(PC) Heredia v. CCI, No. 1:2016cv00788 - Document 26 (E.D. Cal. 2017)
Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS recommending that this action be DISMISSED with prejudice because of Plaintiff's failure to state a cognizable claim; Clerk of Court is directed to assign a District Judge to the action re 23 Amended Prisoner Civi l Rights Complaint filed by Aaron Augustine Heredia ;ORDER Reopening Action; new case number 1:16-cv-788 JLT (PC); referred to Judge Ishii, signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 12/10/17. Objections to F&R due by 12/28/2017 (Martin-Gill, S)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AARON AUGUSTINE HEREDIA, Plaintiff, 12 v. 13 14 ORDER REOPENING ACTION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS CCI, et al., 15 Case No. 1:16-cv-00788-JLT (PC) Defendants. (Docs. 23, 24) 14-DAY DEADLINE 16 CLERK OF COURT TO ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE 17 18 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his rights under the 21 Eighth Amendment and consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (Docs. 1, 8.) On November 22 6, 2017, the undersigned issued an order finding that Plaintiff filed to state any cognizable claims 23 and dismissing the action with prejudice. (Doc. 24.) The defendants had not appeared in this 24 action when it was dismissed. For the reasons discussed below, this action is reopened and 25 recommendation is made that it be DISMISSED with prejudice. 26 II. WILLIAMS v. KING 27 On November 9, 2017, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) 28 requires the consent of all parties named in a civil case before a Magistrate Judge’s jurisdiction 1 vests for dispositive purposes. Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2017). Hence, a 2 Magistrate Judge does not have jurisdiction to dismiss a case or claim based solely on the 3 plaintiff’s consent. Id. The defendants were not yet served at the time that this action was 4 dismissed and therefore had neither appeared nor consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. 5 Because the named defendants had not consented, the screening and dismissal of this action is 6 invalid under Williams. However, the Court now recommends that this action be DISMISSED 7 with prejudice. 8 III. FINDINGS 9 A. 10 11 Screening of the Second Amended Complaint 1. Screening Requirement The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 12 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 13 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 14 frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary 15 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C. § 16 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If an action is dismissed on one of these three bases, a strike is imposed per 17 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). An inmate who has had three or more prior actions or appeals dismissed as 18 frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and has not 19 alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury does not qualify to proceed in forma pauperis. 20 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2015). 21 22 2. Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff complains of an incident that occurred at California Correctional Institute (“CCI”) 23 in Tehachapi, California and now names the following defendants: CCI Warden Kim Holland; FC 24 Chariperson J. Jones; CCII T. Nipper; CCI(A) A. Tabias; Lt. Inmate Assessment, K. Large; and 25 CSR A. Barkley. 26 Plaintiff alleges that, due to an administration error, he was living on a level 3 yard, but 27 was supposed to be on a level 2 yard -- which put his life in danger. After an incident, Plaintiff 28 was shot, sprayed, hit, stripped, and denied “medical care for over five hours on more than one 2 1 occasion.” 2 Plaintiff fails to link any of the individuals named as defendants to his factual allegations 3 and does not even state any factual allegations to show that he was attacked, let alone state 4 cognizable claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the SAC. Since Plaintiff has twice been given 5 opportunity to amend his pleading to correct deficiencies, it appears that further leave to amend 6 would be futile and need not be extended. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 7 2012). This action should thus be DISMISSED with prejudice. 8 9 10 3. Pleading Requirements a. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 11 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the 12 defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ 13 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 14 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 15 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 16 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Plaintiff 17 must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its 18 face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations are 19 accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 20 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557. 21 While “plaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ,” Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 22 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally 23 and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 24 However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations,” Neitze 25 v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), “a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may 26 not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled,” Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union 27 Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 28 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. Wal-Mart 3 1 Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2 The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are 3 ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the plausibility standard. 4 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 5 Despite twice being informed that an amended complaint supercedes the original, Lacey v. 6 Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 7 2012) (en banc), and that Local Rule 220 requires amended pleadings be “complete in itself,” 8 Plaintiff’s allegations have become more and more sparse. The SAC does not contain any 9 allegations from which to infer that Plaintiff’s mere placement on a level 3 yard placed him, as a 10 level 2 inmate, in danger. 11 12 b. Linkage Requirement The Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983) requires that there be an actual connection or link 13 between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by 14 Plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 15 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation 16 of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, 17 participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to 18 do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 19 (9th Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each 20 named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff’s 21 federal rights. However, as noted above, despite twice being informed of this requirement, 22 Plaintiff fails to link any individual defendants to any of his factual allegations. The SAC fails to 23 put any defendant on notice of Plaintiff’s claims against him or her. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 24 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004). 25 26 27 4. Legal Standards a. Eighth Amendment -- Failure to Protect “The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined 28 are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 4 1 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). Prison officials have a 2 duty “to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates, which has been interpreted 3 to include a duty to protect prisoners.” Labatad v. Corrections Corp. of America, 714 F.3d 1155, 4 1160 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-33; Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 5 2005)). 6 To establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must “show that the officials acted with 7 deliberate indifference to threat of serious harm or injury to an inmate.” Labatad, at 1160 (citing 8 Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). This involves both objective 9 and subjective components. 10 First, objectively, the alleged deprivation must be “sufficiently serious” and where a failure 11 to prevent harm is alleged, “the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing 12 a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 834, quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349, 101 13 S.Ct. 2392 (1981). Second, subjectively, the prison official must “know of and disregard an 14 excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837; Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 15 1313 (9th Cir. 1995). A prison official must “be aware of facts from which the inference could be 16 drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . . must also draw the inference.” 17 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Liability may follow only if a prison official “knows 18 that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take 19 reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970. 20 Plaintiff’s allegations fail to show that any of the individuals he named as defendants knew 21 that he was in the wrong housing unit, that being housed in a wrong unit posed a substantial risk of 22 serious harm and that any of the named defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to 23 Plaintiff’s safety. Plaintiff’s general allegations that the defendants knew he had been placed in 24 the wrong housing unit are conclusory and need not be accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 25 26 b. Eighth Amendment -- Medical Care Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to [a 27 prisoner’s] serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “A medical need 28 is serious if failure to treat it will result in ‘“significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 5 1 infliction of pain.”’” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (2014) (quoting Jett v. Penner, 2 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th 3 Cir.1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th 4 Cir.1997) (en banc)) 5 To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care in prison, a plaintiff must 6 first “show a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition 7 could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, 8 the plaintiff must show the defendants’ response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” 9 Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 10 (quotation marks omitted)). 11 As to the first prong, indications of a serious medical need “include the existence of an 12 injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or 13 treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily 14 activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 15 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 16 1122; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff again fails to allege what 17 medical condition he had that might constitute a serious medical need. 18 As to the second prong, deliberate indifference is “a state of mind more blameworthy than 19 negligence” and “requires ‘more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or 20 safety.’ ” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319). 21 Deliberate indifference is shown where a prison official “knows that inmates face a substantial risk 22 of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id., at 23 847. In medical cases, this requires showing: (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 24 prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference. Wilhelm, 680 25 F.3d at 1122 (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). “A prisoner need not show his harm was substantial; 26 however, such would provide additional support for the inmate’s claim that the defendant was 27 deliberately indifferent to his needs.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. 28 Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 6 1 (9th Cir.2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from 2 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person 3 ‘must also draw the inference.’ ” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison 4 official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the 5 Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, 6 Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). 7 Plaintiff merely alleges that the named defendants “didn’t allow me medical care for over 5 8 hrs on more than one occasion.” (Doc. 23, p. 5.) Plaintiff does not allege what injury he had that 9 needed medical attention in less than 5 hours. Indeed, such a delay is common in most emergency 10 rooms for non-life-threatening conditions; the fact he is a prisoner does not entitle him to a greater 11 level of care. Further, Plaintiff fails to link any individual defendant to his allegations to show that 12 any of them specifically knew that Plaintiff suffered from any medical condition and intentionally 13 chose action contrary to his medical needs. 14 15 c. Supervisory Liability Plaintiff was also twice previously informed that supervisory personnel are generally not 16 liable under section 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior 17 and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him 18 and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 19 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 20 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of 21 supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that supervisory 22 defendants either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew 23 of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or "implemented a policy so 24 deficient that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of 25 the constitutional violation.'" Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal 26 citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Under section 1983, 27 liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions of their employees under a 28 theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. "In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action - where 7 1 masters do not answer for the torts of their servants - the term 'supervisory liability' is a 2 misnomer." Id. Knowledge and acquiescence of a subordinate's misconduct is insufficient to 3 establish liability; each government official is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Id. 4 “‘[B]are assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a “formulaic recitation of the 5 elements” of a constitutional discrimination claim,’ for the purposes of ruling on a motion to 6 dismiss [and thus also for screening purposes], are not entitled to an assumption of truth.” Moss, 7 572 F.3d at 969 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). “Such 8 allegations are not to be discounted because they are ‘unrealistic or nonsensical,’ but rather 9 because they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion B even if that conclusion is cast in the 10 form of a factual allegation.” Id. Thus, any allegations that supervisory personnel such as a 11 Warden is somehow liable because of the acts of those under his or her supervision does not state 12 a cognizable claim. 13 Despite previously being given these standards for claims against supervisory personnel, 14 Plaintiff fails to state anything other than legal conclusions against all of the defendants -- let alone 15 any of the supervisory defendants named in this action. 16 IV. CONCLUSION and RECOMMENDATION 17 The Second Amended Complaint neither links any of the named defendants to factual 18 allegations, nor states any cognizable claims. Given the persistent deficiency in Plaintiff’s 19 pleading, despite having previously been provided the requisite legal standards, it appears futile to 20 allow further amendment. Akhtar, 698 F.3d at 1212-13. 21 Accordingly, this action is REOPENED and the Court RECOMMENDS that this action be 22 dismissed with prejudice because of Plaintiff’s failure to state a cognizable claim. The Clerk of 23 the Court is directed to assign a District Judge to this action. 24 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 25 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 26 days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written 27 objections. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 28 Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver 8 1 of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 2 Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 3 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: December 10, 2017 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9
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