Deocampo, et al. v. City of Vallejo, et al., No. 2:2006cv01283 - Document 211 (E.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 5/21/14 DENYING 206 Motion for Relief from Final Judgment. (Meuleman, A)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 13 JASON EUGENE DEOCAMPO; JESUS SEBASTIAN GRANT; and JAQUEZS TYREE BERRY, Plaintiffs, 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 CIV. NO. 2:06-1283 WBS CMK MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM FINAL JUDGMENT v. JASON POTTS, individually and in his capacity as a Vallejo police officer; JEREMY PATZER, individually and in his capacity as a Vallejo police officer; ERIC JENSEN, individually and in his capacity as a Vallejo police officer; and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, Defendants. 23 24 25 ----oo0oo---Plaintiffs Jason Eugene Deocampo, Jaquezs Tyree Berry, 26 and Jesus Sebastian Grant brought this civil rights action 27 against defendants Jason Potts, Jeremy Patzer, and Eric Jensen 28 arising out of defendants’ conduct while employed as police 1 1 officers by the City of Vallejo (“the City”). 2 stipulated dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against the City and 3 Chief of Police Robert Nichelini, the case went to trial against 4 the remaining defendants. 5 Deocampo obtained a judgment of $50,000 against Potts and Jensen. 6 The court subsequently awarded plaintiffs $314,497.73 in 7 attorney’s fees. 8 judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) on the 9 basis that the judgment and attorney’s fee award are liabilities 10 Following a After a thirteen-day jury trial, Defendants now move for relief from final of the City that were discharged in bankruptcy.1 11 Rule 60(b) authorizes a court to relieve a party from a 12 final judgment on the basis, among others, that the judgment has 13 been discharged. 14 Bankruptcy Code provides that a municipal entity is discharged of 15 its debts as of the time when its plan of adjustment is 16 confirmed. 17 Bankruptcy Code also incorporates by reference § 524(a), which 18 provides that a discharge voids any judgment and enjoins any 19 party from collecting on the judgment “to the extent that such 20 judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the 21 debtor.” 22 provisions therefore turns on whether the judgment against Potts Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). 11 U.S.C. § 944(b)(1). Section 944 of the Section 901(a) of the 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1)-(2). The applicability of these 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 On May 23, 2008, the City filed for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California pursuant to Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. (See Docket No. 207-1.) On August 4, 2011, the bankruptcy court confirmed the City’s Second Amended Plan of Adjustment. (See Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 4 (Docket No. 207-4).) The Plan provides, with exceptions not relevant here, that the City is discharged of any liabilities arising prior to August 5, 2011. (Docket No. 207-3.) 2 1 and Jensen and the attorney’s fee award are liabilities of the 2 City. 3 At trial, plaintiffs attempted to prove that each of 4 the three officer defendants used excessive force and unlawfully 5 seized them in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and sought 6 damages to remedy the harm they suffered. 7 plaintiffs sought--and obtained--relief from Potts and Jensen 8 only in their individual capacities.2 9 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1990). In so doing, See Price v. Akaka, 928 A claim against an officer in his 10 individual capacity seeks to impose personal liability on that 11 officer for his own wrongdoing, and can be executed only against 12 the officer’s personal assets. 13 165-66 (1985). 14 action is a victory against the individual defendant, rather than 15 against the entity that employs him.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, As a result, “[a] victory in a personal-capacity Id. at 167-68. 16 Defendants contend that the judgment and attorney’s fee 17 award against Potts and Jensen operate as liabilities of the City 18 because the City is required to defend and indemnify its officers 19 against claims arising out of the scope of their employment. 20 Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 825, 995. See However, the Ninth Circuit has 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 Although the caption states that plaintiffs sued each defendant both individually and “in his capacity as a Vallejo police officer,” plaintiff did not pursue any claims against the officers in their official capacity at trial. See Cent. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Struve, 852 F.2d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 1988) (relying on the “basis of the claims asserted and nature of relief sought,” rather than the caption, to determine the capacity in which the defendants were sued). In fact, while plaintiffs initially asserted Monell claims against the City and Chief of Police Robert Nichelini, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed those claims and parties in July 2007, over six years before the trial began. (Docket No. 60.) 3 1 repeatedly emphasized in the Eleventh Amendment context that a 2 state’s indemnification of its officers is a “‘purely intramural 3 arrangement’ between a state and its officers” and does not 4 shield those officers from liability for individual-capacity 5 claims, even when the judgment will ultimately be paid out of the 6 state’s treasury. 7 Cir. 1984) (quoting Ronwin v. Shapiro, 657 F.2d 1071, 1074 n.5 8 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also Ashker v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 112 9 F.3d 392, 395 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Following Demery, we hold Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1147 (9th 10 California’s indemnification of Brodeur and Astorga does not 11 render California the real party in interest.”). 12 Two judges in this district have applied Demery to hold 13 that the City’s Plan of Adjustment does not discharge liabilities 14 against officers of the City in their individual capacities, even 15 though the City must indemnify them. 16 City of Vallejo, the court reasoned that because “[t]he Ninth 17 Circuit has found that section 1983 claims against public 18 officials in their individual capacities are distinguishable from 19 claims against the employing public entity regardless of 20 California’s indemnification laws . . . [t]he City’s discharge of 21 its liabilities did not result in discharge of the individual 22 officers’ liabilities as well.” 23 WL 4780742, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2013). 24 Barber v. City of Vallejo, the court held that “a claim against a 25 City official is not essentially one against the City for 26 bankruptcy discharge purposes, even if state law requires the 27 City to indemnify the official.” 28 2013 WL 3992403, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2013). For instance, in Wilson v. Civ. No. 2:12-547 JAM CKD, 2013 And in V.W. ex rel. Civ. No. 2:12-1629 LKK GGH, 4 In so holding, 1 the court emphasized that “‘indemnification’ is a claim separate 2 and apart from the Section 1983 liability claim that underlies 3 it,” and that an officer’s right to bring an action for indemnity 4 against the City does not transmute the plaintiff’s claim against 5 the officer into one against the City itself. 6 Id. at *7. Defendants contend that Wilson and V.W. are contrary to 7 the consensus of courts in this district that claims against an 8 officer in his individual capacity are treated as claims against 9 the City itself for bankruptcy purposes. Not so. The cases 10 defendants cite uniformly concern whether 11 U.S.C. §§ 362 and 11 922, which govern stays of litigation during bankruptcy 12 proceedings, also apply to stay an action against an officer of 13 the municipality in his individual capacity. 14 City of Stockton, 484 B.R. 372, 378-79 (E.D. Cal. B.R. 2012) 15 (Klein, J.); Tavake v. Allied Ins. Co., Civ. No. 2:11-3259 KJM 16 DAD PS, 2013 WL 35611, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2013); Smith- 17 Downs v. City of Stockton, Civ. No. 2:10-2495, 2012 WL 3202265, 18 at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2012). 19 staying actions against individual officers on a variety of 20 grounds, including the avoidance of duplicative litigation while 21 Chapter 9 proceedings are ongoing, see Tavake, 2011 WL 35611 at 22 *3, the difficulty of disaggregating litigation against the 23 officers from litigation against the municipality, see Smith- 24 Downs, 2012 WL 3202265 at *2, and preventing parties from 25 circumventing the automatic stay provisions of § 922, City of 26 Stockton, 484 B.R. at 377-78. 27 28 See, e.g., In re Those courts have justified These concerns are inapplicable here: the City is not a party to this action, plaintiffs have dismissed their Monell 5 1 claims against the City and Chief Nichelini with prejudice, the 2 automatic stay has been lifted, and the City’s plan of adjustment 3 has already resolved any pending litigation between the City and 4 its creditors. 5 individual capacity must be stayed during ongoing Chapter 9 6 proceedings, defendants have cited no authority for the 7 proposition that a judgment against that officer is discharged 8 upon approval of the City’s plan of adjustment. 9 multiple cases have explicitly held the opposite. Even if an action against an officer in his By contrast, See, e.g., 10 Wilson, 2013 WL 4780742 at *3; V.W., 2013 WL 3992403 at *7. 11 Accordingly, because the judgment against Potts and Jensen and 12 the attorney’s fee award were not discharged in bankruptcy, the 13 court must deny defendants’ motion for relief from final 14 judgment. 15 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for 16 relief from final judgment be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 17 Dated: May 21, 2014 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6
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