(PC) Aleman v. North Kern State Prison, et al., No. 1:2015cv01293 - Document 61 (E.D. Cal. 2018)

Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS recommending to Dismiss Claims Consistent With Magistrate Judge's Prior Order in Light of Williams Decision re 1 Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint signed by Magistrate Judge Erica P. Grosjean on 12/29/2017. Referred to Judge O'Neill. Objections to F&R due within fourteen (14) days. (Jessen, A)

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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 HECTOR ALEMAN, 5 Plaintiff, 6 v. 7 C/O K. ACOSTA, et al., 8 Defendants. 9 Case No. 1:15-cv-01293-LJO-EPG FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS CLAIMS CONSISTENT WITH MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S PRIOR ORDER IN LIGHT OF WILLIAMS DECISION (ECF Nos. 1 & 13) OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS 10 11 Hector Aleman (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis 12 in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff consented to magistrate 13 judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 6-7). Defendants have not yet consented to magistrate judge 14 jurisdiction or declined to consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction. 15 The Court previously screened Plaintiff’s complaint before Defendants appeared. (ECF 16 No. 13). The Court found that Plaintiff stated cognizable claims against Plaintiff’s complaint 17 states a claim for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment as to Defendants 18 19 20 21 22 Rentieria, Ledesma, Nuno, Fierros, Montalvo, Acosta, and Garcia. (Id. at 5-6.) However, the Court also found that Plaintiff failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim against North Kern State Prison (“NKSP”), and the warden of NKSP, S. Alfaro. (Id.) Additionally, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for a constitutional violation related to the prison grievance process. (Id.) Plaintiff’s state law claims were dismissed without prejudice. (Id. at 6- 23 7.) Prior to the Court dismissing claims and defendants, Plaintiff agreed to proceed only on 24 25 26 27 28 the claims found cognizable by the Court. (ECF No. 14). As described below, in light of Ninth Circuit authority, this Court is recommending that the assigned district judge dismiss claims and defendants consistent with the order by the magistrate judge at the screening stage. 1 1 I. WILLIAMS v. KING 2 On November 9, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held 3 that a magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to dismiss a prisoner’s case for failure to state a 4 claim at the screening stage where the Plaintiff had consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction 5 and defendants had not yet been served. Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2017). 6 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that “28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) requires the consent of all 7 plaintiffs and defendants named in the complaint—irrespective of service of process—before 8 jurisdiction may vest in a magistrate judge to hear and decide a civil case that a district court 9 would otherwise hear.” Id. at 501. 10 Here, the defendants were not served at the time the Court issued its order dismissing 11 claims and defendants, and therefore had not appeared or consented to magistrate judge 12 jurisdiction. 13 defendants based solely on Plaintiff’s consent. Accordingly, the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to dismiss claims and 14 In light of the holding in Williams, this Court will recommend to the assigned district 15 judge that he dismiss the claims and defendants previously dismissed by this Court, for the 16 reasons provided in the Court’s screening order. 17 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 18 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 19 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a). 20 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 21 legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 22 that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 23 ' 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have 24 been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or 25 appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 26 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 27 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 28 not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 2 1 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 2 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 3 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. 4 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 5 this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts 6 “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 7 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, a 8 plaintiff’s legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 9 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 10 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 11 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). 12 13 14 III. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT Plaintiff primarily alleges that he was beaten while in constraints, constituting a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 15 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on August 31, 2014, he was housed at North Kern 16 State Prison (NKSP). That day, he had an altercation with building floor officers, defendants 17 Renteria and Ledesma. After the incident, Plaintiff was handcuffed with both hands behind his 18 back. He was completely restrained and not a threat to the safety of the officers. After Plaintiff 19 had been restrained, Defendants Benteria and Ledesma started punching and kicking Plaintiff’s 20 entire body, including Plaintiff’s face and head. 21 Fierros, Montalvo, Acosta and Garcia applied leg chains and joined in the assault on Plaintiff 22 by taking turns punching and kicking him and using their expandable batons. They also 23 slammed Plaintiff’s head into the door. Responding officers, defendants Nuno, 24 Plaintiff slipped in and out of consciousness for about an hour. Finally, Plaintiff was 25 examined by a medical person and was told Plaintiff needed to go to the hospital immediately. 26 Plaintiff suffered a broken rib. Plaintiff was then transferred to Wasco State Prison. 27 28 Plaintiff also claims that Wasco State Prison attempted to invalidate Plaintiff’s appeals by falsely claiming that Plaintiff missed his deadlines. 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 IV. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS A. Section 1983 Legal Standards The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.... 10 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely 11 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 12 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see 13 also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los 14 Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 15 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 16 To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted 17 under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the 18 Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 19 2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing 20 “under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the 21 meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or 22 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 23 complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th 24 Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite 25 causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others 26 which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional 27 harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of 28 causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” 4 1 Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City 2 of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008). 3 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of 4 their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 5 holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 6 violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 7 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 8 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, 9 Plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that the supervisory defendants 10 either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the 11 violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so 12 deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights' and is ‘the moving force 13 of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal 14 citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 15 supervisor may be liable for his “own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or 16 control of his subordinates,” “his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which the 17 complaint is made,” or “conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of 18 others.” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal citations, 19 quotation marks, and alterations omitted). 20 B. For instance, a Improper Section 1983 Defendants 21 In his Complaint, Plaintiff lists NKSP Warden S. Alfaro as a Defendant. However, 22 Plaintiff makes no specific allegation concerning this Defendant. Thus, the claim against S. 23 Alfaro appears to be based upon his supervisory role at NKSP. 24 To the extent Plaintiff names NKSP Warden S. Alfaro as a Defendant based upon a 25 supervisory liability theory, he does not state a claim against him. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 26 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct 27 of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). 28 5 1 Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff also attempted to name NKSP as a Defendant, 2 this was improper under § 1983. NKSP is a state prison under the control of the California 3 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), a state agency of the state of 4 California. State agencies are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, and are therefore 5 not amenable to suit under that statute. Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004) 6 (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 7 (1989)). 8 C. Claims Concerning Grievance Process 9 Prisoners have no stand-alone due process rights related to the administrative grievance 10 process. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1988); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 11 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no liberty interest entitling inmates to a 12 specific grievance process). Because there is no right to any particular grievance process, it is 13 impossible for due process to have been violated by ignoring or failing to properly process 14 grievances. 15 Prisoners have a First Amendment right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 16 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the right 17 in the context of prison grievance procedures). This right includes petitioning the government 18 through the prison grievance process. See id. The right of access to the courts, however, only 19 requires that prisoners have the capability of bringing challenges to sentences or conditions of 20 confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356–57. 21 As a jurisdictional requirement flowing from the standing doctrine, the prisoner must “Actual injury” is prejudice with respect to 22 allege an actual injury. See id. at 349. 23 contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a 24 non-frivolous claim. See id.; see also Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). 25 Plaintiff fails to state a constitutional violation related to the prison grievance process. 26 It may be that the prison’s wrongful denial of Plaintiff’s claims will allow him to proceed in 27 this case despite not completing the prison grievance process. But as Plaintiff is filing his case 28 in court now, Plaintiff cannot show injury from the failure to properly process his grievance. 6 1 V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that 3 1. The following claims and Defendants be dismissed from this action: 4 a. Defendants North Kern State Prison and Warden S. Alfaro; and 5 b. Plaintiff’s claim alleging a constitutional violation related to the prison 6 grievance process. 7 If these recommendations are adopted in full, this action will proceed only against 8 Defendants Rentieria, Ledesma, Nuno, Fierros, Montalvo, Acosta, and Garcia for excessive 9 force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within seven (7) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 Dated: December 29, 2017 /s/ 22 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28 7

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