriate; or 5 (3) that common questions of law or fact predominate and the 6 class action is superior to other available methods of 7 adjudication. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). 8 ANALYSIS 9 1. 10 The Putative Classes Meet the Requirements of Rule 23(a) 11 12 The numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) is established 13 if “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 14 impracticable.” 15 outside of one district increases the impracticability of 16 joinder, and “when the class is large, numbers alone are 17 dispositive.” 18 Ill. 1986). 19 certify classes of fairly modest size. 20 Angeles County, 669 F.2d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1982) (willing to 21 find numerosity for classes with thirty-nine, sixty-four, and 22 seventy-one people), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 810 23 (1982). 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// The geographical disbursement of class members Riordan v. Smith Barney, 113 F.R.D. 60, 62 (N.D. At the same time, courts have been inclined to 4 See, e.g., Jordan v. Los 1 The only basis for Defendant’s instant opposition is the 2 alleged lack of numerosity of the proposed class. Defendant 3 contends that “[p]rior to filing the complaint, plaintiffs’ 4 attorneys presumably contacted some or all of the hundreds of 5 homeless individuals in the City and County to ascertain if any 6 had their personal property taken by employees of either the City 7 or County of Sacramento and could be included as named plaintiffs 8 in this lawsuit. 9 Plaintiffs’ attorneys presumably contacted prior to filing the Of all these hundreds of homeless individuals 10 complaint, Ms. Hopson turned out to be the only homeless 11 individual with a viable claim that her property was allegedly 12 taken by employees of the City.” 13 according to Defendant, Plaintiffs have fatally failed to provide 14 a reasonable estimate of the number of putative class members. 15 Defendant further argues that the numerosity requirements Opposition, 2:15-21. Thus, 16 are typically not satisfied unless the class is comprised of at 17 least twenty-one individuals. 18 that even “a total of five proposed class members...[is] clearly 19 not sufficiently numerous as a matter of law to warrant 20 certification of a class action based on the second claim.”1 21 Opposition, 6:8-12. 22 purpose of a class action. 23 /// Consequently, Defendant contends Defendant’s argument misapprehends the 24 25 26 27 28 1 Defendant reaches the number five by adding Plaintiff Hopson to four other individuals whose declarations Plaintiffs submitted in support of the instant Motion. The Court is cognizant of Defendant’s evidentiary objections of these declarations. However, resolution of that dispute in the context of the instant Motion is unnecessary as the Court did not rely on that evidence in reaching its decision. 5 1 Defendant is correct that Plaintiffs cannot rely on mere 2 speculation to establish the size of its putative class. 3 v. City of Fresno, 244 F.R.D. 597, 601 (E.D. Cal. 2007). 4 However, neither are Plaintiffs required to name every potential 5 class member as a named Plaintiff. 6 Corp., 122 F.R.D. 258, 261-262 (S.D. Cal. 1988). 7 requirement would defeat the purpose of class litigation. 8 9 Kincaid J.T. Ikonen v. Hartz Mountain Such a Nevertheless, Defendant’s own conclusion that the fact Plaintiffs’ counsel has produced only a single named Plaintiff in 10 this instant action indicates no other putative class members 11 exist is itself based on rank speculation. 12 reasons a person who is forced to engage in a daily hunt for 13 shelter and other basics may not be willing or able to commit to 14 litigating a federal class action and may be wary of signing a 15 declaration in such an action against the City. 16 arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive, and the Court finds 17 the evidence before it sufficient to establish numerosity. 18 There are numerous Defendant’s First, in opposition to Defendant’s original Motion for 19 Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs produced evidence showing that 20 between 1200 and 2200 persons are homeless and without shelter in 21 Sacramento on any given night. 22 declaration that she had witnessed her confiscated property being 23 commingled with that of other homeless individuals. 24 City police officers admitted to posting notices warning homeless 25 individuals that their property would be considered abandoned and 26 disposed of if not removed from various sites. 27 /// 28 /// Plaintiff Hopson also stated in a 6 Moreover, 1 Additionally, Plaintiffs provided the declaration of at least one 2 other individual who had on multiple occasions witnessed mass 3 property destruction at the hands of the City. 4 one representative of the original entity Plaintiffs testified to 5 receiving numerous warnings from City police officers that 6 Defendant intended to conduct clean-ups of various homeless camps 7 and that those entities consequently experienced an increased 8 demand for personal items. 9 adequately shown for purposes of the instant Motion that well in Finally, at least Accordingly, Plaintiffs have 10 excess of one-thousand individuals likely comprise the putative 11 class. 12 The Court need not stretch its imagination to conclude the 13 putative class members in this action are transitory and 14 difficult to locate. 15 necessarily focus their time and efforts on survival, rather than 16 on pursuing what has been, in this instance, highly adversarial 17 litigation. 18 putative class lack permanent residences, consistent contact 19 information, and access to any material resources, each of which 20 increases the impracticability of joining all class members. 21 Thus, this Court finds Plaintiffs’ proposed class meets the 22 numerosity requirements of Rule 23(a)(1). 23 Furthermore, the instant class members must Indeed, it is of no small import that members of the Next, under Rule 23(a)(2), commonality is established if 24 “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” This 25 requirement is construed permissively and can be satisfied upon a 26 finding of “shared legal issues with divergent factual 27 predicates....” 28 (9th Cir. 1998). Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 7 1 There is no question that the instant case presents common legal 2 issues as to whether the City has taken and destroyed the property 3 of homeless individuals. 4 evidentiary and legal arguments necessary to prosecute the instant 5 claims are nearly identical as to all class members. Thus, commonality exists because the 6 Additionally, typicality under Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied if 7 “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical 8 of the claims or defenses of the class.” 9 require the claims to be identical. Typicality does not Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. 10 Rather, the Ninth Circuit has found typicality if the requisite 11 claims “‘share a common issue of law or fact’ ... and are 12 ‘sufficiently parallel to insure a vigorous and full presentation 13 of all claims for relief.’” 14 Legal Servs. Corp., 917 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 1990) 15 (citations omitted), amended, 937 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). 16 alluded to above, the representative plaintiffs in the present 17 matter assert the same claims that could be brought by any of the 18 other class members for violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 19 Amendments. 20 those differences do not preclude a finding of typicality. 21 The last requirement of Rule 23(a) is that “the Cal. Rural Legal Assistance, Inc. v. As Though each individual claim may differ slightly, 22 representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 23 interests of the class.” 24 the Ninth Circuit identified two issues for determining the 25 adequacy of representation: (1) whether the named plaintiffs and 26 their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class 27 members, and (2) whether the named plaintiffs and their counsel 28 will “prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 8 In Hanlon, 1 150 F.3d at 1020. This court is entirely satisfied that the 2 Plaintiff class is adequately represented by counsel. 3 the Court knows of no conflict that weighs against certification. 4 Therefore, Plaintiffs have satisfied the Rule 23(a)(4) 5 requirement for adequacy of representation. Moreover, 6 Based on the foregoing discussion, Plaintiffs have 7 established the class action prerequisites under Rule 23(a). 8 Accordingly, the next issue to be addressed is whether class 9 certification, for purposes of preliminary approval of the 10 Settlement Agreement, is proper under Rule 23(b). 11 12 2. The Putative Classes Meet the Requirements of Rule 23(b) 13 14 Certification is proper under Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) 15 permits class certification when (1) common questions of law and 16 fact predominate over any individual claims and (2) a class 17 action is the superior method to fairly and efficiently 18 adjudicate the matter. 19 Under the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance analysis, the Court must 20 determine whether the proposed class is “‘sufficiently cohesive to 21 warrant adjudication by representation.’” 22 1022, citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 23 (1997). 24 that a “common nucleus of facts and potential legal remedies 25 dominates” the litigation. 26 the present case derives from the alleged unconstitutionality of 27 City policies concerning the confiscation and destruction of the 28 personal property belonging to homeless persons. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at The requirement is satisfied if a plaintiff establishes Id. The “common nucleus of facts” in 9 1 The factual underpinnings underlying each Plaintiff’s potential 2 claims is nearly identical and, despite any minor differences, 3 those common issues prevail. 4 891, 905 (9th Cir. 1975). 5 where common issues predominate, serves the judicial economy 6 function of Rule 23 class actions. 7 See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d Class certification in this case, Valentino, 97 F.3d at 1234. Plaintiffs must also establish that the proposed class 8 action is the superior method of resolving the dispute in 9 comparison to available alternatives. “A class action is the 10 superior method for managing litigation if no realistic 11 alternative exists.” 12 recognized that a class action is a plaintiff’s only realistic 13 method for recovery if there are multiple claims against the same 14 defendant for relatively small sums. 15 Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 16 1152, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001). 17 each plaintiff’s sought-after relief is equitable in nature, and 18 because Plaintiffs lack any means to feasibly prosecute 19 individual actions, a class action is the superior method to 20 resolve this case. 21 Id. at 1234-35. The Ninth Circuit has Local Joint Executive Bd. Accordingly, because the crux of The same conclusion is reached after consideration of the 22 superiority factors set forth by Rule 23(b)(3). 23 it is likely that each individual class member could only pursue 24 relatively small claims, and because they lack the resources to 25 do so, “class members have no particular interest in individually 26 controlling the prosecution of separate actions.” 27 /// 28 /// 10 First, because 1 Rule 23(b)(3)(A); see also Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., 2 Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Where damages 3 suffered by each putative class member are not large, this factor 4 weighs in favor of certifying a class action.”). 5 individual claims of class members are small, the class action 6 “facilitates the spreading of the litigation costs among the 7 numerous injured parties” and encourages recovery for unlawful 8 activity. 9 516, 534 (3rd Cir. 2004). When the See In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d Additionally, in the instant action, 10 the class members have the option to “opt-out” of the proposed 11 settlement, thus allowing individuals the opportunity to control 12 the litigation. 13 Id. The second relevant factor under Rule 23(b)(3) is whether, 14 and to what extent, other class members have begun litigation 15 concerning the controversy. 16 counsels against certification if, despite the class action, a 17 multiplicity of suits will continue through judicial proceedings. 18 Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1191 (citing to 7A Charles Alan Wright, 19 Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 20 § 1780 at 568-70 (2d ed. 1986)). 21 court are aware of any other similar suit raising similar issues. 22 Accordingly, the Rule 23(b)(3)(B) concern regarding the 23 multiplicity of litigation does not weigh against certification. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// Rule 23(b)(3)(B). 11 This factor Neither the parties nor the 1 Under Rule 23(b)(3)(C), the Court may also consider “the 2 desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of 3 the claims in a particular forum.” 4 why concentrating the litigation in this Court would be 5 undesirable considering the presence of both Plaintiffs and 6 Defendant within the forum. 7 There appears to be no reason Lastly, under Rule 23(b)(3)(D), the Court may consider 8 “likely difficulties in managing a class action.” In this case, 9 the overwhelming benefits that inhere in litigating this matter 10 as a class action outweigh any difficulties that might arise in 11 the management of the litigation. 12 CONCLUSION 13 14 15 For the reasons stated, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class 16 (Docket No. 20) is GRANTED. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 Dated: August 21, 2009 19 20 21 _____________________________ MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12
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