S v. Lassen County et al., No. 2:2005cv01217 - Document 74 (E.D. Cal. 2007)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM, OPINION and ORDER signed by Judge David F. Levi on 6/4/07. The court GRANTS summary judgment as to William's IIED claim against Lassen for its actions as a county and William's ADA claim. The court DENIES summary judgment as to William's IIED claim against Lassen for the actions of its employees.CASE CLOSED (Kastilahn, A)
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S v. Lassen County et al. Doc. 74 Case 2:05-cv-01217-JKS-CMK Document 74 Filed 06/05/2007 Page 1 of 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 No. Civ. S-05-1217 DFL CMK WILLIAM S., Memorandum of Opinion and Order Plaintiff, v. LASSEN COUNTY; MELODY BRAWLEY; KEVIN MANNEL; LYNNE MARGOLIES; KIM PERKINS; and RONALD VOSSELOR, Defendants. / 18 Plaintiff William S. (“William”) sued Lassen County 19 20 (“Lassen”) and numerous individual defendants alleging improper 21 public disclosure of his medical condition. Following the 22 dismissal of the individual defendants, only Lassen remains as a 23 defendant in this action. Lassen moves for summary judgment on 24 William’s intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) 25 and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claims. For the 26 27 reasons below, the court GRANTS the motion in part. 28 1 Dockets.Justia.com Case 2:05-cv-01217-JKS-CMK 1 2 Document 74 Filed 06/05/2007 Page 2 of 12 I. On February 23, 2004, Lassen hired William as a social 3 worker. Def’s SUF ¶ 1. On August 16, 2004, William learned 4 5 from a client that his name was among 50 to 100 on a list of 6 individuals with communicable diseases posted in Lassen’s Medi- 7 Cal eligibility office. 8 Id. ¶¶ 21-22, 25. The list noted the specific illnesses of some individuals served by the office, 9 including William. Pl.’s SUF ¶ 4. A Lassen employee claims 10 11 that the list’s “purpose was to give information to eligibility 12 workers that had to interview people that had communicable 13 diseases so that the eligibility worker would be more prepared 14 to interview them.” Johnson Depo. 10:22-25. Lassen states that 15 the list was first placed on the wall between 1994 and 1996. 16 17 Def.’s SUF ¶ 24. William states that it was posted prior to 18 1999. Pl.’s SUF ¶ 4. Melody Brawley, Director of Lassen Works & 19 Community Social Services, learned of the list in the spring of 20 2004. Def.’s SUF ¶ 28. Brawley instructed a caseworker 21 supervisor to destroy the list by shedding it, although the 22 parties dispute whether Brawley acted properly. See Pl.’s Resp. 23 24 to Def.’s SUF ¶ 29. William alleges that he was “embarrassed and 25 distraught” after being notified that his name had been 26 displayed on the list. Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SUF ¶ 17. 27 On February 2, 2005, William filed a claim form with Lassen 28 regarding his inclusion on the posted list. 2 William S. v. Case 2:05-cv-01217-JKS-CMK 1 2 Document 74 Filed 06/05/2007 Page 3 of 12 Lassen Co., et al., S-05-1217, 2006 WL 3388531, at * 1-2 (E.D.Cal. Nov. 11, 2006). In the claim, William unnecessarily 3 disclosed his condition and did not request that the information 4 5 be kept confidential. Id. Lassen, consistent with its practice 6 at the time, posted William’s claim form on the internet by 7 linking it to the online agenda for the meeting at which it was 8 to be discussed. Id. William objected to the public posting of 9 his claim form and requested that Lassen remove it from the 10 11 internet.1 He states that he was “upset because his medical 12 condition continuously remained on the internet after he 13 repeatedly requested that it be withdrawn.” 14 Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SUF ¶ 17. 15 The same month William filed his claim, Lassen promoted 16 17 him to social worker II status. William Depo., Jan. 25, 2006, 18 112:4-9. A supervisor later asked him to apply for a social 19 worker III position, but Merit Systems, the organization 20 responsible for human resources decisions, decided that he 21 lacked sufficient experience for the position. Id. at 112:13- 22 21. Thereafter, Lassen promoted him to “lead social worker,” a 23 24 position he held for two or three weeks before resigning. 25 at 112:22-113:7. Id. William does not believe that the disclosure 26 27 28 1 The court previously held that William had no reasonable expectation of privacy to the information he voluntarily disclosed in the claim form. William S., 2006 WL 3388531, at *1-2. 3 Case 2:05-cv-01217-JKS-CMK 1 2 Document 74 Filed 06/05/2007 of his condition affected his performance reviews. Page 4 of 12 109:10-22. Id. at Rather, he states that his co-workers were typically 3 “very complimentary” about his work. Id. at 212:11-14. 4 II. 5 William alleges that he was the victim of intentional 6 7 8 infliction of emotional distress under California law and a hostile work environment under the Americans with Disabilities 9 Act. These claims are addressed individually below. 10 11 12 13 14 A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress William argues that Lassen County intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress upon him. An IIED claim requires “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the 15 intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability 16 17 of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering 18 severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and 19 proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s 20 outrageous conduct.” Christensen v. Superior Court of Los 21 Angeles County, 54 Cal.3d 868, 903 (1991) (citations omitted). 22 Moreover, “[i]t is not enough that the conduct be intentional 23 24 and outrageous. It must be conduct directed at the plaintiff, 25 or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is 26 aware.” Id. at 903. 27 William alleges that Lassen, the only remaining defendant, 28 “failed to promote and adopt a system” requiring employees to 4 Case 2:05-cv-01217-JKS-CMK 1 2 Document 74 Filed 06/05/2007 Page 5 of 12 protect employee privacy rights and confidential medical information. SAC ¶ 45. William argues that Lassen demonstrated 3 its disregard for such rights by tolerating the office posting 4 5 of the communicable disease list and the internet posting of 6 William’s claim form disclosing his condition. 7 lack merit. 8 These claims Even assuming that Lassen’s conduct was outrageous, William does not demonstrate that Lassen’s alleged failure to 9 implement a privacy policy was intentionally directed at him or 10 11 occurred in his presence. See Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d. at 903. 12 Lassen presents evidence of various efforts to enforce a county- 13 wide privacy policy. 14 Def.’s SUF ¶ 10. William fails to present evidence showing that Lassen intentionally abandoned established 15 policy or followed a different policy to inflict emotional 16 17 18 distress upon him.2 as to the IIED claim against Lassen for its conduct. William also argues that Lassen should be held responsible 19 20 Therefore, the court GRANTS summary judgment for the conduct of its employees. “A public entity is liable 21 for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an 22 employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment 23 24 2 25 26 27 28 William’s response to Lassen’s evidence regarding its county privacy policy does not create a material dispute of fact. See Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SUF ¶ 10. William asserts without evidentiary support that Lassen maintained a policy of posting communicable disease lists without permission of those named. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)(requiring “the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings” to create a material dispute of fact). 5 Case 2:05-cv-01217-JKS-CMK 1 2 Document 74 Filed 06/05/2007 Page 6 of 12 if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his 3 personal representative.” Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2(a). Lassen 4 5 argues that William’s decision to dismiss with prejudice his 6 claims against Lynne Margolies, Kevin Mannel, and Melody Brawley 7 bars him from pursuing claims against Lassen based upon the 8 employees’ conduct. See O’Hara v. Teamsters Local Union No. 9 856, 151 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 1998). Lassen overstates the 10 11 12 13 14 effect of the dismissals. Plaintiffs are masters of their claim and may add or drop parties as allowed by applicable rules of procedure. R. Civ. Pro. 21. See Fed. The res judicata doctrines vaguely invoked by 15 Lassen protect “litigants from the burden of relitigating an 16 17 identical issue with the same party or his privy and . . . 18 promot[e] judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” 19 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). 20 concerns are not present here. Such Although William’s respondeat 21 superior claims against Lassen concern the same conduct as his 22 claims against the dismissed employee defendants, Lassen was not 23 24 a party or in privity with a party to William’s dismissal 25 agreement. 26 (discussing requirements for privity between employee and See Carden v. Otto, 37 Cal.App.3d 887, 892 (1974) 27 employer for res judicata purposes). The dismissals bar William 28 from later pursuing an action against the employee defendants 6 Case 2:05-cv-01217-JKS-CMK 1 2 Document 74 Filed 06/05/2007 Page 7 of 12 for the conduct alleged here, but leave him free to pursue existing claims against the remaining party, Lassen. 3 William alleges that Lassen employees Margolies, Mannel, 4 5 and Brawley “made knowledge about the Plaintiff and his medical 6 condition available to the public without his authority or 7 consent” and “made statements . . . that hold the Plaintiff in 8 disdain without regard to his work and competency but only with 9 regard to his medical condition.” 2AC ¶¶ 42-43. William 10 11 alleges that the employees directed their actions at him and 12 often acted in his presence. 13 903. 14 15 See Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d. at For example, William claims that: (1) Margolies circulated an inter-office memo recommending against hiring him due to his prior EEOC complaint and medical condition,3 William Depo., Jan. 16 17 25, 2006, 183:9-19; (2) Mannel refused to remove his claim form 18 from the internet and told him that he should “get over” the 19 fact that his medical condition had been publicly disclosed, 20 William Depo., Jan. 25, 2006, 92:8-17; and (3) Brawley was aware 21 of the communicable list but intentionally took no action until 22 others raised the issue and unreasonably delayed destruction of 23 24 the list following William’s complaints, compare Brawley Depo., 25 15:1-19 with Johnson Depo., 15:16-16:9. 26 27 28 3 The parties dispute the authenticity of this memo. 7 Case 2:05-cv-01217-JKS-CMK 1 2 Document 74 Filed 06/05/2007 Page 8 of 12 A material dispute of fact remains as to whether the employees’ actions rise to the level of conduct actionable in an 3 IIED claim. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to 4 5 William, the court finds that the alleged actions of Lassen 6 employees were sufficiently severe that a reasonable trier of 7 fact could find them extreme and outrageous. 8 See Bundren v. Superior Court of Ventura Co., 145 Cal.App.3d 784, 792 9 (1983)(holding questions of unreasonableness and outrageousness 10 11 are more appropriately decided by a trier of fact hearing live 12 testimony than on summary judgment); see also Johnson v. Hawe, 13 338 F.3d 676, 687 (9th Cir. 2004)(“The determination of whether 14 conduct is outrageous is ordinarily a jury question, but the 15 court must initially determine if reasonable minds could differ 16 17 on whether the conduct was so extreme as to result in 18 liability.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 19 Therefore, the court DENIES summary judgment as to the IIED 20 claim against Lassen for the conduct of its employees. 21 B. Hostile Work Environment 22 William argues that Lassen violated the ADA by creating a 23 24 hostile work environment when it disclosed his medical condition 25 and failed to take requested remedial action. 26 cite specific sections of the ADA for his hostile work William does not 27 environment claim. The Ninth Circuit “has not yet held that 28 such a claim exists, let alone what its source in the statute 8 Case 2:05-cv-01217-JKS-CMK 1 2 might be.” Document 74 Filed 06/05/2007 Page 9 of 12 See Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1190 n. 14 (9th Cir. 2003). The court finds that William’s hostile work 3 environment claim most closely resembles an ADA discrimination 4 5 claim, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), and construes it as such. Section 6 12112(a) bars discrimination based upon disability “in regard to 7 job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or 8 discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and 9 other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” “[T]he 10 11 ADA outlaws adverse employment decisions motivated, even in 12 part, by animus based on a plaintiff's disability or request for 13 an accommodation.” 14 Head v. Glacier Northwest Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir. 2005). 15 William fails to demonstrate that a dispute of material 16 17 fact exists as to whether he suffered an adverse employment 18 action.4 19 alleged discrimination by Lassen. 20 Margolies circulated a memo demanding that his employment offer In his opposition, William notes four instances of First, he alleges that 21 be rescinded due to his earlier EEOC claim and medical 22 condition. William Depo., Jan. 25, 2006, 183:9-19. Despite the 23 24 letter, Lassen maintained its offer and William accepted it. 25 26 27 28 4 William alleges in his Second Amended Complaint that Lassen failed to give him an interview or hire him from 1999 until 2004 because of his medical condition, ¶¶ 7-9, but does not raise this conduct in his opposition to Lassen’s summary judgment motion or provide evidence sufficient to create a material dispute of fact. See Celotex Corp, 477 U.S. at 324. 9 Case 2:05-cv-01217-JKS-CMK 1 2 SAC ¶ 12. Document 74 Filed 06/05/2007 Page 10 of 12 Second, he alleges that Lassen disclosed his condition on the internet and refused to remove it upon his 3 requests. See William S., 2006 WL 3388531, at *1; see also 4 5 William Depo., Jan 25, 2006, 92:8-17. William does not allege 6 that the posting had any adverse effect upon the terms, 7 conditions or privileges of his employment. 8 The posting was the result of his own activity that was unrelated to his employment. 9 Third, he alleges that Lassen was generally non-responsive to 10 11 violations of his privacy and that an employee told him to “get 12 used to it.” 13 William does not allege that the lack of action by Lassen or 14 William Depo., Jan 25, 2006, 92:8-17. Again, subsequent comments by its employees affected his employment 15 status. The list at issue was not a list of employees, but of 16 17 persons who received services from the Lassen office. Fourth, 18 William alleges that his superiors, to compensate him for their 19 prior actions, encouraged him to apply for positions for which 20 he did not qualify. He relies entirely on his own assertions in 21 explaining his superiors’ motivations and cites no authority 22 holding encouragement for promotion, even if futile, to amount 23 24 to harassment. Moreover, although William did not receive the 25 promotion at issue, he admits that his lack of qualifications, 26 not animus based on his disability, resulted in the denial. 27 at 112:4-115:6. 28 10 Id. Case 2:05-cv-01217-JKS-CMK 1 2 Document 74 Filed 06/05/2007 Page 11 of 12 Lassen presents sufficient evidence to rebut William’s claims of disability-based animus. William’s two performance 3 reviews during his tenure at Lassen found his work to be “above 4 5 satisfactory to excellent.” Id. at 109:10-22. Although William 6 resigned from his position, he does not allege that conditions 7 were so intolerable at the time as to make his resignation a 8 constructive discharge. Wallace v. City of San Diego, 479 F.3d 9 616, 625-26 (9th Cir. 2007)(“Constructive discharge occurs when, 10 11 looking at the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable 12 person in [the employee's] position would have felt that he was 13 forced to quit because of intolerable and discriminatory working 14 conditions.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 15 William fails to create a dispute of material fact as to whether 16 17 Lassen subjected him to an adverse employment action because of 18 his condition. Therefore, the court GRANTS summary judgment as 19 to the ADA claim. 20 III. 21 For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS summary judgment as 22 to William’s IIED claim against Lassen for its actions as a 23 24 county and William’s ADA claim. The Court DENIES summary 25 judgment as to William’s IIED claim against Lassen for the 26 actions of its employees. 27 28 11 Case 2:05-cv-01217-JKS-CMK 1 2 Document 74 Filed 06/05/2007 Page 12 of 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: June 4, 2007 3 4 5 /s/ David F. Levi___________ DAVID F. LEVI United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12
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