(HC) Young v. Brown, No. 1:2015cv01339 - Document 13 (E.D. Cal. 2015)
Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS to Dismiss 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; ORDER DIRECTING that Objections be Filed within Twenty-One Days; ORDER DIRECTING Clerk of Court to Assign District Judge to Case signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 9/9/2015. Referred to Judge Anthony W. Ishii. Objections to F&R due by 10/5/2015. (Sant Agata, S)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) LARRY YOUNG, Petitioner, 12 13 v. 14 JERRY BROWN, 15 Respondents. 16 Case No.: 1:15-cv-01339-JLT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ORDER DIRECTING THAT OBJECTIONS BE FILED WITHIN TWENTY-ONE DAYS ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO CASE 17 18 19 20 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The instant petition was filed on July 10, 2015. (Doc. 1). DISCUSSION 21 A. Preliminary Review of Petition. 22 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition 23 if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is 24 not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The 25 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas 26 corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after 27 an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.2001). 28 1 1 B. Exhaustion 2 A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to challenge his conviction by a petition for 3 writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion 4 doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct 5 the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose 6 v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 7 A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a 8 full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v. 9 Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 10 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full 11 and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the 12 claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 13 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically 14 told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; 15 Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. 16 Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). 17 Assuming, without deciding, that Petitioner, as a pre-trial detainee, may bring a habeas action 18 under § 2241 rather than § 2254, the exhaustion requirement is not merely applicable to state prisoners 19 challenging a state criminal conviction and sentence under § 2254; rather, the rule applies equally to 20 pre-conviction state detainees proceeding under § 2241(c)(3). Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of 21 Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973)(holding that a petitioner seeking pre-conviction habeas relief must 22 exhaust his claims in state court (1) to permit state courts to fully consider federal constitutional 23 claims, and (2) to prevent federal interference with state adjudications, especially criminal trials); 24 Carden v. Montana, 626 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1980)(citing Braden in refusing to find “extraordinary 25 circumstances” justifying interference by federal court in pre-conviction state criminal proceedings 26 raising only a speedy trial issue); Brown v. Ahern, 676 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 2012)(reaffirming 27 applicability of Carden rule). 28 2 1 Here, Petitioner alleges he is in the custody of the Coalinga State Hospital, Coalinga, 2 California, pending resolution of civil proceedings to detain Petitioner as a sexually violent predator 3 under California’s Sexually Violent Predatory law. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Petitioner alleges that the petition 4 filed by the Alameda County prosecutor to designate Petitioner as an SVP is ongoing and that he has 5 filed “pre-trial motions” in those proceedings. In this petition, Petitioner argues that the SVP law is 6 unconstitutional and that it violates Double Jeopardy by trying Petitioner again for acts for which he 7 has already been tried and convicted. 8 9 As mentioned, however, whether a petitioner is challenging a prior conviction and the resulting prison sentence under § 2254, or is challenging circumstances related to his pre-conviction detention 10 pursuant to § 2241(c)(3), in order to proceed in this Court he must first have exhausted all of his 11 claims by presenting them to the California Supreme Court. 12 Here, Petitioner does not allege or establish that he has presented his constitutional claims to 13 the California Supreme Court, either by direct appeal of his SVP status or by habeas corpus petition. 14 From the foregoing, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not presented any of his claims to the 15 California Supreme Court as required by the exhaustion doctrine. Because Petitioner has not presented 16 his claims for federal relief to the California Supreme Court, the Court must dismiss the petition. See 17 Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 107 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Greenawalt v. 18 Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court cannot consider a petition that is entirely 19 unexhausted. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 521-22; Calderon, 107 F.3d at 760. 20 C. Younger Abstention. 21 Moreover, even if the foregoing were not true, the Court would not proceed with this petition 22 because Petitioner has not been convicted in state court and his claims of constitutional violations, 23 such as they are, would be subject to abstention by the federal court. 24 25 A federal court should not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings by granting injunctive or declaratory relief except under special circumstances. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 26 27 28 3 1 43-45 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68- 69 (1971).1 Younger and its progeny are based on 2 the interests of comity and federalism that counsel federal courts to maintain respect for state functions 3 and not unduly interfere with the state's good faith efforts to enforce its own laws in its own courts. 4 Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Assoc., 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982); Dubinka 5 v. Judges of Superior Court of State of California, Los Angeles, 23 F.3d 218, 223 (9th Cir. 1994); 6 Lebbos v. Judges of Superior Court, Santa Clara, 883 F.2d 810, 813 (9th Cir.1989). The Younger 7 doctrine stems from this longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state court 8 proceedings. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43. Federal courts should not enjoin pending state criminal 9 prosecutions absent a showing of the state's bad faith or harassment. Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, 53-54 10 (holding that the cost, anxiety and inconvenience of criminal defense are not the kind of special 11 circumstances or irreparable harm that justify federal court intervention); Dubinka v. Judges of the 12 Superior Court, 23 F.3d 218, 225-26 (9th Cir. 1994). Nor is federal injunctive relief to be used to test 13 the validity of an arrest or the admissibility of evidence in a state criminal proceeding. Perez v. 14 Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 83-85 (1971). The Ninth Circuit follows a three-prong test espoused by the Supreme Court to determine 15 16 whether abstention under the Younger doctrine is appropriate. Younger abstention is required when: 17 (1) state proceedings, judicial in nature, are pending; (2) the state proceedings involve important state 18 interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional issue. 19 Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); Delta Dental 20 Plan of California, Inc. v. Mendoza, 139 F.3d 1289, 1294 (9t Cir.1998); Dubinka, 23 F.3d at 223. 21 If these three requirements are met, the Court must also consider whether any of the narrow 22 exceptions to the Younger abstention doctrine apply. The Court need not abstain if the state court 23 proceedings were undertaken for bad faith or for purposes of harassment or the statute at issue is 24 “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions.” Dubinka, 23 F.3d at 223, 25 26 27 28 1 Although Petitioner does not expressly ask for injunctive relief in his petition, in the portion of the form petition where a petitioner should describe his claims, Petitioner directs the Court to his state petition, which requests only that the state court “get involved” in the case and intervene in what Petitioner’s describes as a discriminatory prosecution. The only conclusion the Court can draw from such language is that Petitioner is seeking injunctive relief of the type proscribed by Younger. 4 1 225; Lebbos, 883 F.2d at 816. The extraordinary circumstances exception recognizes that a federal 2 court need not abstain when faced with a statute that is flagrantly unconstitutional in every clause. 3 Dubinka, 23 F.3d at 225. 4 The first requirement is satisfied here because the state proceedings have not concluded. The 5 second requirement is satisfied because an important state interest, that of not having the federal courts 6 interfere in ongoing state judicial proceedings, is at issue. See Dubinka, 23 F.3d at 223. Finally, the 7 third requirement is met because Petitioner can address his federal constitutional claims related to the 8 allegedly illegal conduct of the prosecutors in the state court criminal proceedings. 9 Petitioner argues that Younger should not apply because he will suffer “irreparable injury” 10 because the “right not to be tried” under the Double Jeopardy Clause would be forfeited by delaying 11 review until after trial. (Doc. 1, p. 66). Nevertheless, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of criminal 12 defense are not the kind of special circumstances or irreparable harm that justify federal court 13 intervention. Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, 53-54. Where a district court finds Younger abstention 14 appropriate as to a request for declaratory or injunctive relief, the court may not retain jurisdiction, but 15 must dismiss. Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 348 (1977); Beltran v. California, 871 F.2d 777, 782 (9th 16 Cir. 1988). The rationale of Younger applies throughout appellate proceedings, requiring that state 17 appellate review of a conviction be exhausted before federal court intervention is permitted. Huffman 18 v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607-11 (1975); Dubinka, 23 F.3d at 223 (stating that even if the trial is 19 complete at the time of the abstention decision, state court proceedings are still considered pending). 20 Here, it now seems apparent that Plaintiff is seeking to have the Court intervene in an ongoing 21 state civil prosecution that closely resembles a criminal prosecution. In doing so, Petitioner seeks to 22 make an “end run” around the exhaustion requirement. This is precisely the type of circumstance to 23 which the Younger doctrine was intended to apply. Petitioner has not established that any exception 24 to Younger abstention is applicable in this case, i.e., that the state court proceedings were undertaken 25 for bad faith or for purposes of harassment. Dubinka, 23 F.3d at 223, 225; Lebbos, 883 F.2d at 816. 26 In sum, state civil proceedings are currently pending, and Petitioner can raise his constitutional 27 concerns within the context of those state court proceedings. 28 5 The Court notes that an additional basis for abstention under Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. 1 2 Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)(“the Pullman doctrine”), appears applicable as well under the facts 3 as pleaded by Petitioner. Pullman abstention is appropriate “in cases presenting a federal 4 constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court 5 determination of pertinent state law.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. V. United States, 424 6 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)(citing Pullman). Clearly, Petitioner’s complaints about the constitutionality of 7 the SVP law and of violating his Double Jeopardy rights can, potentially, be cured before or during 8 trial, or, again, on direct appeal to the state appellate courts. Under those circumstances, any relief that 9 this Court could afford would indeed be “mooted” by the state court determination. In short, this is 10 neither the time nor the place for federal intervention into the state judicial proceedings. ORDER 11 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to assign a United States 12 13 District Judge to this case. RECOMMENDATION 14 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the habeas corpus petition be 15 16 DISMISSED for lack of exhaustion and for Younger abstention. This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge 17 18 assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the 19 Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 20 Within 21 days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court 21 and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 22 Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within 10 23 days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then review the 24 Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). 25 /// 26 /// 27 28 6 1 2 The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 3 4 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: September 9, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7
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