(PC) Jones v. Sherman, et al., No. 1:2018cv01070 - Document 8 (E.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS recommending that this case be dismissed for failure to state a claim; Clerk of Court directed to close this case re 1 Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint filed by Joseph Jones ; referred to Judge Drozd;New case number is 1:18-cv-1070 DD-EPG (PC),signed by Magistrate Judge Erica P. Grosjean on 9/25/2018. Objections to F&R due 21-Day Deadline (Martin-Gill, S)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 JOSEPH JONES, 13 14 Plaintiff, v. 15 Case No. 1:18-cv-01070-EPG (PC) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND S. SHERMAN, et al., (ECF NO. 1) 16 17 Defendants. OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS 18 19 20 ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE Joseph Jones (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 21 this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the complaint 22 commencing this action on August 10, 2018. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges that he received 23 only one meal for dinner on Yom Kippur, when he was told he would receive two meals. 24 The Court has screened the complaint under the applicable legal standards and finds 25 that it fails to state a claim for a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The Court 26 explains the legal standards below and recommends that the assigned district judge dismiss this 27 case without leave to amend. If Plaintiff believes that the Court’s recommendation is in error, 28 Plaintiff should file objections within twenty-one days of the date of service of this order. 1 1 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 3 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 4 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 5 legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 6 that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 7 ' 1915A(b)(1), (2). As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (ECF No. 7), the Court may 8 also screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 9 portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 10 determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 11 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 12 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 13 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 14 not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 15 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 16 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 17 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. 18 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 19 this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts 20 “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 21 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, a 22 plaintiff’s legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 23 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 24 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 25 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 26 II. 27 On September 30, 2017, Plaintiff notified the prison that he was honoring Yom Kippur. 28 Someone from the prison told Plaintiff that he would get a special meal for the evening to take 2 1 back to his cell. But when Plaintiff returned that evening, he was just given a lunch. It had 2 only bread and a pack of tuna. Plaintiff was told that “Jews get nothing here.” Plaintiff alleges 3 this was discrimination on the basis of Judaism. 4 Plaintiff attaches 602 grievances and responses from the prison. Those grievances 5 confirm Plaintiff’s complaint that the evening meal was inadequate with no vegetables or extra 6 food. It appears there was a dispute regarding whether Plaintiff was given a single or double 7 portion in the sack meal provided. 8 9 10 III. DISCUSSION A. First Amendment and RLUIPA The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make 11 no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof....” U.S. 12 Const. amend I. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit summarizes the 13 application of the Free Exercise Clause in a state prison context as follows: 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 The First Amendment, applicable to state action by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment, Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 8, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947), “prohibits government from making a law ‘prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].’ ” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972) (per curiam) (alteration in original). The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that prisoners retain the protections of the First Amendment. See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974); Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322, 92 S.Ct. 1079. A prisoner's right to freely exercise his religion, however, is limited by institutional objectives and by the loss of freedom concomitant with incarceration. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 348, 107 S.Ct. 2400. Hartmann v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013). “To prevail on their Free Exercise claim, Plaintiffs must allege facts plausibly showing 24 that the government denied them ‘a reasonable opportunity of pursuing [their] faith comparable 25 to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts.’” 26 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322, 92 S.Ct. 1079). To implicate the 27 Free Exercise Clause, a prisoner must show that the belief at issue is both “sincerely held” and 28 “rooted in religious belief.” Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Shakur, 3 1 514 F.3d 884–85 (noting the Supreme Court's disapproval of the “centrality” test and finding 2 that the “sincerity” test in Malik determines whether the Free Exercise Clause applies). If the 3 inmate makes his initial showing of a sincerely held religious belief, he must establish that 4 prison officials substantially burdened the practice of his religion by preventing him from 5 engaging in conduct that he sincerely believes is consistent with his faith. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 6 884–85. 7 Government action substantially burdens the exercise of religion when the action is 8 “oppressive to a significantly great extent.” Int'l Church of Foursquare Gospel v. City of San 9 Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 10 “That is, a ‘substantial burden’ on ‘religious exercise’ must impose a significantly great 11 restriction or onus upon such exercise.” Id. (quoting San Jose Christian College v. City of 12 Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004)). “A substantial burden exists where the 13 governmental authority puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to 14 violate his beliefs.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) 15 16 Additionally, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”) provides: 17 No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution…, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that personB (1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 42 U.S.C. ' 2000cc-1(a). Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that defendant substantially burdened the exercise of his religious beliefs. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2005). In any RLUIPA claim, one must first identify the Areligious exercise@ allegedly impinged upon, and then must ask whether the prison regulation or action at issue Asubstantially burdens@ that religious exercise. Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2008). 28 4 1 “RLUIPA does not define ‘substantial burden,’ but [the Ninth Circuit] has held that ‘a 2 substantial burden on religious exercise must impose a significantly great restriction or onus 3 upon such exercise.’” Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1124–25 (citing San Jose Christian Coll. v. City 4 of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004)). “Generally, the term ‘substantial 5 burden’ in RLUIPA is construed in light of federal Supreme Court and appellate jurisprudence 6 involving the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prior to the Court's decision in 7 Emp't Div. Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–82, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 8 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990).” Int'l Church of Foursquare Gospel, 673 F.3d at 1067 (citing Guru 9 Nanak, 456 F.3d at 988). “In the context of a prisoner's constitutional challenge to institutional 10 policies, this court has held that a substantial burden occurs ‘where the state ... denies [an 11 important benefit] because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial 12 pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.’” Hartmann, 707 13 F.3d at 1124–25 (citing Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2005)). 14 Applying these legal standards, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged 15 a claim for unconstitutional burden of religion under either the Free Exercise clause or 16 RLUIPA. Plaintiff was able to observe Yom Kippur. Plaintiff received a meal consistent with 17 his practice. 18 Plaintiff’s allegation that, on this one day, he received only one and not two portions of 19 a meal does not establish a constitutional violation. The burden involved in eating only one 20 portion of a meal on one occasion is not overly oppressive or significantly great to unduly 21 burden his religious exercise. Plaintiff’s allegations that he was told things such as “Jews get 22 nothing” does not change this analysis (especially considering that, according to Plaintiff, he 23 was in fact given a portion of a meal). 24 B. Eighth Amendment 25 “It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions 26 under which [the prisoner] is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” 27 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 28 (1994). Conditions of confinement may, consistent with the Constitution, be restrictive and 5 1 harsh. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 2 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006); Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1996); Jordan v. 3 Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1531 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). Prison officials must, however, 4 provide prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” 5 Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part on other 6 grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); see also Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 7 731 (9th Cir. 2000); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982); Wright v. Rushen, 8 642 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981). 9 Two requirements must be met to show an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 10 U.S. at 834. “First, the deprivation must be, objectively, sufficiently serious." Id. (internal 11 quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, “prison officials must have a sufficiently 12 culpable state of mind,” which for conditions of confinement claims, “is one of deliberate 13 indifference.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Prison officials act with 14 deliberate indifference when they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or 15 safety. Id. at 837. The circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivations are critical in 16 determining whether the conditions complained of are grave enough to form the basis of a 17 viable Eighth Amendment claim. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2006). Mere 18 negligence on the part of a prison official is not sufficient to establish liability, but rather, the 19 official's conduct must have been wanton. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 20 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 21 Plaintiff has alleged that he only received one portion of a meal, when he was supposed 22 to receive two. The Court finds that, even if true, the alleged conduct was not “sufficiently 23 serious” to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See, e.g, Merriman v. 24 Lizarraga, 2017 WL 4340041, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2017) (finding that an allegation that 25 the plaintiff was denied one meal was “insufficient to state a cognizable civil rights claim”); 26 Scally v. Ferrara, 2016 WL 5234691, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2016) (finding that allegations 27 that the plaintiff was harassed and denied one meal on two separate days “do not raise to the 28 level of an Eighth Amendment violation”). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a 6 1 cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. 2 IV. 3 The Court has screened the complaint, and finds that it fails to state a claim under the 4 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS relevant legal standards. 5 The Court does not recommend granting leave to amend. Plaintiff clearly alleged the 6 circumstances underlying his complaint, and the Court has found that those circumstances do not 7 state a constitutional violation for the reasons described in this order. For that reason, leave to 8 amend would be futile. 9 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 10 1. This case be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim;1 and 11 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE this case. 12 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district judge 13 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty- 14 one (21) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file 15 written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 16 Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections 17 within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 18 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 19 1991)). 20 21 Additionally, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to assign a district judge to this case. 22 23 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: September 25, 2018 /s/ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 25 26 27 28 1 This Court believes this dismissal would be subject to the “three-strikes” provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763 (2015). 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
