(PC) Torres v. Patel et al, No. 1:2018cv00188 - Document 41 (E.D. Cal. 2019)
Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS Regarding Plaintiff's 34 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction signed by Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone on 11/25/2019. Referred to Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill. Objections to F&R due within Twenty-One (21) Days. (Sant Agata, S)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MIGUEL TORRES, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 v. Case No. 1:18-cv-00188-LJO-SAB (PC) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISMAIL PATEL, et al., (ECF No. 34) 15 Defendants. TWENTY-ONE (21) DAY DEADLINE 16 Plaintiff Miguel Torres is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this 17 18 civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on Plaintiff’s first 19 amended complaint against Defendants Patel, Ulit, Spaeth, Manasrah, and Serda for deliberate 20 indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 18.) 21 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order and a 22 preliminary injunction, filed on May 28, 2019. (ECF No. 34.) On June 27, 2019, Defendants 23 Patel, Ulit, Manasrah, Spaeth, and Serda filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary 24 restraining order and a preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 40.) Plaintiff did not file a reply, and 25 the time in which to do so has passed. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief has been 26 submitted for decision. Local Rule 230(l). 27 /// 28 /// 1 1 I. 2 LEGAL STANDARD 3 Procedurally, a federal district court may issue emergency injunctive relief only if it has 4 personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. See Murphy 5 Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (noting that one “becomes a 6 party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of summons or 7 other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party serve must appear to 8 defend.). Furthermore, the pendency of this action does not give the Court jurisdiction over 9 prison officials in general. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 491–93 (2009); Mayfield 10 v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the 11 parties in this action and to the viable legal claims upon which this action is proceeding. 12 Summers, 555 U.S. at 491−93; Mayfield, 599 F.3d at 969. 13 A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary measure of relief that a federal court 14 may impose without notice to the adverse party if, in an affidavit or verified complaint, the 15 moving party “clearly show[s] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result 16 to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). 17 The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is essentially the same as that for issuing a 18 preliminary injunction. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 19 (9th Cir. 2001) (analysis for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions is 20 “substantially identical”). 21 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter 22 v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted). “A preliminary 23 injunction can take two forms. A prohibitory injunction prohibits a party from taking action and 24 preserves the status quo pending a determination of the action on the merits.” Marlyn 25 Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 26 alterations and quotation marks omitted). “A mandatory injunction orders a responsible party to 27 take action.” Id. at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted). Since a “mandatory injunction goes 28 well beyond simply maintaining the status quo[,]” mandatory injunctions are “particularly 2 1 disfavored.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted.) “In general, mandatory injunctions are not 2 granted unless extreme or very serious damage will result and are not issued in doubtful cases or 3 where the injury complained of is capable of compensation in damages.” Id. (internal quotation 4 marks omitted). 5 “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on 6 the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 7 balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20 8 (citations omitted). An injunction may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is 9 entitled to relief. Id. at 22 (citation omitted). “Under Winter, plaintiffs must establish that 10 irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.” Alliance 11 for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). 12 Requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the 13 Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires that the Court find the “relief [sought] is narrowly 14 drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the 15 least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” Section 3626(a)(2) 16 also places significant limits upon a court’s power to grant preliminary injunctive relief to 17 inmates. “Section 3626(a) therefore operates simultaneously to restrict the equity jurisdiction of 18 federal courts and to protect the bargaining power of prison administrators – no longer may courts 19 grant or approve relief that binds prison administrators to do more than the constitutional 20 minimum.” Gilmore v. People of the State of California, 220 F.3d 987, 999 (9th Cir. 2000). 21 II. 22 DISCUSSION Summary of Plaintiff’s Motion 23 A. 24 Plaintiff asserts that he is a state prisoner whose ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act) 25 status and appliances and medical appliances were all taken away and that he is presently being 26 denied access to medical treatment and appropriate medical care. (ECF No. 34.) 27 28 On August 12, 2016, Plaintiff suffered second-degree burns to his feet, legs, and buttocks. (Id. at 2.) After receiving medical treatment at San Joaquin Community Hospital, Plaintiff had 3 1 ongoing complications with walking at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”). (Id.) In December 2 2018, Plaintiff had a medical consultation with Dr. Asela Jumao-as, a neurologist. Dr. Jumao-as 3 recommended that Plaintiff be provided with an increase in his Lyrica medication, to combine 4 Lyrica with another medication, oxcarbazepine, a consultation with a pain specialist, and that 5 alternative pain control modalities, such as a TENS unit and/or nerve blocks, should be 6 considered. (Id.) Plaintiff received the medications immediately, which allowed Plaintiff to take 7 multiple steps unaided by his ADA appliances. However, over time, Plaintiff lost the ability to 8 take multiple steps. (Id.) 9 In February 2019, Plaintiff had a consultation with a PMLR, who identified himself as 10 also being a pain specialist. However, Plaintiff discovered that the individual was not a pain 11 specialist. (Id. at 2-3.) After filing a 602 appeal requesting a TENS unit, nerve blocks, a 12 consultation with a pain specialist, and referral to another neurologist, Plaintiff received a TENS 13 unit. (Id. at 3.) 14 On May 12, 2019, Plaintiff was called out his cell for a medical consultation with Doctor 15 John Doe 1. Plaintiff went to the appointment on crutches. (Id. at 3.) During the appointment, 16 Doctor John Doe 1 decided to take Plaintiff’s crutches and orthopedic boots away. (Id. at 3-4.) 17 When Plaintiff protested and stated that he had just received a TENS unit because he could not 18 walk, Doctor John Doe 1 stated that he was taking away Plaintiff’s TENS unit as well. (Id. at 4.) 19 Plaintiff was told to leave the clinic, but Plaintiff protested that he could not walk. After the 20 doctor told the correctional officers to take away Plaintiff’s crutches and that Plaintiff could walk, 21 Plaintiff was dragged out of the clinic by his arms. (Id. at 4-5.) Even though Plaintiff had ADA 22 status and a medical order from his primary care physician for his crutches, his crutches and the 23 rest of his medical and ADA appliances were taken away. (Id. at 5.) 24 On May 17, 2019, Plaintiff had another appointment with Doctor John Doe 1. (Id.) At 25 the second appointment, the doctor cancelled Plaintiff’s nerve pain medications and told the nurse 26 to refer Plaintiff to mental health services because Plaintiff was saying that he could not walk. 27 (Id. at 5-6.) 28 Plaintiff states that, due to Doctor John Doe 1’s actions in taking away Plaintiff’s 4 1 ADA/medical appliances and cancelling Plaintiff’s nerve pain medication, Plaintiff is in pain and 2 is unable to walk. Plaintiff states that he is suffering irreparable harm in the form of continued 3 physical and mental pain and suffering and an increasing risk his feet will be further damaged. 4 (Id. at 6.) 5 Plaintiff asks the Court to issue the following preliminary injunctive relief: (1) to order 6 Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”) Warden Pfeiffer to investigate the events that transpired as 7 stated in Plaintiff’s motion and ensure that KVSP medical staff provide Plaintiff with necessary 8 medical care; (2) to order KVSP Associate Warden/ADA Coordinator Cortez to reinstate 9 Plaintiff’s ADA status, to return all of Plaintiff’s ADA appliances (crutches, orthopedic boots, 10 orthopedic insole, medical hand gloves, and any other appliances medical personnel deem 11 necessary), and to provide oversight so that due process is utilized before any other medical staff 12 is able take Plaintiff’s ADA status and appliances away; (3) to order KVSP’s Chief Medical 13 Officer to return Plaintiff’s TENS unit and medications and to abide by Dr. Jumao-as’ 14 recommendations for Plaintiff’s medical care (a consultation with a certified pain specialist for 15 nerve blocks and a follow-up consultation with another neurologist); (4) to order KVSP’s health 16 care appeals staff to not take any further retaliatory actions towards Plaintiff and his medical care 17 and not to send another doctor to take away all of Plaintiff’s ADA/medical appliances just 18 because Plaintiff exercised his right to file grievances and a lawsuit; (5) to order Defendant Patel, 19 Plaintiff’s primary care physician, to stop delaying Plaintiff’s medical care, to return Plaintiff’s 20 ADA status, medical appliances, and medications, to comply with Dr. Jumao-as’ 21 recommendations for Plaintiff’s medical care, and to expedite any and all future medical 22 appointments and recommendations by any and all specialists that Plaintiff may see in the future 23 without any further delay; and (6) to order Doctor John Doe 1 to not take any retaliatory actions 24 towards Plaintiff, to not incite the correctional officers to assault Plaintiff again, to not lie to 25 medical and custody staff about Plaintiff’s medical condition again, and to not take any further 26 action in relation to Plaintiff’s medical care. (Id. at 7-8.) 27 B. Analysis 28 First, the Court notes that, while Plaintiff’s motion seeks a preliminary injunctive relief 5 1 against KVSP Warden Pfeiffer, the KVSP Associate Warden/ADA Coordinator, the KVSP Chief 2 Medical Officer, KVSP’s health care appeals staff, Doctor Patel, and Doctor John Doe 1, only 3 Doctor Patel is a named Defendant in this action. As noted above, the pendency of this action 4 does not give the Court jurisdiction over prison officials in general. Summers, 555 U.S. at 5 491−93; Mayfield, 599 F.3d at 969. Since the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the parties named 6 in this action, the Court has no jurisdiction to issue preliminary injunctive relief against KVSP 7 Warden Pfeiffer, the KVSP Associate Warden/ADA Coordinator, the KVSP Chief Medical 8 Officer, KVSP’s health care appeals staff, and Doctor John Doe 1. See Zepeda v. United States 9 Immigration & Naturalization Service, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985) (“A federal court may 10 issue an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction 11 over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court.”). 12 Second, it appears that Plaintiff is seeking to expand his causes of action by using the 13 request for preliminary injunctive relief as a means to litigate additional claims unrelated to those 14 set forth in Plaintiff’s first amended complaint and found cognizable by the Court. This action is 15 proceeding on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint against Defendants Patel, Ulit, Spaeth, 16 Manasrah, and Serda for deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, based on 17 Plaintiff’s burned feet and legs and high blood pressure in 2016 and 2017. (ECF Nos. 14, 18.) 18 On the other hand, the allegations on which Plaintiff bases his motion for preliminary injunctive 19 relief concern events that occurred at KVSP in May 2019, more than a year after this action was 20 filed in February 2018 and approximately 11 months after Plaintiff’s first amended complaint was 21 filed in June 2018. (ECF Nos. 1, 14.) However, the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to 22 preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held. See University 23 of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). Here, since “the scope of litigation is framed 24 by the complaint at the time it is filed[,]” the events that occurred in May 2019 are not currently 25 within the scope of this action. Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School 26 Dist., 750 F.2d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 1984). As the Court’s jurisdiction to grant preliminary 27 injunctive relief in this case is limited to the viable legal claims upon which this action is 28 proceeding, this Court has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction based on Plaintiff’s allegations 6 1 regarding the events that occurred at KVSP in May 2019. Summers, 555 U.S. at 491−93; 2 Mayfield, 599 F.3d at 969. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 3 4 injunction, (ECF No. 34), should be denied. 5 III. 6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 7 Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that 8 Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, (ECF No. 34), 9 be DENIED. 10 These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 11 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one 12 (21) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, the parties may file 13 written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 14 Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections 15 within the specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s 16 factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 17 Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 18 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: November 25, 2019 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7
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