(PC) Washington v Brown, et al, No. 2:2006cv01994 - Document 166 (E.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER signed by Judge William B. Shubb on 10/5/2012 ORDERING that the 162 Findings and Recommendations of 8/23/2012, be, and the same hereby are, ADOPTED to the extent they are consistent with this Order. Defendants' 147 motion for judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff's claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPPA) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. Plaintiff's RLUIPA claims be, and the same hereby are, DISMISSED. (Zignago, K.)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
(PC) Washington v Brown, et al Doc. 166 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 JESSEE WASHINGTON, NO. CIV. 2:06-1994 WBS DAD PC 12 Plaintiff, 13 ORDER RE: FINDINGS AND RECOMENDATIONS v. 14 15 J. BROWN, W. BREWER, Z. MADRIGAL, T. KISSINGER, S. MOHAMED, 16 Defendants. 17 / 18 19 ----oo0oo---Plaintiff Jessee Washington, a prisoner proceeding pro 20 se, brought this civil rights action based on various alleged 21 violations of his First and Eighth Amendment rights. 22 was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 23 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Local General Order No. 262, and Local 24 Rule 302(c)(17). 25 on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 12(c), seeking dismissal of plaintiff’s claims under the 27 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 28 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. The matter Defendants filed a renewed motion for judgment 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 In his Findings and Recommendations, Magistrate Judge 2 Drozd recommends that defendants’ motion for judgment on the 3 pleadings be granted because “money damages are unavailable under 4 RLUIPA against defendants in either their official or their 5 individual capacities.” 6 filed timely objections to the Findings and Recommendations, and 7 the court now reviews them de novo. 8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2)-(3). 9 (Docket No. 162 at 1:19-21.) Plaintiff 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); While the Supreme Court recently held that the Eleventh 10 Amendment precludes an award of damages under RLUIPA against a 11 state officer in his official capacity, Sossamon v. Texas, --- 12 U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1663 (2011), neither the Supreme Court 13 nor the Ninth Circuit has determined whether damages are 14 available under RLUIPA against an officer in his individual 15 capacity. 16 recommendation that, even though the plain language of RLUIPA 17 appears to create a damages remedy against individual officers, 18 such a remedy cannot stand in this case. 19 The court agrees with Magistrate Judge Drozd’s Most courts have assessed Congress’s power to enact 20 RLUIPA as stemming from its spending power. 21 v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 886 (7th Cir. 2009). 22 enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a 23 contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply 24 with federally imposed conditions.” 25 v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 26 are not the recipients of the federal funds, the Fifth Circuit 27 has held that “Congressional enactments pursuant to the Spending 28 Clause do not themselves impose direct liability on a non-party 2 See generally Nelson “[L]egislation Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. Because individual officers 1 to the contract between the state and the federal government.” 2 Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 327-89. 3 The Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits and numerous 4 district courts have reached the same conclusion. 5 F.3d at 889; Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 6 2009); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1275 (11th Cir. 2007), 7 abrogated on other grounds by Sossamon, 131 S.Ct. 1651; Kindred 8 v. Cal. Dep’t of Mental Health, Civ. No. 1:08–01321 AWI GSA, 2011 9 WL 2709104, at *9 (E.D. Cal. July 12, 2011) (citing cases). 10 courts have repeatedly held when faced with similar claims, 11 plaintiff’s claims against the individual officers in this case 12 cannot derive from Congress’s spending power because the officers 13 were not recipients of the federal funds. 14 Nelson, 570 As Congress also enacted RLUIPA pursuant to its powers 15 under the Interstate Commerce Clause. 16 1(b)(2) (“This section applies in any case in which . . . (2) the 17 substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden 18 would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several 19 States, or with Indian tribes.”). 20 addressed whether Congress had the power to enact RLUIPA under 21 the Commerce Clause. 22 n.2 (2005) (“[T]hough RLUIPA is entirely consonant with the 23 Establishment Clause, it may well exceed Congress’s authority 24 under either the Spending Clause or the Commerce Clause. . . . 25 The Court, however, properly declines to reach those issues, 26 since they are outside the question presented and were not 27 addressed by the Court of Appeals.”) (Thomas, J., concurring). 28 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc- The Supreme Court has not See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 727 Most circuit courts have either declined to address the 3 1 validity of RLUIPA under the Commerce Clause or found that the 2 claim at issue did not implicate interstate commerce. 3 Nelson, 570 F.3d at 886 (citing cases); Smith, 502 F.3d at 1274 4 n.9 (“Like the other courts that have addressed this statutory 5 provision, we agree that it hinges on Congress’s Spending Power, 6 rather than its Commerce Clause Power.”); Mayweathers v. Newland, 7 314 F.3d 1062, 1068 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (declining to “decide 8 whether Congress also had the authority to pass RLUIPA under the 9 Commerce Clause” after concluding that Congress had the authority 10 11 See, e.g., to enact the statute under the Spending Clause). In Nelson, 570 F.3d 868, a prisoner brought RLUIPA 12 claims based on the alleged denial of meals that he requested 13 because of his religious practice, which are similar to the 14 claims plaintiff brings in this case. 15 concluded that the plaintiff’s claims did not come within the 16 Commerce Clause: 17 18 19 20 The Seventh Circuit Although RLUIPA ostensibly includes Commerce Clause underpinnings as well, there is no evidence in this case that Miller’s denial of a religious diet “affect[ed] . . . commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes.” Thus, it strikes us as appropriate, at least in this case, to interpret RLUIPA as an exercise of Congress’s power under the Spending Clause. 21 22 Nelson, 570 F.3d at 886. The Fourth Circuit and numerous 23 district courts have also concluded that RLUIPA claims based on a 24 denial of the plaintiff’s religious diet do not implicate the 25 Commerce Clause. 26 diet); Halloum v. Ryan, Civ. No. 11–0097, 2011 WL 4571683, at *5 27 (D. Ariz. Oct. 4, 2011) (failure to accommodate fasting during 28 Ramadan); Patterson v. Ryan, Civ. No. 05–1159, 2011 WL 3799099, Rendelman, 569 F.3d at 189 (denial of kosher 4 1 at *6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 26, 2011) (denial of a three meal a day 2 kosher diet); Mahone v. Pierce Cnty., Civ. No. 10–58472011, 2011 3 WL 3298898, at *5 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2011), (denial of Jewish 4 kosher diet), adopted in full by 2011 WL 3298528 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 5 1, 2011); Sokolsky v. Voss, Civ. No. 1:07–00594 SMM, 2010 6 2991522, at *4 n.4 (E.D. Cal. July 28, 2010) (denial of Passover 7 diet); Harris v. Schriro, 652 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1030 (D. Ariz, 8 2009) (denial of Jewish kosher diet); see also Sossamon, 560 F.3d 9 at 329 n.34 (“In light of the Supreme Court’s rationale for 10 striking down the prior incarnation of RLUIPA as applied to the 11 states, . . . we agree with the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion 12 (and the implicit conclusion of the other circuits by their 13 uniform choice to select the Spending Clause as the most natural 14 source of congressional authority to pass RLUIPA) [that the 15 Commerce Clause cannot sustain RLUIPA claims] when there is no 16 evidence concerning the effect of the substantial burden on 17 ‘commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with 18 Indian tribes.’”). 19 Based on these cases and the lack of any allegations in 20 plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint suggesting that the denial 21 of his religious diet would lead in the aggregate to a 22 substantial effect on interstate commerce, the court concludes 23 that plaintiff’s claims do not come within the Commerce Clause 24 underpinnings of RLUIPA. 25 Lastly, Congress’s power to create a RLUIPA claim 26 enabling plaintiff to seek damages against the individual 27 officers does not stem from § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in 28 this case. “RLUIPA is Congress’s second attempt to accord 5 1 heightened statutory protection to religious exercise in the wake 2 of this Court’s decision in Employment Division, Department of 3 Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).” 4 Sossamon, 131 S.Ct. at 1655-56; see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 5 U.S. 507, 514 (1997) (explaining that Smith, 494 U.S. 872, held 6 that “neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to 7 religious practices even when not supported by a compelling 8 governmental interest”). 9 Congress’s first attempt came in RLUIPA’s predecessor, 10 the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. 11 § 2000bb et seq., which Congress purported to enact under § 5 of 12 the Fourteenth Amendment. 13 Although RLUIPA is more limited in scope than RFRA, both acts 14 sought to restore the compelling interest test to free exercise 15 claims and thereby prohibit a substantial burden on a person’s 16 free exercise of religion unless the government demonstrates that 17 the burden is in furtherance of a compelling interest and employs 18 the least restrictive means. 19 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515-16. 20 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514. See Sossamon, 131 S.Ct. at 1656; In City of Boerne, the Supreme Court held that Congress 21 lacked the power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact 22 RFRA. 23 § 5 gives Congress “the power ‘to enforce,’ not the power to 24 determine what constitutes a constitutional violation,” and that 25 RFRA exceeded that power because it “attempt[ed] a substantive 26 change in constitutional protections.” 27 at 519 (“Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free 28 Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515. 6 The Court explained that Id. at 519, 532; see id. 1 Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what 2 the right is.”). 3 to enact RLUIPA as it relates to inmates under only its Spending 4 and Commerce Clause powers,1 it also precluded Congress from 5 utilizing § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to impose the 6 compelling interest test to laws of general applicability. 7 Section 5 therefore cannot sustain plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims in 8 this case. City of Boerne thus not only prompted Congress 9 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that (1) the Magistrate Judge’s 10 Findings and Recommendations of August 23, 2012, be, and the same 11 hereby are, adopted to the extent they are consistent with this 12 Order; (2) defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on 13 plaintiff’s claims under the Religious Land Use and 14 Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPPA”) be, and the same hereby 15 /// 16 /// 17 /// 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 With claims pertaining to land use regulations, Congress purported to act under the Spending Clause, Commerce Clause, and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(2)(A)-(C); see generally Life Teen Inc. v. Yavapai Cnty., Civ. No. 3:01–1490, 2003 WL 24224618, at *13-14 (D. Ariz. Mar. 26, 2003). In contrast, RLUIPA links claims by institutionalized persons only to the Spending and Commerce Clauses. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1)-(2). Even assuming § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment could be used to justify RLUIPA claims by inmates that attack laws or regulations providing for individualized assessments, plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims attack a general policy that was applied to all Muslims in his unit. (See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-25, 2-30 (alleging that defendants failed “to assure that Facility ‘Z’ (Ad-Seg) Housing Unit Muslim Inmates were provided with Institutional unit (Inmate Sign-Up List) For Ramadhan Fast . . . Plaintiff, Inmate Brown And other Muslim Inmates were Intentionally Denied Ramadhan Fast”).) 7 1 is, GRANTED; and (3) plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims be, and the same 2 hereby are, DISMISSED. 3 DATED: October 5, 2012 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
