Gardiner Family, LLC, et al. v. Crimson Resource Management Corp, No. 1:2015cv00751 - Document 19 (E.D. Cal. 2015)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER Denying Defendant's 6 Motion to Dismiss, signed by District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on 9/24/2015. (Gaumnitz, R)

Download PDF

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 12 13 14 GARDINER FAMILY, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY; AND ROSEDALE FARMING GROUP, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, 15 16 17 18 19 Plaintiffs, Case No. 1:15-CV-00751-LJO-JLT MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS. (Doc. 6) v. CRIMSON RESOURCE MANAGEMENT CORP., A COLORADO CORPORATION; AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50, Defendants. 20 21 22 Before the Court in the above-styled and numbered cause of action is Defendant Crimson 23 Resource Management Corporation’s (“Crimson”) Motion to Dismiss, filed July 7, 2015. (Doc. 6). 24 Plaintiffs Gardiner Family, LLC (“Gardiner Family”), and Rosedale Farming Group, LLC (“Rosedale 25 Farming”) (together, “Plaintiffs”) filed their Opposition on July 28, 2015 (Doc. 10), and Defendants 26 filed their Reply on August 4, 2015 (Doc. 11). The matter is appropriate for resolution without oral 27 argument. See Local Rule 230(g). Having considered the record in this case, the parties’ briefing, and 28 the relevant law, the Court will deny Defendant’s motion for the reasons set forth below. BACKGROUND 1 Plaintiffs assert that this Court has original jurisdiction on the basis of diversity. Plaintiffs 2 3 originally filed in federal court on May 15, 2015, asserting federal jurisdiction arises under 28 4 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), on the grounds that the instant dispute involves citizens of different states and 5 the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. See Compl., Doc. 1. Defendants here do not challenge that diversity of citizenship provides an independent basis 6 7 of subject matter jurisdiction. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 8 1, 25 n. 32 (1983). It is uncontroverted that Plaintiffs allege damages in excess of the threshold 9 $75,000.00 amount in controversy requirement. See id.; Compl. ¶ 13. Fictional Doe defendants 10 aside, the parties agree that Plaintiffs Gardiner and Rosedale are California corporations with their 11 principal places of business in California and Defendant Crimson is a Colorado corporation with its 12 principal place of business in Colorado. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see Compl. ¶¶ 8-10. 13 Nor do the parties dispute that a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction applies the 14 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,1 and the substantive law of the state in which it is located. Erie 15 R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). The parties agree that the Court applies the 16 substantive laws of the state of California and California state law includes substantive Doe 17 statutes. The facts are otherwise known to the parties and need not be repeated here. By the instant motion to dismiss, Defendant asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint 18 19 for lack of jurisdiction based on the presence of Doe defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The matter is ripe for review. 20 LEGAL STANDARD 21 Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a defendant may move 22 23 to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Under this rule, “[t]he party asserting federal 24 subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden of proving its existence.” Chandler v. State Farm Mut. 25 Auto Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 26 561 (1992). To succeed, the party carries the burden by proffering “the manner and degree of 27 evidence required” at that stage of the litigation. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 28 1 Hereinafter, references to “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 DISCUSSION 1 2 I. JUDICIAL NOTICE 3 Defendant Crimson requests that the Court take judicial notice of Palla Farms LLC’s 4 pleadings (“the Palla Complaint”) in a state court action in which Crimson is also a defendant. See 5 Doc. 12. Crimson does not allege that Gardiner Family or Rosedale Farming are involved in that 6 action in any way. 7 When considering a motion to dismiss, the court ordinarily does not look beyond the four 8 corners of the complaint. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). Under Federal 9 Rule of Evidence 201, however, “[t]he court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to 10 reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the court’s territorial jurisdiction; or 11 (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 12 questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201. For instance, “[a] district court may take judicial notice of 13 undisputed matters of public record, including documents on file in federal or state courts.” Harris 14 v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Lee, 250 F.3d at 689; Bennett v. 15 Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2002)). Documents not attached to a complaint 16 may be considered if no party questions their authenticity and the complaint relies on those 17 documents. Lee, 250 F.3d at 688. 18 Here, the Plaintiffs’ complaint does not rely on the document at issue. See Doc. 1. Rather, 19 Crimson highlights that the Palla Complaint shares a defendant with the instant action, implying 20 that the two cases necessarily share other defendants and these other defendants destroy diversity. 21 However, the state court case was brought by an unrelated plaintiff. Despite factual similarities 22 between the two cases, there is no indication in the Palla Complaint that Plaintiffs Gardiner Family 23 and Rosedale Farming make the same factual allegations as Palla Farms did against such third 24 parties. Indeed, different land is involved. Palla Farms may have pleaded that such defendants were 25 involved in activity in relation to their farm, but it cannot be said based on their pleading that it is 26 generally known in this jurisdiction that the third parties are involved in activities related to the 27 Gardiner Family or Rosedale Farming farms. In other words, there is a reasonable question of fact 28 whether the other defendants named in the state action are in any way involved in the instant action. 3 1 Moreover, although the plaintiffs in the two cases share counsel and the legal principles may be the 2 same, the circumstances do not necessarily demonstrate shared facts. The Court finds that it is 3 reasonably subject to dispute whether the same defendants are involved. Under Federal Rule of 4 Evidence 201, the Court concludes that it is inappropriate to judicially notice such disputed facts. 5 Accordingly, the Court declines to take judicial notice of facts alleged in pleadings in that 6 different case. See Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978-79 (E.D. Cal. 2000) 7 (finding no authority for judicial notice of pleadings in an unrelated case). Defendant’s request for 8 judicial notice (Doc. 12) is DENIED. 9 II. 10 JURISDICTION The single question put to the Court in Crimson’s motion to dismiss is whether a plaintiff’s 11 Doe pleading defeats original diversity jurisdiction as a matter of law. In support, Crimson relies 12 upon Garter-Bare Co. v. Munsingwear, Inc., 650 F.2d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that mere 13 presence of Doe defendants destroys diversity jurisdiction). 14 Plaintiffs counter that their use of Doe defendants does not destroy diversity, citing Lindley 15 v. Gen. Elec. Co., 780 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that California’s so-called “Doe” statutes 16 are substantive law and as such are applied under the Erie doctrine). Plaintiffs cite a string of cases 17 starting with Macheras v. Ctr. Art Galleries--Hawaii, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1436, 1438 (D. Haw. 18 1991), that follow this legal principle. Plaintiffs argue that a district court must allow the use of Doe 19 defendants as provided under substantive California law. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 474. 20 The Ninth Circuit decided Lindley in 1986, finding that California’s “Doe” statutes, § 474, 21 are substantive state law and concluding that a benefit derived from the state’s substantive laws are 22 applied in federal court, under the Erie doctrine, when a federal court is sitting in diversity. 780 23 F.2d at 800-01. The court reasoned that “the absence of a federal pleading mechanism comparable 24 to section 474 should not deprive a plaintiff of the extension of the limitations period provided 25 under California Doe practice.” Id. at 802 (citing Rumberg v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 424 F.Supp. 26 294, 298 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (Pregerson, J.)). The circuit court specifically found that “[a] contrary 27 rule would be a departure from Erie Railroad Co. . . . , and its progeny, particularly Guaranty Trust 28 4 1 Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), because it would result in the abridgment of substantive rights 2 under state statutes of limitations.” Id. (citations omitted). 3 Defendant’s motion hinges on ignoring the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lindley and applying 4 instead its prior decision in Garter-Bare, in which it held that generally, in an original federal 5 action brought solely on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a), a plaintiff’s use of 6 fictitious Doe defendants necessarily defeats diversity and a district court thus lacks jurisdiction. 7 650 F.2d at 981; see also Molnar v. National Broadcasting Co., 231 F.2d 684, 687 (9th Cir. 1956); 8 see also Fifty Associates v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 446 F.2d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir 9 1970) (finding that a plaintiff cannot affirmatively demonstrate complete diversity if the identity 10 and citizenship of fictional defendants are unknown). Defendant argues that despite Lindley, 11 Garter-Bare controls. 12 Federal courts acknowledge the split between those courts which subscribe to the principle 13 that a federal court must allow Doe pleading under state substantive law, post-Lindley, and others 14 that exercise the Garter-Bare rule against Doe pleading. See, e.g., Ferm v. McCarty, No. 2:12-CV- 15 00782-GMN, 2013 WL 800536, at *5 (D. Nev. Jan. 28, 2013) report and recommendation adopted, 16 No. 2:12-CV-00782-GMN, 2013 WL 800819 (D. Nev. Feb. 20, 2013) (noting that Lindley led to a 17 split in how district courts determine the effect of pleading Doe defendants on diversity 18 jurisdiction); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 426 n. 10 (1st Cir. 2007) 19 (noting that “Federal courts do not agree on whether John Does are permitted in diversity cases 20 originally filed in federal court,” but declining to reach the issue) (collecting cases); Doe v. Ciolli, 21 611 F.Supp.2d 216, 219 (D.Conn. 2009) (“Federal courts are divided on the question of whether the 22 existence of unidentified or ‘Doe’ defendants defeats diversity jurisdiction.”). 23 There are three complicating factors. First, Garter-Bare, decided 1980, predates Congress’s 24 1988 amendment to § 1441(b)(1), which itself came on the heels of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 25 Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 844 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1987) (Bryant II) vacated, 886 F.2d 1526 (9th 26 Cir. 1989). In Bryant II, the court held that the mere presence of Doe defendants destroys diversity 27 jurisdiction. Id. at 605. Bryant II had significant negative externalities; it allowed plaintiffs to 28 strategically name Doe defendants to manipulate keeping their cases in state court. To address the 5 1 forum selection problem created by Bryant II, Congress added the following language to § 1441: 2 “[i]n determining whether a civil action is removable on the basis of [diversity jurisdiction], the 3 citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1); 4 see also Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 886 F.2d 1526, 1527 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that “Congress 5 obviously reached the conclusion that doe defendants should not defeat diversity jurisdiction”). 6 Second, Congress did not amend § 1332, despite the pre-Bryant doctrine’s similar deleterious effect 7 on cases originally filed in federal courts sitting in diversity. In a final wrinkle, in the wake of the 8 amendment to § 1441, the Ninth Circuit vacated Bryant II, see 886 F.2d 1526, causing the doctrine 9 to revert to the form it held after Garter-Bare, which the court in Bryant II had only recently 10 characterized as unworkable and “riddled with exceptions,” making it “near-impossible” for a court 11 to determine “when the allegations against Doe defendants are specific enough to defeat diversity.” 12 Bryant II, 844 F.2d at 605. Consequently, courts were (and are) left to wrestle with three problems, 13 how to: (1) reconcile Garter-Bare with Lindley and the Erie doctrine; (2) negotiate the “near- 14 impossible” labyrinth of exceptions to the Doe pleading rule; and, (3) resolve the effect of Doe 15 pleading on those cases brought under § 1332, if at all differently from those brought under § 1441. 16 A. Reconciling the Historical Jurisprudence 17 Numerous courts understood that applying Garter-Bare produces an absurd and inefficient 18 procedural dance. For instance, in Macheras, the court considered whether a district court sitting in 19 diversity should “continue to hold to the pre-Bryant rule that Doe defendants destroy diversity 20 jurisdiction under § 1332.” 776 F. Supp. at 1438. The court found that “at least two strong reasons 21 . . . militate against such a holding.” Id. First, the court could not reconcile the pre-Bryant doctrine 22 with the Ninth Circuit’s more recent decision in Lindley, reasoning that applying Garter-Bare 23 would render Lindley “meaningless for cases brought under § 1332,” because it would produce the 24 perverse result that “would-be federal plaintiffs, who seek to exercise their rights under the state 25 Doe statutes, would, paradoxically, be confined to state court.” Id. at 1439-40. Second, the court 26 noted the same problem Congress addressed in its amendment to § 1441. That is to say, if including 27 Doe defendants necessarily destroys diversity then, to exercise the Doe statutes, a plaintiff is not 28 only forced to state court but, as a result, “defendants [have] a forum selection advantage.” Id. at 6 1 1440. Indeed, under certain conditions, “defendants have the unilateral power to determine the 2 forum.”2 Id. On the paradox created by Lindley and Garter-Bare, another court summarized: [O]nce a court applies the [California] Doe Defendant statute—i.e. allows a plaintiff to include Doe Defendants—the court, under Garter-Bare Co., would have to simultaneously dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This could not have been the intent of Ninth Circuit in deciding Lindley. 3 4 5 Fat T, Inc. v. Aloha Tower Associates Piers 7, 8, & 9, 172 F.R.D. 411, 414 (D. Haw. 1996). The 6 court concluded that, “[i]nstead, a more sensible approach would be to allow Doe Defendants while 7 deferring the jurisdictional question until actual parties are substituted.” Id. 8 The weight of case law follows this logic. Courts have recognized, in light of Lindley, that 9 applying Garter-Bare runs contrary to the Erie doctrine, and on that basis have concluded that Doe 10 pleading does not necessarily defeat federal diversity under § 1332. See, e.g., Carroll v. Hilton, No. 11 CIV. 14-00456 JMS, 2015 WL 1863054, at *1 (D. Haw. Apr. 22, 2015) (applying the reasoning of 12 Center Art Galleries and Fat T, finding that Doe defendants are disregarded in a court’s diversity 13 jurisdictional analysis); accord Pac. Mar. Freight, Inc. v. Foster, No. 10-CV-0578-BTM-BLM, 14 2010 WL 3339432, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2010) (holding that Doe defendants do not 15 presumptively destroy diversity, reasoning that Garter-Bane is outdated precedent inconsistent with 16 17 Lindley); Bailey v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1209 (D. Haw. 2003) (finding that “Doe pleading in diversity cases is allowed” because “federal courts look to state law on Doe Defendants 18 in diversity cases”); W. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. CV 10-132-M-DWM-JCL, 2011 WL 19 2559966, at *25 (D. Mont. June 28, 2011) report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 10-132-M20 DWM, 2011 WL 2961626 (D. Mont. July 20, 2011) aff’d, 489 F. App’x 153 (9th Cir. 2012) 21 (concluding that use of fictitious defendants does not automatically destroy diversity, and denying 22 motion to dismiss for lack of substantive jurisdiction). 23 Similarly, in a recent case out of this district, the court found that a federal court sitting in 24 diversity must apply the state’s Doe defendant statute, and that Lindley made clear that “the absence 25 26 27 28 2 The Court notes that the instant Defendant is a Colorado corporation and that, “[t]raditionally, diversity jurisdiction has been viewed as serving the interest in protecting out-of-state defendants from potential state-court bias in favor of local plaintiffs.” Lee v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1005 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3601 (2d ed. 1984)). 7 1 of a federal pleading mechanism comparable to [a particular section of the California Code of Civil 2 Procedure] should not deprive a plaintiff of [the benefits] provided under California Doe practice. 3 A contrary rule would be a departure from Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and its progeny . . . 4 because it would result in the abridgement of substantive rights under state statutes of limitations.” 5 Pena v. Taylor Farms Pac., Inc., No. 2:13-CV-01282-KJM-AC, 2014 WL 1665231, at *3 (E.D. 6 Cal. Apr. 23, 2014) (citations omitted).3 This Court finds unpersuasive the few unpublished orders which show that some courts 7 8 continue to follow Garter-Bare without resolving the Lindley-created paradox. See, e.g.,Wong v. 9 Rosenblatt, No. 3:13-CV-02209-ST, 2014 WL 1419080, at *4 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014) (dismissing 10 action without prejudice because of the presence of Doe Defendants, reasoning that Garter-Bare 11 controlled because the Ninth Circuit has not explicitly extended Lindley’s rationale to original 12 federal action); Hung v. Tribal Technologies, No. C 11-04990 WHA, 2012 WL 33253, at *1 (N.D. 13 Cal. Jan. 6, 2012) (same) rev'd on other grounds, 577 F. App'x 650 (9th Cir. 2014); Assurance 14 Indus. Co. v. Snag, Inc., No. C 10-1718 SBA, 2010 WL 4055925, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2010) 15 (without analyzing the application of substantive California Doe statutes, finding Garter-Bare 16 binding, yet noting that other courts have resolved the matter to the contrary). In these, the courts 17 assert the general rule as a bludgeon, without resolving, and in some instances simply ignoring, the 18 paradox created by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lindley. 19 Rather, the Court agrees with the reasoning in Hao v. Chen, No. 10-CV-00826-LHK, 2010 20 WL 3910165 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2010), in which the court acknowledged the Garter-Bare rule, but 21 found that “more recent decisions call this rule into question” because “under Lindley, a federal 22 court sitting in diversity is required to apply the state’s Doe defendant statute, yet once a plaintiff 23 includes Doe defendants pursuant to such a statute, the court would be required to dismiss the 24 matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Garter-Bare Co.” Id. at *4. As this Court does, 25 the court “agreed with courts in Hawaii and California that the more sensible approach is to permit 26 Doe defendants and to defer the jurisdictional question until actual parties are substituted.” Id. 27 3 28 Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 states that unpublished dispositions of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued before January 1, 2007 “may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit” except in limited circumstances inapplicable here. While the unpublished cases cited herein do not implicate Rule 36-3, the Court notes that it cites to unpublished cases not as precedent, but for their persuasive value and to illustrate the contours of the controversy. 8 1 (citations omitted). Judge Koh noted, “this approach is also consistent with the revisions to the 2 removal statute [§ 1441] that occurred since Garter-Bare Co. and which provide that Doe 3 defendants do not destroy diversity in the removal context.” Id. (citing Bryant, 886 F.2d at 1527). 4 There is no getting around that the Ninth Circuit plainly held that California “Doe” statutes 5 are substantive law. Lindley, 780 F.2d at 799-81. Nor can this Court ignore the Erie doctrine which 6 requires a federal court to apply state substantive law in diversity actions. See Erie R.R. Co., 304 7 U.S. at 78. Because Garter-Bare was decided before the Ninth Circuit reached these issues, it 8 cannot operate in the way Defendant suggests. The Court finds Plaintiffs’ use of fictional 9 defendants is consistent with California state substantive law. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 474. For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ use of fictional defendants 10 11 does not destroy diversity and does not divest the district court of jurisdiction. 12 B. Exceptions 13 Even if Garter-Bare governed, however, it does not operate in a vacuum. The Ninth Circuit 14 abrogated its overruling of all of the cases creating exceptions to the general rule on Doe pleading. 15 See Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 886 F.2d 1526, 1533 n.9 (9th Cir. 1989) (vacating Bryant II). Thus, 16 various exceptions live on. See, e.g., Grigg v. Southern Pac. Co., 246 F.2d 613, 619 (9th Cir. 1957) 17 (disregarding Does is proper in a diversity jurisdiction determination if the court finds that Does are 18 wholly fictitious); Chism v. National Heritage Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1981) 19 (disregarding Does is proper when charges against the Does are so general as to give no clue of 20 their identity or relationship to the action); Hartwell Corp. v. Boeing Co., 678 F.2d 842, 842-43 (9th 21 Cir. 1982) (same); see also Othman v. Globe Indem. Co., 759 F.2d 1458, 1463 (9th Cir. 1985) 22 (finding Doe pleading does not divest a district court of jurisdiction when Does are not 23 indispensable parties and serve no other purpose than protecting plaintiffs under California pleading 24 practice); see also Kruso v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1424 (9th Cir. 1989) (a finding 25 that the Doe defendants were “shams” precludes the necessity for remand). The question therefore 26 becomes whether the Plaintiffs’ description of Doe defendants or their activities is specific enough 27 as to suggest their identity, citizenship, or relationship to the action. 28 // 9 1 To the contrary, Plaintiffs’ Complaint gives no reasonable indication as to the Doe 2 defendants’ relationship to the action. Plaintiffs use “Does 1through 50,” absent details about their 3 possible identity or citizenship, nor do they give any other information from which the Court could 4 glean this information. See Doc. 1, ¶¶ 11, 12. The Court finds Does 1 through 50 wholly fictitious. 5 The Court concludes that where, as here, the charges against the Does are so general that no clues 6 exist as to their identity, citizenship, or relationship to the action, the Court may disregard these 7 fictitious defendants for jurisdictional purposes. See Grigg, 246 F.2d at 619; see also Chism, 637 8 F.2d at 1330. 9 III. 10 CONCLUSION AND ORDER Although Defendants are correct that Lindley did not specifically extend its rationale to 11 original federal action, it need not have. In Lindley, the Ninth Circuit specifically held that 12 California Doe statutes (relative to a benefit derived under those statutes) are substantive law. 780 13 F.2d at 800-01. In doing so, the court presumptively recognized that a plaintiff is entitled to use 14 Does under state law. Where, as here, a district court applies state substantive law in an action 15 brought under § 1332, it rests on the same principle: a plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the 16 California “Doe” statutes which allow the use of fictional defendants at this stage of the litigation. 17 See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 474. That the Lindley court did not explicitly address the exact context 18 now before this Court is of no mind. Federal procedural rules set threshold requirements for entry 19 to federal court, substantive state law is applied once inside. See Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at 78. Said 20 another way, substantive state laws are not federal procedural law. Because a plaintiff may use 21 fictional defendants under substantive California state law, and federal courts are bound under the 22 Erie doctrine to use that law, the corollary is that a district court may not use the substantive state 23 law as a barrier to federal court as if it were procedural law. 24 Even assuming, arguendo, that Garter-Bare controls, exceptions to its rule apply and the 25 Court may disregard the Doe pleading. The Court is not divested of jurisdiction on these grounds. 26 Should Plaintiffs amend the Complaint to in any way identify Does 1 through 50, Rule 12(h)(3) 27 provides that a court may raise, sua sponte, the question of subject matter jurisdiction at any point 28 in the litigation prior to final judgment. Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002). 10 1 2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is DENIED. 3 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill September 24, 2015 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.